Mining for Change by Page, John & Tarp, Finn

OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 11/01/20, SPi
Mining for Change
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 11/01/20, SPi
UNU World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER) was 
established by the United Nations University as its first research and training centre 
and started work in Helsinki, Finland, in 1985. The mandate of the institute is to 
undertake applied research and policy analysis on structural changes affecting 
developing and transitional economies, to provide a forum for the advocacy of 
policies leading to robust, equitable, and environmentally sustainable growth, and to 
promote capacity strengthening and training in the field of economic and social 
policymaking. Its work is carried out by staff researchers and visiting scholars in 
Helsinki and via networks of collaborating scholars and institutions around the world.
United Nations University World Institute for 
Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER)
Katajanokanlaituri 6B, 00160 Helsinki, Finland
www.wider.unu.edu
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 11/01/20, SPi
Mining for Change
Natural Resources and Industry in Africa
Edited by
JOHN PAGE AND FINN TARP
A study prepared by the United Nations University World Institute 
for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER)
1
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 11/01/20, SPi
1
Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP,
United Kingdom
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford.
It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship,
and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of
Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries
© United Nations University World Institute for  
Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER) 2020
World Institute for Development Economics Research of the United Nations University (UNU-WIDER), 
Katajanokanlaituri 6B, 00160 Helsinki, Finland
The moral rights of the authors have been asserted
First Edition published in 2020
Impression: 1
Some rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in
a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, for commercial purposes
without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by
law, by licence or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organization.
This is an open access publication. Except where otherwise noted, this work is distributed under the terms of 
a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-Share Alike 3.0 IGO licence (CC BY-NC-SA 3.0 IGO), 
a copy of which is available at https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/igo/.
Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of this licence 
should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above
Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press
198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
Data available
Library of Congress Control Number: 2019947626
ISBN 978–0–19–885117–2
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198851172.003.0001
Printed and bound in Great Britain by
Clays Ltd, Elcograf S.p.A.
Links to third party websites are provided by Oxford in good faith and
for information only. Oxford disclaims any responsibility for the materials
contained in any third party website referenced in this work.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 11/01/20, SPi
Foreword
Africa is a region richly endowed with natural resources. More new discoveries in 
previously non-resource-abundant economies increase the prospect that a grow-
ing number of African countries will become resource exporters in the future. 
The sustainable exploitation of natural resources is a tremendous opportunity, but 
it is also one that carries considerable risks. To effectively manage the natural 
resource booms, and the vast revenues generated, will depend in large measure 
upon the critical choices that governments make as they put in place the institu-
tions, policies, and public investments needed for successful structural trans-
form ation, economic growth, and job creation.
To focus on how better management of revenues and opportunities associated 
with natural resource discoveries could be used to accelerate diversification and 
structural change in low-income economies, in 2017 UNU-WIDER and the 
Brookings Institution launched a large collaborative research project—Natural 
Resources, Structural Change, and Industry in Africa—bringing in some of the 
field’s most experienced researchers. This book before the reader is the distillation 
of that in-depth research work.
I hereby express my sincere gratitude to the book’s editors, John Page and Finn 
Tarp, for their project leadership, and sound analytical and editorial skills. And to 
the book’s many contributors for sharing their research expertise with us, the 
readers, on what is a hugely important area which holds so much promise for so 
many people.
UNU-WIDER gratefully acknowledges the support and financial contribu-
tions to its research programme by the governments of Finland, Sweden, and the 
United Kingdom. Without this vital funding our research and policy advisory 
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The twin concerns of ‘jobless growth’ and slow poverty reduction are central 
 challenges on the policy agenda in Africa. Poverty in Africa continues to be high; 
and the region has the lowest responsiveness of poverty to per capita income 
growth of any of the world’s developing regions. In response, and as part of its 
2014–18 work programme, UNU-WIDER pursued an ambitious set of research 
activities together with the Brookings Institution to address these issues. While a 
key question addressed up-front was ‘Why is there so little industry in Africa?’ 
the research went far beyond this starting point, aiming to broaden our under-
standing of the structural transformation challenge in Africa, link it to issues of 
employment creation and poverty reduction in a more systematic way, and 
provide practical guidance for policymakers.
A recent blog on the ins and outs of African industrialization contains a useful 
overview and an entry point to the results of almost a decade of work in this 
area.1 In the blog, the reader will find both a summary overview of the many 
varied outputs we have produced in collaboration with a vast number of col-
leagues to whom we owe an enormous debt for their intellectual advice and 
many-faceted professional input to our joint work in the difficult nexus of policy, 
research, and practice. Links are also available in the blog to a wealth of open 
access material and information about associated activities including lectures, 
conferences, etc.
This book Mining for Change: Natural Resources and Industry in Africa—
focused on the risks and opportunities natural resources offer African countries 
wishing to industrialize—is the last output in the series. We would like to express 
our most sincere gratitude to the chapter authors for their willingness to partici-
pate in this project and for their many insightful contributions. Warm thanks are 
also due to UNU-WIDER and Brookings as well as their respective staff for insti-
tutional support and never-failing collaboration.
We wish in particular to thank Lorraine Telfer-Taivainen, UNU-WIDER 
 editorial and publishing associate, for advice, hard work, and making the col -
labor ation with Oxford University Press run smoothly. Adam Swallow, econom-
ics and finance commissioning editor at Oxford University Press, and his 
colleagues provided expert guidance with the publication process, and we do 
1 See https://www.wider.unu.edu/publication/ins-and-outs-african-industrialization
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1. Introduction
For a growing number of countries in Africa the discovery and exploitation of 
natural resources is a great opportunity. It is also an opportunity accompanied by 
considerable risks. There is an extensive cross-country literature linking natural 
resource dependence to poor economic performance, known as the ‘resource 
curse’.1 Several important oil exporters—Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Qatar, and 
Venezuela—have experienced negative growth during the last few decades, and 
OPEC saw a decline in GNP per capita. In Africa, countries dependent on oil, gas, 
and mining have tended to have weaker long-run growth, higher rates of poverty, 
and greater income inequality than less resource-dependent economies.2
One significant risk is the structure of resource-rich economies themselves. 
Relative prices tend to make it more difficult to diversify into internationally 
competitive activities outside the resource sector, limiting the scope for structural 
change. In 2017, the Brookings Institution and UNU-WIDER launched a joint 
research project, Natural Resources, Structural Change and Industry in Africa. 
While a great deal of literature is available on the issues of transparency and 
accountability in the management of resource revenues, our interest was further 
up- and downstream.3 We were particularly interested in how better management 
of the revenues and opportunities associated with natural resource discoveries 
could be used to accelerate diversification and structural change in a low-income 
economy.
This book presents the results of that research, structured in three main parts. 
Part I presents three essays that survey key themes—managing the boom, the 
construction sector, and linking industry to the resource. We chose these three 
topics because they are at the centre of the debate on how to use natural resources 
for structural change. Relative prices make it more difficult for resource-rich 
economies to diversify into tradable activities, but natural resources also generate 
1 See Gelb (1988); Sachs and Warner (1995); Gylfason et al. (1999); Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian 
(2003). Van der Ploeg (2011) gives a survey.
2 See Eifert, Gelb and Tallroth (2003); Arbache and Page (2009).
3 For a survey of good practices in transparency and accountability, see the Natural Resources 
Charter at (https://resourcegovernance.org/approach/natural-resource-charter).
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public revenues. For structural change to succeed, governments must make 
critical choices about how these revenues are spent. Managing the boom addresses 
the policies and institutions needed for public revenue management in a resource-
abundant economy.
The construction sector determines the extent to which investment effort 
results in investment outcomes, and, thus, the capacity of the economy to realize 
growth-promoting investments. High construction costs reduce the amount of 
physical capital obtained from the investment budget, and they can bias project 
selection away from investments in higher cost sectors. In addition, high con-
struction costs reduce the number of projects carried out in a given sector, lower-
ing the ability of construction firms in the sector to expand.
Since the 2009 publication of the African Mining Vision, many African gov-
ernments have viewed diversification through the lens of local content. Local 
content legislation often requires resource investors to create national employ-
ment opportunities, procure from local suppliers, open equity to local partners, 
and encourage technology transfer. However, success in linking domestic firms to 
the natural resources sector depends on more than legislation. It requires putting 
the institutional framework in place to forge a successful public–private partner-
ship between government, local firms, and the extractive industry.
Part II consists of fifteen chapters on five African countries, covering the 
same three issues as the chapters in Part  I.  Four of these countries—Ghana, 
Mozambique, Uganda, and Tanzania—are dealing with newly discovered hydro-
carbon resources. The fifth, Zambia, has a much longer history of natural resource 
dependence. While the country-level studies show a great diversity of approaches 
and experience, there are also some common threads. Among these is a tendency 
to overestimate the size of the potential resource boom and underestimate the 
time it takes for revenue to come on line. Construction is constrained by a lack of 
capable African firms, the cost and quality of inputs, lack of skilled technicians 
and artisans, and lack of access to finance. Local content initiatives have been 
more successful in promoting local ownership and employment than in linking 
industry to the resource. Local procurement regulations have met with mixed 
results for several reasons, including the scarcity of small and medium enterprises 
capable of meeting industry quality and price standards.
Part III sets out some policy implications of the research. It contains our con-
cluding chapter on the role of public policy in supporting structural change in 
resource-abundant economies. We first address policies directed at the three 
themes that guided our research—managing the boom, the construction sector, 
and linking industry to the resource. We then propose some ideas for widening 
the options for structural change, including policy and institutional reforms to 
deal with Dutch disease, widening the perspective from industrialization to 
‘industries without smokestacks’, and investing in knowledge.
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2. Resource abundance, risk, and diversification
For the majority of resource-rich economies in Africa, economic structure matters 
for at least two reasons. The first is that countries whose exports are concentrated 
in one or two natural resources are vulnerable to significant risks of declining 
commodity prices and volatility. The second is that there is persuasive evidence 
that what an economy produces and exports matters for its long-term growth.4
2.1 Commodity prices and volatility
Concentration of output and exports in one or two commodities can expose 
resource-rich economies to long-run declines in commodity prices and price vola-
tility. Global GDP growth has consistently outpaced the demand for commod-
ities, and commodity prices are likely to continue their gradual downward path 
relative to manufactured goods and knowledge-intensive services. Long-term 
estimates of the rate of decline vary from –0.6 to –2.3 per cent per year. The 
reasons for this secular decline have been widely explored. They include low 
demand elasticities for primary commodities relative to manufactures and ser-
vices, growth of substitutes, and rapid technological advances that have reduced 
the cost of extracting commodities (Dadush 2010).
Independently of their long-term trend, commodity prices are also likely to 
remain highly volatile. van der Ploeg and Poelhekke (2009) argue that volatility is 
a quintessential feature of the resource curse. The reasons for high volatility of 
commodity prices have also been widely discussed. They include low short-term 
income and price elasticities of demand and supply, long lead times before 
investment and supply respond to changing demand conditions, weather shocks, 
and policy-induced distortions that impede the orderly adjustment of commodity 
markets (Dadush 2010).
Historical data suggest that external shocks are especially important determin-
ants of growth in resource-rich countries (Collier and Goderis 2007). While output 
variability in general is declining among African countries, the relative import-
ance of external shocks as sources of output instability has increased in the past 
twenty years. Because of Africa’s marked improvement in economic management, 
internal shocks—including conflicts and policy instability—have declined sub-
stantially. At the same time, there has been a relative increase in the vulnerability 
of output to external shocks, such as price volatility (Raddatz 2008).
4 See for example, Haussmann, Hwang, and Rodrik (2007); UNIDO (2009).
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The defence against volatility is diversification. Economic diversification can 
increase the resilience of countries to external shocks (Haddad et al. 2013). Both 
export and output diversification are associated with lower output volatility. The 
effect is manifest in low-income countries, where output volatility diminishes by 
0.5 percentage points in the wake of diversification spurts. The effect of diversifi-
cation on output volatility is primarily caused by a more evenly balanced export 
basket. This remains true even in countries that are more open to international 
trade, as measured by the ratio of exports and imports to GDP (IMF 2014).
2.2 Resource abundance and structural change
Income from resource extraction increases the demand for all goods. In the case 
of traded goods and services, imports at international prices can satisfy increased 
demand. On the other hand, rising marginal costs usually characterize the pro-
duction of non-tradable goods, and their price will generally increase relative to 
internationally traded goods. The foreign exchange market reflects this in a real 
exchange rate appreciation. Because of these relative price changes, diversification 
into tradable goods production outside the resource sector is difficult, even with 
prudent management of overall spending. This is the ‘Dutch disease’, and it can 
limit the potential range of industries and services in which a resource-abundant 
economy is internationally competitive.
In the early stages of development, structural change links closely with diversifica-
tion. Because most low-income countries are largely specialized in a narrow range 
of agricultural and other resource-based activities, structural change through 
reallocation of resources involves diversification into a more balanced production 
structure (IMF 2014). In Africa’s resource-abundant economies, production and 
exports are highly concentrated and—apart from growth of non-traded services—
there is little evidence of structural change. As a result, the shares of agriculture 
and manufacturing in GDP are lower in the resource-rich economies than in 
middle-income benchmarks, and the manufacturing deficit is particularly large 
(Table 1.1). Other industry, mainly extractives, dominates the structure of output 
but not employment. Mines and gas fields do not generate many direct jobs.
Three quarters of the exports of Africa’s resource-rich countries are in less 
than three sectors (UNCTAD 2016). This strong export concentration limits the 
potential for growth-enhancing structural change. Low-income countries with a 
more diversified export base experienced more rapid structural change over the 
period 1990–2010, and sectoral reallocations of resources tended to be more 
productivity enhancing. Moreover, diversified exporters experienced higher aver-
























Table 1.1 Structural characteristics of Africa’s resource-abundant economies
 Value Added Share Labour Share
 Agriculture Other Industry Manufacturing Services Agriculture Other Industry Manufacturing Services
Upper middle-income benchmark 7.0 10.3 30.0 52.7 14.0 10.0 19.0 57.0
Lower middle-income benchmark 21.7 12.2 21.9 44.2 45.2 6.6 11.6 36.6
Africa resource-abundant 17.8 44.3 16.8 21.1 45.4 4.8 6.5 43.4
Africa low-income 27.8 11.8 11.1 49.3 63.1 5.1 6.6 25.2
Notes: Angola, Botswana, Cameroon, Republic of Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, and 
Zambia classified as resource-rich middle-income countries (World Bank 2012).
We constructed the benchmark economies by identifying a group of currently middle-income countries at the time at which they crossed the World Bank GNI threshold 
for middle income. The economic structure of the benchmark is simply the average of the shares of value added and employment in four broad sectors—agriculture, 
manufacturing, other industry, and services—in the benchmark year, for the following countries: China (2000), India (2007), Indonesia (2004), Korea (1968), Malaysia 
(1968), Philippines (1976), and Thailand (1987).
Sources: World Bank WDI database 2018; de Vries, Timmer, and de Vries (2013). Authors’ calculations.
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2.3 Implications for long-run growth
Growth and diversification correlate, although the relationship displays considerable 
cross-country heterogeneity. Initial diversification is on average positively associated 
with subsequent growth. The size of the growth boost associated with export 
and output diversification is economically significant. A one standard deviation 
increase in export product diversification in low-income countries raises their 
growth rate by about 0.8 percentage points. Similarly, a one standard deviation 
increase in output diversification raises the average annual growth rate by about 
1.4 percentage points. In addition, large increases in diversification are associated 
with subsequent growth accelerations (IMF 2014).
One reason why diversity matters for growth is that diverse economies appear 
to be better able to take advantage of opportunities in global markets, as they 
emerge. Cross-country evidence suggests that output diversification leads to export 
diversification.5 This is consistent with the idea that economies build competence 
and then enter global markets in more complex and sophisticated products. 
Empirical studies (Haussmann, Hwang, and Rodrik  2007; UNIDO  2009) have 
found that there is a strong, positive relationship between the level of sophistication 
of a country’s exports and its subsequent growth.6 Another reason why diversity 
spurs growth is that a wide range of activities provides a broad basis for the 
entry  and exit of firms, and this ‘churning’ raises economy-wide productivity 
(Syverson 2011).
3. Understanding the boom
While the relative price changes that accompany natural resource extraction are 
unavoidable, public policy can mitigate them. Tradable goods production will 
expand or contract according to whether it is internationally competitive. 
This  depends partly on the exchange rate and partly on the investments and 
institutional innovations that governments make to enhance competitiveness. 
Understanding the size and timing of the boom and putting in place the policies 
and institutional structures needed to manage resource revenues and public 
investments are essential first steps to support structural change in resource rich 
economies.
5 See Imbs and Wacziarg (2003) and Cadot, Carrere, and Strauss-Kahn (2011).
6 This research measures the degree of sophistication of a product or export based on the per capita 
incomes of the countries that ‘intensively’ export it. If mostly high-income countries export a product, 
the associated income level is high, and the classification of the product is sophisticated. Measured in 
this way, sophistication directly reflects higher productivity—firms that export goods characteristic of 
richer economies must have productivity levels greater than would be predicted from their host coun-
try level of income.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 11/01/20, SPi
Page and Tarp 7
3.1 How much revenue and when?
The early questions posed by a natural resource discovery are mostly questions of 
public financial management. In chapter 2, Mark Henstridge argues that the first 
questions should be how big is the revenue boom likely to be and when will rev-
enue come on line? These are often the questions least well understood by politi-
cians and the public. Sometimes it can take a decade or more to take the steps that 
move an economy from the discovery of a new mineral deposit to a point where 
there is material mineral revenue showing up in the public finances.
Henstridge points out that in addition to uncertainty about the size and timing 
of the revenue flow, resource revenues can be highly volatile. Even if prices are 
stable and production volumes constant, revenues will often change from year to 
year. This is because the relationship between the value of production and the 
revenue associated with it can change as the fiscal regime accommodates a phase 
of cost recovery, or the capital allowances carried forward change, or the interest 
cost of finance changes. In Tanzania, for example, the central projection of revenue 
from the possible LNG project varies each year, even though the price assump-
tion is constant and the assumption of volumes of production after a ramp-up 
phase is flat through to a period of decline.
The experiences of Ghana, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Uganda show that in 
general the size of the boom is overestimated and the delay in receiving revenues 
is underestimated. There has been almost no public discussion of the possible 
volatility of revenues to the treasury, in part because of lack of transparency 
regarding the terms of extraction agreements between the foreign investor and 
the government. This has frequently led to a great deal of confusion about the 
projected revenues, and at times suspicion of corruption.
Ghana experienced difficulties controlling fiscal expenditures in the face of 
optimistic revenue projections. In chapter 5, Ernest Aryeetey and Ishmael Ackah 
point out that in 2009 the World Bank estimated that Ghana would earn US$20 
billion in the period 2012–30 from oil production from its Jubilee field. In reality, 
petroleum has contributed less than 10 per cent to government revenue, aver-
aging about 7.5 per cent for the first five years of oil production.
Writing in chapter  8, Alan Roe argues that in Mozambique inflated expect-
ations about the availability and timing of future public revenues following the 
large hydrocarbon finds offshore in Cabo Delgado Province led to a debt crisis. 
The government contracted very large external loans to public companies and 
government-linked organizations on the assumption that Mozambique would 
quickly become a global gas exporter. Projections of future government revenues—
including by the IMF—had assumed that development of the field would proceed 
quickly and used informed guesses of what the negotiated terms and cost struc-
tures might be. In fact, the timelines for the LNG projects were delayed several 
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times, and the most recent projections assume that additional resource revenues 
will not flow before 2023 at the earliest.
In chapter  11, Mark Henstridge projects that in Tanzania the revenue stream 
will peak in 2040 at about 1.9 per cent of GDP or US$54 per person, if production 
of gas starts in 2021. Writing in chapter 14, Sebastian Wolf and Vishal Potluri pro-
ject oil revenues in Uganda to begin in 2021 with peak revenue between 2025 and 
2028. In per capita terms, they project revenues of up to US$83 at peak oil extrac-
tion and US$38 on average over thirty-three years. As a percentage of non-oil 
GDP, the oil revenue would be 13 per cent at peak and 6 per cent on average. In 
both cases the likely size and timing of the windfall suggests that it will not be 
large enough to be transformative.
Zambia is a country with a long history of copper mining, and a mixed history of 
managing copper revenues. In 2018 it found itself facing a bullish price outlook for 
copper and other commodities (notably cobalt). In chapter 17, Robert Liebenthal 
and Caesar Cheelo observe that the range of possible public revenue outcomes is 
large, and some projections do not forecast a significant increase in public 
 revenues. Despite this uncertainty, fiscal balances in Zambia have deteriorated, as 
deficits have grown since 2014.
3.2 Save or spend?
Prudent public revenue management requires establishing how much public 
spending should increase and how much to save before resource revenues begin 
to accrue to the treasury. Sustainable development depends on converting rents 
from resource extraction into other sources of income. Accordingly, it is necessary 
to save and invest some revenue. In chapter 2, Henstridge argues that the widely 
used rules governing saving from non-renewable resources—such as those implied 
by the permanent income hypothesis, or the ‘bird-in-hand’ rule—tend to place 
excessive weight on the welfare of future generations and encourage the accumula-
tion of foreign assets.
In a poor, capital-scarce economy he observes, this is inappropriate for two 
reasons. First, it is likely that future generations will be richer, making it reasonable 
for government to use a portion of the oil windfall to increase the  consumption of 
today’s poor.7 Second, the returns to domestic investment in a capital-scarce 
economy should exceed those offered by foreign assets (Collier, van der Ploeg, 
Spence, and Venables 2010). Henstridge offers one very important qualification to 
this judgement: provided funds are well invested.
7 Indeed, one strand of the literature argues for the direct distribution of a share of oil revenues to 
citizens (Gelb and Majerowicz 2011).
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3.3 Paying it forward: debt financing
The country studies reveal a new wrinkle in public expenditure management in 
emerging resource-exporters: some countries have responded to the news of a 
resource windfall by increasing public expenditure and accumulating debt well 
ahead of the income coming on stream. Ghana’s external debt to GDP ratio 
increased from 37 per cent in 2009 to 50 per cent in 2016. Mozambique’s debt to 
GDP ratio shot up from around 40 per cent in 2012 to now around 130 per cent. 
Heavy international and domestic borrowing has driven up public debt, and the 
government issued public guarantees of loans amounting to US$2.3 billion (about 
20 per cent of GDP) beginning in 2013. Public payments arrears have also become 
a problem. In Zambia, the public debt stock rose from 36 per cent of GDP in 2014 
to 62 per cent in 2015, and the IMF predicts that it will reach 72 per cent of GDP 
by 2023. Both Mozambique and Zambia are classified by the IMF as at risk of 
debt distress. Ghana’s medium-term debt trajectories have worsened, and gross 
financing needs are likely to remain elevated in the near term. As Alan Roe points 
out in chapter 8, any increased borrowing still needs to be cognizant of both the 
fiscal productivity of the extra spending—how much extra tax revenue it will gen-
erate and how quickly—and of the additional debt service in the period before the 
large expected extractive revenues actually accrue. Significant additional fiscal 
slippages could seriously jeopardize debt sustainability in all three countries.
In contrast, Tanzania and Uganda have successfully resisted the temptation to 
front-load public expenditures. In Tanzania, total public and publicly guaranteed 
debt was 36.2 per cent of GDP at end-2015/16. Although the share of commercial 
financing has increased to about 30 per cent, official bilateral and multilateral 
creditors continue to be the major financiers, accounting for more than two thirds 
of external debt at end-2015/16. Uganda’s external debt was about 21 per cent of 
GDP in 2016. Although scaling-up of investment spending has increased fiscal 
pressure, revenue collection strengthened significantly over the last few years, 
albeit from a low base. Domestic debt is low. Public and publicly guaranteed debt 
is mostly concessional multilateral debt, and Uganda has made no effort to tap 
external private debt markets. The government plans to increase its debt stock 
further to 47.8 per cent by 2022 and expects future oil revenues to play an import-
ant medium-term role in debt management.
3.4 Setting the rules
Ironically, a long lead-time before revenues begin to flow—while it increases 
pressures to borrow and spend—can be beneficial to resource exporters. 
Countries with new discoveries have a window of opportunity to make decisions 
about savings rules and public expenditures and lock them in before pressures to 
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spend become irresistible. Henstridge reminds us that recognizing volatility matters 
as well, because it makes building a budget and managing fiscal and monetary 
policy harder. Ghana provides both a model of how governments can use this 
space to establish the institutional framework needed and a cautionary tale of 
how pressures to spend can undermine their efforts. Ghana’s Petroleum Revenue 
Management Act 2011 together with its 2015 amendment were intended to estab-
lish the highest international standards of transparency and good governance in 
the management of petroleum revenue and savings. The law established processes 
for the collection, expenditure, investment, and accountability for the use of oil 
revenues, and a new Public Interest and Accountability Committee was set up to 
oversee the management of petroleum revenues.
Under the Act, the budget should receive 70 per cent or less of expected petrol-
eum revenues based on a seven-year moving average price. The intention is that 
the residual is deposited in two institutions, the Ghana Stabilization Fund, 
designed to cushion government expenditure when there is a petroleum revenue 
shortfall and the Ghana Heritage Fund, a fund for future generations. Aryeetey 
and Ackah point out that weak fiscal management means that the rules are not 
followed. Successive finance ministers have used their power to ‘cap’ the 
Stabilization Fund and use the revenues released for debt service. This has led to 
the depletion of the Stabilization Fund to less than 20 per cent of its estimated 
value and rendered it incapable of smoothing government expenditure in case of 
oil revenue shortfalls.8
In Uganda, the five-year period after 2010 saw a substantial slow-down in 
activity in the oil sector. Wolf and Potluri note in chapter 14 that the government 
used the time to develop a more solid policy and legal framework for the oil sec-
tor. The Public Finance Management Act of 2015 included provisions for the 
management of oil resources and created a Petroleum Fund. Withdrawals from 
the fund support the annual budget, via transfers into the consolidated fund or 
investments in the Petroleum Revenue Investment Reserve, designed to be a sov-
ereign wealth fund holding assets abroad. Appropriations to the reserve need 
authorization from parliament. The Medium-Term Budget Framework is required 
to outline expenditure priorities and clearly indicate expected annual withdraw-
als. The government has adopted the non-oil, non-grant deficit as a fiscal anchor, 
and every new parliament sets the deficit limit. While this allows government to 
react to unforeseen circumstances, it ties the fiscal rule to the political cycle. 
When a new government comes into power, the temptation to tap into the 
Investment Reserve fund to finance quick achievements is great.
8 See chapter 5.
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3.5 The quality of public spending
The country studies suggest that two factors often undermine the quality of pub-
lic spending out of resource revenues. These are the quality of project appraisal 
and selection and the budgeting of the recurrent costs of maintenance. In all the 
country cases, institutional structures and rules designed to address these issues 
appear to have been only partially successful.
In Ghana, the Petroleum Revenue Management Act lists several priority 
areas—agriculture, education, health, roads, alternative energy, security, potable 
water, sanitation, and environmental protection—in which the government can 
invest oil revenues. The minister of finance was to prioritize not more than four 
areas for the medium-term investment programme. Aryeetey and Ackah note 
that oil revenues were in practice spread over a wide range of projects outside the 
priority areas, leading to cost and time overruns. When the priority areas were set 
at five in 2018, a new challenge emerged, the need to ‘prioritize within priority 
expenditures’. When government selects a priority area like agriculture, it is pos-
sible to spend funds for irrigation, fertilizer subsidies, seeds, agriculture training 
and extension, but there is no clear guidance as to how priorities among these are 
to be established.
Roe observes in chapter 8 that Mozambique’s recent poor record of debt man-
agement and growth reflects in part the consequences of three failures of 
 decision-making in public investment. These were a failure to select public 
investments by reference to sound economic criteria, a systematic tendency to 
use overly optimistic predictions of prices, costs, and impacts, and a serious lack 
of information at the time of implementation on the likely rates of return on 
investments and their impact.
Liebenthal and Cheelo report that currently there is no public investment 
management system in place in Zambia.9 Although a Public Investment Planning 
Department has been established in the Ministry of National Development and 
Planning, it lacks authorizing legislation and capacity. No formal system for pro-
ject identification, screening, or appraisal is in place, and economic analysis of 
proposed major investments is not undertaken. They conclude that mining rev-
enues are likely to be pooled with other revenues towards honouring the public 
wage bill, interest payments on debt, and payments of arrears.
Frequently governments make public investments without adequate provision 
in the budget for recurrent costs of maintenance. On average about 30 per cent of 
the infrastructure assets of a typical African country needs rehabilitation 
(Briceño-Garmendia et al. 2008). This reflects a legacy of underfunding for infra-
structure maintenance, and over time represents a major waste of resources, since 
9 See chapter 17.
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the cost of rehabilitating infrastructure assets is several times higher than the 
cumulative cost of sound preventive maintenance. In the roads sector, for 
example, many countries fail to cover basic maintenance and rehabilitation needs 
and find themselves in a downward spiral with respect to road quality.
Lack of adequate provision for maintenance is especially dangerous in the case 
of spending out of resource revenues. Poor maintenance can seriously degrade 
the returns to investments, but investments in the domestic economy must offer 
higher returns than foreign assets, if they are to meet the investment rule. Some 
reallocation of resources from investment to maintenance merit consideration, 
particularly in countries that show low levels of maintenance expenditure. 
Liebenthal and Cheelo argue that in Zambia, multi-year budgeting of investment 
projects and protection of funding is not taken seriously and no standardized 
procedures are in place for project monitoring. They argue that maintenance of 
existing assets deserves a higher priority than much new construction.
Uganda was one of the early adopters of the Medium-Term Expenditure 
Framework, which in principle should accommodate better planning of mainten-
ance expenditures. In practice, it has been less successful. Uganda established a Road 
Fund in 2010 with the mandate of funding maintenance on all roads. Despite the 
Fund, adequate resources are not devoted to routine and periodic maintenance of 
the main road networks. In fact, Uganda is one of the countries in Africa that has 
the largest divergence between actual and required spending on road mainten-
ance (Ranganathan and Foster 2012).
4. The construction sector
Investing resource revenues requires public expenditures that transform resources 
‘below the ground’ into physical assets ‘above the ground’. The construction sector 
is central to this process. Writing in chapter  3, Martina Kirchbirger argues that 
construction determines the ability to transform investment effort into investment 
outcomes in at least three ways. First, higher construction costs decrease the 
amount of infrastructure a country can afford for a given investment budget and 
tend to reduce maintenance expenditures and the lifespan of assets. Second, higher 
costs may affect project selection. If a minimum rate of return criteria is relied on 
to select projects, high construction costs will decrease the likelihood of choosing 
a project in a high cost sector. If construction costs differ systematically by sector, 
this will affect the composition of public spending. Third, there are important 
potential feedback effects. High construction costs can reduce the number of pro-
jects implemented in a given sector. Because contractors must often prove that 
they have experience in handling similar projects in the past, this restricts the type 
of contracts that a given firm can take on, limiting its ability to expand.
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Because of the diversity of construction activities, cross-country evidence on 
the impact of higher construction costs on investment outcomes is limited. There 
is, however, evidence from a large sample of countries that higher construction 
costs are significantly associated with poorer road infrastructure. A 10 per cent 
increase in unit road-construction costs, for example, is associated with a 
 country-level reduction of 0.7 per cent in the kilometres of paved roads per 
person and a 0.4-point reduction in the quality of the trade- and transport-related 
infrastructure index component of the World Bank Logistics Performance Index 
(Collier, Kirchberger, and Söderbom 2016).
In addition to its role in determining the efficiency of public investment, 
 construction has an important direct link to the natural resource sector itself. 
The construction phase of a resource project begins once a contractor makes 
what is widely known as a ‘final investment decision’ (FID). Oil and gas projects 
differ from mining in terms of their level and sequencing of demands on the 
construction sector. Henstridge notes that the construction phase of an oil and 
gas project is when the big capital investment takes place. In oil and gas, this can 
amount to several billion dollars, much of which might be offshore. In mining, 
capital expenditure is lower in the construction stage, but it will often continue 
during the life of the project. In both cases, some of the capital investment is on 
highly specialized precision engineering, while other components of these pro-
jects are construction activities such as bricklaying, carpentry, metal works, 
plumbing, and electrical. The extent to which the domestic economy can benefit 
from the construction phase depends on the capacity of the sector to respond in 
terms of price and quality to the standards of the natural resource investors.
4.1 Construction costs
Kirchbirger argues that measuring the cost of construction across countries is dif-
ficult for several reasons. The construction sector produces highly differentiated 
outputs, such as roads, buildings, and bridges, making direct comparisons diffi-
cult. Different types of construction methods may also lead to very different unit 
costs. Evidence on construction costs in our case-study countries varies substan-
tially, reflecting differences in project selection, market structure, origin of sup-
plying firms, and bidding procedures.
In chapter  12, Geraldine Kikwasi and Cecilia Escalante observe that foreign 
contractors carry out most large-scale construction in Tanzania. Local Tanzanian 
contractors have a market share of just 33 per cent against 67 per cent for 
 foreign contractors. While this poses problems from the point of view of capability 
building in the domestic construction sector, it means that the supply price of con-
struction services on major public investment projects is less sensitive to domestic 
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supply constraints.10 Caesar Cheelo and Robert Liebenthal, writing in chapter 18, 
argue that while entry barriers in road construction, civil works, and mining are 
moderate in Zambia, the sector is highly concentrated and comprised of a set of 
oligopolies across the differentiated construction product groups. Information 
asymmetries offer significant possibilities for collusion, raising bid prices. In 
Uganda, Emanuele Colonnelli and Nicole Ntungire report that construction costs, 
particularly for civil works and non-residential buildings, have outpaced overall 
inflation significantly and appear to be accelerating. Although prices for the 
construction sector as a whole fell by 0.4 per cent between December 2016 and 
December 2017 (dampened by a slump in residential housing prices), prices for 
civil works rose by 3.1 per cent, reflecting the surge in public investment.11
Where construction inputs are largely imported, or foreign firms dominate the 
industry, costs are subject to macroeconomic shocks. In chapter 6, Nkechie Owoo 
and Monica Lambon-Quayefio point to exchange rate volatility as a major source 
of price shocks in Ghana’s construction sector. Heavy dependence on imported 
raw materials such as high-tensile steel and skilled and expatriate labour leads to 
higher costs during periods of exchange rate depreciation. Cheelo and Liebenthal 
find similar macro-driven price shocks in Zambia, including the adverse business 
shocks and uncertainty associated with the local currency collapse from mid-2015 
through most of 2016.12
4.2 Firm capabilities in construction
Firm capabilities are the knowledge and working practices used by firms during 
production. Productivity is one dimension of capability. The other dimension is 
quality, which in construction embraces a much wider range of characteristics—
for example design, adherence to standards, and ability to bid—than the technical 
characteristics of the product itself. Productivity and quality depend in turn on 
the knowledge of the individuals, both managers and workers, who make up the 
firm (Sutton 2012).
Because capabilities are hard to codify they are difficult to measure. To under-
stand construction firm capabilities in Africa better, Kirchberger uses the World 
Bank major contracts award database which contains World Bank-financed 
prior-review contract awards from 2004–2018. She finds that sub-Saharan Africa 
lags other developing regions in supplying civil works to open bid contracts. 
Companies based outside the region supply about half of the contracts above 
US$2 million in sub-Saharan Africa, and regional suppliers carry out less than 
one third of contracts of at least US$50 million. Chinese and Indian firms have 
captured an increasing share of African contracts, while sub-Saharan African 
contractors are virtually inactive in other regions.
10 See chapter 12. 11 See chapter 15. 12 See chapter 18.
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Zhang and Gutman (2015) suggest that most African construction firms lack 
the minimum capabilities needed to succeed in competitive bidding processes. 
Asher, Kirchberger, and Novosad (2018), for example, show that about 30 per cent 
of bids submitted for road maintenance contracts in Tanzania are disqualified 
immediately. Failure to conform to the terms, conditions, and specifications 
stipulated in the bidding documents is the main reason for disqualification. The 
requirement to submit all documents in English is an important barrier for 
smaller contractors.
The country studies provide further evidence of limited firm capabilities. In 
Tanzania, for example, clients perceive that contractors lack qualified staff, exhibit 
poor knowledge of tendering procedures, and lack financial and project manage-
ment skills.13 In chapter 9, Antonio Cruz, Francisco Fernandes, Fausto Mafambissa, 
and Francisco Pereira identify lack of planning and management capacity as a 
major constraint to the growth of local construction firms in Mozambique. 
Specialized technical services for large projects—such as feasibility studies, inspec-
tions, surveys, laboratory tests, and quality control—must be imported.
In chapter 15, Colonnelli and Ntungire report the results of a survey of contrac-
tors in Uganda. The firms responding to the survey are relatively young. Sixty-five 
per cent of firms started operations after 2004 and only 10 per cent began oper-
ations before 2000. Interestingly, the majority of owners (62 per cent) also own or 
run an additional business. Most of the firms have some standard management 
practice in place, and close to 100 per cent of top managers regularly hold meet-
ings to discuss efficiency and quality expectations with their construction teams.
Zambia grades construction firms based on a mix of criteria, including the 
firm’s previous contracts, number of professional and technical staff, financial pos-
ition, and level of technology. The grading system is numeric from 1 to 6, with 1 as 
the highest grade and 6 the lowest. The majority (88 per cent) of firms in Zambia’s 
construction sector in 2017 were in grades 4–6. These lower graded firms were 
generally less successful in winning bids and invested less in modern construction 
methods, technology, and basic ICT than higher graded companies.14
4.3 Materials, skills, finance
If construction faces bottlenecks in production, any surge in demand may force 
up costs and prices. As the supply curve becomes less elastic, the same shift in 
demand leads to a smaller increase in the quantity produced at a higher price. A 
recurrent theme in the country studies is the extent to which access to material 
inputs, skilled labour—particularly in engineering, technical disciplines, and skilled 
artisans—and access to finance limit the ability of firms to expand production.
13 See chapter 12. 14 See chapter 18.
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Kikwasi and Escalante note that while the manufacturing of local construction 
materials such as cement, reinforcement steel, paints, concrete, and roofing 
materials has been increasing in Tanzania, quality is a challenge. Interviews with 
contractors and clients indicate that both perceive the high cost and low quality 
of construction materials, whether domestic or imported, as problems. Cruz, 
Fernandes, Mafambissa, and Pereira report that only about 15 per cent of the 
upstream construction value-chain originates in Mozambique. Local material 
inputs include floors, frames, doors and windows, tiles, roof tiles, cement and 
stones, and sand. All other upstream components are imported. Colonnelli and 
Ntungire observe that in Uganda 96 per cent of firms report checking the quality 
of materials before using them in production.15
In construction, bricklayers, welders, electricians, and plumbers are complemen-
tary to unskilled labour and capital. Lack of these skills can limit supply. In Ghana 
there is a current shortfall of 60,000 skilled artisans in the construction sector, 
and the gap is projected to increase to as many as 250,000 by 2020. Although there 
are large numbers of informal sector artisans and construction workers, they lack 
the skills and training required for modern construction projects. Lack of skilled 
labour similarly constrains the construction sector in Mozambique. Kikwasi and 
Escalante note that Tanzania has few engineering or architectural technicians and 
few skills at the middle management level. Most artisans lack formal training, 
including knowledge of basic construction theory and drawings. Drawing on 
their survey of contractors in Uganda, Colonnelli and Ntungire report that more 
than one out of three firms lack on-the-job training for new hires.16
In the case of hydrocarbons projects, the construction phase is the period of 
peak demand for a range of semi-skilled and skilled workers, such as construction 
workers, bricklayers, metalworkers, carpenters, plumbers, and electricians. In 
chapter  11, Henstridge estimates, for example, that the construction of LNG 
 facilities in Tanzania would directly create some 4,000–5,000 jobs. The country 
studies suggest that there is unlikely to be an elastic supply of such workers to fill 
this demand.
Lack of financing affects firms in the construction sector by making it difficult 
and costly to purchase or rent the equipment necessary to carry out a contract. 
As  Colonnelli and Ntungire point out, rental markets for equipment are often 
missing. In Ghana, the Real Estate Developers Association identifies lack of 
affordable credit to the residential construction industry as a factor contributing 
to the increasing cost of housing. In Mozambique, surveys of contracting firms 
identify limited access to credit as a major constraint, and in Tanzania contractors 
lack the capital to acquire operating equipment and plant.17
15 See chapters 6, 9, 12, 15. 16 See chapters 6, 9, 12, 15.
17 See chapters 6 and 9.
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In Uganda, Colonnelli and Ntungire find that lack of access to finance is 
especially acute for local construction firms. Rigidities in the domestic financial 
market and a lack of adequate collateral limit their ability to borrow. A survey of 
construction firms executing work on donor-financed road projects found that 
the typical amount of credit obtained by a foreign construction firm was twenty 
times larger than that obtained by a local construction firm. In Zambia, Cheelo 
and Liebenthal find that lower ranked firms in the national classification of con-
tractors face significant challenges with access to finance.18
5. Rowing against the current: local content
In Africa’s resource-abundant economies, production and exports are highly con-
centrated, and—apart from some non-traded services—there is little evidence of 
structural change. In addition, the extractive sectors in most sub-Saharan African 
countries have developed as enclaves. Local firms seldom make it to be suppliers 
and except for South Africa and Ghana, an indigenous service and supply sector 
for the mining industry has not developed to any significant extent. In response, 
as John Page notes in chapter  4, the African Heads of State and Government 
adopted the African Mining Vision (AMV) in 2009.
The Vision focused on the mining sector’s potential to help transform economies 
through more diversified growth, and governments in resource-abundant countries 
have adopted a wide range of ‘local content’ and ‘value addition’ initiatives in 
 pursuit of greater diversification. Local content regulations often require resource 
investors to expand national employment opportunities, procure from local sup-
pliers, open equity to local partners, and encourage technology transfer. ‘Value 
addition’ concentrates on downstream processing of the extracted resource and 
promotion of related industries.
Ghana’s local content and participation policy for oil and gas gives priority to 
Ghanaians in the award of oil blocks, oil field licenses, and in all projects award-
ing contracts in the oil and gas industry. In chapter 7, Charles Ackah and Asaah 
Mohammed note that Ghana also requires that all operators in the oil and gas 
industry must use goods and services made or sold in Ghana, as far as practic-
able. The policy further mandates that all petroleum operators provide training to 
Ghanaians in all aspects of petroleum sector technology and operations.
In chapter 10, Evelyn Dietsche and Ana Maria Esteves argue that in Mozambique, 
local content objectives are contained in a diverse range of policies, strategies, plans, 
laws, and regulations. Their objectives range from providing more short-term 
opportunities to local workers and enterprises to longer-term skills and enterprise 
18 See chapters 15 and 18.
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development. In addition, the government has chosen to interpret the term 
 ‘corporate social responsibility’ (CSR) broadly. The government’s Policy on 
Corporate Social Responsibility for the Mineral Resources and Extractive Industries 
promotes local content at the sub-national and community level.
In chapter 13, Mia Ellis and Margaret McMillan point out that mining regula-
tion in Tanzania has historically lacked specific instruments to promote local 
content. In 2017, however, the amended Mining Act started requiring that min-
eral right-holders give preference to goods produced or available in Tanzania, and 
to services provided by Tanzanian citizens or local companies. The 2015 Petroleum 
Act, the primary legislation governing the petroleum sector, contains require-
ments that license holders, contractors, and subcontractors give preference to 
goods produced or available in Tanzania and to services provided by Tanzanian 
citizens or companies.
Ritwika Sen reports in chapter 16, that the National Oil and Gas Policy in Uganda 
emphasizes expanding employment opportunities for citizens and supporting the 
development of national competencies to supply goods and services to the sector. 
In addition, the Production Sharing Agreements with licensed operators provide 
for the training and employment of suitably qualified Ugandans.
Efforts to increase local content have a long history in Zambia. The corner-
stone of Zambia’s post-independence development was its state-led import sub-
stitution industrialization strategy (ISI). In chapter  19, Wilfred Lombe points 
out that in practice, public ownership of the mines and protection from import 
competition produced a local content development strategy for the mining sector. 
At its peak, it featured manufacturing of mining inputs such as rubber products, 
chemicals, non-metallic minerals, and metals and machinery. Privatization of the 
mining industry significantly reduced the scope for local content development. The 
current Development Agreements with the mining companies allow imports of 
capital equipment free of customs and excise and do not oblige mine owners to 
purchase inputs from Zambian suppliers.
5.1 The political economy of local content
Political pressures to ‘localize’ the benefits of a natural resources discovery are a 
reality faced by all governments of resource-abundant economies. The country 
case studies highlight two broad areas in which these political pressures are present. 
The first is pressure for policies favouring local employment, investment, and 
 procurement along the extractives supply chain. These initiatives tend to reflect the 
interests of larger firms and more-skilled workers. The second emphasizes 
strengthening the link between the extractive sector and sub-national develop-
ment, especially the development of communities where extractives operations 
are located.
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Local content rules can be subject to abuse by ruling elites through awarding 
contracts, jobs, and opportunities to those supporting the ruling party or coalition. 
Ackah and Mohammed note that partisan politics has strongly influenced the 
Ghana Petroleum Commission—the body charged with implementing the local 
content initiative—since its establishment. Management and technical staff 
appointments to the Commission reflect party affiliation, and tenure in office 
depends on the tenure of the political party in power.19 Dietsche and Esteves con-
tend that the Mozambique government has a range of laws in place to ensure that 
political elites and politically connected domestic entrepreneurs benefit from 
existing local content requirements.20
In Tanzania, there are significant ties between politics and business, and there 
has been increasing concern that vested economic interests with ties to the ruling 
party will benefit from local content initiatives. The firms that participate in the 
extractive industries value chain are often relatively large, which means that benefits 
primarily accrue to a wealthier segment of the local population.21 In Zambia, the 
commonly held view is that while there is a proliferation of Zambians in labour-
intensive jobs this is not so in technical and managerial roles. Non-industry 
stakeholders, including civil-society organizations, do not believe there is any 
well-defined career path for Zambians in the mining industry, and there are con-
tinuing questions concerning the value and effectiveness of supplier development 
programmes.22
The sub-national dimension of development has become increasingly important 
for both host governments and the extractive industries themselves. Dietsche and 
Esteves note that in Mozambique, the political opposition is putting pressure on 
the government to devolve political power and promote local economic and social 
development. This pressure comes out in the recently approved Implemention 
Guide underpinning the government’s Policy on Corporate Social Responsibility 
for the Mineral Resources and Extractive Industries, which provides guidance to 
firms on supporting local economic development.23
Ackah and Mohammed describe how political pressures are building to address 
specific needs in affected communities in Ghana. Since the oil discovery, stake-
holders, such as community leaders and civil society, have called for a share of the 
benefits of the oil industry to be channelled directly to communities affected by oil 
production and related activities. The petroleum MNCs have responded to the 
pressure. For example, all the 140 unskilled and semi-skilled workers employed in 
the contract for site preparation for the Onshore Gas Receiving Facility came from 
eighteen affected communities nearby. Companies from the same communities 
supplied catering services, driving, and hospitality services.24
19 See chapter 7. 20 See chapter 10. 21 See chapter 13.
22 See chapter 19. 23 See chapter 10. 24 See chapter 7.
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5.2 Linking industry to the resource
The supply chains of multinational companies (MNCs) in resource extraction 
generally have a pyramid structure. The multinational company will have small 
number of lead subcontractors, many international and some local. Each lead 
subcontractor will then contract other companies to supply inputs. These are 
the so-called second-tier subcontractors or suppliers. The country studies indi-
cate that the MNCs and their first-tier suppliers often prefer to operate almost 
exclusively with foreign second-tier suppliers, due to the limited capabilities of 
domestic firms.
Ackah and Mohammed find that most Ghanaian companies are concentrated 
at the lower end of the petroleum supply chain, competing to provide services such 
as catering and hospitality, logistics, freight forwarding, and waste management. 
Two notable exceptions are in metal fabrication, where some indigenous Ghanaian 
companies are making impressive strides, and in the installation of subsea infra-
structure.25 Dietsche and Esteves suggest that two types of firms are attempting to 
enter the resource value chain in Mozambique. One group includes specialist 
firms that offer geological, laboratory, logistics, transport maintenance, and waste 
management services. These companies tend to be larger and their capabilities, 
while not at the level of certified suppliers, are sufficiently high that targeted sup-
plier development initiatives might be successful. The second group of firms—
composed primarily of micro enterprises selling catering services, office 
consumables, construction materials, camping equipment, chemicals, and HVAC 
equipment—lacks the capabilities to benefit from targeted interventions.26
Ellis and McMillan conclude that in Tanzania, the domestic industrial base can-
not compete effectively with global suppliers. Based on analysis of the Industrial 
Census they show that foreign and jointly owned firms spend significantly more 
on imported materials than on locally sourced materials and that average spending 
on services is much greater than average spending on materials. They identify the 
‘missing middle’—the small number of productive small and medium enterprises 
(SMEs) in manufacturing—as a major reason why the extractive companies have 
difficulty finding qualified local partners.27
Ritwika Sen uses unit record transaction data to map the network of domestic 
suppliers in Uganda’s natural resource value chain. She finds that although there 
is a population of local goods and service providers that sell to the sector, retail 
and wholesale services dominate these transactions, including the purchase of 
imported products such as motor vehicle parts and accessories, motor vehicles, 
and machinery. The manufacturing sector ranks second among suppliers, in terms 
of connections in the network (about 10 per cent of the total). A handful of manu-
facturing firms dominate the supplier network. These include manufacturers of 
25 See chapter 7. 26 See chapter 10. 27 See chapter 13.
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plastic products, fabricated metal products, batteries and accumulators, cement, 
and plaster and lime. She also finds that the accommodation and food service 
sector, and water supply, sewerage, and waste management are under-prepared to 
service the industry.28
Wilfred Lombe finds that lack of access to engineering expertise and produc-
tion technology and low-quality control standards limit backward linkages in 
Zambia. However, Zambia has had greater success in developing forward linkages 
to copper production. Copper exports are mostly in smelted and refined forms, 
representing several value-added stages beyond mining. Further downstream, one 
company has historically undertaken processing of refined copper into rods and 
wire, and reports state that a large Chinese investment has increased exports of 
semi-fabricates.29
6. Conclusions
Natural resources represent a major opportunity for Africa’s growing number of 
resource-abundant economies, and one accompanied by substantial risks. Success 
or failure in managing these risks largely depends on the investment of the rents 
from natural resource extraction. This fact places a burden on public financial 
management and public investment planning. The country studies show that some 
countries have responded to the news of a resource windfall by increasing public 
expenditure and accumulating debt. In addition, they have neglected two import-
ant areas of public expenditure management. The first is ensuring that the public 
investments selected are in fact sound. The second is making systematic provision 
in the budget for the recurrent costs of maintaining new assets. In chapter 20, we 
propose a set of institutional reforms designed to address these issues.
Investing resource revenues requires transforming resource rents into physical 
assets through public expenditures. The construction sector is central to this pro-
cess. The country studies point to several constraints to the expansion of con-
struction, beginning with a lack of capable African firms. Firms lack qualified 
staff, have poor knowledge of tendering procedures, and lack the financial man-
agement and project management skills needed to compete for major infrastruc-
ture projects. The cost and quality of material inputs, lack of skilled technicians 
and artisans, and limited access to finance also constrain the ability of construc-
tion firms to respond to demand increases. We address some initiatives needed to 
relieve these constraints in the concluding chapter.
Because they control access to the resource, governments can seek to integrate 
local suppliers into the resource value chain through local content and 
28 See chapter 16. 29 See chapter 19.
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value-addition initiatives. Our country studies indicate that these initiatives have 
not been uniformly successful. Most countries have had considerable success 
with the hiring and skilling-up of local labour. In contrast, local procurement ini-
tiatives have met with mixed results for several reasons, including the scarcity of 
small and medium enterprises capable of meeting industry quality and price 
standards in the procurement of goods and services. However, governments can 
take several initiatives to expand the options for diversification. We turn to those 
in chapter 20.
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A significant natural resource discovery creates excited popular expectations of 
imminent wealth. But those expectations run contrary to the conventional wisdom 
in social science that a resource boom confers a ‘curse’ on growth and development, 
with many people ending up worse off than they would otherwise have been. In 
general, the size of an anticipated boom is overestimated and the delay in receiving 
revenues is underestimated.
This chapter sets out a framework for thinking about the challenges presented 
by a natural resource boom. I first take stock of the sequencing, timing, and scale 
of the development of a natural resource endowment. I then review the ‘resource 
curse’ literature to set out the key challenges. The debate about the resource curse 
has run for decades. The last ten years has seen a closer focus on the variation of 
experience across resource-rich countries (Torvik 2009), rather than looking to 
explain the average experience of slower growth in resource-rich countries (Sachs 
and Warner 1995). Third, I look at some benchmarks of scale and timing so as to 
put some potential booms into the broader context of the challenges of growth 
and structural change in Africa. Finally, I gather together some observations on 
policy and institutional changes, which emerge from each section.
In sum, everything almost always takes longer than everybody at first thinks. 
The different counter-parties and interest groups then have dashed hopes. They also 
have different discount rates. Delay means that risks materialize as opportunities 
evaporate; that there are some potentially significant non-revenue dimensions to 
a resource boom means that a literature that revolves around the correlations of 
average effects of resource ‘intensity’, ‘abundance’, or ‘dependence’ is unlikely to 
provide any particular insight to the specific circumstances of any one resource-
rich economy. Each country that finds the opportunity of natural resources disap-
pointing does so in its own way. Equally, the path-dependence that early forms of 
regulation or rent-seeking can set up may condition the possibilities of prudent 
policy in the face of natural resource rents when they eventually arrive.
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2. Sequence and timing
The conceptual foundation for thinking about sequencing is the observation that 
a natural resource endowment is best defined as an asset. This is the basis for the 
framing in Venables (2016). More specifically, with oil, gas, or minerals the focus 
is on a natural resource that is extracted on a non-renewable basis, as opposed to 
the natural asset of fertile arable land which yields production—and this echoes a 
key premise of Humphreys et al. (2007).
A mineral deposit below the ground which is an asset is still an asset when it is 
extracted to be above the ground. It is still an asset when it is transformed from 
mineral to money through processing and sale.
Holding fast to conceptual clarity means that what we refer to as the produc-
tion of a mineral is actually a sequence of asset transformations. The labels ‘pro-
duction’ and ‘revenue’ imply a flow of output or income, when those transactions 
are principally steps in a transformation of an asset from one form to another.1 A 
sub-soil mineral asset is shifted to be above ground over time (‘production’). It 
remains an asset after processing and sale in exchange for money—a series of 
payments over time are a series of part-payments in the transformation of min-
eral into money (‘revenue’). Although the treatment in fiscal accounts shows 
these payments as revenue, conceptual fidelity would show them as asset transac-
tions below the line in financing.2 This financial asset should then finance public 
spending—in particular the public investment to create public capital goods, 
often most simply thought of as public infrastructure. So, mineral to money to 
public capital—a sequence of asset transformations.
However, somewhat inevitably, conceptual clarity gets messy in reality. Everything 
takes time; mineral production runs for decades. But it also takes time, some-
times a decade or more, to take the steps that move from the discovery of a new 
mineral deposit to a point where there is material mineral revenue showing up in 
the public finances. Setting out the steps in the chain of events that runs from 
exploration through to any accumulation of public capital assets helps make clear 
how much time matters to understanding the impact of a mineral sector on the 
economy, and the many interesting ways in which the opportunity of a conceptually 
clean and positive contribution to investment, and therefore growth and develop-
ment, can fail to materialize.
1 There is a nuance to this point, which is that some proportion of a natural asset converted into a 
financial asset could be identified as equivalent to an expected yield or return, and so constitutes 
income. It is the failure of many resource-rich developing economies to convert a sub-soil asset into 
sustained higher income that constitutes the idea of a ‘resource curse’—pointing to arguments that if 
the expected value of, or return on, a sub-soil asset is negative, then it should be left in the ground 
until there is the institutional architecture required to make the most of it (see Stevens et al. 2015).
2 This is an argument that has been applied to the treatment of receipts from privatization.
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I next set out those steps between exploration and production, and endeavour 
to illustrate the extent to which the formal institutional framework—by which 
I mean the laws, regulations, licences, contracts, and government ministries and 
agencies that are supposed to operate them—shapes the opportunities and risks 
from natural resources.
2.1 A sequence of asset transformations
Figure 2.1 lays out the steps of an asset transformation in terms of the key stages 
in the development of a natural resource extraction project, together with the 
duration of each stage of a project building up to production. The key differences 
between oil and gas extraction and mining are that ‘conventional’ hydrocarbon3 
extraction is more capital-intensive up front, with capital investment in a mining 
project running throughout the life of the project instead of much of it taking 
place before production starts; there are usually more direct jobs in mining, 
which also has a bigger physical footprint, than in hydrocarbons.
To discover the sub-soil asset you have to go and look for it. Exploration is done 
in a mixture of ways: using geological mapping and modelling; using ground-, 
3 ‘Conventional’ oil and gas are broadly defined as typical reservoirs consisting of a permeable res-
ervoir rock with an overlying layer of impermeable rock (a trap or seal). This contrasts with reservoirs 
of ‘unconventionals’ such as shale and tight gas or oil that require constant stimulation through 
hydraulic fracturing (‘fracking’) and other techniques. This results in an ongoing need for investment 

































Figure 2.1 A sequence of asset transformations
Source: Adapted from Henstridge and Rweyemanu (2016) and AfDB (2015a).
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sea-, or air-based surveys; generating seismic, magnetic, or gravity data to 
 understand whether there are deposits and the associated geological phenomena 
that will trap hydrocarbons, or yield an ore body. The footprint of these activities 
is small. It is specialist, often with a focused international supply chain. If  offshore, 
the footprint is limited to the seismic vessel, water, and airborne support crafts, an 
office, and a shore base. If onshore, then the exploration activity has more of 
an obvious presence, but seismic surveys are transitory activities rather than any 
permanent establishment, except in rare circumstances. The concentration of 
skills and experience in exploration is high, and usually imported along with the 
risk capital that gets sunk into such exploration.
Exploration is risky: it is a step into the unknown. As a result, the global pattern of 
mineral production reflects a long legacy of exploration around better under-
stood geology. Only once something has been discovered does a prospective geo-
logical ‘play’ start to become de-risked. This explains the observation that there are 
more sub-soil assets, recorded as mineral reserves, in the OECD than in Africa 
(Collier 2010), when geology would provide for a more uniform global distribu-
tion across continents.
Most oil companies will only drill when they are reasonably sure they will have 
a result. As the risk is mainly geological it can be analysed down to a well-
understood level. The footprint and cost of drilling is bigger than seismic activities. 
For hydrocarbons, there is then often the development of a programme to drill 
successive exploration wells. At this point there are more people involved, and 
some increase in the supply of services, both specialist foreign industry services 
and domestically sourced non-tradable services such as accommodation, trans-
port, and catering. There will be an increment to employee income tax once a 
company staffs a permanent establishment.
If there are commercially viable discoveries, the investor will build up quite 
a  large organization. If it is a multinational, it will tend to bring in established 
standard operating procedures, both of a specialist nature and as part of the regu-
lar running of a large business organization.
Commercial viability switches a project from the discovery phase to a develop-
ment phase. At this point there will also be a switch in the basis for interacting 
with the state. The terms and conditions for exploration licences may be less com-
plex than those typically associated with the production contracts and regula-
tions, which may be subject to negotiation. At the same time, the first commercial 
discovery in a geological area quickly de-risks exploration strategies of other 
companies, and that shifts the balance between exploration risk and expected 
return for a mix of investors, and for the government.
The development phase switches to a construction phase once a contractor 
makes what is known as a ‘final investment decision’ (FID). By this point, there 
will often have been considerable investments in understanding the geological 
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characteristics and risks of a hydrocarbon deposit; in the engineering appraisals 
and designs, which also have ‘technical’ risks; and in commercial appraisals and 
market risks; as well as any ‘non-technical’ risks—for example, the largely 
political risk of future changes in fiscal terms and conditions. The FID means a 
commitment has been sunk into the project and country—a point of no return. 
This has considerable risk for the investor of a hold-up problem. There are also 
risks for the government if it turns out the deal is not seen to be somehow fair in 
the long run.
The construction phase of a conventional oil and gas project is when the big 
capital investment takes place. In oil and gas this can amount to several billion 
dollars, much of which might be offshore; in mining, capital expenditure is lower at 
this stage, but it will often be ongoing during the life of the project, with relatively 
less sunk up front. Some of the capital investment is on highly specialized precision 
engineering, but other components of these projects are literally construction, 
including bricklaying, carpentry, metal work, plumbing, and electrical works.
In oil and gas, if a large onshore facility is part of the project, such as a plant for 
cooling and liquefying natural gas, then there will be several thousand jobs dur-
ing construction. Though it is also capital-intensive, mining creates relatively 
more jobs during the operations phase than oil and gas, which will only number 
in the few hundreds.
During the operations phase, natural resource projects will start to yield 
 revenue. This goes in two stages: there is a period during which revenue to the 
government is depressed as the project takes a share of the profit to re-pay capital 
investment, known as ‘cost recovery’, or the contractors’ corporation tax liability 
is zero owing to carried-forward capital investment allowances. Once that phase 
is completed, then most modern oil and gas projects will typically see a larger 
share of the rent being transferred to the government.
The management of revenue is part of the management of the public finances 
writ large. The debates about how much to save and how to save, and how much 
to spend, and on what, are centred on the phase which turns rent into public 
spending. This process is complex enough without the extra risk associated with 
large and sometimes volatile receipts.
It is also the case that in some countries even modest receipts, when set against 
gross domestic product (GDP), can represent large inflows against the other com-
ponents of the balance of payments, or the balance sheet of the central bank, or 
even the banking sector as a whole, making for monetary policy challenges that 
are a corollary to fiscal policy challenges—a point on scale to which we will 
return. These asset transformations entail interactions between state regulation 
and public policy and the usually foreign private investment to finance invest-
ment at the scale needed by hydrocarbons and large-scale mining. It is this 
sequence of transformations of a state-held sub-soil mineral asset, through the 
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 11/01/20, SPi
32 Understanding the Boom
mix of public investment and private business activities, that unlocks the growth 
and development opportunities, and in which the risks to a positive development 
outcome can be found.
2.2 The legal and institutional context
Wrapped around that sequence of asset transformations is the institutional 
 context—the laws, regulations, licences, contracts, and the ministries and agencies 
with the legal mandate to implement them. Figure 2.2 provides an illustration.
The specifics of this legal and institutional context will vary across countries. 
Figure 2.2 provides a stylized framework for gauging the institutional and policy 
challenges in an asset transformation. Exploration is typically governed by a law 
and a licence with one ministry as the policy authority.
Once a discovery is made, there is a process that engages a broader range of 
ministries and agencies, such as those covering the environmental impact.4 The 
contractual obligations are more complex for the development and production of 
a discovery. With each new government ministry or public agency involved, there 
are growing possibilities for inconsistency between legal mandates, regulatory 
4 While environmental impact assessments (EIAs) are a requirement prior to any exploration 
activity (seismic and drilling) in all jurisdictions, once a discovery has been made the assessments 
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Figure 2.2 The legal institutional context
Source: Adapted from Henstridge and Rweyemanu (2016) and AfDB (2015b).
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authorization, and the agenda and interests of each particular organization. This 
elevates the stakes on interactions between the contracting company and a mix of 
government agencies.
A company will go to FID after working to assess and mitigate as much risk as 
possible—the geological, engineering, market, and non-technical risks associated 
with the political economy in which they will be operating. They will get to this 
point on the basis of detailed plans that will have had to secure government 
approvals. The construction phase broadens out the local supply chain. Indeed, 
for hydrocarbons this is the phase with the most direct hires. The project will then 
have an interface with the labour market and a broader mix of business suppliers, 
and the associated laws and regulations.
In many countries, one of the biggest components of this framework is the 
national or state-owned company. It may have no in-house capability to operate 
any stage of a natural resource project—though many do—yet will have an 
involvement for and on behalf of the government. In particular, it may hold any 
share of a consortium assigned to the state, led by one company as operator, in the 
development and production of a mineral asset. The administrative and policy 
complexity goes up as rents go into the fiscal arena. There is an interface between 
the exploration and production law and regulations and the law and regulations 
governing taxes more broadly, and in turn with the organic budget law and other 
instruments that govern the operations of public finances, which shape and con-
strain decisions.
Before going further into the economic context, I turn to the literature on the 
impact of natural resources on growth and development.
3. The literature
The literature that reviews the development trajectory of resource-rich economies 
highlights weak growth and disappointment. The initial focus was a debate on 
why, in an apparent paradox, resource wealth is a ‘curse’ for development. There 
have been two main threads of analysis contributing to this broad debate: first, is 
there actually an impact on growth and development? Second, if so, what are the 
transmission mechanisms—in other words, why is it that some countries have 
suffered, but not all?
The idea of a ‘resource curse’ was highlighted by Auty (1988, 1993), in particu-
lar with a review of the experience of the oil boom and crash in Trinidad and 
Tobago (Gelb 1988).5 The trajectories of a mix of other countries, such as Nigeria 
and Venezuela, had common elements, including a sharply appreciated real 
5 Rick Auty coined the term ‘resource curse’ in 1993, building on the title of Alan Gelb’s edited vol-
ume (1988) asking whether resources were a ‘curse or blessing?’
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exchange rate. A debate of now decades has been sustained, and has been subject 
to multiple surveys. More recently these include: Frankel (2010), van der Ploeg 
(2011), Ross (2012), Deacon (2011), Gilberthorpe and Papyrakis (2015), Venables 
(2016), and van der Ploeg and Poelhekke (2016). Badeeb et al. (2017) provide an 
overview of the evolution of the resource curse thesis, and conclude that ‘there is 
currently no consensus regarding the existence of a natural resource curse. If 
the curse is a relevant concern, the disparate literature certainly indicates that its 
ubiquity should not be exaggerated.’ The point is to explore what the literature 
might offer as an answer to the question: what follows for other countries which 
might be facing a potential resource boom?
The many papers prompted by Sachs and Warner (1995) using cross-country 
regressions were exploring average effects, and looking to hold some variables 
constant to isolate correlations that could point to causal mechanisms. The statistical 
problems with cross-country regressions, combined with endogeneity in the 
 chosen variables, render this swathe of papers problematic. Van der Ploeg and 
Poelhekke (2016) argue that the quantitative evidence is at best mixed but not 
strong. The variables used to capture resource abundance, intensity, or depend-
ence suffer for being endogenous (Brunnschweiler and Bulte 2008; van der Ploeg 
and Poelhekke 2009).
In any case, measures of the level of natural resources are trumped by the 
impact of volatility. It is hard to distinguish empirically between the effects of 
institutional quality, financial development, or the political environment because 
they are all correlated. In general, there are omitted variable biases and multiple 
confounding factors at work. More promising are approaches that use a mix of 
identification techniques, such as difference in differences on natural experi-
ments, to get at statistical power in country-specific studies.
The attention of the literature has switched away from looking at average effects 
to explore in more specific terms the mechanisms that may mean an impact on 
growth and development from resources (Torvik 2009). There is a mix of possible 
mechanisms, but here I just look at two categories because each has a different 
class of policy responses. One is the impact of resource revenues and the associ-
ated fiscal and monetary policy choices for managing them. The other relates to 
the impact of resources on institutions, for which there are fewer textbook-type 
policy recommendations.
3.1 ‘Dutch disease’ and volatility
One common explanation of slow growth arising from natural resources is 
the  Corden and Neary (1982) analysis of ‘Dutch disease’—when there was a 
 manufacturing recession in the Netherlands once the natural gas from the 
Groningen gas field was associated with an appreciation of the real exchange rate, 
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which squeezed employment in tradables.6 The appreciation of the real exchange 
rate is a powerful change in relative prices. It can be driven by a surge in foreign 
direct investment (FDI), by an increase in volume of exports as production for 
export comes on-stream, or by a sharp increase in the price of the exported 
 commodity—primary commodity prices being notoriously volatile. The impact 
of ‘Dutch  disease’ has also been analysed by van Wjinbergen (1984), while the 
impact of volatility on growth was a key transmission mechanism for van der 
Ploeg and Poelhekke (2009).
There is an important distinction to be made between the real exchange rate 
change that is a fundamental consequence of an increase in natural resource 
exports, and changes in relative prices which are too sharp for the resulting 
 reallocation of resources to be smoothly accomplished—such as could be driven 
by commodity price volatility. On the other hand, Lee (2018) argues persuasively 
that the permanent appreciation of the real exchange rate is an important conse-
quence of raised natural resource export income, inducing stronger supply of 
non-tradable goods and services to meet demand. This happens with all export 
activities, not just natural resources. Investment in non-tradable production can 
be the major driver of job creation.
There is scope for economic policy to manage the impact by dampening the 
impact of changes in relative prices. This could be achieved through care in not 
spending sharp increases in revenue, or by using monetary policy to sterilize 
shifts in the balance of payments. That this is feasible does not mean it is easy. 
There are examples of careful management of surges of foreign inflows—which 
includes international aid transfers, which are sometimes as volatile as commod-
ity prices. But the analysis involved in separating out volatility from underlying 
fundamental shifts in relative prices, and then the politics of deferring expenditure, 
especially in a low-income country, are especially difficult. The policy prescrip-
tions for managing spending and savings decisions, such as those that apply the 
‘permanent income hypothesis’ or the Hartwick Rule, or Hotelling’s Rule, also 
rely on such a decomposition, typically being illustrated by projections of fiscal 
receipts with constant commodity prices (see, inter alia, Collier et al. 2010; van 
der Ploeg and Venables 2013).
The challenges of introducing robustly valid theory to the reality of volatility 
and the challenge of sustaining technocratically strong policy positions in the face 
of popular expectations for more wealth quickly should not be underestimated. 
This is why ideas such as putting fiscal rules into law, having dedicated legislation 
to mandate savings, or creating stand-alone funds, while sound in principle, are 
problematic in practice. In the context in which they are needed to hold political 
pressure at bay, they would not survive; if they can be sustained because the political 
6 The term ‘Dutch disease’ having been coined in The Economist in 1977 in an article on these 
developments.
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environment protects their integrity, they are not needed.7 Such considerations 
of political context are also important when looking at the literature on the role of 
resources in shaping the institutions of public policy, with an impact, in turn, on 
growth and development.
3.2 Natural resources and institutions
There is a debate on the role of institutions as a mechanism for the resource curse. 
My focus is less on whether, on average, there is a role, and more on the thread of 
analysis of how such a mechanism might work. There are two main arguments. 
The first is that only initial conditions matter: if institutions were weak to start with, 
the impact of natural resources on growth and development will be negative.8 
If they are strong, or simply strong enough, then there will not be a resource curse. 
The second argument is that the rents associated with natural resource extraction 
endogenously corrode the quality of institutions, which in turn affects growth. Of 
course, both effects could be in operation at the same time.
Lane and Tornell (1996) and Tornell and Lane (1999) cite dysfunctional institu-
tions to explain disappointing economic performance in the wake of oil windfalls 
in Nigeria, Venezuela, and Mexico. Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003) esti-
mate the impact of the share of natural resource earnings in GDP on the quality 
of institutions and the impact of institutions on growth, concluding that ‘some 
natural resources—oil and minerals in particular—exert a negative and non-linear 
impact on growth via their deleterious impact on institutional quality’. Mehlum 
et al. (2006) distinguish between producer-friendly institutions, where rent-seeking 
and production are complementary activities, and grabber-friendly institutions, 
where rent-seeking and production are competing activities (the origins of these 
institutions are in turn explained by Acemoglu and Robinson 2012).
Alexeev and Conrad (2009) argue that the claims that natural resources nega-
tively affect growth and that they degrade institutional quality are incorrect. They 
argue that the time frame used in cross-country regressions is too limited. And by 
using a prediction of a counterfactual GDP per capita in the absence of a high oil 
or mineral endowment, they argue that natural resources do not undermine the 
quality of existing institutions—which may have been weak to start with. As 
already argued, the study of average effects of natural resources on institutions 
and growth might be a fallacy in general, because institutional change itself is 
 dependent on pre-existing institutions—we therefore have to understand the 
7 For some analysis on this challenge, see Davis et al. (2003): an underlying concern is to avoid 
assuming the conditions exist for successful and sustained implementation of institutional remedies.
8 This argument is also applied with respect to foreign aid inflows by Bourguignon and Gunning 
(2016).
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historical development of these (as discussed in the historical institutionalism 
literature).
Torvik (2009) argues that we have quite limited knowledge along which 
dimensions resource-abundant winners and losers differ, but proposes six that 
can shape outcomes:
 • saving of resources income
 • presidentialism vs. parliamentarianism
 • institutional quality
 • type of resources
 • offshore vs. onshore oil
 • early vs. late industrialization.
The way in which any one of these dimensions would work could be through the 
incentive that resource abundance provides to elites to demolish institutions 
because it is in their interest. For example, by reducing accountability by weakening 
checks and balances, and so allowing them to grab more rents (for examples, see 
Persson et al. 2000; Ross 2001). This might not always be driven by politicians/
elites, but could also be favoured by voters, as in Acemoglu et al. (2013). Torvik 
(2016) argues that natural resources may still influence institutions on a case-by-
case basis, and the question is why natural resources contribute to prosperity in 
some places and to more poverty in another? And the normative implications: 
what does it imply for the design of policy and institutions?
This literature also throws up some interim conclusions:
 • The various explanations of a ‘resource curse’ effect can often be linked: 
commodity price volatility can provoke sharp changes in the real exchange 
rate, elevating risks to investment; elite rent capture with weak accountability 
implies little space for technically strong economic management or careful 
long-term planning of public investments.
 • There is some evidence that a key transmission mechanism of disappointment 
from natural resource discoveries is through the impact on politics, institutions, 
and structural change. The corollary is that the sequence of events that follow 
discovery offers some opportunities for policy to shape or condition the 
economic and political impact of the transformation of mineral assets. Some 
countries have not fallen foul of the threatened curse. It may be difficult to 
avoid, but it is not inevitable.
 • Cross-country regressions with average correlations are unsatisfactory for 
using variables such as resource dependence or abundance, which not only 
risk being endogenous, but which also only capture one step in the sequence 
of asset transformations through which resources interact with the growth 
and development process.
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In sum, each country that finds the opportunity of natural resources disappointing 
does so in its own way. As Venables (2016) points out, there is no single reason 
why using natural resources for development has proven so difficult.
4. Magnitudes
While in general the size of an anticipated boom is overestimated and the delay in 
receiving revenues is underestimated, it is also the case that the steps for developing 
a resource discovery, the extent to which it has an impact, and the scale and 
 timing of those steps are also often under-appreciated. Figure 2.1 showed that it 
can take decades to get from exploration to production, in both oil and gas and in 
mining—at least for large mining projects. Moreover, for hydrocarbons the big-
gest impact on direct employment comes during the construction phase rather 
than during operations. The big numbers on FDI are also ahead of production 
starting up, although much of FDI is likely to be international finance for capital 
goods imports rather than having a direct impact on the economy. These points 
on sequencing and timing are of relevance to the institutional environment into 
which revenue would eventually flow. If the elite have expectations of a boom that 
will arise when the revenue comes in, they will take early action so as to be nicely 
positioned to secure rents. The other aspect, to which we return in this section, is 
how sequencing and timing interact with expected scale—but not so much the 
magnitudes surrounding the project, rather the scale of economic impact.
First, however, two examples that show that the scale of a resource boom can 
be made to look big or small, depending on the comparators against which it is 
benchmarked. Perceptions of scale depend on the perspective one adopts. In 2012 
there were inflated expectations about the prospects for oil in Uganda. It could be 
seen as really big: P50 proved reserves had been declared by Tullow Oil at 1.1 bil-
lion barrels. In 2012 the international price for Brent oil averaged US$111 per bar-
rel (BP  2017). A simple multiplication would therefore value those reserves at 
US$122 billion, which was around four times the 2012 GDP. Big numbers, but 
misleading:
 • First, you cannot get all the oil turned into cash all at once: it takes time to turn 
reserves into production—the life of most oil projects is around twenty-five 
years—even if the government and the private contractor are both in a hurry.
 • Second, Ugandan oil is waxy and landlocked: it does not fetch the same price 
as Brent crude oil, and it is costly to export.
 • Third, the sizeable capital costs involved in three interlocked projects—oil 
production, a refinery, and a heated export pipeline—required international 
investment. There was then a tough problem of coordination across those 
three large and risky projects, and it has been a persistent problem.
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In fact, oil in Uganda is quite small as well as a distant prospect. Even just dividing 
the gross figure by total population, and so ignoring any costs involved in 
 bringing a sub-soil asset above ground, reduces it to US$3,500 per person. But 
getting realistic and allowing for time to develop and produce and export the oil, 
with all the costs associated with that, and using a more conservative price of 
US$75/bbl, then Henstridge and Page (2012) show that total revenue to government 
would be equivalent to 5 per cent of non-oil GDP, and would only amount to US$41 
per person per year in 2030. Not insignificant, but not of itself transformational. 
Tanzania provides another example of a prospect that could be simultaneously 
very big and small (Henstridge and Rweyemamu 2016).
A broader perspective on the scale of a boom is to look at the scale of economic 
impact of each step in the sequence of asset transformations. For hydrocarbons 
there are a few direct points of contact, and relatively few directly created jobs; the 
broader impact of natural resources on structural change will be indirect, could 
start well ahead of any revenue flows, and will be mediated by a constellation of 
policy positions.
Figure  2.3 provides an illustration of the main linkages between a resources 
project and jobs—with some of the key mediating areas of public policy listed as 
well. It is calibrated for conventional hydrocarbons rather than mining, where 
there will be thousands of direct jobs during production, and capital investment 
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Figure 2.3 The broader context: jobs and policy
Source: Adapted from Henstridge and Rweyemanu (2016).
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The calibration for conventional hydrocarbons serves to make a more stark 
point about the broader economic impact of a natural resources project when the 
direct job creation only swells to thousands of jobs during the construction phase 
of a project. It only takes a few hundred people to run some oil or gas projects, 
many of whom will be highly experienced industry specialists. It is, of course, a 
well-understood statement of the obvious that a hydrocarbon project does not of 
itself drive a shift in employment in a developing economy.
There is, however, scope for phases of policy to influence the indirect impact, 
including on jobs. The areas of policy of potential relevance are illustrated in 
Figure 2.3: (1) construction jobs and skills training; (2) the environment for pri-
vate business investment—which can increase ahead of the development of the 
natural resource, and which includes ‘local content’ which seeks to support firms 
who can be part of an international supply chain; (3) appropriate fiscal policy 
management in the face of possibly large and volatile macroeconomic flows; and 
(4) the efficiency and focus of public investment, including in infrastructure and 
other forms of public capital.
4.1 The construction sector and jobs
Through the exploration phase and the development phase, direct economic 
impacts are limited to the hiring of a few hundred people, and some supplies for 
an office and an exploration programme. The construction phase sees the first 
material impact on jobs, many of which may be semi-skilled. What gets built may 
be limited to onshore facilities for offshore hydrocarbons, such as with the oil 
developments in Ghana. But it could include building or assembling a facility for 
the ‘trains’ which condense natural gas to a liquid by cooling it to –161°C (–260°F) so 
that it can be exported by ship as liquefied natural gas (LNG). In mining operations, 
the development phase could involve substantial ongoing employment.
Where construction is involved, there is likely to be a material impact on the 
labour market for a range of semi-skilled and skilled workers, such as construc-
tion workers, bricklayers, metal workers, carpenters, plumbers, and electricians. 
In a low-income country there is unlikely to be an elastic supply of such workers 
to fill some thousands of jobs. It was estimated that some 4,000–5,000 jobs would 
be created directly during construction of LNG facilities in Tanzania. This com-
pares to a range of jobs on other LNG construction projects ranging from around 
2,000 in Australia to 8,000 in Angola (OPM 2013).
Although a few thousand is a few jobs when the labour force numbers  millions, 
there are not the skilled people to meet this demand. Training will be essential for 
secure project delivery, and it may well need a specific initiative. An example is 
provided by the analysis of the labour force in Tanzania in anticipation of 
large-scale LNG. An assessment of vocational and educational training needs 
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(VSO  2014) concluded, among other findings, that: (1) those graduating from 
‘vocational education and training’ are not directly employable; (2) the trades 
which will be needed are not being taught; and (3) in any case, the training is low 
quality. However, most of the areas in which training would be needed to fill the 
jobs created as part of the investment in hydrocarbons were not sector-specific: 
the VSO assessment showed that a significant number of the skills needed are 
transferable. These include the skills needed in metal work, building works, civil 
engineering and infrastructure, mechanical work, and electrical work.
This is an important point for the economic impact of the boom when revenue 
starts. A natural resource boom leads to a construction boom: it is a facet of 
Dutch disease that the appreciation of the real exchange rate raises the returns to 
non-tradable activity, but also to non-traded capital, which is mainly structures. 
If the construction sector is weak, the supply of structures is inelastic, and the real 
estate boom is more in prices than buildings. If, however, there are growing num-
bers of people with transferable construction skills, then the supply of structures 
is more elastic. This points to a policy position that training to a standard good 
enough to work on the construction phase of a natural resource project means 
people with those skills will be in demand as the boom kicks in. That there is a 
shared interest in sufficient-quality training of more than enough people between 
the natural resource company and the government seems clear. Training tens of 
thousands, even if only a few thousand are needed, could provide mitigation for 
the risks associated with a sharp appreciation of the real exchange rate. It would 
mean running a training organization that could cope with 1,000+ people each 
year for more than ten years.
4.2 The environment for private business
There are three channels of impact from the natural resource sector to the broader 
private business environment. One is through expectations, another through the 
supply chain, and the third is broader, being conditioned by the array of policies 
that can affect industry and business.
First, the impact of the natural resource sector on private business can start 
with the discovery itself. There is evidence that the news of a discovery has an 
impact on private business because it can sharply shift expectations about future 
levels of national income. In a panel of 180 countries over the period 1970–2012, 
Arezki et al. (2017) show that investment rises robustly after the news of a giant 
discovery. There are contrary results from Poelhekke and van der Ploeg (2013) on 
the impact of resource rents on non-resource FDI in the period 1985–2002, who 
argue that resource rents depress non-resource FDI in the long run. This can be 
argued to be the Dutch disease, or the resource curse more broadly, in action, 
given that the effect is prompted by the rents from natural resources. But using 
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data taken during the more recent commodity boom between 2003–12, Toews and 
Vezina (2017) document a 58 per cent increase in non-resource extraction FDI in 
the two years following a giant natural resource discovery. They also use detailed 
multiple waves of household survey and firm census data to track the impact of a 
giant discovery of natural gas in Mozambique on further FDI for other business 
activities. They estimate that each FDI job results in 6.2 additional local jobs.
Second, to the extent that there is a potential supply base, the more an oil or 
gas or mining project has a potential role in elevating domestic firms to the stand-
ards of quality necessary for participation in an international supply chain. This is 
a point that has been well made by John Sutton in his series of Enterprise Map 
books.9 Part of the framework for this impact is provided by regulations and 
 policy relating to ‘local content’. In some instances, there are requirements for the 
international contractor to buy inputs locally. However, in some instances that 
means that a domestically registered company proceeds to import goods and ser-
vices, instead of the oil or gas or mining company, or one of their tier-one suppliers, 
importing directly. That serves to raise costs and offers scope for rent-seeking: 
only a few will be able to take up a coveted position as the domestically registered 
supplier. That there is a monopsonist compelled to buy locally likely limits 
competition.
Finally, the rate of private investment, business formation, and firm growth will 
be conditioned by an array of public policy positions which together constitute 
‘industrial policy’. The impact of the natural resource sector on the broader busi-
ness environment will come through the way in which policy is a consequence of 
accumulated interests which will shape the ‘institutions’ (in the Douglass North 
sense) of the economy. The argument here is that if the natural resource sector is 
significant, as it so often is in low-income countries, then the more that the 
 activities which surround it are conducive to rent-seeking, the stronger will be the 
interests in reduced economic openness and competition. In these instances, they 
will strengthen interests in further elite rent-seeking, or ‘extractive institution’ 
formation (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012), or ‘closed order political settlements’ 
(in the language of North et al. 2009). In turn, the impact on economic openness, 
or a flexible or competitive economy, will be deleterious.
This point has further resonance when one considers that a long-term process 
of growth and structural change means huge reallocation of people and resources, 
perhaps most clearly in migration from rural and agricultural employment to 
urban service-sector jobs. Even in China, most modern sector jobs were non-
tradable services jobs. Gollin et al. (2013) show that in natural resource-rich, low-
income countries, cities are not centres of production for tradable goods, rather 
9 See for example Sutton et al. for Enterprise Maps for Ethiopia (Sutton and Kellow 2010), Ghana 
(Sutton and Kpentey 2012), Tanzania (Sutton and Olomi 2012), Zambia (Sutton and Langmead 2013), 
and Mozambique (Sutton 2014).
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they are ‘consumption cities’. Lee and Vanino (2018) establish the important point 
for thinking about the role of extractive institutional settlements, and the long-
run structural change of resource-rich economies, that rent-seeking and predation 
is a lot easier on non-tradable sectors than internationally tradable sectors. The 
logic is that squeezing a tradable activity, for example by raising costs, threatens the 
whole venture because of competition in international markets or the  availability 
of imported substitutes. Non-tradable sectors do not have that existential threat 
and can be sustainably squeezed quite hard. Sustainable rent extraction is then 
compatible with sustaining extractive institutions, and hence an array of indus-
trial policies which may not be good for sustained growth in competitive private 
business.
4.3 Fiscal and monetary policy management
Macroeconomic policy is at the heart of the literature analysing the ‘resource 
curse’, and offering advice on how to ward off the curse. This is because rents 
are central to thinking about natural resources and they mainly show up in the 
economy in the public finances. Macroeconomic flows shift as a natural resource 
project goes through its phases, and matter in different ways to different inter-
ested parties. The company as contractor is concerned about the flows that deter-
mine the commercial sustainability of the project as a business venture. The 
finance ministry is most interested in the revenue and other flows which have a 
fiscal impact. While the central bank will be most concerned with the balance of 
payments flows, and consequences for the exchange rate and inflation as targets 
for monetary policy.
The macroeconomic magnitudes that matter when scaling the impact of a nat-
ural resource project depend on the variable of concern. Initially, the scale of FDI 
being brought onshore could be big in relation to other components of the bal-
ance of payments. That impact will be of more immediate interest to the central 
bank than the ministry of finance. If there are material foreign inflows, they could 
be particularly big in relation to the central bank balance sheet, possibly also the 
consolidated balance sheet of the banking system in a low-income country, and 
hence be a handful for monetary policy to manage if there are threatened sharp 
movements in the exchange rate, reserves, or money.
If there is the sort of FDI boom that Toews and Vezina document for 
Mozambique, there will be a mini-boom in fiscal revenue from import duties, 
sales taxes or VAT, and income taxes. None will be immediately associated with 
the operations of the natural resource sector, and they will be well in advance of 
payments of rents from natural resources. Turning to the bigger, eventual, fiscal 
impact of resource revenues, they have an inescapable characteristic of volatility. 
Commodity prices are notoriously volatile (Figure 2.4).
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But even if prices are absolutely flat, and production volumes constant, revenues 
will often change from year to year. This is because the relationship between the 
value of production and the revenue associated with it can change from year to 
year as the fiscal regime accommodates a phase of cost recovery, or the carried-
forward capital allowances change, or the interest cost of finance changes. 
Figure  11.2 in Chapter  11 this volume carries some illustrative projections of 
 revenues from the possible, but now unlikely, large-scale offshore gas and LNG 
projects in Tanzania. The central projection of revenue in the right-hand panel in 
Figure  11.2 varies each year, even though the price assumption is flat and the 
assumption of volumes of production after a ramp-up phase is flat through to a 
period of decline. Volatility matters for the impact of a boom because it makes 
building a budget and managing fiscal and monetary policy difficult, and because 
volatility means additional risk, if not outright uncertainty, for private investment, 
and that lowers growth and potentially contributes to a resource curse effect (see 
van der Ploeg and Poelhekke 2009).
Addressing these macroeconomic policy challenges is difficult overall, but 
some of them can be separated from the others by looking at a sequence of deci-
sion points. The decision on how much to spend, whether on consumption or 
investment, and how much to hold offshore is an early choice. This was a decision 
that was foreseen by the Petroleum Revenue Management Act (PRMA) in Ghana. 















































































































Crude Oil (petroleum),  Dated Brent, light blend 38 API, fob UK, US$ per barrel
Natural gas LNG (Japan), import price, cif, US$/mmbtu
Henry Hub spot price (US$/mmbtu)
US$: per barrel (crude oil) US$ per mmbtu (gas)
Brent crude oil (lhs)
LNG in Japan (rhs)
US Henry Hub gas (rhs) 
Figure 2.4 Commodity prices
Source: Author’s construction based on IMF Primary Commodity Prices database, available at https://
www.imf.org/external/np/res/commod/index.aspx (accessed 23 December 2018).
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absorbed. That in turn is a function of economic flexibility, in particular the 
 supply elasticity of non-tradables (Adam and Bevan 2004). There is also an early 
choice on whether to bring forward new natural resource revenues by borrowing 
in advance against the security of future expected revenues. There is reasonable 
economic logic which would analyse the decision in terms of the relative costs of 
borrowing and the rate of return on early investment and the discount rate 
applied to early consumption spending. There is also a strong political logic: 
borrowing to bring forward access to rents is a tempting source of finance for a 
political strategy to retain power. That points to sub-optimal economic returns 
from early spending financed by borrowing. The various accounts of Chinese 
loans to Ghana—outside the purview of the PRMA in terms of fiscal prudence—
provide an illustration.
On the spending decisions, there is a balance to be struck between raising con-
sumption in line with increased permanent income, and further transforming the 
mineral asset by using the rent to invest in public capital, such as infrastructure. 
The importance of a coherent link between resource rents and savings and the 
broader public finances can be illustrated by thinking about the role of different 
categories of public expenditure in the accumulation of private capital assets, 
including personal health and education, as well as the building up of public 
assets. Private and public investment are of course complements—people will 
invest in trucks if there are the roads and bridges that enable trade, for example.
But equally important, the returns to public assets, infrastructure in particular, 
are high when operations and maintenance spending is sustained. Adam and 
Bevan (2014) show that the returns to operations and maintenance of existing, but 
poorly maintained, public infrastructure are higher in terms of their contribution 
to growth than building new infrastructure. Standard fiscal classification has oper-
ations and maintenance spending as recurrent expenditure rather than invest-
ment. Similarly, the public expenditure that contributes most directly to people’s 
accumulation of their own human capital is recurrent, being the salaries of teachers 
and medical staff, and the medical supplies, that are all part of improving and 
maintaining education, skills, and health through public service delivery. But if 
there are rules which limit the spending of resource revenues to investment, then 
the returns on existing public assets and the opportunities for human capital 
development, all of which draw upon recurrent expenditure, may be sub-optimal.
5. Institutions and policy stance
A set of policy issues has emerged throughout this framing of a natural resource 
boom. But whether policy implications, recommendations, or recipes are ever 
actually relevant to the reality of a resource boom is more a function of the 
politics of policy than the analysis of evidence informing recommendations. The 
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political economy of natural resources mainly revolves around the rents involved. 
The extent to which rent-seeking succeeds, and then those who extract rent suc-
ceed in sustaining their position through their influence on the institutional 
foundations of the policy process, is therefore key to even just glimpsing appro-
priate policy.
There is a long literature on institutions, both where they come from or what 
shapes them, and what follows from different institutional configurations. I made 
reference earlier to the work of North et al. (2009) and Acemoglu and Robinson 
(2012), to which can be added the framework of Pritchett et al. (2017). In essence 
they all provide a framing of the way in which a political settlement shapes the 
institutional ‘rules of the game’, and drives the coordination of agents’ decisions 
and expectations. The settlement could be the suspension of a threat of violence 
(North et al.  2009), or it could be an equilibrium division of the spoils of rent 
capture.
Such an ‘extractive’ institutional configuration is consistent with the strands of 
the literature on the resource curse which look at the role of rents in shaping insti-
tutions which determine growth out-turns. But as the literature argues, a resource 
endowment is not destiny. The interesting element of the institutions literature is 
the bit that tries to focus on what changes the institutional configuration.
In essence there are two things that can represent positive change. One is the 
development of impersonal transactions among elites. This is the key threshold 
condition for North et al. for moving from a closed-order settlement to an open-
order one. A second is an external shock that disrupts the equilibrium of political 
settlement. In a resource-rich economy this could be driven by sharp changes in 
commodity prices and the disruption in the flow of rents that follows, or it could 
be a technology shock—perhaps one that makes fast-growing services tradables 
rather than non-tradables.
That point links to two other observations on the political and institutional 
foundations for policy. One is that cities in resource-rich economies are ‘consump-
tion cities’ that have grown on the increased national income arising from a 
resource boom, with a strengthened real exchange rate increasing the returns to 
non-tradable production, and to non-tradable capital—as represented by a con-
struction boom (Gollin et al. 2013). The second is that it easier for an elite to cap-
ture rents from non-tradable than tradable sectors (Lee and Vanino  2018). 
‘Consumption cities’ might be efficient or they might be a symptom of growth-
killing extractive institutions. If natural resource exports are very high, then it is 
expected and efficient for other exports to be low and for a lot of urban produc-
tion to be focused on non-tradable services—consider Australia. However, if 
institutions are fundamentally extractive, with private individuals extracting rents 
from natural resources and from non-tradable producers in a way that pushes 
up  costs and reduces competitiveness, then investment and production of 
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 non-resource exports is indeed suppressed. This is inefficient and bad for 
growth—consider Nigeria. Observing a high level of resource exports and high 
employment in non-tradable production is not enough to distinguish between 
these two sets of conditions.
What follows from all that is that some policy choices made early on offer a 
different path forward to the institutional constraints that will shape or constrain 
subsequent policy decisions. Initial policy choices come right at the outset of the 
sequence of steps along a natural resource value chain.
These include the initial encounter between explorers and the relevant govern-
ment ministry. If there are requirements for some elements of transparency and 
competition in awarding exploration licences, then there is already an openness 
to the governance of the sector. If a major discovery is made, then there will be a 
material economic impact in terms of FDI—and the experience of Mozambique 
implies that there is an opportunity for job creation at some scale. If the manage-
ment of FDI provides for an open and competitive business environment, then 
the transactions between elites who might otherwise have sought to stitch up par-
ticular sectors—particularly non-tradables, such as brewing—may become more 
impersonal. Impersonal transactions among elites, particularly capital transac-
tions, such as traded equity or debt, are a threshold condition for the switch from 
closed-order to open-order settlements. In a similar vein, a stitch-up of local 
content regulations may hold back inclusive open-order institutional settlements.
When eventually resource rents come into the line of sight of policymakers, the 
various macroeconomic policy choices will be better formulated and debated if 
the tone has been set towards openness and inclusive institutional settlements. 
This would be evidenced by elite consensus on wanting reasonable degrees of 
competition in markets for factors of production and non-tradables, as well as 
open trade.
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The construction sector plays a central role in the economy of any country, pro-
viding essential structures such as public and private infrastructure and housing. 
Even the most advanced economies would be incapable of maintaining a high 
standard of living without continuous investments in infrastructure, such as for 
waste management, water provision, or transport. A poorly functioning sector 
has two primary consequences: first, it tends to translate into high prices, lead-
ing to low levels of output for a given level of expenditure. For instance, if a 
 kilometre of road costs US$1 million in country A and US$2 million in country 
B, the latter can afford exactly half the length of road. This chapter will show that 
such differences in unit costs are fairly common, and differences in unit costs 
frequently exceed a factor of 2. Second, when local capacity is low, countries 
need to purchase construction services from foreign firms, limiting local 
employment generation and local content. Many developing countries have low 
levels of infrastructure and often the existing infrastructure is not well main-
tained. How productive the construction sector is in translating a given amount 
of input into output has therefore wide-ranging consequences for the provision 
of basic infrastructure and services.
The aim of this chapter is to survey the current state of knowledge on key issues 
of the construction sector. Overall, there is little systematic knowledge on the 
construction sector in Africa. With an aim of contributing towards filling this 
gap, I draw on evidence from a wide range of sources, including journal articles, 
industry reports, and enterprise maps (Sutton and Olomi 2012). Further, to show 
general trends and patterns, I use data from National Accounts Statistics (United 
Nations 2018), the World Development Indicators (World Bank 2018a), databases 
of unit costs (World Bank 2006), the World Bank Procurement database (World 
Bank 2018b), as well as the International Comparison Project 2011 (World Bank 
2015).
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The chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 sets the stage. It starts by reviewing 
some of the key characteristics of the sector that distinguish it from any other 
sector of the economy. It then shows trends in the share of construction in value 
added, and gross fixed capital formation, both for the world, as well as for the 
countries selected for five case studies: Ghana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda, 
and Zambia.1 I discuss why the construction sector might be under particular 
pressure in natural resource-rich countries, and how this affects prices depending 
on the slope of the supply curve of the construction sector. Section 3 reviews what 
we know about differences in the unit cost of constructing infrastructure and dis-
cusses how construction costs affect the link between investment efforts and 
investment outcomes. Section 4 discusses some of the key bottlenecks in the con-
struction sector. Section  5 outlines policies to improve the sector’s ability to 
respond to surges in demand. Section 6 draws some conclusions.
Throughout the chapter I focus on the more formal aspects of the construction 
sector, in the measurement of the size of the sector across time and space, price 
levels, and capacity of the sector. This is not a statement about the relative 
 importance of the formal versus the informal segment of the market; rather, it 
is  driven by the availability of data. Arguably, when considering large-scale 
 infrastructure construction, this is the relevant segment of the sector to analyse. 
While some of the issues touched upon in this chapter will apply to all subsectors 
within construction, I make sure to highlight whether an issue is particularly 
important for a certain subsector.
2. Background
The construction sector has a number of characteristics that, when considered 
together, distinguish it from other sectors in the economy (Moavenzadeh 1978). 
First, goods in the construction sector are highly differentiated, often purpose-
built, and financed by the customer. Contrast this with manufacturing, where 
products are traditionally designed by the producer, built by the producer, and 
then sold to the customer. In particular in developing countries, financing is 
frequently provided by external parties, who have a substantial influence on the 
procurement and construction process of the infrastructure. Second, stockpiling 
of infrastructure is seldom possible, and most products are difficult to transport 
across space. Third, due to the high level of differentiation, size of projects, and 
limits to stockpiling infrastructure, the construction of infrastructure frequently 
responds precisely to demand. Overall, these features lead to unstable demand that 
depends on resource availability and often political factors. Fourth, maintenance 
1 These country case studies are presented in this volume by Owoo and Lambon-Quayefio (chapter 6), 
Cruz et al. (chapter 9), Kikwasi and Escalante (chapter 12), Colonnelli and Ntungire (chapter 15), and 
Cheelo and Liebenthal (chapter 18).
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of the constructed good has a strong effect on the return on a piece of infrastructure. 
Finally, it is worth mentioning that governance issues—for example, transparency 
in project selection, procurement, and construction—pose challenges for countries 
across all levels of development.
Table 3.1 shows the shares of value added as a percentage for five different years 
between 1995 and 2015. Across sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), value added in the con-
struction sector accounted for about 3.4–6.0 per cent and has been increasing 
over time. In 2015, value added in the construction sector in SSA is slightly above 
the average value added for the world, which is 5.8 per cent. Over the two decades 
1995–2015 there has been an increase in value added in construction in South 
Asia and a decrease in East Asia.
Turning to the case-study countries, there is a marked increase in value added in 
construction in Ghana, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. For instance, in Tanzania 
value added in construction has increased from 4.2 per cent in 1995 to 14.6 per cent 
in 2015; Ghana saw a similar increase. The share of value added generated in the 
construction sector being relatively low in Mozambique (between 1.5–4.1 per cent).
I next investigate gross fixed capital formation, which measures the additions 
to fixed capital in an economy, including land improvements, plant, machinery, 
and equipment purchases, and the construction of fixed infrastructure. Panel A in 
Table 3.2 shows aggregates for gross capital formation. The table shows that SSA 
experienced an increase in gross capital formation as a percentage of gross 
domestic product (GDP) in the past two decades, from 17 per cent to almost 
21 per cent. This level remains lower than the average for South Asia and East Asia 
and the Pacific, which have capital formation levels of close to 30 per cent or more 
Table 3.1 Share of construction in value added, per cent
 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
Panel A: Aggregates
sub-Saharan Africa 3.4 3.5 3.7 4.5 6.0
East Asia 7.6 6.4 5.5 5.6 6.2
South Asia 5.4 6.0 7.7 8.1 7.3
South America 5.7 5.4 5.1 6.6 6.5
World 5.9 5.5 5.7 5.5 5.8
Panel B: Case-study countries
Ghana 4.8 5.5 5.6 8.5 13.5
Mozambique 3.0 4.1 1.5 2.1 2.5
Tanzania 4.2 5.3 8.3 8.3 14.6
Uganda 3.7 4.8 5.6 6.2 8.0
Zambia 3.8 4.4 7.7 10.6 10.6
Source: Author’s calculation based on United Nations (2018) data.
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for the past two decades. In 2015, SSA’s gross capital formation is in line with the 
level found in Latin America and the Caribbean.
Panel B shows that there is a substantial amount of heterogeneity across both 
time and space in the countries studied in more detail. In 2015, all case-study 
countries show gross capital formation at a level above the SSA average, ranging 
from 39 per cent in Zambia to 24 per cent in Ghana and Uganda. Mozambique 
and Tanzania have levels of gross fixed capital formation of 32–34 per cent, which 
are close to the level prevailing in East Asia and the Pacific. Table 3.2 shows that, 
across time, there is substantial variation across the five-year periods shown. 
Mozambique is the only country in which value added in construction and gross 
fixed capital formation do not move together. A possible explanation is that this is 
due to the fact that gross fixed capital formation includes land improvements as 
well as plant, machinery, and equipment purchases, and this has been the main 
driver of the rise in gross fixed capital formation.
There are several reasons for a link between natural resource discovery or 
exploitation and the construction sector. First, infrastructure investments might 
be driven by an anticipation of future exploitation. Expectations of future discoveries 
might further drive investment in private and public infrastructure in an 
area. Second, new infrastructure might be required to facilitate the discovery or 
exploitation of natural resources, such as housing for workers, or roads and 
railroads to bring machinery in and take resources out. Third, natural resources 
lead to additional spending capacity at the level of governments. Particularly 
when countries lack basic infrastructure, governments might want to use the 
additional fiscal space to build new and upgrade existing infrastructure. All these 
factors imply that there is an increase in the demand for goods produced by the 
Table 3.2 Gross fixed capital formation, per cent of GDP
 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
Panel A: Aggregates
sub-Saharan Africa 16.5 15.2 15.4 19.9 20.5
South Asia 24.7 23.8 30.5 30.7 27.7
East Asia and Pacific 31.2 29.1 30.7 31.5 31.8
Latin America and Caribbean 18.7 18.8 18.6 20.1 19.9
World 23.3 23.5 24.0 23.1 23.4
Panel B: Case-study countries
Ghana 21.1 23.1 29.0 24.7 23.8
Mozambique 19.9 22.1 13.2 17.9 32.0
Tanzania 19.6 16.4 25.2 28.7 34.3
Uganda 16.4 19.2 22.2 25.2 24.2
Zambia – – – 25.9 38.5
Source: Author’s calculation based on World Bank (2018a) data.
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construction sector. Whether this increase in demand leads to an increase in the 
unit price and the extent of that increase depends on the slope of the supply 
curve, as illustrated in Figure 3.1.
The left-hand graph in Figure 3.1 shows the effect of an increase in the demand 
for goods produced in the construction sector when the supply curve is unit elastic. 
The increase in demand leads to a shift in the quantity produced from Q∗1 to Q
∗′1. 
The equilibrium price shifts up from P1
∗ to P ′1
∗. The right-hand graph shows the 
same shift in the demand curve, but now with a supply curve that is less elastic. 
The graph shows that the same increase in demand leads to a smaller increase in the 
quantity produced, which shifts from Q∗2 to Q
∗′2 but at a higher price. Therefore, 
a given increase in the demand for goods produced in the construction sector can 
lead to different levels of new equilibrium prices and quantities. Note that the 
graphs show aggregate supply. One important concern for policymakers is the 
composition of local and foreign firms, which in turn has effects on employment 
generation and likely dynamic effects on local capacity. An increase in the number 
of firms in construction following a natural resource discovery might also lead to 
a shift of the supply curve to the right, exerting downward pressure on prices.
3. Construction costs across time and space
This section discusses our basic knowledge of construction costs across countries 
and time. I start by highlighting measurement issues when aiming to measure 
unit costs in construction, where a core difficulty is to find comparable projects. 
I then review recent evidence on the cost of road infrastructure across ninety-nine 
low- and middle-income countries.2 Finally, I discuss how construction costs 
affect the link between investment efforts and investment outcomes.














Figure 3.1 Demand shift with different supply elasticities
Source: Author’s illustration.
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3.1 What do we know about differences in unit costs?
Measuring the cost of construction across space is difficult for a number of 
 reasons. First, the construction sector produces highly differentiated goods, such 
as roads, buildings, and bridges. Considering only one type of good makes com-
parisons slightly more feasible. However, there are still enormous differences. For 
example, consider building a non-paved road and a four-lane highway. These two 
types of infrastructure are likely to include a different set of raw materials, equip-
ment, and types of labour. Comparing narrowly defined work activities—such as 
an asphalt overlay of a specific thickness—is one possible way forward. Still, dif-
ferent types of construction methods (e.g. labour-intensive versus capital-intensive) 
might still lead to very different unit costs.
For building construction, comparisons are even more difficult: a database might 
consist of costs of different types of buildings, including residential buildings, pub-
lic buildings such as schools and hospitals, and industrial buildings. Several mar-
gins could be responsible for differences in costs. First, all of these will have different 
specifications that likely manifest themselves in differences in unit costs. Safety 
requirements will differ across these different building types, affecting the materials 
chosen and type of labour involved in the construction. Even within a category, 
comparison of costs is complicated by differences in building codes across time 
and space which might lead to differences in costs of a particular project that are 
due to different specifications, even when holding construction unit costs constant. 
Knowledge of differences in building codes is not readily available, such that it is 
difficult to control for them. Even if they exist, compliance with building codes 
might vary across countries and be correlated with factors that also drive the costs 
of construction, such as corruption.
Second, there are different types of costs: estimated costs, which are typically 
estimated by construction engineers familiar with the project; contracted costs, 
which is the amount that figures in the contract with the construction firm; and 
actual costs, which are the sum of contracted costs and cost adjustments such as cost 
overruns. Cost overruns are fairly typical in the construction sector, such that the 
differences in these cost types can be substantial and one needs to be careful when 
making comparisons across them. Finally, rarely are data on costs stored centrally. 
Most commonly, they are part of reports held by different ministries and entities, 
making comparison difficult. The lack of overview of the costs of construction for 
a particular country also means that it is difficult to compare a set of bids for a 
project with similar projects. To illustrate the magnitude in differences in con-
struction costs for similar activities, Table 3.3 (reproduced from Collier et al. 2015) 
shows the unit cost per kilometre of an asphalt overlay of 40–59 mm across coun-
tries. The upper panel shows projects undertaken in the period 1996–8 and the lower 
panel shows activities undertaken between 2005–7. These years are shown together 
to allow comparability and to minimize differences in costs that are due to exchange 






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.3 Unit costs per kilometre of asphalt overlays of 40–59 mm
Country Cost per kilometre Number Year Country Cost per kilometre Number Year
 (US$1,000)   (US$1,000)   
  Work activities undertaken 1996–8
Dominican        
Republic 33.5 1 1997 Argentina 69.7 1 1997
Ghana 42.9 5 1998 Brazil 74.4 1 1998
Lithuania 44.4 1 1996 Argentina 74.9 1 1996
Indonesia 48.5 1 1996 Cameroon 76.8 4 1997
Lithuania 49.7 1 1998 Bangladesh 79.1 26 1998
Mexico 50.7 1 1997 Vietnam 79.6 2 1998
Ghana 52.7 1 1996 Bangladesh 83.6 1 1997
Costa Rica 57.9 1 1996 Panama 84.1 1 1997
Armenia 60.7 1 1997 Nigeria 95.1 1 1997
Brazil 62.5 2 1996 El Salvador 102.2 1 1998
Bolivia 67.4 1 1997 Pakistan 105.0 1 1997
India 68.1 3 1997 Tanzania 111.7 1 1996
  Work activities undertaken 2005–7
Paraguay 31.2 1 2005 Botswana 68.0 1 2006
India 35.9 2 2006 Nigeria 73.0 1 2007
Bulgaria 40.7 1 2006 Argentina 76.2 3 2006
Ecuador 41.6 1 2005 Georgia 82.6 1 2006
India 45.6 1 2005 Brazil 82.9 2 2005
Burkina Faso 48.0 1 2007 Georgia 84.9 1 2005
Brazil 55.2 3 2006 Vietnam 85.4 1 2005
Brazil 58.2 1 2007 Macedonia 85.7 1 2007
Thailand 59.5 1 2005 Rwanda 90.6 1 2006
Philippines 60.8 1 2006 Philippines 94.8 1 2005
Bosnia and Herzegovina 61.9 2 2006 Chile 98.9 1 2006
Nepal 63.1 1 2006     
Notes: all costs are in 2000 US dollars; number denotes the number of work activities in a given country over which a simple average is taken.
Source: Collier, Kirchberger, and Söderbom (2015), World Bank. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/22664 reproduced under license: CC BY 3.0 IGO.
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The table shows that differences in unit costs are large: an asphalt overlay of 
40–59 mm for 100 km of road would cost US$3.3 million in the Dominican 
Republic, compared to US$10.5 million in Pakistan and US$11.1 million in 
Tanzania. Ghana is somewhat in the middle, with activities costing US$4.3–5.2 
million. There are large differences in unit costs even in the same country. In the 
period 2005–7, an asphalt overlay for a length of 100 km in Brazil could cost 
between US$55.2 and US$82.9 million. Some of the dispersion in the database 
could be explained by differences in the measurement of roads—for example, 
using costs per square metre compared to costs per metre—or estimated versus 
contracted or actual costs. Collier et al. (2016) show that the ranking is largely 
unaffected when using different levels of unit costs. What drives these differences 
in the costs of construction and maintenance projects across countries? The next 
section discusses evidence on drivers of costs.
3.2 How do construction costs affect the link between 
investment effort and investment outcomes?
In light of the scarce knowledge on construction costs across space, literature on 
the link between investment effort and investment outcomes is even more scarce. 
Theoretically, higher costs of infrastructure affect outcomes in at least three ways. 
First, they mechanically decrease the amount of infrastructure a country can 
afford to get for a given budget. Consider that the annual budget available for 
road construction of country C amounts to b. Assume that the unit cost per 
kilometre is p, and for simplicity, assume that there are no fixed costs. The country 
will then be able to afford r = b/p kilometres of roads. The higher p, the lower the 
number of new roads a country is able to afford. Second, costs might affect pro-
ject selection. Assume that projects are selected if they have a certain rate of 
return. High construction costs will decrease the likelihood that a particular pro-
ject is selected. If construction costs differ systematically by sector, this will have 
an effect on spending across sectors. Third, there are important possible dynamic 
effects. High costs in the construction sector might reduce the number of projects 
being carried out in the sector, lowering the ability of the sector to expand its 
capacity. If maintenance costs are high, this might reduce expenditures on main-
tenance and thereby reduce the lifespan of a piece of infrastructure and thereby 
its rate of return.
4. Key bottlenecks in the construction sector
This section discusses key bottlenecks in the construction sector. I start by 
 discussing the capabilities of the sector by analysing data from the World Bank’s 
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Procurement Database. I present some key facts about origin of suppliers for 
projects carried out by different borrower regions. I show that SSA fares poorly 
compared to all other regions in terms of regional firms winning contracts, in 
particular when contract size increases. What constrains growth of firms in the 
construction sector? I discuss institutional constraints such as procurement and 
financing, the role of critical inputs, and governance and corruption.
4.1 Organization and capabilities
There is little systematic knowledge about the market structure of the construc-
tion industry in Africa, as well as the origins of construction sector firms operat-
ing in SSA.3 This is important: when competition is limited, firms can extract 
rents, increasing the cost of infrastructure. Further, the construction sector has 
the possibility to create large numbers of jobs. If local firms cannot participate in 
the sector, these effects will be limited. To shed some light on this question in the 
broader regional context and to provide more detail on the case-study countries, 
I use the major contracts award database, which contains World Bank-financed 
prior-review contract awards from the period 2004–18 (World Bank 2018b).
This is a selected number of projects and likely not representative of 
the   universe of projects. Still, it is likely a good proxy for the capabilities of the 
 sector in successfully bidding for World Bank projects that are auctioned off via 
internationally competitive tendering. For each project, the database contains the 
name of the country borrowing, the supplier country, the amount of the contract, 
and further details on the sector and procurement method. The country listed as 
the supplier represents the place where the supplier is registered, so this may or 
may not be the supplier’s actual country of origin. For example, if a firm sets up a 
subsidiary in a foreign country and employs mainly staff from its origin, this 
would look in the data as if the country has substantial local capacity. The figures 
might therefore be overestimating local capacity. I select projects in civil works 
that were tendered via international competitive bidding to examine the relation-
ship between borrowing country and supplier country.
Table 3.4 tabulates the percentage of projects by region that are carried out by 
different suppliers. Panel A shows all contracts in the database. It shows that at 
least 74 per cent of civil works contracts tendered via international competitive 
bidding are carried out by suppliers within the same region, suggesting that there 
is capacity within each region for the type of civil works carried out under World 
Bank contracts.
3 One notable exception is Zhang and Gutman (2015), who construct a dataset from the World 
Bank’s Summary and Detailed Borrower Procurement Reports.
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Table 3.4 World Bank contract awards by borrower and supplier region


























Panel A:  
All awards
East Asia and 
Pacific
97.87 1.51 0 0 0.41 0 0.21
Europe and 
Central Asia
2.45 95.24 0.29 1.52 0.15 0 0.34
Latin America 
and Caribbean




0.88 13.44 0 84.8 0.44 0.22 0.22
South Asia 7.74 7.59 0.56 0.56 83.26 0 0.28
Sub-Saharan 
Africa
11.48 8.9 0.24 1.59 2.98 74.65 0.16
Total 21.8 28.58 13.3 5.52 8.07 22.38 0.36
Panel B:  
Awards >  
US$2,000,000
East Asia  
and Pacific
97.27 1.82 0 0 0.68 0 0.23
Europe and 
Central Asia
5.42 91.13 0.37 2.71 0.37 0 0
Latin America 
and Caribbean




1.55 17.05 0 80.23 0.78 0 0.39
South Asia 10.84 8.92 0.72 0.96 78.07 0 0.48
Sub-Saharan 
Africa
21.28 14.59 0.37 1.86 5.76 55.95 0.19
Total 27.97 24.77 17.18 6.1 9.42 14.28 0.28
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The region that carries out most of its projects through regional suppliers is 
East Asia and the Pacific, where 9 per cent of projects are carried out by a supplier 
in the region. In Europe and Central Asia, as well as Latin America and the 
Caribbean, 90 per cent or more of contracts are awarded to suppliers within the 
region. The region with the lowest percentage of overall contracts being awarded 
to suppliers in the same region is SSA, where one out of four contracts gets 
 procured outside the continent. Given that contracts have varying sizes, I next 
explore whether there is heterogeneity in this dimension. The database contains 
information on the size of the contract (in US dollars, based on the US Treasury’s 
rate of exchange) when it was awarded.4 Therefore, this does not include cost 
overruns. Unless cost overruns are so substantial that they lead to a country being 
placed in a different category, this does not affect the results. The asymmetry in 
borrower–supplier relationships becomes more pronounced when exploring bor-
rower and supplier origins for contracts above US$2 million. Table 3.4 shows that 
while the fractions remain relatively similar for most regions, in SSA about one 
out of every two contracts gets supplied by a company outside SSA when looking 
at contracts above US$2 million.
In panel C, I limit contracts to a size of at least US$50 million. There are 276 
contracts in the database for this amount. Even for contracts of this size, East Asia 
and the Pacific, as well as Europe and Central Asia, procure more than 94 and 83 
per cent, respectively, from companies in the region. For both the Middle East 
and North Africa and SSA there are big shifts in the region of suppliers. Out of 
4 I use the consumer price index (CPI) of the United States to deflate the contract amount to the 
base year 2010. For 2018 the CPI data were not yet available so I use the same value as 2017.
Panel C:  
Awards >  
US$50,000,000
East Asia  
and Pacific
93.75 6.25 0 0 0 0 0
Europe and 
Central Asia
8.22 83.56 0 6.85 1.37 0 0
Latin America 
and Caribbean




12.5 62.5 0 12.5 12.5 0 0
South Asia 18.87 13.21 0 0 67.92 0 0
Sub-Saharan 
Africa
43.55 24.19 0 0 4.84 27.42 0
Total 31.8 37.46 7.42 2.47 14.84 6.01 0
Source: Author’s calculations based on World Bank (2018b) data.
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the sixty-two contracts in SSA, about one-quarter are carried out by suppliers in 
the region. For this size of contract in SSA, 44 per cent are carried out by suppliers 
from East Asia and the Pacific, and about 24 per cent are carried out by suppliers 
from Europe and Central Asia. It is also worth pointing out that SSA suppliers are 
virtually inactive in other regions. These regional averages mask important het-
erogeneity across countries.
Table 3.5 shows country-level heterogeneity for the case-study countries for the 
515 contracts taking place there. The first panel again shows all contracts, while 
the second limits contracts to those above US$2 million, which is about the 
median contract value for the civil works in the database for our case-study coun-
tries. The third panel shows contracts above US$10 million.
The first panel shows that about 65 per cent of all contracts awarded across the 
case-study countries are carried out by suppliers in the region, which is lower 
than the average across all SSA countries. There are significant differences across 
countries: in Mozambique 47 per cent of the contracts were awarded to suppliers 
from SSA, compared to Tanzania where 82 per cent were awarded to regional 
suppliers. In Zambia and Uganda, 77 per cent and 66 per cent of contracts were 
carried out by suppliers from SSA, compared to Ghana, where just over half of the 
contracts were carried out by suppliers from SSA. Suppliers from East Asia and 
the Pacific deliver about one out of every five contracts in these countries.
When looking at the 257 contracts above US$2 million, Tanzania still procures 
the highest fraction of contracts using suppliers from the region, compared to 
Ghana where only 40 per cent of contracts are carried out by suppliers from the 
region. An equal number of contracts are carried out by suppliers from East Asia 
and the Pacific. In Mozambique, Tanzania, and Uganda, between one-fifth and 
one-third of contracts are carried out by suppliers from East Africa and the 
Pacific. In Zambia, the most important supplier regions apart from SSA are South 
Asia and East Asia and the Pacific, carrying out more than one-quarter of con-
tracts above US$2 million.
Panel C shows data for the seventy-one contracts above US$10 million. At this 
threshold, only one out of every six contracts is supplied locally, while about half of 
the contracts are supplied by firms from East Asia and the Pacific and South Asia. 
About one in five contracts is supplied by firms from Europe and Central Asia.
The database also records the major sector in which the project is carried out. I 
therefore examine heterogeneity with respect to whether a supplier is from the 
same region as a borrower across sectors in the five case-study countries. Among 
the 515 contracts for the five case-study countries, there are four sectors that have 
more than fifty contracts: energy and extractives; the transport sector; water, 
 sanitation, and waste management; and public administration. The data suggest that 
local suppliers are chosen in only 35 per cent of the contracts in the energy and 
extractives sector and the transport sector. About 63 per cent of suppliers come 
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from the same country as the borrower in the water, sanitation, and waste man-
agement sector, and about 85 per cent in civil works in public administration.
Finally, I explore whether there are differences across the study countries in the 
proportion of suppliers that are from the same country. I construct a dummy 
variable that is equal to 1 if a supplier comes from the same country as the bor-
rower. I then regress this on a set of country dummy variables. I use Tanzania 
as the base country, where 79 per cent of suppliers come from Tanzania. The 
Table 3.5 World Bank contract awards by borrower and supplier region, case-study 
countries
   Supplier region   




















Panel A: All 
contracts
Ghana 27.63 6.58 0 3.95 6.58 55.26
Mozambique 33.04 16.07 0 0.89 2.68 47.32
Tanzania 10.26 4.27 0 0.85 2.56 82.05
Uganda 17.78 7.41 2.96 2.22 3.7 65.93
Zambia 6.67 0 0 5.33 10.67 77.33
Total 19.22 7.38 0.78 2.33 4.66 65.63
Panel B: Awards > 
US$2,000,000
Ghana 40.38 9.62 0 3.85 5.77 40.38
Mozambique 31.03 22.41 0 1.72 3.45 41.38
Tanzania 20.34 8.47 0 1.69 3.39 66.1
Uganda 33.9 6.78 6.78 3.39 8.47 40.68
Zambia 13.79 0 0 6.9 13.79 65.52
Total 29.18 10.51 1.56 3.11 6.23 49.42
Panel C: Awards >  
US$10,000,000
Ghana 66.67 16.67 0 0 0 16.67
Mozambique 42.11 31.58 0 0 5.26 21.05
Tanzania 44.44 22.22 0 5.56 11.11 16.67
Uganda 50 18.75 12.5 6.25 12.5 0
Zambia 50 0 0 0 0 50
Total 49.3 21.13 2.82 2.82 7.04 16.9
Source: Author’s calculations based on World Bank (2018b) data.
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country fixed effects are statistically significant for Ghana, Mozambique, and 
Uganda, who are 33 per cent, 45 per cent, and 14 per cent, respectively, less likely 
to have a supplier that is from their country.
This section brought together evidence from World Bank procurement of civil 
works that underwent an internationally competitive tendering process. These 
findings are in line with Zhang and Gutman (2015), who find that SSA is an out-
lier in participation in supplying civil works. They show that as a share of total 
contracts, SSAn suppliers have actually lost market share since 1995. More com-
prehensive data are needed to get a fuller understanding of the capabilities of the 
sector, as well as to understand differences across sectors within countries and 
how they relate to differences in procurement rules. One dimension that has not 
been taken into account in this section due to data availability is the role of sub-
contracting, a common practice in the construction sector. It would be helpful to 
know to what extent different government organizations, and local and foreign 
contractors sub-contract differentially with local suppliers.
4.2 Institutional constraints
4.2.1 Procurement
Governments willing to invest in infrastructure usually award contracts via 
national and international competitive bidding. Mostly these contracts are one-
off contracts. This poses several constraints for local suppliers. First, they might 
be constrained in the preparation of the bidding documents. For example, Asher 
et al. (2018) collected 381 Procurement Evaluation Reports for road maintenance 
projects from six regional offices in Tanzania. They show that about 30 per cent of 
bids submitted for road maintenance contracts get disqualified immediately. 
Failure to conform to the terms, conditions, and specifications stipulated in the 
bidding documents is the main reason for this disqualification. Language—such 
as being required to submit all documents in English—can become an important 
barrier in particular for smaller contractors with lower levels of knowledge. 
Second, when contracts are based on price only, local contractors in Africa are 
often unable to win bids due to lack of access to financing, as I discuss in more 
detail below. Third, contractors often have to prove that they have experience in 
handling a similar project in the past, limiting the type of contracts a given firm 
can take on.
The fact that contracts tend to be one-off contracts has further consequences. 
First, it fails to internalize design decisions during construction and resulting 
maintenance costs if the firm that carries out the construction is different from 
the firm that maintains an asset. Second, it leads to a discontinuous and unpre-
dictable workflow for contractors. Third, it results in hold-up problems: once a 
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contractor wins a project and starts construction, the bargaining power has 
shifted. A further dimension that is important in determining costs is the role of 
competition. Unfortunately, the procurement database used in this chapter only 
contains information on the company winning the bid, but does not contain 
information on the name and origin of all bidders, and the value of their bids.
4.2.2 Financing
Financing is often mentioned as a key constraint for local firms, in particular 
when trying to compete with international firms. One reason for this is that inter-
national firms might have access to lines of credit at low interest rates, making it 
impossible for local firms to compete. This appears to be a major issue in particu-
lar in trying to compete with Chinese firms (Zhang and Gutman 2015).
Lack of upfront financing affects firms in the construction sector by making it 
difficult to purchase or rent the equipment necessary to carry out a contract. 
Rental markets for equipment are often missing due to failures of banks to pro-
vide access to finance. Sometimes it is the government itself that is failing to pay 
contractors. In 2012, the Tanzanian government reported owing US$300 million 
to firms (Sutton and Olomi 2012). Delays in payments are particularly problem-
atic for smaller contractors as they do not have the necessary liquidity to purchase 
further materials or pay their workers. They are further negatively affected by 
being forced to have equipment idle at construction sites until they receive pay-
ment. There is anecdotal evidence that firms prefer contracts by international 
donors for the reason that they know they will be paid on time, and charge higher 
prices to government in anticipation of payment delays. It would be helpful to 
have systematic evidence on this.
4.3 Critical inputs
The availability and cost of critical inputs is an important determinant of the 
slope of the supply curve in the construction sector. Frequently discussed con-
straints include the availability of skilled labour, raw materials, and the cost of 
hiring and purchasing equipment. There is little knowledge to what extent these 
different factors affect the slope of the supply curve in the construction sector. 
One helpful comparable measure for the overall price level of key inputs into 
construction is the data collected by the International Comparison Project 
(World Bank 2015). Eurostat–OECD countries and CIS countries followed a 
 bill-of-quantities approach in which hypothetical projects were priced.5
5 See World Bank (2015) for more detail on how the construction sector purchasing power parities 
were constructed.
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Table 3.6 shows differences in price levels across regions and the case-study 
countries. The benchmark price level is the world, which is set equal to 100. Price 
levels in construction are 85 per cent and 55 per cent higher in the Eurostat–OECD 
and CIS areas, respectively, compared to the global average. In light of the fact that 
the CIS and Eurostat–OECD regions use a different methodology to compute con-
struction sector prices, the comparison is likely more relevant across the remaining 
regions that use a similar method. For completeness, I leave them in the analysis.
Africa and Western Asia have the lowest price levels, about 45 per cent lower 
than the global average. When looking at the case-study countries, price levels in 
the construction sector are highest in Mozambique, at 83 per cent of the global level. 
Zambia, where price levels in construction are about 50 per cent of the global 
level, is roughly in line with the African average. Overall construction price levels 
are much lower in Ghana, Uganda, and Tanzania, at 37, 31, and 29 per cent of 
world levels, respectively. Further research outlining heterogeneity in input costs 
across space would be useful to better understand differences in price levels.
One interesting dimension to consider is the relationship between the price 
level in the construction sector and the price level in general in a country. 
Figure 3.2 plots the price level of GDP versus the price level in construction for all 
African countries in the International Comparison Project, again considering the 
world as the benchmark.
Table 3.6 Differences in price levels across regions
Panel A: Aggregates
Regional rank Region Price level (world = 100)
1 Eurostat–OECD 184.6
2 Commonwealth of  
Independent States
154.7
3 Latin America 84.8
4 Asia and the Pacific 60.5
5 Africa 55.8
6 Western Asia 55.2
Panel B: Case-study countries






Notes: Panel A shows the regional aggregate provided by the International 
Comparison Program, Panel B shows country-level data.
Source: Author’s calculation based on World Bank (2015) data.
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The diagonal shows the 45-degree line. The closer countries are to the line, the 
more similar are price levels of GDP and construction. The upper triangle shows 
countries that have price levels in construction exceeding GDP price levels, and vice 
versa for the lower triangle. The figure shows that the only case-study country in 
which construction has higher price levels than GDP is Mozambique; all other 
countries are in the lower triangle. Overall, within Africa, the ratio of the price level 
of GDP to construction is lowest (between 0.6 and 0.7) in Ghana, Swaziland, 
Botswana, Tunisia, Tanzania, Morocco, Sao Tome, and Principe, and highest 
(between 1.3 and 1.4) in the Congo, Niger, Guinea, Egypt, Burundi, Cameroon, 
and Chad.
4.4 Governance and corruption
Public works contacts and construction have been found to be the most corrupt 
sectors globally (Transparency International 2011), and this might significantly 
affect costs in the construction sector (Kenny 2009; World Bank 2011).6 Collier 
et al. (2016) use data on 3,322 unit costs of work activities collected by the World 
Bank to examine correlates of construction costs, with a focus on government 
6 Arguably, corruption has detrimental effects on the quality of infrastructure as well, as shown by 
Olken (2007). It might also affect project selection, either directly or via an increase in costs, thereby 
































































Figure 3.2 Price levels of GDP and construction
Source: Author’s illustration based on World Bank (2015) data.
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capacity, corruption, and political stability. They control for drivers of unit costs 
related to the ruggedness of the terrain as well as market access. Using various 
measures for corruption and conflict, they find that both more corrupt countries and 
those in conflict have significantly higher unit costs of construction. Costs are 
on average about 30 per cent higher in conflict countries. They are 6.8 per cent 
higher when moving a country from the twenty-fifth percentile of corruption to 
the seventy-fifth percentile. There are a number of channels through which conflict 
or corruption might affect unit costs. First, higher levels of corruption might 
drive up costs as firms’ prices take into account any additional side payments that 
are required to the government to be selected as a contractor. Second, contractors 
might inflate costs and take the difference in costs as payments.
Political instability and conflict can have severe consequences for construction 
costs, arising through various mechanisms: staff security, supply chains, disputes, 
and industrial organization. Companies operating in conflict countries might 
require higher awards to cover security of their staff on site. Disruptions to 
 supply-side networks might delay arrival of important inputs, leading to higher 
costs as machinery stands idle on the construction site. Benamghar and Iimi 
(2011) analyse 155 rural road upgrading contracts in Nepal and find that cost 
overruns and delays in project completion were significantly correlated with 
security incidents. Bidders appear to anticipate these costs by submitting higher 
bids. Disputes over land rights might slow down the construction process. Finally, 
political instability might affect the market structure of the construction industry, 
leading to fewer firms and lower competition. In these circumstances, few of the 
operating firms will be able to capture the rents.
All these discussed bottlenecks might prevent countries from being able to 
facilitate increased levels of investment. The ability of a country to translate an 
additional unit of investment into outcomes in times of accelerated growth in 
investment is known as absorptive capacity. Presbitero (2016) shows that a 3 per cent 
increase in the ratio of public investment to GDP with respect to its five-year 
average is correlated with a 3.9 percentage-point reduction in project outcomes, as 
measured by the World Bank. While project outcomes are not telling us about the 
relationship between surges in demand and costs, this suggests that there are limits 
to the capacity of the construction sector when there is an increase in demand.
5. Policy options
This section discusses some policy options to enhance the sector’s ability to 
respond to surges in demand. Ofori (2012) highlights that many of the bottle-
necks prevailing in the construction sector, some of which were discussed in sec-
tion 4, have not changed over the past decades. Much more research is needed on 
the effects of different policies on the quality and quantity of construction.
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5.1 Institutional and regulatory reforms
An institutional feature of the construction sector is that it often lacks strong rep-
resentation in government (Ofori 2012). In a study on the Zambian construction 
sector, Uriyo et al. (2004) state that, ‘A number of Studies have been conducted 
and recommendations made, but with limited success in implementation, due to 
absence of an institution to champion and steer the industry.’ In an effort to bring 
together actors in the construction sector and promote a set of priorities in the 
sector, several countries have established such representations, known as national 
construction councils. These have been established in a number of countries, 
including Tanzania in 1979 and Zambia in 2003.
In a seminal paper on corruption in construction projects, Olken (2007) evalu-
ates different approaches to monitoring construction works on road construction 
in Indonesia. He conducts a randomized controlled trial in which 600 communi-
ties were selected. Some villages were told that an audit was to take place with 
certainty. The second experiment involved bottom-up monitoring by inviting vil-
lagers to accountability meetings and distributing comment forms along with the 
invitations. He then used an innovative measure of missing expenditures based 
on core samples of the roads. Olken (2007) finds that the audit experiment 
reduced missing expenditures by 8 per cent, while bottom-up monitoring did not 
reduce missing expenditures significantly. An important dimension to consider 
might be the effect of audits on subsequent procurement behaviour: Gerardino 
et al. (2017) find that audits led to more instances of direct contract selection. Using 
data from Italy, Decarolis (2014) presents evidence that suggests that first-price 
sealed bid auctions are suitable when contracts are enforceable.
One possibility to improve corruption in procurement is to use technology to 
augment state capacity via electronic procurement. However, one concern is that 
this might exclude smaller firms that are still unable to access procurement infor-
mation. Lewis-Faupel et al. (2016) investigate bidding data for roads constructed 
under India’s Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana (PMGSY) programme and for 
construction and consulting services in Indonesia. They find that the shift to 
e-procurement has no effect on costs in both countries, but improves quality 
(India) and reduces delays (Indonesia).
An important initiative is the Construction Sector Transparency Initiative 
(CoST), a multi-stakeholder effort to increase transparency in the construction 
sector (Construction Sector Transparency Initiative 2011). The core idea is that 
greater transparency reduces corruption in the construction sector and thereby 
improves the quality of construction sector outcomes. Kenny (2010) discusses the 
costs and benefits of increased levels of transparency in the sector and possible 
implementation issues. While strong regulatory frameworks are important, a 
report by the Construction Sector Transparency Initiative (2011) shows that there 
can be substantial gaps between legal requirements and what information is 
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actually disclosed in the eight pilot countries, with procuring entities claiming to 
‘always disclose’ about 51 per cent of the material project information (key project 
information) that the law prescribes ought to be published. Knowledge appears to 
be a significant barrier, along with the availability of suitable systems for storage 
and retrieval of information. In 2015, CoST expanded to fifteen members.
5.2 Procurement and local content
Purchasing construction goods from companies abroad allows countries to build 
their infrastructure even when local capacity is low. This means countries do not 
have to wait until they have developed local capacity to put in place key pieces of 
infrastructure. However, when local participation in the sector is low, possible 
additional benefits of infrastructure construction, such as employment and 
income generation, are lost. Wells and Hawkins (2008) argue for changes in 
demand-side policies, namely changes related to procurement rules which make 
participation of local companies difficult to impossible. The authors argue for 
changes in the regulatory frameworks in a number of areas. First, a move away 
from the requirement of donors that goods and services ought to be bought from 
donor countries. More data are required to get a better understanding of the scale 
of this problem. Second, access to capital at reasonable rates. In most countries 
this is a significant factor constraining firms. Third, examining potential disad-
vantages in fiscal policies which discriminate against local firms. It is possible that 
large firms are also at an advantage, for example, in their capacity to file for tariff 
exemptions.7 Governments might also want to consider tying contracts over time 
rather than space, resulting in smaller-sized contracts and a more steady work-
flow, allowing mid-size contractors to compete. To understand to what extent a 
lack of skills are constraining the sector, more evidence is needed on different 
types of firm training and vocational training, with a focus on the construction 
sector.
6. Conclusion
The construction sector is unique in the types of goods that are produced. At the 
same time, it also has a unique position in providing the key structures for an 
economy and employing large numbers of people. For several reasons, the con-
struction sector faces increasing demand in resource-rich countries. The slope of 
the supply curve plays a key role in determining to what extent increased demand 
7 See Wells and Hawkins (2008) for a number of concrete policy proposals.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 11/01/20, SPi
Kirchberger 71
leads to increases in output and what the effect on prices is. The capacity of the 
local sector to meet the increased demand determines to what extent local firms 
can participate in the boom led by a natural resource boom.
There are a number of bottlenecks in procurement, financing, and corruption. 
Some of the discussed policies appear straightforward to fix, such as governments 
paying according to the schedule stipulated in the contract with the company, 
allowing companies to carry out projects on time. Donors could take a lead in 
publishing details of all contracts carried out in the infrastructure construction 
sector, including bidding data and why a certain contractor was awarded a con-
tract, as well as cost overruns and reasons behind them. Providing assistance in 
the development of information management systems would be a further way to 
support countries recording information on contracts that are not financed by 
donors. If donors take building local capacity seriously, eliminating aid that is tied 
to the donor country is a natural consequence. With regard to other types of 
measures that promote the sector, much more knowledge of the relative importance 
of bottlenecks and the effects of policies is required.
Natural resource-rich countries have an advantage in the construction sector 
that other countries do not have. They typically have experience with local con-
tent policies and what works and does not work. They can view the construction 
sector as an important sector employing workers that were involved in projects 
directly related to the natural resources, taking advantage of the willingness of 
firms in the natural resources sector to train workers. An improved understand-
ing of the sector and linkages with the rest of the economy will be useful to inform 
policymakers who aim to put in place a policy environment in which the 
 construction sector can flourish.
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Rowing against the Current
Economic Diversification in Africa
John Page
1. Introduction
Although precise data are not available, it is likely that Africa holds about 
30 per cent of the world’s reserves of minerals, oil, and gas. The exploitation of 
natural resources is a huge opportunity, but it also carries considerable risks. One 
such risk lies in the structure of resource-abundant countries themselves. Relative 
prices in resource-exporting economies tend to push them towards economic 
structures in which a high share of output is concentrated in the resource sector 
and non-tradable services (UNIDO 2009). Economic structure matters because 
greater diversity in production and exports is associated globally with more rapid 
and sustained economic growth (IMF  2014). Diversifying beyond the natural 
resource sector is, therefore, critical to sustaining development once natural 
resources are depleted.
The extractive sectors in most sub-Saharan African countries have developed 
as enclaves, weakly linked to the rest of the national economy. Local suppliers 
are seldom used, and except for South Africa and Ghana, an indigenous service 
and supply sector for the mining industry has not developed to any significant 
extent (Hanlin  2011). Most countries continue to export a disproportionate 
share of their resources in raw form, and royalty and fiscal transfer systems 
have historically not yielded much benefit to the communities in which resource 
extraction takes place.
The African Mining Vision (AMV) adopted by African heads of state and 
government in 2009 focused on the mining sector’s potential to help transform 
economies through more diversified growth, and governments in resource-
abundant countries have adopted a wide range of ‘local content’ and ‘value-addition’ 
initiatives. Local content regulations often require resource investors to expand 
national employment opportunities, procure from local suppliers, open equity to 
local partners, and encourage technology transfer. ‘Value addition’ concentrates 
on downstream processing of the extracted resource and promotion of related 
industries.
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This chapter explores several ways to achieve structural change and diversification 
in a resource-rich economy. Section 2 gives a brief history of diversification efforts in 
Africa’s major resource exporters. Section 3 describes the relative price changes that 
accompany a resource boom and suggests policies and public investments to miti-
gate their impact. Section 4 explores some of the issues that influence the participa-
tion of local firms in the resource value chain. Section 5 argues for broadening the 
options for diversification through the development of trad able services and agro-
industries and investments in knowledge. Section 6 concludes.
2. Diversification initiatives
In an effort to achieve the vision of more diversified growth from natural 
resources, resource-rich economies across Africa are introducing requirements 
for local content and value addition in their policy, legislative, and regulatory 
frameworks for the natural resources sector. A local content requirement is a 
regu la tion that requires domestic procurement of a specified fraction of a final 
good or service. Usually, legislation, regulations, or mineral extraction agree-
ments set minimum targets for employment of local staff, purchases from national 
suppliers of goods and services, investment in local enterprise development, and 
support for local economic development around extractive activities. Value-addition 
initiatives include efforts to develop ‘beneficiation’ of raw commodities and 
promotion of related downstream industries.
Africa’s earliest local content initiatives in the mineral, oil, and gas sectors date 
to the 1960s and 1970s. Increasing backward linkages from extractive companies 
to local manufacturers was a key component of Zambia’s post-independence 
industrialization strategy, pursued through a combination of preferential pro-
curement from the state-owned Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM) 
and import substitution. Strong linkages between ZCCM, its suppliers, and pub-
lic research and training institutions developed during the 1980s, but during the 
1990s, with the privatization of the nationally owned mines and the introduction 
of trade and investment liberalization measures, Zambia’s manufacturing cap-
abil ities in the mining supply chain largely eroded (Fessehaie 2012). Recently, 
the government has again attempted to expand local content. Zambia’s Mineral 
Resource Development Policy, 2013 and the revised Mines and Mineral Development 
Act, 2015 contain requirements for preferences in employment and procurement 
of goods and services (OECD 2017).
The Nigerian oil industry was originally the exclusive domain of the inter-
nation al oil companies. In 1971, the government established the National Oil 
Corporation to promote indigenization of the industry, but little actually changed 
until the turn of the twenty-first century. Local content ranged from 3 to 5 per cent 
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of the value of production from the 1970s to the 1990s (UNCTAD 2006). In 2000, 
the government included commitment to the development of Nigerian expertise 
in oil operations and development of input suppliers among the criteria for award 
of concessions. In addition, petroleum contracts were revised to include training 
and local employment obligations. Local content requirements became more 
stringent in 2005, and by 2009 Nigeria had reached 39 per cent local content in 
petroleum operations (Tordo  2009). Nigeria has gradually developed some 
important upstream industries—particularly in fabrication and well construction—
linked to the oil and natural gas value chain (Oyejide and Adewuyi 2011). Deeper 
forms of cooperation aimed at improving quality, delivery, and reliability are 
evolving, including developing quality assurance systems, upgrading technology, 
and training labour.
The Petroleum Activity Law of 1976 assigned sole ownership of Angola’s 
hydrocarbon resources and mining rights to the Angolan state, which manages 
the sector through Sonangol, the national oil company. Sonangol sees itself as an 
active investor in oil extraction and in forward processing along the lines of 
Petrobras in Brazil. It is also responsible for developing linkages to the petroleum 
value chain for locally owned firms. State ownership of the resource and concession 
rights gives the government significant bargaining power for preferential treatment 
of national firms in the supply of goods and services along the value chain (Morris 
et al.  2011). Sonangol requires that unless the price of local inputs exceeds the 
price of imports by more than 10 per cent, all goods and services not requiring 
vaguely defined ‘large capital investments and specialized know-how’ must be 
sourced from firms having more than 51 per cent of share capital owned by 
Angolan citizens (Teka 2011).
Ghana has a long history of gold mining, and a supplier industry linked to the 
mining value chain has developed gradually. First-tier suppliers include global 
mine construction companies, international mining equipment companies, input 
suppliers, and agents and distributors. Local firms are smaller first-tier and 
second-tier suppliers in metals and metalworking, chemicals and plastics, civil 
en gin eer ing, business services, and logistics. Since 2010, Ghana has introduced a 
series of local content policies in both mining and the oil and gas sector. Its 
Minerals and Mining Regulations of 2012 focused explicitly on employment and 
promotion of the local workforce and procurement of locally produced inputs 
(Morris et al. 2011). Between 2009 and 2012, employment of Ghanaian nationals 
in the mining sector increased by 65 per cent (ECA 2013). Companies engaged in 
resource extraction allocate staff to identify local suppliers and build capacity, and 
several have introduced programmes designed to increase local procurement 
from communities based close to the mines. The Petroleum Local Content 
and Local Participation Regulations 2013 define Ghana’s expectations of local 
content in oil and gas. The regulations set out detailed targets for minimum 
local employment and procurement of services and goods in the oil and gas 
sector that grad ual ly increase over ten years (OECD 2017).
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In Tanzania, the 1997 Mineral Policy and the 2012 Mineral Act emphasized 
developing backward linkages to the mining sector, but failed to set out targets, 
incentives, or penalties, leaving implementation largely to voluntary compliance. 
In gold exploration, local content is limited to drilling services and logistics, while in 
gold mining it is limited to fuel, equipment repair and maintenance, and basic 
services. Most goods and services are imported. The limited ability of local firms 
to meet the quality and price standards of lead suppliers and the multinational 
mining companies is one reason for lack of participation in the mining value 
chain. Potential suppliers also face a major policy-driven disadvantage: import 
tariff exemptions for mining inputs have been granted to the mines but not to 
components imported by their domestic suppliers (ECA  2013). Major new 
 discoveries of natural gas have further complicated Tanzania’s efforts to develop 
linkages in the natural resources value chain. The Petroleum (Local Content) 
Regulations 2017 give priority to maximizing local participation in the gas sector—
including in highly specialized operations—over developing linkages with other 
sectors. It is uncertain whether Tanzania has sufficient gas reserves to justify 
investing in the development of highly specialized skills or the production of 
goods and services of use only to the gas sector, and there is little information on 
local capabilities (Roe 2017; Scurfield et al. 2017).
Mozambique has identified several areas in which resource-extraction firms 
are required to make special efforts to increase local participation. Mining firms 
are obliged to have between 5 and 20 per cent of their equity held by Mozambicans. 
Local content requirements are set out in the Mining Law and Petroleum Law, 
both of 2014. These require that contracts for the procurement of goods and 
services give preferential treatment to ‘the purchase of local goods and services 
when such goods and services are internationally comparable in terms of quality, 
availability, and quantity required and are offered at prices inclusive of taxes not 
higher than ten percent of the available imported goods’. The legal framework is 
at an early stage in terms of defining objectives and the means to achieve them. 
Recent regulatory reforms seek to increase the participation of Mozambicans 
in the mining sector gradually, without obliging firms to adhere to numerical targets, 
and a number of suppliers’ development programmes have been instituted with 
varied success (OECD 2017).
South Africa has significant expertise in mining and mining-related supply 
industries. It has several globally competitive suppliers and has developed clusters 
of firms that provide world-class goods and services to the global mining 
industry (Kaplan 2012). Some 89 per cent of spending by mining firms is local, 
and the local content of exports of mining equipment is estimated at 90 per cent. 
South African suppliers are global leaders in a number of areas, such as underground 
locomotives, mining fans, and submersible pumps (ECA 2013). South Africa’s 
Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act of 2003 is a post-apartheid 
effort to promote local ownership among historically disadvantaged citizens. 
Its local content requirements include employment quotas at all levels, ownership 
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requirements, procurement targets, mandatory expenditure on training, and 
sup pliers’ development. Mining rights holders are encouraged by the Mining 
Charter (2004) to procure an increasing percentage of their capital goods, 
 consumables, and services from Black Economic Empowerment suppliers 
(OECD 2017).
Botswana has pursued the idea of processing uncut diamonds since the 1980s, 
when government pressure on De Beers led to the establishment of three cutting 
and polishing factories. A major opportunity to ratchet up the pressure for for-
ward linkages came in 2005, when De Beers’ twenty-five-year mining licence was 
due for renewal. The government insisted that for De Beers to renew its licence it 
should use its considerable market power to help Botswana create a globally 
competitive diamond cutting and polishing industry. In 2006, the government 
invited some of the world’s leading cutting and polishing companies to establish 
factories in Botswana. To promote the transfer of cutting and polishing skills to 
local citizens, the companies receive rough diamond allocations on the condition 
that they hire and train locals in cutting and polishing skills. The sixteen factories 
currently in operation employ more than three thousand people, most of whom 
are Botswanan citizens. Policies designed to enhance capabilities further down 
the value chain—for example, in jewellery manufacture and trading—are still 
under development (Mbayi 2011).
Overall, progress in increasing local content and value addition has been mixed. 
Most countries have succeeded in introducing and enforcing requirements 
for  the employment and gradual skilling-up of nationals. Changes in mining 
technology, however, mean that direct employment in mining is on the decline. 
The hydrocarbon sector is highly capital- and skill-intensive and offers limited 
prospects for the employment of large numbers of national workers. These 
technology-driven realities make employment requirements increasingly difficult 
to enforce, raising questions about the primacy of the employment ob ject ive in 
local content legislation.
Local procurement regulations have met with limited success for several 
 reasons, including the small size of local markets and the scarcity of small and 
medium enterprises capable of satisfying industry standards in the procurement 
of goods and services. In many countries the private sector has been too weak to 
respond to local content policy initiatives (Ramdoo 2015). Poor implementation 
of local content policies has also been a common problem, and in several countries 
programmes aimed at the natural resources sector lack coherence with broader 
economic development policies (Morris et al. 2011).
3. Dealing with Dutch disease
The relative price changes that occur in a resource-abundant economy make 
diversification into tradable goods production outside the natural resources 
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sector difficult. During a commodity boom, the income from resource extraction 
increases the demand for all goods. In the case of internationally traded goods, 
imports can meet the increased demand, but because non-traded goods are 
subject to increasing marginal costs, the relative price of non-tradables tends to 
rise. The foreign exchange market reflects the increase in a real exchange rate 
ap pre ci ation. This ‘Dutch disease’ tends to make the development of manufac-
turing and other tradable goods and services outside the minerals sector more 
difficult.
International competitiveness, however, is not solely determined by the exchange 
rate. Governments can enhance the productivity of private investments outside 
the natural resource sector by undertaking institutional and regulatory reforms 
and making public investments that lower the costs of producing tradable goods; 
in short, by improving the ‘investment climate’ (Stern 2001). The investment climate 
has come to be broadly and somewhat vaguely defined, but three of its key 
elements are particularly relevant to dealing with Dutch disease—regu la tion, 
infrastructure, and skills. Well-designed regulatory reforms, reliable elec tric al 
power, lower costs of transport, and workers better able to perform their jobs 
increase the potential productivity of all firms (Newman et al.  2016). Thus, 
governments can complement direct efforts to link domestic firms to the resource 
value chain with broader investments and reforms to improve the investment 
climate. An added benefit is that the investment climate reforms will help 
domestic firms attempting to enter the natural resource value chain.
3.1 Regulatory reform
Reforms that reduce regulatory compliance costs and encourage firm entry and 
exit can have high payoffs. Surveys of firms in resource-abundant African countries 
highlight a wide range of areas in which regulatory or administrative burdens 
raise costs and reduce competitiveness. In Uganda, for example, inadequate 
regulatory capacity and an unclear framework increase the regulatory burden. 
Senior managers of manufacturing firms spend more than thirteen days each year 
on average dealing with government officials, and 40 per cent of the manufacturing 
firms surveyed complained that regulations were not interpreted consistently 
(Henstridge and Page 2012). In Mozambique, business regulations—and the oppor-
tunities for corruption engendered by the regulatory regime—increase firms’ 
costs and reduce competitiveness (World Bank  2009a). In Kenya, which has 
recently discovered oil, almost one-third of firms ranked corruption—ranging 
from payments for utility hook-ups to informal payments in public procurement—
among the top three problems faced. Three-quarters of Kenyan firms reported 
having to make payments to public officials to ‘get things done’, and the more 
often inspectors visited firms, the more likely they were to ask for informal 
payments (World Bank 2009b).
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Reforms that encourage the entry and exit of firms can have a positive impact 
on productivity. In open economies, imports should provide competition in 
domestic markets, yet World Bank Enterprise Surveys often find that formal-sector 
firms in Africa do not feel pressed by competition. More than 70 per cent of 
African countries rank in the bottom half on the perceived intensity of local 
competition (World Bank 2016b). Changes to rules that make markets more open 
and contestable—by facilitating imports, supporting entry in production or 
op er ation, and giving all firms an opportunity to compete on common ground—
can reduce concentration and the likelihood of anticompetitive practices. 
Building capacity to help strengthen competition authorities and increase the 
effectiveness of competition policy is also important.
Institutional and regulatory reforms should be undertaken soon after natural 
resources are discovered. This is because they may prove more difficult to initiate 
and sustain in resource-rich countries once resource revenues start to flow. 
Incumbent workers and firms benefit from lack of competition and have little 
incentive to support improvements in the regulatory regime. Normally pressures 
for regulatory reform would come from other interest groups in society, but there 
is evidence that rent-seeking interests gradually make competing interest groups 
less successful in changing policy in resource-exporting countries (Collier and 
Hoeffler 2008).
3.2 Infrastructure and skills
The revenues that flow from natural resources open fiscal space for governments 
of resource-abundant economies to address two of the fundamental constraints 
to competitiveness in Africa: lack of infrastructure and skills. African firms pay a 
substantial productivity penalty because of poor infrastructure (Escribano et al. 
2010). Sub-Saharan Africa lags at least 20 percentage points behind the average 
for low-income countries on almost all major infrastructure measures. In add ition, 
the quality of service is low, supplies are unreliable, and disruptions are frequent 
and unpredictable (Newman et al.  2016). The quality of electricity service is 
ranked as a major problem by more than half of the firms in more than half of the 
African countries in the World Bank’s Investment Climate Assessments. Transport 
comes a close second to power across the region. Road infrastructure has received 
little attention, as, until recently, have ports and railways.
Investments in trade-related infrastructure can make an important contribution 
to diversification. By reducing both the variable and fixed costs of exporting, 
trade facilitation increases the exports of those firms already involved in inter-
nation al trade, while enabling new firms to export for the first time. Global value 
chains in activities from manufacturing to horticulture are highly demanding of 
trade logistics. The nine currently resource-rich African countries have an 
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 11/01/20, SPi
Page 81
average trade-related infrastructure (ports, rail, road, and telecommunications) 
ranking of 125 out of 160 countries in the World Bank Trade Logistics Index 
(World Bank 2016a). Seven are in the bottom third of the global distribution and 
four are in the bottom quintile. Public investments in power, transport, and trade 
logistics can boost competitiveness.
Despite significant gains in average levels of schooling, the region’s workforce 
is the least skilled in the world (World Bank 2017). In many countries, the skills 
constraint is felt most strongly in more productive and export-oriented firms. 
Firms with at least 20 employees—those that are generating employment in 
growing economies—are feeling the skills shortage as well. Employers in the 
region are increasingly demanding workers with multiple skills. More than half of 
the firms surveyed as part of the School to Work Transition surveys in several 
African countries reported that technical, interpersonal, and higher-order cognitive 
skills (problem-solving and decision-making) are important to them. Because 
poor learning outcomes diminish the foundational skills of workers, improvements 
in quality at all levels are needed. Investments in demand-driven technical and 
vocational education and training, higher education, entrepreneurship, and 
business training programmes can spur productivity growth (World Bank 2017). 
In an increasingly austere aid environment, governments can use resource revenues 
to address the skills gap.
Unmet needs in infrastructure and skills increase pressures for spending 
 following new discoveries, but prudent revenue management requires establishing 
how much public spending should increase and how much to save. Not all infra-
structure and education projects will have the same impact. Careful cost–benefit 
analysis of infrastructure investments is essential, and governments should have a 
prioritized list of vetted projects ready for funding. Applying this rule is actually 
more complex than it appears. It is difficult to appraise the possible catalytic effect 
of investments in infrastructure and human capital on private investment. 
Nevertheless, problems with addressing externalities should not be an excuse for 
failure to evaluate the vast majority of investment projects. For example, rigorous 
assessments of the cost effectiveness of proposed skill development programmes 
can be undertaken. Once the overall volume of spending consistent with prudent 
public investment is set, the revenue that remains should be parked in invest-
ments overseas.
Because the needs in infrastructure and skills are large and the timing of rev enues 
is uncertain, governments face strong pressures to borrow in anticipation of the 
arrival of resource revenues. Careful debt management is essential. In the case of 
Ghana, for example, the government ramped up infrastructure spending before 
resource revenues were in place, raising the public debt burden through sovereign 
borrowing. Sovereign debt generally comes with high costs and short maturities. 
This may adversely affect the ability to borrow in the future. In situations in which 
governments face external credit constraints, it may even make sense to use a 
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portion of the resource windfall to repay foreign debt (van der Ploeg and 
Venables 2011).
4. Linking industry to the resource
In resource-rich countries, foreign investors are often competing to gain access to 
the resource. This gives an opportunity to governments to attempt to integrate 
local companies into the supply chains of the multinational resource-extraction 
firms. One widely used policy has been to require preferential local procurement, 
but simple rules of thumb—like domestic content legislation—are frequently 
ineffective. Backward linkages to input suppliers and forward linkages to processors 
are often a function of the age and the scale of the resource sector in the country 
(ECA  2013). Ghana and South Africa’s relative success in integrating mineral 
development with the rest of the economy is due to historical circumstances. 
Nigeria’s, Mozambique’s, and Tanzania’s efforts in building resource-based 
industrialization using oil and gas have not been as effective. Botswana’s success 
in diamond cutting and polishing mainly reflects its market power in the global 
diamond market.
The supply chains of multinational companies (MNCs) in resource extraction 
generally have a pyramid structure. The multinational company will have a small 
number of lead subcontractors, some international and some local. Each lead 
subcontractor will then contract other companies to supply inputs. These are the 
second-tier subcontractors. Only a small number of local firms can play the lead 
subcontractor role in any area of activity, and the MNCs may prefer to operate 
almost exclusively with foreign lead subcontractors. Even where local capability 
is available, local suppliers may not have the opportunity to tender. For example, 
in 2013 the Zambian Association of Manufacturers reported that mining procure-
ment managers in the Copperbelt were unaware of local manufacturing of 
roofing sheets, a significant and competitive metal fabrication industry 
(Fessehaie et al. 2016).
Governments and the public, on the other hand, frequently have inflated 
expectations of how many domestic firms can be integrated into the resource-
related value chain. There is a tendency for policymakers to focus upstream on 
opportunities for local engineering, fabrication, assembly, and construction firms 
to participate in the new extractive investments. Downstream, the emphasis tends 
to be on further processing of the resource. Ghana’s industrial development strategy, 
for example, calls for the establishment of new industries such as petrochemicals, 
fertilizer, and liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) cylinder production linked to its oil 
and gas industry. This is an overly narrow view of what kinds of firms can benefit 
from the resource boom and runs the risk of concentrating on capital-intensive 
sectors that generate little employment. It also diverts attention from other 
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opportunities, some as mundane as cleaning, catering, security, and personnel 
transport, which are often locally outsourced in African resource-producing 
countries (Morris et al. 2011).
4.1 Building a public–private partnership
Integration of local firms into the resource value chain depends on addressing the 
priorities and concerns of both the MNCs and the government. This is a more 
complex undertaking than legislating or regulating local content. It depends on 
the ability of government and industry to develop an effective public–private 
partnership. Most major resource-extraction multinationals devote considerable 
resources to the management of local content development and systematically 
analyse patterns of local procurement with a view to improving their processes. 
A major Zambian mining MNC, for example, has created a local business 
development programme that focuses on improving delivery time, increasing 
access to finance, providing skills and technical expertise, and developing quality 
assurance systems (ECA 2013).
From the public-sector side, well-designed institutions to negotiate and man-
age local participation are critical to success. Sutton (2012) advocates creating 
an institutional focal point—located within the office of the head of state or 
government—to act as the broker between the MNCs and domestic firms.1 The 
agency should have deep familiarity with the range of capabilities of domestic 
companies and be staffed with professionals with the ability to deal on equal 
terms with executives in the procurement divisions of the MNCs. Its primary 
functions are to propose realistic targets for integrating local firms into each area 
of operation and to take the lead role in establishing qualification schemes for 
domestic firms to achieve ‘approved vendor’ status, including the design of 
appropriate training programmes. Some staff should have industry experience, 
while others require a public-sector background to facilitate coordination across 
government agencies.
A high-level champion is crucial to success. Because the agency is responsible 
for leading negotiations with the MNCs, it needs to have—and be seen to have—
support at the highest political level. A senior sponsor in government can also be 
useful in resolving conflicts among the multiple interests that are engaged in 
local content issues. The programme and the agency should be subject to periodic 
reviews and evaluated against observable outcomes—for example, the rate of 
growth of jobs. It should also be subject to a sunset clause: requiring that a 
programme expire unless a review recommends that it be extended places the 
burden on advocates to show why it remains relevant (Page and Tarp 2017).
1 He calls it a ‘Local Content Unit (LCU)’.
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4.2 Improving coordination and reducing complexity
Efforts aimed at building local capabilities are crosscutting and require balancing 
different, sometimes conflicting, priorities. Because the development of local 
content is part of the overall planning process, a clear link to the planning ministry 
is needed. One benefit of having an institutional focal point and a high-level 
champion in government is improved incentives for coordinated behaviour across 
ministries. Lack of coordination among different government entities and levels 
of government may result in conflicting regulations, increased administrative 
costs, delays in project execution, and in some cases may create an incentive for 
rent-seeking behaviour. In Angola, for example, industrial policy is the responsi-
bility of the industry ministry, while policy towards the oil sector (including 
backward linkages) is the responsibility of the Ministry of Petroleum and 
Sonangol. There are no joint-working arrangements in policy design and imple-
mentation (Teko 2011).
In many resource-rich countries, local content regulations are complex, adding 
to the administrative costs of firms and exceeding the capacity of the regulators. 
In Ghana and South Africa, resource companies appear to have been sending 
large volumes of documents to regulatory bodies, knowing that the capacity of 
these bodies to read and digest them is limited (ECA 2013). Especially for small 
businesses, assimilating and complying with complex administrative and/or tech-
nical rules can create an unreasonable burden. One attractive feature of creating a 
focal agency is that it can reduce complexity by concentrating reporting require-
ments on specific constraints identified by the MNCs and the local private sector.
4.3 Training
Because initially only a small number of local firms may be able to play a role in 
any area of activity along the resource value chain, training programmes for 
potential supplying firms—covering both technical and business management 
subjects—are needed. The objective of training is to raise the capabilities of local 
firms to the minimum level required to allow them to become ‘approved vendors’ 
and enter the MNC value chains. For training to succeed, the government and the 
resource-extraction companies need to agree on the design of training, and on 
the qualification process through which a firm achieves approved vendor status. 
Supplying training without buy-in by both parties is unlikely to lead to good out-
comes. Ghana, for example, established an Enterprise Development Centre 
(EDC) to enhance the capacity of indigenous firms to participate in the oil and 
gas industry, but only a few well-established medium- to large-scale Ghanaian 
enterprises have been able to take advantage of the opportunities provided 
(Ablo 2015).
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Randomized experiments suggest that management training at the firm level is 
a potential channel for building the capabilities of local firms (Bloom et al. 2013), 
but they also raise some red flags. The results of most training programmes tar-
geted at micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs) have been disappointing 
(McKenzie and Woodruff 2012). The challenge is to identify firms that can benefit 
most from training. These are likely to be higher-capability firms (Otsuka and 
Sonobe  2014). If firms have failed to adopt good management practices out of 
ignorance, training programmes in basic management, like inventory and quality 
control, targeted to higher-capability firms offer a potentially substantial payoff in 
terms of increased productivity. Unless incentives are right, however, training 
may not achieve its full potential. When firms lack competitive pressure, they 
often fail to see the need to improve performance (Bloom et al. 2013).
Because the number of domestic firms hoping to benefit from a resource boom 
is potentially large, choosing those eligible for training must balance selectivity 
against effectiveness. Narrow or opaque selection criteria may encourage rent-
seeking, while broad criteria may result in attempting to train too many low-
capability firms. This can be addressed by setting up a process that allows any 
local firm to apply but specifies in advance a set of criteria that will be used in 
selecting applicants. Oversight of the programme, ideally by an independent 
watchdog organization composed of public-sector, private-sector, and civil-society 
representatives with a reputation for probity and public disclosure of their findings 
can help to diminish concerns of abuse.
5. Widening the options
Although new discoveries of natural resources make the process of diversification 
more challenging, they also offer new opportunities. This section explores two. 
The first is to broaden the perspective on diversification from a focus on manu-
facturing to include other tradable goods and services. The second is to develop 
knowledge, either linked to the resource itself or in areas in which a resource-
abundant economy may have geographical or other location-specific sources of 
comparative advantage.
5.1 Industries without smokestacks
As Africa enters its next phase of development, it confronts a global economy 
substantially different from previous ‘late industrializers’. Our understanding of 
industry is changing. Today, new technologies have spawned a growing number 
of services and agro-industries—including horticulture—that share many charac-
teristics with manufacturing. They are tradable, have high value added per 
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worker, and can absorb large numbers of workers. Like manufacturing, these 
‘industries without smokestacks’ benefit from technological change, productivity 
growth, scale, and agglomeration economies.2 They may provide an alternative 
path towards diversification.
Since the 1980s, global trade in services has grown faster than merchandise 
trade. Modern service exports (computer and information services, financial 
services, business services, and communication) are growing especially rapidly. 
In 2014, the tourism industry provided an estimated 277 million jobs and accounted 
for about 9.8 per cent of global gross domestic product (GDP) (Daly and Gereffi 
2018). In horticulture, a logistics-based revolution has occurred: once efficient 
logistics are in place, countries with suitable agroecological conditions are able to 
produce high-value products, such as cut flowers and fresh vegetables, which 
formerly needed to be grown near their point of consumption. As a result, 
horticultural exports increased to around 12 per cent of global agricultural 
exports in 2014 (Fukase and Martin 2018).
Where the service sector has the characteristics attributed to manufacturing—
strong linkages, productivity growth, and technological innovations—it can 
act as an engine of structural change.3 Several modern service sectors—such as 
information and communications technology (ICT) services, transport, and 
logistics—have become leading sectors in a number of countries (Lavopa 2015; 
Lavopa and Szirmai 2014). In tourism and horticulture, leading firms connect 
customers and service providers along global value chains that push suppliers 
to upgrade product quality, respond to changing tastes, and reduce costs. 
Participation in global value chains is a significant driver of labour productivity. 
An increase of 10 per cent in the level of global value chain participation increased 
average prod uct iv ity by close to 1.7 per cent (Constantinescu et al. 2017).
Chile, the world’s leading copper producer, was a pioneer in diversifying 
through industries without smokestacks. Its abundant lakes and rivers are ideal 
for the cultivation of salmon, and its climate and topography are well suited to the 
production of wine. By 2000, Chile had become the world’s second-largest 
producer of Atlantic salmon and the world’s fourth largest exporter of wine. 
African resource exporters may also find opportunities to diversify into horticulture, 
agro-industry, or tradable services, where geography or other endowments 
provide a comparative advantage.
Because industries without smokestacks share many firm characteristics with 
‘smokestack’ industries—tradability foremost among them—it is possible to 
develop a diversification strategy that applies broadly to manufacturing, tradable 
services, agro-industry, and horticulture. The strategy has two components—
investment climate reforms and an ‘export push’. Investment climate reforms have 
2 See Ghani and Kharas (2010).
3 See, for example, Ghani and O’Connell (2014), Szirmai and Verspagen (2015), and Tregenna 
(2015).
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the potential to raise the productivity of firms in industries without smokestacks, 
as well as in manufacturing.4 The regulatory regime in telecommunications is 
vital to IT-enabled services. Tourism is strongly dependent on how the air transport 
system is regulated and is sensitive to the behaviour of public officials ran ging 
from immigration inspectors to the police. Horticultural exports are perishable 
and particularly vulnerable to delays in shipping caused by inefficient or corrupt 
inspection procedures at airports. Because productivity in services has an important 
impact on productivity levels across the economy, encouraging a competitive 
environment is essential.
Lack of infrastructure and skills limits the ability to diversify. Trade-related 
infrastructure directly affects the competitiveness of manufactured and horticultural 
exports. High-speed data transmission is critical to exporting a wide range of 
services and especially to IT-intensive exports. Most African countries lack 
adequate backbone IT infrastructure because they went straight to mobile networks 
without investing in connectivity first. Tourist-related infrastructure is a neces-
sary condition for fully leveraging tourism potential (Daly and Gereffi 2018). In 
sub-Saharan Africa, many hotels have to provide their own infrastructure services, 
such as power, water filtration and treatment, solid waste removal and sewage 
treatment and disposal, to compensate for unreliable public services. Such 
investments raise capital and operating costs and adversely affect competitiveness 
(World Bank 2014).
In Kenya, attempts to expand the IT-enabled services industry rapidly have 
encountered constraints due to a lack of software development and project 
management skills (Ngui Muchai and Kimuyu 2018). Senegal’s rank among the 
top fifty potential suppliers of outsourcing services has fallen significantly in 
the last five years due to weakness in the quality and quantity of human 
resources (English 2018). The skills needed to interact with tourists and to pro-
vide the many ‘back office’ services that are inputs into the production of high-
quality tourism are essential to further development of the tourism industry 
(Daly and Gereffi 2018).
For most countries in Africa, regional and global export markets represent the 
best option for rapid growth of manufacturing and industries without smokestacks. 
Exports permit firms to realize economies of scale, and in low-income countries the 
act of exporting raises firm-level productivity through learning (Harrison and 
Rodriguez-Clare 2010). Because individual firms in resource-abundant economies 
face high costs of entering export markets, governments need to develop an ‘export 
push’—a coherent package of trade policies, public investments, regulatory reforms, 
and institutional changes to support new exporters.
4 It is important to keep in mind that each activity has some unique characteristics that imply gen-
eric, and ‘one size fits all’ policymaking may be ineffective. Complementary sector-specific public 
actions may also be required.
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A critical component of the export push is prudent macroeconomic management 
of the resource windfall. While some appreciation of the exchange rate is 
unavoidable, public expenditures must be managed to reduce excessive upward 
pressure. The structure of protection plays an important role in ensuring that 
exporting is as attractive as producing for the local market. Duty drawback, tariff 
exemption, and VAT reimbursement schemes are often complex and poorly 
administered; these can be reformed. Investments and institutional reforms to 
improve trade logistics are essential, including institutional reforms at the 
regional level to improve transnational transport corridors. Market structure in 
the transport sector and inappropriate regulations can also impede exports, and 
should be addressed.
5.2 Investing in knowledge
In addition to investments in general production skills, there is a strong case for 
attempting to build specialist knowledge linked to the extractive industries them-
selves. The South African mining supplier industry has developed globally com-
petitive capabilities based on serving its domestic mining industry. South Africa 
is a world leader in a wide range of mining equipment products, including spirals 
for washing coal, water pumps, underground locomotives, and ventilation. The 
area in which South African expertise is particularly advanced is in turnkey deep-
level mine design and operation. At the time oil was discovered, Norway had no 
expertise in the oil industry. The Norwegian government invested in building 
specialist knowledge about deep-sea oil exploration through its universities. Now, 
Norway’s knowledge-based oil service industry is a major source of income in its 
own right. Qatar’s expertise is in dealing with the environmental consequences of 
oil spills. Qatari companies have developed a global reputation that has involved 
them is such high-profile containment and clean-up operations as the BP spill 
in the Gulf of Mexico. Initially, resource-abundant economies should attempt 
to strengthen the geology and engineering departments of universities, with 
the goal of developing more technically qualified staff and, perhaps, a services 
export industry. A recent public–private partnership between the Jubilee 
Partners and Takoradi Polytechnic in Ghana, the Jubilee Technical Training 
Center (JTTC), is an example. The first batch of petroleum engineering train-
ees graduated in 2014.
Resource exporters may also have the opportunity to use knowledge for diver-
sification into industries without smokestacks. IT-enabled services, horticulture, 
and tourism all depend on knowledge of potential markets and production. 
In Chile, the main drivers of growth in both salmon and wine were investments 
in the generation and diffusion of production knowledge across firms. The initiative 
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was led by an innovative public–private partnership, the Fundación Chile, and 
eventually involved private firms, government at all levels, universities, and 
specialist research institutes (Kjöllerström and Dallto 2007). Similar three-way 
partnerships with the private sector, universities, and specialist research institutions 
can be developed around tradable services or agro-industries in which resource-
abundant economies have location-specific comparative advantage.
6. Conclusions
Discoveries of oil, gas, and minerals represent an unparalleled opportunity for 
Africa’s resource-abundant economies, but one accompanied by substantial risks. 
For the typical resource-rich economy in Africa, natural resources are not suffi-
ciently abundant to ignore economic structure, and diversification is important. It 
helps to establish the basis for long-term growth and development once the 
resource has been depleted. The relative price changes that occur in resource-
exporting economies—symptoms of Dutch disease—place them at a disadvan-
tage with respect to diversification. The public revenues accruing to governments 
from resource extraction—together with complementary institutional and policy 
reforms—can be used to offset this disadvantage through improvements in the 
investment climate. Institutional and regulatory reforms and investments in 
infrastructure and skills can help to raise the productivity of firms outside of the 
resource sector.
Beyond investments in institutions, infrastructure, and skills, African gov-
ernments have a range of options for diversification. The common approach is to 
use the presence of the resource to acquire firm capabilities from global resource 
investors. Because they control access to the resource, governments can seek to 
integrate local suppliers into the resource value chain. This is closest in spirit to 
the concept of local content held by most African policymakers, but it is not a 
trivial task. It requires a deep understanding of the current capabilities of 
domestic firms and a strong commitment to develop the institutional framework 
needed to expand them.
Governments can widen the options for diversification to include ‘industries 
without smokestacks’. Agro-industry, tourism, and tradable services may prove 
less vulnerable to appreciation of the real exchange rate than task-based manufac-
tured exports. And, because they share many characteristics in common with 
manufacturing, a common diversification strategy based on investment climate 
reforms and an export push can be effective. Governments can also use resource 
revenues to develop specialized knowledge, linked either to the resource itself or 
in industries with geographical or other country-specific sources of comparative 
advantage to develop non-traditional exports.
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The Boom, the Bust, and the Dynamics of 
Oil Resource Management in Ghana
Ernest Aryeetey and Ishmael Ackah
1. Introduction
‘Even without oil, we are doing so well. With oil as a shot in the arm, we’re going 
to fly.’1 These were the words of President John Kufuor, under whose adminis-
tration in 2007 oil was discovered in Ghana in commercial quantities. The 
announcement came with huge expectation throughout Ghana. Indeed, through-
out the world petroleum discoveries inspire hope. This hope is derived from what 
the discoveries and revenues are expected to do. According to Ross (2012), oil 
discoveries and the revenues associated with them have the characteristics of 
‘scale and superiority’. No matter how modest the finds are, they have conse-
quences for the structure of the economy, the environment, and other social 
implications (Ablo 2015).
Exploration for oil in Ghana began in the then Gold Coast in the nineteenth 
century. Chitor (2012) reports that a limited exploration for petroleum began in 
1896 in the Tano basin.2 After the early attempts, oil discovery was first made in 
the Saltpond basin in the 1970s. The Saltpond discovery was not in commercial 
quantities, producing an average of about 600 barrels in 2009–10 (Gyampo 2010).
After discovering oil in commercial quantities in 2007, production began at the 
Jubilee field in December 2010. The field was estimated to produce 120,000 barrels 
per day. Petroleum reserves for the Jubilee field were calculated to be between 600 
million and 1.8 billion barrels (Ayelazuno  2014). The World Bank estimated in 
2009 that Ghana would earn US$20 billion from oil production in the period 
2012–30 from the Jubilee field. These expectations notwithstanding, the contribution 
of petroleum to government revenue has been less than 10 per cent, averaging 
about 7.5 per cent for the first five years of oil production (Benkenstein  2016). 
Ghana had only one field, the Jubilee, until two other fields started operation 
recently. The Tweneboa–Enyenra–Ntomme (TEN) and Sankofa fields started 
1 President John Kufuor made this observation in an interview in 2007 (see BBC 2007).
2 Ghana has four main sedimentary basins. These are the Central basin (Saltpond), Western basin 
(Tano), the Eastern basin (Accra-Keta), and the inland Voltaian basin (Adda 2013).
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production in 2016 and 2017, respectively. The TEN field is expected to produce 
80,000 barrels of oil per day and 180 million standard cubic feet of natural gas per 
day when it reaches its full potential. According to the Ghana National Petroleum 
Corporation (GNPC 2016), the TEN field has an estimated reserve of 239 million 
barrels of oil and 360 billion cubic feet (bcf) of natural gas. In the case of 
the Sankofa field, the estimated reserve is 204 million barrels of oil and 1071 bcf 
of natural gas (GNPC  2016). In a report in 2016, the Public Interest and 
Accountability Committee (PIAC) declared that Ghana earned US$3.2 billion in 
the first five years of oil production (see PIAC 2016).
This chapter shows that Ghana is a fairly modest producer of oil and has made 
some effort to learn proper oil governance from the experiences of other countries, 
but has not always managed to implement the lessons learned. While it has put in 
place a good number of institutions and sound regulations to ensure that the 
benefits from oil production are translated into broader-based development, this 
has not always worked. The management of oil revenues has not been protected 
from generally poor fiscal management.
The Africa Centre for Energy Policy (2014) reported that although transpar-
ency has been high in the petroleum sector, accountability and the collection of 
revenues, including surface rentals, have been poor. It called on the government 
to do more to spread the benefits of oil production.
There is enough experience from around the world to show that translating oil 
discoveries through production to revenues and inclusive growth is not necessar-
ily a linear process. Inclusive growth has been particularly difficult to achieve in 
many places, and Ghana has been no exception so far. Can Ghana escape a 
resource curse?3 Our view is that it can, provided that it implements fully as soon 
as possible, and more diligently, the regulations that it has adopted.
The remainder of this chapter is divided into five sections. Section 2 provides 
an overview of petroleum resources in terms of size, including a comparison with 
other African oil producers. It also introduces Ghana’s fiscal and petroleum legal 
regimes. In Section  3, the accountability and transparency mechanisms that 
have been put in place for effective oil resource governance are discussed. 
Section 4 examines the petroleum management framework. In Section 5, oil 
and macroeconomic performance is discussed. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2. Petroleum production and exploration in Ghana
The central coastline along the Gulf of Guinea in West Africa is endowed with 
hydrocarbons to the extent that the estimated reserves, if produced, can meet the 
3 The curse of petroleum resources occurs when countries with large endowments of such 
resources generally perform worse in terms of economic development and good governance than 
those countries with little or no petroleum resources (see Auty 2001; Sachs and Warner 1995, 1999; 
Gylfason et al. 1999).
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petroleum needs of the European Union (Ayoade  2002). While Nigeria and 
Gabon have been producing oil since the twentieth century, Ghana is basically 
a frontier nation. But, as mentioned earlier, oil exploration is not new to Ghana. 
Edjekumhene et al. (2010) have indicated that the people of Nzema started reporting 
oil seepages around the onshore Tano basin around the 1800s, and this led to 
exploration by the West African Oil and Fuel Company. The government intensi-
fied the oil search by passing the Oil and Mining Regulations, 1957 (L1 221), the 
Mineral (Offshore) Regulations, 1963 (L1 257), and the Minerals (Oil and Gas) 
Regulations, 1965 (LI 257). These regulations and international collaborations led 
to the discovery of the first non-commercial oil in 1970 by Signal and Amoco Oil 
Company Limited at the Saltpond offshore field (Aratuo 2012). The Saltpond 
offshore field, which was estimated to have rather limited reserves, started pro-
duction in 1978 by Agripetco, with a daily average output of 4,800 barrels. In 
1985, production declined to 580 barrels per day (Takyiwa 2014).
According to the GNPC (2013), the first natural gas discovery in Ghana was in 
1973, around the offshore Cape Three Points by Zapata Oil Company Limited. 
Takyiwa (2014) has classified the history of oil exploration in Ghana into four 
phases. The first phase, spanning 1896–1969, was characterized by wildcat drilling 
and non-systematic exploration activities. This phase also witnessed the acquisition 
of the first two-dimensional seismic coverage in 1968. The second phase, spanning 
1970–84, focused more on international oil companies-led offshore exploration 
activities. The first offshore deep water well was drilled by Philips Petroleum in 
1978. The third phase saw the establishment of the GNPC and the involvement of 
a national oil company in exploration. There was an increase in two- and 
three-dimensional seismic coverage in 1985–2000. The current phase, 2001 to 
date, has involved restructuring and resourcing of the national oil company and 
the passing of appropriate legislations.
2.1 Regulating exploration and production
Prior to 2007, the major laws and regulations governing the petroleum sector 
in Ghana included the Ghana National Petroleum Corporation Act, 1983 
(Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) Law 64), the Petroleum Exploration 
and Production Act, 1984 (PNDC Law, 84), and the Petroleum Income Tax Law, 
1987 (PNDC Law 188). A new petroleum and exploration law was passed in 2016 
to replace the old one (PNDC Law 84). The weakness of the old law was, among 
other things, the limited transparency provisions. According to the Africa Centre 
for Energy Policy (2016), the current Exploration and Production Law (Act 919) 
has many positive attributes including a provision for an open and competitive 
public tender for the allocation of petroleum rights, a requirement for publication 
by the Minister for Energy and Petroleum, the reasons for vetoing the outcome 
of a competitive public tender, and the establishment of a public register for 
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the disclosure of petroleum agreements, authorizations, and permits. These 
transparency provisions notwithstanding, Ndi (2018) has suggested that there are 
pockets of opposition to the law because of changes to the fiscal terms from 
production-sharing to hybrid or tax/royalty system. However, Kankam and 
Ackah (2014) have argued that the choice of hybrid fiscal system allows the state 
to meet revenue maximization as well as socio-economic objectives.
The main elements of Ghana’s petroleum hybrid fiscal regime include royalty, 
corporate income tax, surface rentals, carried and participating interest, and add-
itional oil entitlements (AOEs) (Sasraku  2016). According to Amoako-Tuffour 
and Owusu-Ayim (2010), the royalty rate is not fixed and ranges from 4 to 
12.5 per cent of gross production of oil. In the case of natural gas, the royalty ranges 
from 3 to 10 per cent. There are clear discrepancies in the various laws. Petroleum 
corporate tax has been set at 35 per cent for all fields currently operating. This 
notwithstanding, the Petroleum Income Tax Law sets corporate tax at 50 per cent 
whereas Ghana’s Income Tax Law, 2015 (Act 896) states income tax as 25 per cent. 
Section 10 of the Model Petroleum Agreement provides for an AOE. The AOE is 
triggered if the contractor’s post-tax rate of return (ROR) exceeds the prescribed 
target for that year. The trigger points for the AOE are 12.5, 17.5, 22.5, and 
27.5  per cent ROR. Surface rental is an additional source of revenue for the 
government. The Ghana Model Petroleum Agreement provides for a minimum 
of 10 per cent initial carried interest in all petroleum agreements and a negotiated 
participating interest thereafter. The GNPC holds and manages the carried and par-
ticipating interest on behalf of the state.
2.2 The state of oil production
The Jubilee field produced a total of 161.9 million barrels of oil between 2010–15. 
The Ghana Energy Commission reported in 2017 that the Jubilee field produced 
26.9 million barrels in 2016; that is, 94,200 barrels per day on average. This was 
lower than the 2015 average, which was 106,939 barrels per day. With regard to 
prices, the average price at which Ghana sold its oil was US$51 per barrel in 2015 
and US$40 per barrel in 2016.
Ghana’s three operating fields had a total estimated reserve of 2279 bcf of natural 
gas and 898 million barrels of oil as at the end of 2016 (GNPC 2016). The Jubilee 
field has an estimated 455 million barrels of oil and 568 bcf of associated and non-
associated natural gas. The TEN field contains an estimated 239 million barrels of 
oil and 353 bcf of associated and non-associated natural gas. Finally, the Sankofa 
field contains an estimated 204 million barrels of oil and 1358 bcf of associated 
and non-associated natural gas. Figure 5.1 presents a summary of the petroleum 
reserve estimates of Ghana.
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2.3 Comparing production with other African countries
Africa has an estimated reserve of 129.1 billion barrels, representing 7.6 per cent 
of the total global reserve in 2015 (see BP 2016). Libya and Nigeria have the largest 
petroleum reserves in Africa with an estimated value of 48.4 billion and 
37.1 billion barrels, respectively, in 2015. Angola and Algeria follow with 12.2 and 
12.7 billion barrels, respectively. Together, Libya and Nigeria contribute 5 per cent of 
global reserves and 66.2 per cent of Africa’s total reserve. With regard to production, 
Africa produced 8.4 million barrels per day in 2015, contributing 9.1 per cent of 
global production. Nigeria was the highest producer with 2,352,000 barrels per day 
(Ghana’s production for twenty-two days), followed by Angola with 1.82 million 
barrels per day and Algeria with 1.58 million barrels per day (BP  2016). These 
statistics dwarf Ghana’s production effort. Ghana’s average production in 2015 was 
only 1.3 per cent of Africa’s total and 4.5 per cent of Nigeria’s production.
By 2015, Africa had 7.5 per cent of global natural gas reserves and contributed 
6 per cent of global production. Cumulatively, Africa holds 496.7 trillion cubic 
metres in reserves and produces 211.8 billion cubic metres as of 2015. Nigeria, 
Algeria, Egypt, and Libya account for 92.1 per cent of Africa’s natural gas reserves 
and 93 per cent of the continent’s natural gas production. Figure 5.2 presents the 
contribution of oil rents to the gross domestic product (GDP) of selected coun-
tries in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA).
On average, oil rents contributed 8.23 per cent of the GDP of SSA between 
2010 and 2015. Oil rents had contributed 12.09 per cent in 2011 but this declined to 











Natural gas (in bcf) Crude oil (in million barrels)
Figure 5.1 Petroleum reserves of Ghana’s operating fields
Source: Authors’ illustration based on data from GNPC (2016).
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compared, Angola recorded the highest average contribution of oil rent to GDP 
with 32.72 per cent. This was followed by Gabon with 30.16 per cent, South Sudan 
with 26.42 per cent, Algeria with 16.50 per cent, Nigeria with 11.02 per cent, 
Cameron with 5.06 per cent, and Ghana with 3.92 per cent, over the period 2010–15. 
The implication is that oil price shocks should technically not have as much 
impact on economies such as those of Ghana, Cote d’Ivoire, and Cameroon. 
However, for Ghana, that has not been the case. The oil price fall in 2015 led to 
the request for an International Monetary Fund (IMF) facility, and a huge cut to the 
capital budget by an estimated 52.4 per cent.
2.4 Negotiating petroleum agreements in Ghana
Acheampong et al. (2016) have suggested that the Ghana Model Petroleum 
Agreement serves as the basis on which all petroleum agreements are negotiated. 
The GNPC represents the country and holds the carried and participating interest 
in all contracts. Thus, there is a high private-sector participation in Ghana’s 
petroleum industry. However, the equity share of the private sector depends on 
the contract. In the case of the Jubilee contract, Ghana has 13.64 per cent carried 
and participating interest and receives 5 per cent royalty, 35 per cent corporate 
tax, and surface rentals (PIAC  2016). The private-sector participants in the 
Jubilee field are Tullow (the operator who owns 35.64 per cent), Kosmos Energy 
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Figure 5.2 Oil rents as a percentage of GDP in selected African countries
Source: Authors’ illustration based on data from the World Development Indicators (2018).
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(see Tullow 2018). In the case of the TEN field, the operator Tullow has a share 
of 47.18 per cent, while Kosmos has 17 per cent; Anadarko, 17 per cent; GNPC, 
15 per cent; and Petro SA, 3.82 per cent. Finally, the project partners for the Sankofa 
field include ENI (44.4 per cent), GNPC (20 per cent), and Vitol (35.56 per cent) 
(see ENI et al. 2017).
One of the biggest challenges in negotiating oil agreements is how to take 
adequate care of the interests of local people. According to Ross (2012), some of 
the challenges faced by local people in oil-bearing communities include land, air, 
and water pollution, loss of livelihoods, and the increased cost of living. These 
challenges, if not properly managed, can lead to conflicts and other social tensions. 
In order to manage these and promote value addition, Ghana passed the Petroleum 
Local Content and Local Participation Regulation (LI 2204) in 2013. According to 
Acheampong et al. (2016), Ghana’s local content regulations seek to achieve direct 
employment for Ghanaians, technology transfer, use of locally produced materials, 
and procurement of local goods and services. These regulations aim at the pro-
motion of benefits to the broader economy through its forward and backward 
linkages. They further seek to promote value addition and to create jobs through 
the use of local expertise, goods and services, business, and finance in the petroleum 
industry value chain in Ghana.
The passing of the Petroleum Commission Act, 2011 (Act 821) created an 
independent upstream regulator for the petroleum sector. The Act mandates 
the Ghana Petroleum Commission to regulate and manage the deployment of 
petroleum resources and to perform functions such as licensing and monitoring 
of the implementation of the local content regulations. Section 10(2) of the Act 
clearly extricates the commission from the influence of the Ministry of Energy 
and Petroleum. The commission is governed by a seven-member board with a 
chairperson. Other members include the chief executive of the commission, the 
chief executive of the Ghana National Petroleum Company, and four other per-
sons, at least one of whom should be a woman. The president appoints the chief 
executive officer of the commission.
3. Transparency and accountability measures
Transparency has often been considered as the central pillar around which the 
fight against corruption in the petroleum sector revolves. According to Mehlum 
et al. (2006), corruption in the form of rent-seeking is a key factor behind the oil 
curse. McPherson and MacSearraigh (2007) identified the many forms of corrup-
tion in the petroleum industry. These include: policy corruption, administrative 
corruption, commercial corruption, and diversion of massive amounts of money 
through the diversion of production, products, or revenues. This is generally 
referred to as grand corruption. In order to promote good governance and limit 
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the incidence of corruption, Ghana joined the Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative (EITI) in 2003. In 2007, Ghana became a candidate country by producing 
and publishing its first EITI report covering the period 2004–6. The country 
finally assumed the status of a compliant country after completing the validation 
process in 2010. The country has since been implementing the standard to the 
mining sector and later extended to cover the petroleum sector. On 24 February 
2016, Ghana was honoured at the 2016 Global EITI Conference in Lima, Peru for 
turning recommendations in its EITI reports into policy reforms (see EITI 2016).
In addition to joining and implementing the recommendations of EITI, the 
Exploration and Production Law, 2016 (Act 919), the Petroleum Revenue 
Management Act (PRMA), 815 (2011) (amended in 2015 as Act 893), Petroleum 
Commission Law, 2011 (Act 821), and the Petroleum Local Content and Local 
Participation Regulation (LI 2204) all make provision for transparency and 
accountability. For instance, Section 56 (1 and 2) of the Petroleum Exploration 
and Production Law, 2016 (Act 919) mandates the Ghana Petroleum Commission 
to establish and maintain a public register of all petroleum licences, agreements, 
authorizations, and permits and requires the commission to make the informa-
tion open to the public. Further, Section 39 (a and b) of the Petroleum Local 
Content and Local Participation Regulation (LI 2204) grants the public access to 
local content information held by the commission.
Ghana’s PRMA made similar transparency provisions. For instance, Section 
49(1) of the Act states that the management of petroleum revenue and savings 
shall always be carried out with the highest internationally accepted standards of 
transparency and good governance. This may be seen in one of the new creations 
of the Act, which is the establishment of the PIAC, armed with the objective of 
playing a watchdog role in the management of petroleum revenues. PIAC is 
charged under Section 51 of the PRMA to monitor and evaluate compliance with 
the Act. In addition, Section 48(2)(b) of the amended PRMA, 2011 (Act 815) man-
dates the minister for finance to publish the status of implementation of oil-
funded projects annually. The minister for finance is required to report on the 
status of implementation and completion of oil-funded projects to parliament. 
Section 8 (1, 2, and 3) of the PRMA requires that, for the purpose of transparency 
and accountability, the records of petroleum receipts in whatever form shall be 
published by the minister for finance simultaneously in the Gazette and in at least 
two state-owned daily newspapers, within thirty calendar days after the end of 
the applicable quarter and that the information required to be made public shall 
also be published online on the website of the ministry and presented to parlia-
ment on the date of the Gazette publication. The minister for finance is also 
required to publish the total petroleum output lifted and the reference price in the 
same manner as provided in sub-sections (1) and (2).
In addition to the above requirements, the PRMA also requires Bank of Ghana 
to present to the minister for finance and to the Investment Advisory Committee 
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quarterly reports on the performance and activities of the Ghana Stabilization 
Fund (GSF) and the Ghana Heritage Fund (GHF) no later than the end of the 
month following the end of each quarter and to publish semi-annual reports on 
the GSF and the GHF no later than 15 February and 15 August each year. The 
report is required to be presented to parliament and published in the national 
dailies and also on the website of the bank. In the minds of the lawmakers these 
provisions were essential for the purpose of fast-tracking economic development 
and promoting equal and inclusive development with petroleum resources.
4. Petroleum revenues framework
Petroleum revenue has the potential to contribute significantly to economic 
development, if properly managed. However, petroleum revenue has four distinct 
qualities that can have negative macroeconomic implications. These are volatility, 
potential Dutch disease, exhaustibility, and the assumption that petroleum rev-
enue is free money (Ossowski and Gonzáles-Castillo 2012; Ross 2012; Schubert 
2006). Caballero (2000) has suggested that oil revenues are volatile and can lead 
to poor investments and negative impact on the economy due to unpredictable 
government revenue. According to Elder and Serletis (2010), changes in oil prices 
affect the macro economy through three main transmission channels. The first is 
the monetary and real balance channel that occurs when oil price increases lead 
to increases in the overall level of prices, thereby reducing real money balances 
held by households and firms and ultimately reducing aggregate demand. The 
second is the income transfer channel, where it is assumed that oil-importing 
countries transfer money to oil-exporting countries when prices are high. Finally, 
high or low energy prices have an effect on labour and capital productivity. 
Indeed, Elder and Serletis’ (2010) assumption of a symmetric relationship between 
oil prices and the macro economy can best be identified in oil-importing countries. 
Regarding oil-exporting countries, Farzanegan and Markwardt (2009) studied 
the impact of oil price shocks on the Iranian economy and found that the Iranian 
economy was very vulnerable to the negative shocks of oil prices. The real effective 
exchange rate fell significantly (domestic currency depreciated) when there were 
negative oil price shocks. On the other hand, positive oil price shocks increased 
the real exchange rate and appreciated the domestic currency. According to 
Husain et al. (2008), fiscal policy is the main transmission mechanism of oil price 
shock in oil-producing countries.
PRMA 2011 (Act 815) and its 2015 amendment (Act 893) discussed earlier were 
intended to help avoid the oil curse and ensure that petroleum revenues promote 
inclusive development (Ghanney and Amoako-Tuffour  2016: 61–90; Graham 
et al. 2016). The law established processes for the collection, expenditure, invest-
ment, and accountability of the use of oil revenues. The role of the PIAC has been 
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discussed earlier. Figure 5.3 provides the framework for the Petroleum Revenue 
Management Law. All petroleum revenues (from corporate tax, royalties, carried 
and participating interest, surface rentals, AOEs, etc.) are deposited in the 
Petroleum Holding Fund (PHF). The PHF is an intermediary fund designed to 
collect and disburse petroleum revenues (Oshionebo 2018).
Under the PRMA, the GNPC receives 55 per cent or less of the carried and 
participating interest. The budget receives 70 per cent or less of the benchmark 
revenue. The benchmark revenue is the expected petroleum revenue based on a 
seven-year moving average.4 The percentage of petroleum revenue that goes into 
the budget is the annual budget funding amount (ABFA). The ABFA is shared 
between the priority areas, the Ghana Infrastructure Investment Fund and the 
PIAC. The remaining 30 per cent of the benchmark revenue goes to the Ghana 
4 See the first schedule (Section 17) of the Petroleum Revenue Management Act (PRMA), 2011 (815) 
for the formula. According to Section 7 of the amended PRMA (Act 893), the minister for finance can 
recommend a revision of the benchmark revenue to parliament if it becomes evident that unexpected 
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Figure 5.3 Petroleum management framework, Ghana
Source: Based on PIAC (2018: Figure 2.3), reproduced with permission.
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Petroleum Funds, which is shared between the GSF (21 per cent) and the GHF 
(9 per cent). The GSF is used to cushion government expenditure when there is a 
petroleum revenue shortfall, and an excess of the cap is sent to the sinking 
(debt repayment) and contingency funds. The GHF is an endowment for future 
generations. The PRMA sets out the framework to regulate the allocation and 
management of revenues realized from petroleum production in Ghana. The 
amendment of sections of the Act in 2015 was intended to strengthen it and 
make compliance easier.
5. Oil and macroeconomic performance
Petroleum production has affected Ghana’s macroeconomic performance in 
different ways. On the positive side, oil contributed about US$3.2 billion to the 
economy in the first five years of production, an average of 7.5 per cent of gov-
ernment revenue and about 4 per cent of GDP. According to Fosu (2017: 137), the 
petroleum sector contributed 30 per cent of industrial sector output in 2013 and 
28.3 per cent of export revenue in 2014. The contribution of petroleum to export 
revenue fell to 18.7 per cent in 2015 and then to 12.2 per cent in 2016 on account of 
lower oil prices. In 2011, Ghana’s GDP rose to 14 per cent from 7 per cent in 2010 
(World Development Indicators 2018). However, the high growth was petroleum 
exploration-led and short lived as GDP growth declined to 3.9 per cent in 2015 
and to 3.6 per cent in 2016. By the end of 2012, both the primary balance and the 
overall balance had plummeted by about 6 per cent (Younger 2016). This shortfall 
was caused, among others, by high oil revenue expectations, election-related over-
expenditure, and the implementation of the single-spine salary structure.
According to Bawumia and Halland (2017), although the fiscal deficit fell from 
6.2 per cent in 2010 to 4 per cent in 2011, it deteriorated again to 9.3 per cent in 
2014. IMF (2014) estimates that although government taxes in Ghana averaged 
18.9 per cent of GDP from 2010 to 2014, government expenditure increased from 
20.1 per cent in 2010 to 28.2 per cent in 2014. The bulk of the increase in government 
expenditure went towards expenditure on goods and services, driven by the wage 
bill. Indeed, Younger (2016) has suggested that expenditure on personal emolu-
ments increased by 1.6 per cent of GDP between 2010 and 2012 while the average 
contribution to GDP of oil over the same period was 1 per cent. Although Ghana 
chalked up some legal and regulatory successes in the initial stages of oil production, 
there were serious concerns about rising public debt, declining capital expend-
iture, and a deteriorating external payment position (Bawumia and Halland 2017). 
Figure 5.4 shows Ghana’s inflation trends for 1990–2016.
Even though Ghana recorded single digit inflation in 2011 (8.73 per cent) and 
2012 (9.16 per cent), there has been an upward trend since. In addition, the cedi 
depreciated by 31 per cent against the US dollar in 2014.
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5.1 Dutch disease
One of the biggest concerns for new oil economies is the Dutch disease. Under 
the Heckscher–Ohlin model, countries exporting natural resource are expected 
to specialize in their main export. However, when such export diversification is 
dominated by petroleum, there is little room for a spillover effect to other sectors 
(Ross 2012). Cordon and Neary (1982) have argued that this is due to currency 
appreciation and loss of competitiveness of the non-tradable sectors. That is, a 
boom in the oil sector can channel labour and capital from the non-tradable 
sectors through the resource movement effect. Coupled with this, currency 
appreciation associated with such a boom can lead to a high cost of inputs, thus 
making the output of the manufacturing and agriculture sectors relatively expen-
sive.5 In addition, oil resources are non-renewable and will therefore be exhausted, 
given time and technology.
Ghana has always been aware of the possibility of the Dutch disease and 
policymakers have often mentioned the need to avoid that from the beginning of 
the oil journey. Learning from the experiences of countries such as Nigeria, 
Norway, and Trinidad and Tobago, the government organized a number of 
international conferences, regional and sub-national consultations, and study 
tours to discuss the best ways to avoid the Dutch disease. The aim was to learn 
lessons especially on how petroleum revenues have been managed in these 
5 The combined effect of resource movement and currency movement is what is commonly 































































Figure 5.4 Ghana’s inflation performance, 1990–2016
Source: Authors’ illustration based on data from the World Development Indicators (2018).
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 11/01/20, SPi
Aryeetey and Ackah 109
countries. Figures 5.5 and 5.6 show petroleum revenues from 2011 to 2016 and the 
contribution of petroleum to government revenues in Ghana, respectively.
The contribution of the petroleum revenue to government revenue has been 
significant, especially considering that donor support was dwindling over the 
same period. Many analysts have expressed the view that the management of pet-
roleum resources has been less than satisfactory, despite the passing of good laws 
and regulations. The essential problem has been the recurring rapid rise in public 
consumption expenditures and, hence, the growing deficit. Ghana approached 
the IMF for a US$900 million facility in 2014–15 and experienced a higher-than-
budgeted-for cash fiscal deficit of 9.5 per cent of GDP and faced other fiscal chal-
lenges (IMF  2015). In the face of weak fiscal management, unstable petroleum 
revenues have not been of much use, and the elaborate rules have not been 
followed.
According to Bleaney and Halland (2016), there is no empirical evidence of a 
correlation between fiscal indiscipline and petroleum discovery and production. 
However, this assertion may not be the case in most oil-producing countries in 
Africa, as most of the fiscal challenges of oil-producing economies may be self-
inflicted. Indeed, that is Ghana’s story. Bawumia and Halland (2017) have 





















Figure 5.5 Petroleum revenues in Ghana, 2011–16
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Figure 5.6 Petroleum revenue as a percentage of government revenue in Ghana
Source: Ministry of Finance (2018).
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hoped to earn political dividend from the petroleum discovery in 2007 with the 
impending 2008 national elections. This happened in three ways. First, the petrol-
eum discovery gave false hope that there was more fiscal space than there really 
was. Second, institutional quality, in the form of nominal fiscal rules, independence 
of the central bank and regulatory entities were not supported by political con-
sensus. Finally, there was selective compliance with the PRMA; for instance, 
Section 48(3) of the PRMA was never complied with until 2017–18. These factors 
affected macroeconomic stability. According to Witter et al. (2017), even though 
Ghana’s real GDP growth has been modest between 2012 and 2016, the fiscal 
deficit averaged 9 per cent for the same period. In addition, inflation has been 
rising steadily since 2012, reaching 17.47 per cent in 2016.
Oil-producing countries recognize these fiscal challenges and deploy different 
strategies to minimize the impact of oil price shocks on their economies. These 
strategies include diversification, establishment of a stabilization fund, hedging, 
and application of fiscal rules (Bartsch 2006; Davis et al. 2003: 273–315). Ghana 
implemented similar strategies. The Ghana Petroleum Funds were established as 
a sovereign wealth fund charged with the responsibility of investing and saving 
petroleum revenues (Oshionebo 2018). These funds consist of the GSF and the 
GHF. The purpose of the stabilization fund is to cushion government expenditure 
during periods of unanticipated petroleum revenue shortfall. Figure 5.7 indicates 
that the contribution of petroleum to GDP reduced from 8 per cent in 2013 to 1.6 
per cent in 2016 due to falling oil prices.
However, the Petroleum Revenue Management Law allows the minister for 
finance to cap the GSF. The excess from the cap can be used for debt repayment. 
Specifically, Section 5 of the amended PRMA, 2015 (Act 893) stipulates that there 
can be withdrawals from the GSF to offset petroleum revenue shortfall, to trans-
fer into the contingency fund, or for debt repayment (sinking fund). According to 
PIAC (2016), the GSF should have had a balance of US$604 million by December 
2015. However, the fund was capped at US$100 million in the 2016 budget. The 
Africa Centre for Energy Policy estimates that about 62.4 per cent of the GSF has 
been used to repay debt (AccraFM.com  2016). This clearly defeats the primary 
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Figure 5.7 Share of petroleum output in GDP, 2011–16
Source: Ministry of Finance (2018).
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Moreover, the government’s commodity price risk management programme, 
which was expanded in May 2011 to deal with volatility, was cancelled in 2013, 
thereby exposing the country to significant oil price shocks (IFS 2015). The GHF 
seeks to satisfy intergenerational equity requirements of petroleum production by 
supporting the development for future generations when petroleum reserves have 
been depleted.
Another strategy Ghana employed to deal with the effect of oil price shocks on 
the economy was diversification. Section 21 of the PRMA lists a number of areas 
in which the government can invest its oil revenues. These priority areas were 
arrived at based on public consultations and include agriculture, education, 
health, roads, alternative energy, security, potable water, sanitation, and environ-
mental protection. In selecting the priority areas, the budget process is followed. 
That is, the medium-term fiscal framework, the available fiscal space, and the 
strategic initiatives of the government are considered before the priority areas are 
proposed. The proposed priority areas are then sent to cabinet for discussion and 
preliminarily allocations. After the budget approval by parliament, ministries, 
departments, and agencies (that are chosen as priority areas) select specific projects 
that receive oil revenues. According to Section 21 (4 and 5), for any financial year, 
a minimum of 70 per cent of the ABFA shall be used for public investment 
expenditures consistent with the long-term national development plan. In order 
to maximize the impact of the use of the petroleum revenue, the finance minister 
is expected to prioritize not more than four areas for the medium term (over a 
three-year period) in the absence of a long-term development plan. This provision 
is to help diversify from oil and develop areas where Ghana has competitive 
advantage, such as agriculture. However, there have been reports that oil revenues 
are spread over too many projects (Reportingoilandgas.org 2016) that are outside 
of the priority areas.6 In addition, instead of complementing existing revenue 
sources to these sectors, oil revenue is gradually replacing traditional sources. 
There is always one broad priority area that is used to spread spending of oil 
revenues over many ‘non-selected areas’. For instance, in the first three years of 
oil revenue spending (2011–13), ‘roads and other infrastructure’ always featured as 
a priority area. Under this category, government spent on housing, roads, rail, 
markets, coastal protection, education, and health, although they had not been 
earlier considered to be priority areas. This was repeated in the second triennium 
(2014–16). In the third triennium (2017–19), government selected another broad 
priority area, ‘road, rail, and other critical infrastructure development’. The selection 
of broad priority areas and unconstrained spending within them are major 
reasons for the ABFA being thinly spread.
6 In the past, oil revenues have been allocated to the office of the president, parliament, Musicians 
Union of Ghana, and the Microfinance and Small Loans Centre among others that were not in the 
priority areas.
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Furthermore, in establishing the PIAC, the aim of monitoring and evaluating 
compliance with the PRMA by government and other relevant institutions in the 
discharge of their duties, in relation to the use and management of petroleum 
revenues and resources, as required by law was paramount. The law expected 
PIAC to do the following:
 • provide a formal active voice in the use and management of petroleum 
revenues, by providing space and a platform for the public to debate whether 
spending prospects and management of revenues adhere to development 
priorities
 • provide independent assessments on the use and management of petroleum 
revenues and resources to assist parliament and the executive in the oversight 
and performance of related functions
 • ensure that petroleum revenue is sustainably and efficiently managed.
Although a critical institution, PIAC’s findings are often not implemented 
(Oshionebo 2018). It is perceived to be a critical accountability institution that 
has been turned into a report-writing body with little action.
5.2 Local content regulations
Ghana passed the local content regulations in 2013, ostensibly to ensure that 
the  local oil industry generates benefits to the broader economy through its 
forward and backward linkages (Acheampong et al.  2016). An Enterprise 
Development Centre has been established to support local firms in the petroleum 
sector. According to the Petroleum Local Content and Local Participation 
Regulation (LI 2204), local content refers to the percentage of Ghanaian-
produced materials, financing, personnel, goods, and services rendered to the 
oil and gas industry and can be measured in monetary terms. According to a 
report by the Ghana Petroleum Commission, as of 2014, the oil and gas industry 
employed 7,000 people out of which the international oil companies (IOCs) 
had 3,612 people. The distribution of employees by nationality was 80 per cent 
Ghanaian and 20 per cent expatriate. In the IOCs, a smaller proportion of 
Ghanaians were employed (64 per cent), while expatriates made up 36 per cent 
of persons employed.
According to Acheampong et al. (2016), the prescriptive nature of the local 
content regulations may create implementation challenges. Various supply chain 
and local content targets are set by the Petroleum Local Content and Local 
Participation Regulation (LI 2204) for operations in the oil and gas sector. As of 
December 2015, 474 companies were registered with the Ghana Petroleum 
Commission to provide both direct and indirect services. According to the 
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commission, 321 (68 per cent) of the firms were indigenous companies, 107 
(23 per cent) had foreign ownership, and the remaining 46 (10 per cent) were 
joint-venture companies. Even though about 68 per cent of the companies registered 
to access contracts in the upstream petroleum value chain are Ghanaian owned, 
they received less than 25 per cent of the total value of the contracts awarded 
between 2010 and 2015. Out of a cumulative total value of US$6,262,757,339 
indigenous companies received only a little over US$1 billion (Ghana Petroleum 
Commission 2016).
6. Conclusion
Oil resources are neither a curse nor a blessing. Sound management of these 
resources can make them beneficial or otherwise. Oil revenues can be used 
to finance economic development, if properly managed. In the same vein, oil 
production and revenues can lead to conflicts, corruption, stunted growth, and 
non-competitive and declining manufacturing and agricultural sectors. Ghana 
discovered oil in commercial quantities in 2007; the government, recognizing 
both negative and positive effects of petroleum production in neighbouring 
countries, organized a number of stakeholder consultations and study tours. One 
major outcome of these consultations and tours was the passing of the PRMA 
in 2011. Among other objectives, the PRMA seeks to provide a framework for 
the collection, allocation, and management of petroleum revenues in a respon-
sible, transparent, efficient, accountable, and sustainable manner to ensure 
inclusive development in line with Article 36 of Ghana’s 1992 constitution. Indeed, 
the PRMA created the Ghana Petroleum Funds, an independent PIAC, and placed 
transparency and accountability responsibilities on the minister for finance, PIAC, 
and Bank of Ghana.
In an effort to manage volatility and the Dutch disease, the PRMA created the 
GSF as an insurance against petroleum revenue shortfall and mandated the minister 
for finance to select four priority areas, in the absence of a long-term development 
plan to develop over a three-year period. In addition, the law satisfies an intergen-
erational equity requirement, by setting aside 9 per cent of the benchmark revenue 
to be invested in the GHF as an endowment for future generations.
Despite these provisions, it is reported that petroleum revenues are spread over 
too many projects. Apart from defeating the purpose of diversification, spreading 
thinly also leads to cost and time overruns. Indeed, oil revenues have been used 
to tackle many national projects (thinly spread), which has weakened the impact 
of petroleum investments on the social and economic development of the coun-
try. In addition, the law gives authority to the minister for finance to cap the GSF. 
This has led to the depletion of the GSF to less than 20 per cent of its estimated 
value and renders it incapable of cushioning the government in case of oil revenue 
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shortfall. Even though the priority areas have been reduced to four in 2018, the 
challenge has been the ‘thinly spread within priorities’. That is, when a priority 
area like agriculture is selected, funds may be spent on many expenditure lines 
such as irrigation, fertilizer subsidy, seeds, agriculture training, and extension.
On a positive note, the minister for finance, PIAC, and Bank of Ghana have been 
complying with most of the transparency requirements by publishing petroleum-
related reports on their websites and/or in the newspapers. In the 2017 edition of the 
Natural Resource Governance Index, published by the Natural Resource Governance 
Institute, Ghana scored high in terms of petroleum  sovereign wealth management, 
transparency, and management of the national oil company (Ghana National 
Petroleum Corporation) but scored low in oil revenue management through the 
budget and local impact of petroleum resources. Further, PIAC, which was facing 
financial challenges prior to 2016, now receives its budget from the ABFA. Finally, 
although thinly spread, oil revenues have been used to construct and maintain some 
roads, irrigation dams, schools, and other critical infrastructure.
In order to diversify and enhance sustainable growth, it is important that 
petroleum revenue expenditure is focused on a medium- to long-term inclusive 
development strategy that is based on proper needs assessment, global trends, 
and possible growth dynamics of the country. This will help convert petroleum 
revenues into long-lasting physical, human, and financial resources.
It should be possible to rationalize ABFA expenditure and develop investment 
and reporting guidelines to reduce within-priority expenditure to not more than 
three project/expenditure lines. This will help to identify and measure efficiency 
savings and improve petroleum revenue management.
There is a need for value addition through refining and active local participa-
tion to link the petroleum sector to other sectors. There should be fiscal adjust-
ment by building the GSF to cushion the government in times of petroleum 
revenue shortfall, and policymakers should strive to effectively manage the non-
oil economy through proper diversification.
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The Construction Sector in Ghana
Nkechi Srodah Owoo and Monica P. Lambon-Quayefio
1. Introduction
The discovery of oil in Ghana in commercial proportions in 2007 may be reason-
ably expected to have had significant consequences for the construction sector. 
Indeed, the production and export of oil have driven large-scale projects in the 
country’s construction sector, such as investments in real estate (in order to provide 
accommodation for migrant workers and expatriates), the port in Takoradi, and 
other infrastructure projects around the country. Generally, construction refers 
to the creation, repair, maintenance, alteration, and demolition of buildings, 
highways, streets, bridges, roads, sewers, railways, and communication systems. 
Relevant construction subsectors in Ghana include housing and urban development 
(i.e. residential buildings; municipal and commercial buildings), infrastructure 
(i.e. water and sanitation; energy), and transport infrastructure (i.e. roads; airports; 
ports and harbours).
Government policy is critical to ensuring that there is sufficient investment in 
the construction sector, and that the sector is able to respond adequately to the 
oil-fuelled increase in demand for construction and infrastructural developments. 
Where the construction sector faces significant challenges that limit its ability to 
increase supply, the rising demand is likely to increase prices within the sector; 
these higher prices are often indicative of higher marginal costs within the 
 sector. The importance of a country’s construction industry stems from its robust 
linkages with other sectors within the economy (Park  1989; World Bank  1984). 
The construction industry is known to create significant multiplier effects through 
extensive backward and forward linkages with other sectors of the economy, 
although the interdependence tends to change over time. Increases in growth 
affect the level of construction within an economy; construction activity also gen-
erally leads to improvements in welfare since it increases levels of employment 
and income.
In Ghana, the construction sector appears to be performing well, and indeed 
contributes substantially to gross domestic product (GDP) and employment 
within the economy. For example, the demand for cement, a key indicator of con-
struction activity, has increased consistently—from 4.8 million metric tonnes in 2010 
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to 5.5 million by 2012. According to Sutton and Kpentey (2012), the construction 
sector’s share of GDP increased from 5 per cent in 1975 to 15 per cent by 2007. 
According to the Ghana Statistical Service, between 2009 and 2013, the construc-
tion and real estate industry contributed on average about 14.34 per cent to the 
country’s GDP (GSS  2018). Given its labour-intensive nature, the construction 
sector is a major employer within the economy. For instance, the recent Ghana 
Living Standards Survey (GLSS) indicates that 0.2 per cent of young  people who 
had been employed in the previous week worked in the construction sector. 
Additionally, the Ministry of Education (2010) puts the number of registered con-
tractors at about 23,000.
Figure 6.1 describes the contribution to GDP of the various industry subsectors 
over the period 2006–16. In this period, the mining and quarrying subsector con-
tributed little to GDP. This is not surprising, as there was no oil production in the 
country within this period. After 2010, however, following the discovery of oil, 
the proportion of the contribution made by the mining and quarrying subsector 
to the industry sector increased significantly. From 2006 to 2016, the proportion 
of the manufacturing sector’s contribution declined consistently, from 10.2 per cent 
in 2006 to 4.6 per cent by 2016. It is important to note the trends in the construc-
tion sector as well; the proportion contributed to GDP from 2006–16 demon-
strates a steady upward trend, and the share of the construction subsector more 
than doubled from 5.7 per cent in 2006 to 13.7 per cent in 2016. Indeed, after 2010 














Mining and quarrying (w/o oil)
Electricity
Construction
Figure 6.1 Contribution of construction (and other subsectors) to Ghana’s industry 
sector (% of GDP)
Source: Authors’ illustration based on data from GSS (2018).
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the share of the mining and quarrying subsector (both including and excluding 
oil) has been on the decline.
In order to more closely examine changes in the contribution of the construction 
and other subsectors, Figure  6.2 illustrates growth rates between 2007–16. 
Although Figure  6.1 shows an upward trend in the proportion contributed to 
industry over time by the construction subsector, it is observed from Figure 6.2 
that despite a spike in growth rates in construction in the country, since the 
discovery of oil in 2010 annual growth rates of the subsector have been falling. 
The growth of the construction sector declined, from 39 per cent in 2008 to 
17.2 per cent in 2011 to 2.9 per cent in 2016. The high rates in 2007 and 2008 may 
be attributed to the massive infrastructure projects (stadiums, real estate, roads, 
etc.) that were undertaken to celebrate Ghana@50 in 2007 and to host the Africa 
Cup of Nations tournament and the African Union Heads of State conference in 
2008 (Ackah et al. 2014).
Despite the declining contribution of the construction subsector in 2009 and 
2010, with growth rates of 9.3 per cent and 2.5 per cent respectively, the increased 
production of crude oil in 2011 led to a significant growth rate in construction of 
17.2 per cent. Not all subsectors demonstrated increased growth within this 
period, however, as evidenced by the dismal performance of the water and sew-
age, and electricity subsectors, with recorded growth rates of 2.9 per cent and 
−0.8 per cent respectively in 2011. Although these subsectors are not the focus of 
the present chapter, it may be important to note the falling annual growth rates of 
the mining and quarrying sector (including oil) during 2011–16, eventually reach-
ing negative growth rates in 2016.
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Construction 23.1 39.0 9.3 2.5 17.2 16.4 8.6 0.0 2.2 2.9
Water and sewerage 1.2 0.8 7.7 5.3 2.9 2.2 –1.6 –1.1 20.0 –3.2
Electricity –17.2 19.4 7.5 12.3 –0.8 11.1 16.3 0.3 –10.2 11.7
Manufacturing –1.2 3.7 –1.3 7.6 17.0 2.0 –0.5 –0.8 2.2 2.7
Mining and quarrying (w/o oil) 0 0 0 0 0.0 21.6 18.0 4.5 0.9 –16.9










Mining and quarrying Mining and quarrying (w/o oil) Manufacturing
Electricity Water and sewerage Construction
Figure 6.2 Growth rates of industry subsectors, 2007–16
Source: Authors’ illustration based on data from GSS (2018).
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The falling growth rates of the construction subsector provide some incentive to 
investigate the performance of the sector more closely. The present research study 
has three main objectives:
 • What is the evidence on the marginal costs of construction?
 • What, if any, are the key bottlenecks to the supply response of the construc-
tion sector?
 • What institutional and policy reforms might be useful for improving the 
performance and output of the construction subsector?
2. Marginal costs of construction
This section examines how costs in the subsector respond to increases in output, 
with attention to how these marginal costs and expenditure shocks may vary 
among subsectors within the construction sector such as housing, roads, and 
social infrastructure such as drains. It also analyses the expenditure shocks that 
may occur as a result of inflation and price dynamics. Information in this section 
is compiled from interviews conducted with the Ghana Real Estate Developers 
Association (GREDA) and Ministry of Works and Housing. The section also 
includes a discussion on the structure of the construction sector as regards the 
distribution of firms by size and specialization; it concludes with a brief discus-
sion of expenditure shocks and how these affect construction projects.
2.1 Analyses of subsector costs
2.1.1 The housing subsector
There is some evidence that the housing subsector in Ghana has experienced 
increasing costs of operations due to increased demand for housing units. As a 
result of the country’s, and the industry’s, heavy dependence on imported raw 
materials such as high-tensile steels and other equipment, continued and often 
rapid depreciation of the local currency often leads to higher costs. Figure  6.3 
illustrates quarterly increases in housing prices between 2012–17, and the strong 
correlation between this and changes in the US dollar–Ghanaian cedi (GHC) 
exchange rate.
It is important to note that exchange rate volatilities also affect the costs of 
skilled and expatriate labour in the industry. Other sources of rising costs in the 
housing subsector include high import duties at the ports and rising fuel prices 
which increase firm costs due to increases in transportation and haulage expenses.
And it is interesting to note the industry’s supply response to this situation of 
increasing marginal costs of production. There appears to be a preference for a 
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particular section of the housing market, where profit margins are large enough 
to compensate for increasing costs. According to existing theory, higher costs 
may often translate into higher prices for housing units in the country, thereby 
constricting the quantity of units demanded. Despite the noted increases in costs, 
however, the demand response in the housing subsector appears to be varied. 
According to interviews with GREDA, there are generally three categories of 
housing market in Ghana: the high-end, middle-end, and low-end/‘affordable 
housing’ markets. The high-end market comprises units which cost US$200,000 
and above and are located in prime areas of the country; the middle-end market 
comprises housing units that range from US$100,000 to US$150,000; while the 
low-end/affordable housing market consists of housing units that cost below 
US$100,000. Interviews with personnel from GREDA indicate that the industry is 
unable to adequately deal with the affordable housing deficit due to the continu-
ously increasing cost of production, mostly fuelled by challenges such as the land 
tenure system and lack of affordable credit to finance the industry.1 Although the 
provision of social infrastructure such potable water and electricity is seen as 
the sole responsibility of government, most parts of the country still lack these 
basic amenities. Developers are therefore forced to take up the responsibility of 
providing these social facilities as they develop new areas for habitation. This sig-
nificantly increases the cost of production, which makes it difficult to satisfy the 
increasing demand for affordable housing.
1 The Ghana Housing Policy, launched in 2017 aims to accelerate efforts to address the national 
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Figure 6.3 Trends in exchange rates and housing prices, 2012–17
Source: Authors’ illustration based on exchange rate data (Bank of Ghana) and housing data (Trasacco 
Valley, a major industry player in Ghana’s housing subsector).
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Developers have found it more profitable to operate in the middle- to high-end 
markets in the industry, where there are relatively high profit margins. In these 
markets, despite high costs of production, production does not appear to be 
affected in significant ways and the supply of housing units is not constrained.
2.1.2 Roads, drainage, and other social infrastructure subsectors
Production costs in these subsectors have generally been increasing; costs of 
imported raw materials have experienced large upswings due to rapid de pre ci-
ation of the local currency. These raw materials include bitumen and other equip-
ment and machinery, which are often sourced from countries in South America 
(particularly Venezuela) and in Europe. As a result of the rapid depreciation of 
the cedi, contractors and other service providers tend to index their costs in a 
foreign currency (usually US dollars) which is expected to be more stable and 
predictable. For example, in the construction of feeder roads (i.e. roads connect-
ing communities in rural areas) US$250,000 and US$100,000 are recent quotes 
for the construction of a kilometre of new bitumen road and the rehabilitation of 
existing road, respectively.
From interviews with the Ministry of Roads and Transport (responsible for 
roads and infrastructural construction in the country), the greatest proportion of 
costs in the roads and social infrastructure subsectors are associated with 
imported raw materials, including the use of skilled expatriate labour. Figures 6.4 
and  6.5 graphically illustrate these increasing equipment and labour costs 
between 2014 and 2017.
Figures 6.4–6.6 show various indices used to track changes in the prices of con-





































































































































































































































Figure 6.4 Trends in price index for plant and equipment, 2014–17
Source: Authors’ illustration based on Ministry of Roads and Transport (Department of Urban Roads) 
data.
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for concrete works. The indices are constructed from the Works Procurement 
Manual (WPM).2 Figure 6.4 displays the cost index for plant and equipment—
such as earth-moving equipment (hydraulic excavator, dozer), road-making 
equipment (road paver, asphalt concrete plant), and hauling equipment (truck, 
tractor trailer)—employed in infrastructure projects. The index measures changes 
in the costs of providing and maintaining construction plant and equipment for a 
specified period of time. Between 2014–17, the index suggests a steady increase in 
equipment costs in the roads and social infrastructure subsectors. Figure  6.5 
shows the price index for local labour, based on annualized data from 2014–17. 
Based on the data, the cumulative annual growth rate in labour cost between 
2014–17 is approximately 26 per cent.
Chippings are a key ingredient in the construction of drains, tunnels, bridges, 
and other related infrastructure. The cost of high-grade chippings has also been 
on the rise, as evidenced by the trend observed in Figure 6.6. Often, irregularities 
in the supply of high-quality chippings necessitates the addition of quarry dust, 
which also drives up costs in the industry. From Figure  6.6, the price index 
2 The World Bank produces price adjustment formulae for civil engineering contracts. The 
Ministry of Roads and Transport modifies these formulae based on the local materials and inputs that 
are used in the construction industry to produce its localized version of the index. Annexes D–F of 
the Works Procurement Manual 3.2, Section 6, provide details of each index and how it is calculated. 















Figure 6.5 Trends in annualized price index for local labour, roads, and social 
infrastructure, 2014−17
Source: Authors’ illustration based on Ministry of Roads and Transport (Department of Urban Roads) 
data.
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increased sharply in the first half of 2014, and remained stable throughout 2015. 
However, the price index for these high-grade chippings resumed its upward 
trend from the second half of 2016 to the first half of 2017.
2.2 Patterns of inflation and subsector costs
Figures  6.7a–6.7d compare the costs of housing and a series of construction 
costs with trends in year-on-year (YOY) inflation (INF) between 2012 and 
2017, the period for which costs of construction components are available. 
Generally, inflation appears to have risen steadily between 2012 and 2015, 
but  it  fell in early 2016. The fall in inflation rates in 2016 may be attributed 
to  some  degree of stability in major drivers of inflation in that year, such as 
utility and transport prices. Prices of housing and construction in the various 
 subsectors initially appear to follow trends in inflation closely but diverge 
around 2016.
Rising construction costs may be explained by exchange rate movements, 
as  mentioned above. The increasing trend in the US dollar–Ghanaian cedi 
exchange rate and the subsequent higher cost of imported inputs may provide a 
plausible explanation for the increases in housing and construction prices over 
time, despite the decline in general price levels in 2016. Although local prices fell 



































































































Figure 6.6 Trends in price index for chippings, 2014–17
Source: Authors’ illustration based on Ministry of Roads and Transport (Department of Urban 
Roads) data.
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2.3 Structure of the construction industry
The construction industry in Ghana comprises building project consultants, 
en gin eers, architects, quantity surveyors, building contractors, and artisans. There 
is currently no national authority that governs and regulates the activities of the 
industry. In the absence of this authority, the various sectors within the industry 
have individual governing institutions. The Ministry of Works and Housing 
supervises all building and civil works in the country while the Ministry of 
Roads and Highways oversees the activities of players in the construction and 
maintenance of roads, highways, railways, airports, and other structures. These 
two ministries are therefore jointly responsible for the registration and classifica-
tion of contractors within the industry. Nonetheless, there is no national database 
of industry players with information on the respective sizes and capabilities of the 
members.
Classification of contractors in both the housing and roads and civil works 
subsectors is primarily based on the financial resources, human resource capaci-
ties, and level of technology (i.e. type and efficiency of equipment employed) of 
firms. There are different classifications for contractors in the housing and roads 
subsectors. These are described below. Contractors in the housing subsector are 
grouped into four classifications, 1 to 4, depending on the value of the project to be 
implemented. As described in Table 6.1, class 1 contractors (D1K1) are contractors 
6.7a: Inflation (YOY) and price of chippings, 2014–17 6.7b: Inflation (YOY) and price of plant and equipment, 2014–17









































































































































































































































































































































































Price of chippings INF-YOY Price of plant and equipment
INF-YOY Housing prices Local labour INF-YOY
Figure 6.7 Inflation and prices 2012–17
Source: Authors’ illustration based on Ministry of Roads and Transport (Department of Urban 
Roads) data.
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with the capacity to execute projects that are above US$500,000 in value; class 2 
contractors (D2K2) have the capacity to execute projects that are up to a value of 
US$500,000; class 3 (D3K3) contractors have the resources to implement projects 
with a maximum value of US$200,000; while class 4 (D4K4) contractors have the 
means to carry out projects with a maximum value of US$75,000.
According to the Ministry of Works and Housing, the majority (roughly 
60 per cent) of contractors in Ghana fall within the class 3 category, while only about 
10 and 20 per cent fall within the first two categories, respectively. The remainder fall 
within the fourth classification. These classifications have direct implications for the 
types of projects that contractors within the sector can bid for, with varying degrees 
of competition from one classification to the other. Given the relatively lower 
concentration of contractors in class 1, the level of competition in this class appears 
to be more oligopolistic in nature. The level of competition in the class 3 category, 
however, where more contractors are concentrated, appears to be more competitive.
In spite of the preferential bidding that is typically reserved for lower-class 
Ghanaian contractors (intended to build their capacity in the industry), there is a 
recent trend of incursion by Chinese firms. According to the Association of 
Building Contractors and Civil Engineers, contractors involved in relatively low-
value contracts such as the construction of classroom units within villages and 
other minor civil works within rural areas, which were initially reserved for class 
4 contractors, are now having to deal with fierce competition from Chinese con-
struction firms. These foreign firms are often fronted by local citizens, who enable 
them to win contracts intended for indigenous contractors. Once such contracts 
are won, Chinese construction firms typically rely on foreign labour (mainly 
Chinese) in order to execute the projects.
Contractors in the road’s subsector are also classified into four categories, 
based on the financial assets of the firm. These are summarized in Table 6.2. Class 
1 contractors are those that have no limit on their tender—they can implement 
projects of any value. Class 2 contractors are those with the resources to tender 
bids up to a maximum of US$2.5m, class 3 contractors can tender bids up to a 
maximum of US$1.3m, while class 4 contractors have a maximum of US$500,000. 
Table 6.1 Housing subsector classification
Class Project value Proportion of  
contractors, %
Class 1 (D1K1) > $500,000 10
Class 2 (D2K2) ≤ $500,000 20
Class 3 (D3K3) ≤ $200,000 60
Class 4 (D4K4) ≤ $75,000 10
Source: Authors’ construction based on information provided 
by the Ministry of Works and Housing, 2018.
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In addition to a classification based on financial capabilities, contractors are also 
classified according to the nature of project. A category A contractor can execute 
large projects such as major roads and highways, airports, and related structures; 
a category B contractor is able to execute projects such as bridges, culverts, and 
other structures. Contractors in categories C and D are able to implement pro-
jects relating to labour-intensive works and steel bridges, and rehabilitation and 
maintenance works, respectively.
Ghana’s Road Fund was established in 1985 by an act of parliament to preserve 
the country’s road network. Funds are obtained from multiple sources, including 
fuel levies; tolls from roads, bridges, and ferries; fees from vehicle licensing and 
inspection; and international transit fees collected from foreign vehicles entering 
the country. The Ghana Road Fund Secretariat is the governmental agency, under 
the Ministry of Roads and Highways, that is mandated to manage the Road Fund. 
Unlike the road and highways subsector, the housing subsector currently does not 
have any fund that allows for the maintenance and management of the country’s 
housing structures.
2.4 Expenditure shocks and price dynamics
A major source of production interruptions in the construction sector is changes 
in local prices, mainly due to the instability of the exchange rate. As illustrated in 
Figure 6.3, these fluctuations have had direct bearings on the costs of production. 
Particularly in the area of road construction and other social infrastructure, the 
government is expected to bear the additional costs that arise, as this is often 
embedded in contract clauses. These unexpected price changes often culminate in 
delays or indefinite suspensions of construction projects.
Table 6.2 Roads subsector classification
Classification based on financial capabilities
Class Project value
Class 1 No limit on tender
Class 2 ≤ $2.5m
Class 3 ≤ $1.3m
Class 4 ≤ $0.5m
Classification based on nature of project
Class A Major roads and highways
Class B Bridges and culverts
Class C Labour-intensive works and steel bridges
Class D Rehabilitation and maintenance works
Source: Authors’ construction based on information provided  
privately by the Ministry of Roads and Highways, 2018.
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A second source of expenditure shocks is the compensation that often needs to 
be made to individuals affected or displaced by construction projects. It is not 
uncommon for this compensation to run into millions of Ghanaian cedis. 
Prohibitive costs such as these often lead to projects being delayed for long  periods. 
Projects such as the construction of highways and other urban construction 
activities are more often plagued by compensation challenges, compared with 
more rural projects. This is due to the fact that it is relatively easier to compensate 
people with farmlands in smaller towns and villages than those with businesses 
and houses in urban locations. A good example of this is the 52-kilometre 
Ayanfuri–Asawinso highway in the Central Region, which was funded by a devel-
opment partner. Although originally scheduled to be completed within twenty-four 
months, the project was delayed for about two years due to issues of compensation. 
The delay stemmed from the government’s inability to pay compensation to 
project-affected people in the construction path.
A third source of expenditure shocks is the presence of natural obstacles in 
the landscape. These obstacles may include large boulders and bodies of water in 
the path of a construction project, which may result in unanticipated interruptions 
in the implementation of a project while the most appropriate resolution to the 
problem is determined and carried out. Often, large boulders are required to be 
dug out and crushed before construction can resume. Additionally, depending on 
whether construction activities begin in the rainy season or the dry season, the 
water table may be higher than expected, causing interruptions in construction 
activities. In such situations, additional materials may be required to reinforce the 
ground before actual construction can begin, increasing time and financial costs.
The existing land administration system also poses a shock to expenditure in 
the construction sector. The activities of land developers are often halted for long 
periods due to prolonged land litigation issues. Such interruptions have direct 
cost implications for developers, especially in an environment where the prices of 
raw materials, indexed to the US dollar, experience price volatilities. Fluctuations 
in power supply have also been a major source of production interruptions in the 
construction industry, especially in the past couple of years, during which the 
country’s power challenges have heightened. Interruptions caused by unreliable 
power supply often result in higher expenditure due to reliance on alternative, but 
often more expensive, power sources such as generators.
Finally, expenditure shocks may occur as a result of changes in government 
policy and the lack of continuity in projects. Projects begun by an outgoing 
government are not necessarily completed by the new administration. In rare 
cases where projects are indeed taken up by a new administration, funding can 
be delayed for long periods, leading to major interruptions to the original schedule. 
An example is the Borteyman Housing Project, which was commenced by the 
previous administration in 2006 but received little attention and financial as sist ance 
when the new government assumed office in 2008. The government only provided 
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support to revive this project in 2014, when challenges to affordable housing 
units had become topical. Interruptions in construction project schedules also 
occur during public–private partnership (PPP) arrangements, when delays 
in  the realization of government pledges, in the form of tax refunds of about 
5–10 per cent, occur.
3. Bottlenecks to the supply response of the construction sector
The presence of challenges to and limitations on demand-induced supply in the 
construction sector is likely (as mentioned earlier) to result in higher prices. In 
this section, particular attention is paid to institutional constraints such as access 
to land and permits; critical inputs such as skilled labour and raw materials; and 
organization and capability issues such as the structure of the sector and competi-
tion. These are discussed below.
3.1 Access to land and permits
A supply bottleneck in the construction sector is the difficulty of accessing land for 
productive activity. Despite the physical presence of land resources, the existing 
tenure systems restrict the availability of and access to these resources. 
Approximately 80 per cent of Ghana’s land is communal land that is vested in 
chieftaincies, with communities holding land through allodial titles (USAID 2016). 
Land is therefore sold less frequently, and decisions about the use of the land are 
made by families and communities. The lack of documentation involved in these 
situations provides little evidential foundation for use rights. The situ ation is fur-
ther complicated by the existence of parallel formal and legal systems of managing 
land, which are more common in southern Ghana, where traditional processes are 
less dominant. The result is therefore little tenure security, even if access is granted 
for land use—and the lengthy and bureaucratic procedures involved in registering 
plots of land often discourage this practice. The end result is often multiple land 
transactions for the same piece of land. Land developers are often saddled with 
multiple payments to multiple individuals in order to have legitimate access to the 
land, leading to increases in costs. The Ghana Housing Policy, launched in 2017, 
aims to provide solutions to these problems. In addition to the establishment of 
a land bank register to provide prospective investors with adequate information 
on land ownership status, location, availability, and other such data as will aid 
decisions on housing investment, another objective of this policy is to:
Facilitate private sector access to land banks through a programme of land own-
ership confirmation and guarantee arrangements with MMDAs [Metropolitan, 
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Municipal and District Authorities] and regional land bank registry. This would 
be done in collaboration with land owners in all regional and district capitals 
to reduce the associated risk and transaction costs.
(Government of Ghana 2015: 15)
Low access to land resources has noted direct implications for construction activity. 
Indirect effects are also present, as access to land and its proper documentation is 
often a major requirement for securing credit from financial institutions.
3.2 Access to critical inputs
3.2.1 Skilled labour
A major supply-side bottleneck of the construction subsector in Ghana is the 
nature of and capacity for skills development. Despite the large number of artisans 
and construction workers in the country, these individuals largely operate in the 
informal economy, with little skill and training to match the expertise required 
for modern construction projects. According to the GLSS 6, over 90 per cent of 
youth in the construction sector are found in the informal economy (GLSS 2014). 
An unfortunate consequence of this is that local artisans are often unable to bid 
for and win contracts in the construction sector.
In addition to training programmes organized by the national Council for 
Technical and Vocational Education and Training (COTVET), which provides 
technical training for artisans, the Ministry of Roads and Highways also organizes 
frequent competency-based skills training programmes for all levels of manage-
ment and project implementation personnel and its stakeholders through its 
inter-ministerial training centre at Koforidua in the Eastern Region. The training 
centre provides training to both new and existing members in new skills and 
technologies in the construction industry. It also provides hands-on skills devel-
opment training to personnel from other West African countries such as Togo 
and Burkina Faso.
Despite existing attempts at skills training, the skills gap remains relatively 
large, as has been noted by a number of researchers. Darvas and Palmer (2014), 
for example, found a shortfall of 60,000 skilled artisans in the construction sector, 
with the dearth projected to increase to as many as 250,000 by 2020. A large pro-
portion of the Ghanaian construction industry’s growth originates from its resi-
dential market, followed by commercial and retail shopping, heavy engineering 
(especially road works), and multi-storey and high-rise buildings. This translates 
into high demand for skills such as bricklaying, plastering, plumbing, roofing, 
steel-frame flooring, steep roofing, and architectural assistants at all levels. This 
demand is, however, not being met by a sufficient quantity, or quality, of labour 
with more sophisticated, frontier skills. The existing freeze on employment as a 
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condition of an International Monetary Fund (IMF) facility received by the country 
also has implications for the recruitment of various types of skilled labour, such 
as engineers and surveyors among others, necessary for providing supervision on 
a number of projects.
A result of the lower training and skills level of Ghanaian artisans is that they 
appear to face significant levels of competition from neighbouring Francophone 
countries in certain aspects of construction. Togolese artisans, for example, are 
noted for their superior ‘finishing’ skills, and are also often willing to work for 
lower wages than their Ghanaian counterparts. The limited skills development 
may be explained by factors such as the limited capacity of existing technical 
training institutions, a shortage of teaching and training staff, and misalignment 
between existing curricula and the current needs of the construction sector. The 
high mobility levels of artisans in the construction sector often serve to deter 
companies from training their staff, as they could easily be poached by other 
organizations and individuals (Fugar et al. 2013).
3.2.2 Raw materials
Another supply-side bottleneck is the rising cost, in Ghana, of raw materials for 
construction purposes, such as water, cement, and electricity, which contributes 
to increasing costs of production. The government of Ghana, in response to the 
situation, recently introduced waivers and tax concessions for contractors partici-
pating in particular infrastructure projects. A good example is the US$1.5bn 
expansion of the Port of Tema, which is being carried out by the Ghana Ports and 
Harbours Authority, Netherlands-based APM Terminals, and French firm Bolloré 
Africa Logistics. Contractors received tax concessions valued at US$832m, which 
include waivers on materials and equipment taxes, as well as a ten-year corporate 
tax exemption. It is important to note, however, that not all project contractors 
are beneficiaries of these fiscal incentives.
There is also an issue of adequate access to the necessary raw materials within 
the country. There are noted time delays in efforts to locate quality raw materials, 
and when these materials are found, there are transportation costs in moving 
them from source to construction destination. For instance, road construction 
projects in the northern part of the country often source quarry dust and chip-
pings from the Brong-Ahafo region. The distance between these regions results 
in delays to construction, in addition to haulage costs, given rising fuel costs in 
the country.
There also appears to be a preference for foreign-supplied building and con-
struction materials due to their perceived higher quality, despite the fact that 
similar materials are often produced domestically. Unfavourable changes in for-
eign exchange rates and the depreciation of the cedi, however, have had negative 
effects on imports of these raw materials, constraining their supply and access. 
Additionally, spikes in the prices of raw materials such as copper and aluminium 
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on the world market can also be disastrous for the construction sector. A reason 
often cited for the preference for foreign construction inputs is that locally pro-
duced raw materials are not of the level of sophistication that is required for more 
complex construction projects.
3.3 Organization and capacity
Noted delays in the payment of funds for government construction projects often 
limit the participation, and hence the development, of local firms. There are often 
financial obligations to contractors which lead to delays in completion or complete 
abandonment of infrastructure projects. Additionally, tax refunds (mainly prom-
ised to the private sector in PPPs) are usually not fulfilled. For example, delayed 
tax refunds from the government have been the main reason for the delays in the 
completion of the Segleme Housing Project in Prampram in the Greater Accra 
Region. As a result of these funding issues, larger foreign firms are often the 
beneficiaries of large-scale construction projects as they are more likely to have 
the necessary capital to remain in business in the event of delayed government 
payments. This situation predictably excludes many local contractors. Although it 
might be expected that local artisans would benefit through being employed by 
these large companies, this is not often the case. Many large-scale construction 
projects provide few opportunities for the training of artisans, unlike smaller 
domestic construction projects. Large foreign contractors which employ domestic 
firms may relegate them to shorter-term and more menial activities, as is common 
across Ghana’s transport infrastructure subsector, such as in the construction of 
ports, oil refineries, and airports.
A second supply bottleneck in the construction sector may be the changing 
priorities of government, often linked with changes in political power. The provi-
sion of infrastructure often has a bearing on the budgetary allocation for the sec-
tor and therefore, depending on the priorities of the existing government, parts of 
the construction sector may receive little or no attention. An example is the pri-
ori tiza tion of infrastructural growth during the 2012–16 Mahama government, 
while the current government appears more focused on a free-education agenda. 
This might explain the declines in budgetary allocation for roads and other infra-
structure in recent periods.
Access to the prospect of large-scale projects tends to require political connec-
tions. This is due to the fact that government is the main supplier of construction 
projects in the country, a situation which may increase levels of bureaucracy, cor-
ruption, and other inefficiencies in the subsector. A number of reasons may be 
given for the flourishing of corruption in the construction sector. First, due to the 
large amount of funds that are often labelled for construction projects, it may 
be less detectable if additional funds are included for bribery purposes and 
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 11/01/20, SPi
Owoo and Lambon-Quayefio 135
kick-backs. Second, the true amount of funds channelled directly into a project 
may not be apparent until long after the project is completed and payments are 
made. Finally, the lack of regulation within the subsector may exacerbate corrup-
tion. Due to the lack of an established regulating body within the subsector, the 
government serves as both the client and the regulator. It is not uncommon to 
find situations where government officials are themselves the owners of construc-
tion firms that are the final awardees of construction projects. The structure of the 
construction sector with respect to the awarding of contracts therefore serves as a 
deterrent to local artisans, as the processes involved in bidding and the awarding 
of contracts often lack transparency.
Corruption in construction projects may be present at any and all stages (i.e. 
planning, inspection, design, bid/contract signing, construction, service delivery, 
maintenance/management, subscription, billing, disconnection, fault redress, etc.) 
and can lead to lower efficiency and effectiveness of infrastructural services, as 
these final infrastructures may be unnecessary, unsuitable, defective, or dangerous.
4. Institutional and policy reforms in the construction sector
This section discusses some institutional and regulatory reforms necessary to 
eliminate the noted bottlenecks in the supply of construction within the country. 
These suggested policy reforms stem directly from the noted constraints in the 
construction sector.
An observation on Ghana’s construction sector is the noted absence of a single 
government agency responsible for overseeing activities within the sector. 
Currently, the responsibility appears to be shared by three ministries—the 
Ministry of Water Resources, Housing, and Public Works; the Ministry of 
Transport; and the Ministry of Road and Highways. There also appear to be min-
imal legal mandate and enforcement mechanisms operating in the subsector. 
There has been some interest in the establishment of a regulatory body—the 
Construction Industry Development Authority, which is currently under review 
by the Ministry of Works and Housing and Ministry of Roads and Highways—to 
ensure safety, transparency, and professionalism within the industry, but this has 
not seen much progress. A major responsibility of this central agency would be to 
monitor and ensure transparency in the awarding of contracts, for example. It is 
believed that the lack of a regulator in the industry has led to the lack of enforce-
ment of some laws, such as the preferential bidding for particular projects which 
in turn has led to the incursion of foreign players in a section supposedly reserved 
only for Ghanaian contractors.
The following are other avenues that could be explored to promote transpar-
ency in the bidding for, awarding of, and execution of construction projects: 
establishment of a national database of all stakeholders within the sector; random 
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auditing of public funds to increase transparency and monitor public ex pend iture; 
legislation to reduce the incidence of bribery and kick-backs; blacklisting of 
companies found engaging in acts of bribery; public disclosure of all project 
agreements; integrity pacts undertaken during both tender and project execution 
phases; prohibitive action taken on corrupt practices among trade or professional 
associations.
There is also a need to develop a comprehensive local content policy for the 
construction sector, similar to what exists in the mining subsector. This might 
involve reserving a proportion of and/or particular kinds of projects for local 
firms. There are several potential benefits to be derived from this. A local content 
law that makes collaboration essential between foreign and local firms could lead 
to critical skills transfer from the former to the latter, leading to increased cap-
acity. This would also increase employment opportunities and incomes for local 
artisans. However, it should be noted that, as occurs under the existing local con-
tent law in the mining sector, the low skills levels of local artisans may present a 
challenge to successful collaborations between local and foreign firms.
Other policy reforms could be explored to raise the skills levels of local artisans 
in the construction sector. For instance, additional training could be provided for 
local artisans. Despite the fact that most artisans are trained under apprenticeship 
schemes, no additional professional training is received after apprenticeships, 
limiting access to knowledge of new techniques and equipment. The Youth 
Inclusive Entrepreneurial Development Initiative for Employment (YIEDIE) pro-
gramme is an example of such an intervention. This is a five-year programme 
designed to create economic opportunities in Ghana’s construction sector for 
disadvantaged youth (i.e. school drop-outs living in poverty). Established in 2017, 
the programme aims to provide training and better job placement for 23,700 
young people, leading to an estimated 90 per cent increase in income levels. Over 
14,000 youth will be given training in technical construction skills through par-
ticipating in an apprenticeship programme, enhanced with entrepreneurship, life 
skills, and safety and health training. The remaining youth will receive entrepre-
neurship training relevant for participation in the construction sector, along with 
support in microenterprise start-up or growth. Financial literacy education is also 
provided to all youth. Despite the laudable components and aims of the pro-
gramme, the focus on only disadvantaged youth may present a limitation, as 
other young and older people could also benefit from such training. Additionally, 
the programme presently targets only a few of the largest cities in the country (i.e. 
Accra, Kumasi, Sekondi-Takoradi, Ashaiman, and Tema), preventing it from 
reaching larger numbers of artisans who require training.
The issue of the late payment of contractors within the subsector is another 
subject for potential policy reform, as it has disastrous consequences particularly 
for small-scale local contractors. Due to delays in payment by government, local 
construction companies often pay high interest rates on loans contracted. 
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Additionally, in several instances, local firms default on these loans, leading to a 
perception among banks that loans for government projects are risky. This 
reduces the competitiveness of local firms, compared with that of their foreign 
counterparts, as they are unable to raise the required capital to bid for and execute 
projects. Even when these funds are secured, they are often at high rates of inter-
est. There have been calls, therefore, for the passage of a Delayed Payment Law 
(DPL), not unlike what exists in countries such as the United Kingdom, Singapore, 
and Malaysia. Such a law would make it mandatory for government to make 
interest payments on all delayed construction payments, which would serve to 
compensate for delays and guarantee the survival of local firms, and would also 
perhaps act to deter late payment by the government in the first place.
To tackle the problems of irregular supply of construction materials, a reliable 
value chain could be put in place. For example, to make quarry products more 
accessible there is a need to encourage investment in the manufacture of chippings 
and quarry dust, which are both essential in the construction industry. Currently, 
the few quarries in Ghana are mainly located in the southern half of the country. 
Therefore, all construction in the northern belt is particularly constrained with 
respect to accessing cheap quarry raw materials. Investment in this area would be 
beneficial, particularly for construction projects in northern parts of the country. 
Despite the noted importance of free trade, imports of some building materials 
could also be restricted so as to encourage production by local individuals. For 
instance, Angola has banned the import of cement into the country in order to 
protect its local industries.
Effective collaboration between government and the other stakeholders (housing 
developers) in the area of providing social infrastructure should be encouraged. 
A construction fund should also be established as a means of easing the cost of 
operations. Such a partnership would enable the industry to deal more eff ect ive ly 
with the rising demand for affordable housing. The establishment of a housing 
development fund would also be useful for developers, allowing them to access 
affordable long-term credit in order to reduce their operation costs and hence 
increase their ability to effectively deal with the affordable housing gap.
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Local Content Law and Practice
The Case of Ghana
Charles Godfred Ackah and Asaah S. Mohammed
1. Introduction
Oil and gas were discovered in Ghana in 2007 and the country began to extract 
these resources in 2010. With subsequent discoveries the country has come to 
realize its long-time hope of boosting its socio-economic development with pro-
ceeds from oil and gas. Paradoxically, however, the oil sector globally has not 
helped to boost local economic development in producing countries, especially 
developing countries. This paradox, which has been christened the ‘paradox of 
plenty’ or ‘resource curse’, has become a catchphrase in international discussions 
on extractivism and development.
Ever since 2007, Ghana’s government has been developing strategies to both 
take advantage of the oil find and attempt to escape the resource curse. One such 
strategy was the policy and legislative development on local content and local 
participation in all facets of the oil and gas industry. To this effect, in 2010, a 
coherent policy was developed to regulate the nascent oil and gas industry. This 
aimed to ensure that Ghanaian citizens participate in the ownership of businesses 
in the oil and gas industry by giving priority in employment, in the award of oil 
blocks, oil field licences, and oil extraction licences, and in all oil and gas projects 
for which contracts are awarded. To ensure the effective implementation of the 
policy, legislation (LI 2204 [Petroleum (Local Content and Local Participation 
in Petroleum Activities) Regulations]) was passed in 2013 by the Parliament of 
Ghana. In both the legislation and policy, local content refers to the use of 
Ghanaian local expertise, goods and services, people, businesses, and financing in 
oil and gas activities. The regulation and policy not only aimed to maximize 
value-addition and job-creation in the petroleum sector through the use of local 
content, they also acted as a mechanism for the coordination, transparent moni-
toring, and governance of Ghanaian content. While local content policies (LCPs) 
and legislation have the potential to stimulate broad-based economic develop-
ment, which is necessary to alleviate poverty, achieve prosperity, and ensure 
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sustainable economic and social outcomes in Ghana’s oil and gas sector, their use 
has often achieved mixed results in many extractive developing countries.
It has now been over four years since Ghana passed the LI 2204. Its impacts 
are therefore worth examining to understand how the law has aided the utiliza-
tion of Ghanaian goods and services, skills development, and the training and 
employment of Ghanaians. This chapter therefore seeks to review local content 
policy and legislation in Ghana and to assess their effectiveness since oil and gas 
production began in 2010. The chapter attempts to identify not only direct benefits 
but also indirect and induced benefits of local content through forward and back-
ward linkages between the oil and gas industry and other sectors of the economy. 
The chapter also highlights some challenges hindering the effective implementa-
tion of the law.
The chapter relied largely on a qualitative desk review of existing literature, 
research papers, and institutional reports on local content law and practice in 
Ghana’s oil and gas sector. Current local content policy and legislation were 
reviewed in terms of their suitability for achieving effective local participation in 
the oil and gas industry. Secondary information was sourced from company 
reports, legal and policy documents, academic publications, articles, and sector 
reports from civil-society organizations (CSOs), government ministries, inter-
nation al oil companies (IOCs), etc. First-hand information was collected from 
limited fieldwork conducted for the study. In-depth interviews were conducted 
with key informants in the oil and gas industry, including the local content secre-
tariat of the Ministry of Energy and the Petroleum Commission, to augment the 
information contained in their institutional reports. Some former staff of the 
Enterprise Development Centre (EDC) and some international oil companies 
such as Tullow Ghana and Kosmos Energy were interviewed to obtain additional 
information.
2. Contextualizing natural resource extraction 
and national development
Most theoretical arguments, particularly in the 1960s and early 1980s, were that 
the presence of natural resources in any nation would lead to rapid development 
(Karl 2007; Rostow 1990). This led to a mad rush to discover and exploit natural 
resources, particularly those with high economic value at the time. Resources 
such as gold, diamonds, oil, and timber became the target of many developing 
countries (Rostow 1990). The argument linking natural resources to accelerated 
development was given its impetus by the development paradigm of developed 
countries such as Australia, the United States, and the United Kingdom. Its 
proponents, chiefly Rostow (1990), argued that natural resources extraction was 
posi tive ly correlated with industrial development, a prerequisite for infrastructural 
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and economic development. Drake (1980), cited in Rosser (2006), argued that 
the  presence of natural resources would open domestic markets and ensure 
investment capital needed for industrial development. In his five-stage model for 
development, Rostow saw the presence of natural resources as a pre-condition 
for take-off.
In the 1980s, the extractive-led development argument continued, with the 
World Bank spearheading the agenda. From a liberal economic perspective, propon-
ents of the extractive-led development paradigm argued that countries endowed 
with extractive resources such as oil and gas and gold would witness accelerated 
growth and development (Africa Development Bank 2009; Henstridge et al. 2012; 
World Bank  2004). Their view was supported by some studies, which found a 
positive correlation between growth in the oil and gas sector and GDP growth 
in countries in Africa, including Algeria, Angola, Nigeria, and Libya (Africa 
Development Bank 2009; King 2010; KPMG 2013).
Despite the developmental potential of natural resources for national growth, 
arguments emerged in the 1980s to question the contributions of the sector to the 
development of several developing countries. Auty (1993) argued that several 
developing countries lacked the capacity to manage the revenues from extractive 
resources, leading to corruption and mismanagement—a culture of rent-seeking 
common in developing countries. In Sierra Leone, Maconachie and Binns (2007) 
noted that due to poor management the country had remained one of the poorest 
African countries despite mining diamonds for several decades. Sachs and Warner 
(1995), using the economic growth rates of ninety-seven countries between 1970 
and 1989, delved deeper in an attempt to understand how the presence of natural 
resources influenced their development. They found that countries with copious 
natural resources tend to grow less rapidly than those with few natural resources 
(Sachs and Warner 1995).
The fundamental assumption by liberal economists is that growth in the 
extractive sector will induce economic growth through increased government 
revenues, used to finance poverty alleviation programmes and facilitate the 
improvement of infrastructure (Campbell 2001; Henstridge et al. 2012; Karl 2007). 
Liberal economists believe that the indigenous population in extractive areas will 
have a comparative advantage to secure jobs and will receive trickle-down benefits 
because they live close to the resource extraction point. Moreover, sub-national gov-
ernments are expected to witness an increase in revenues for sub-national 
development (O’Faircheallaigh 2013). What appears not conclusive in the lib-
eral economic view is how these benefits will trickle down and who specifically 
will benefit at sub-national levels. A segment of the literature has concluded that 
the extractive sector is a curse rather than a blessing to developing countries 
across the world, and particularly those in Africa (Andersen and Aslaksen 2008; 
Auty  1993; Baland and Francois  2000; Bjorvatn et al.  2012; Brückner  2010; 
Brunnschweiler and Bulte 2008; Coxhead 2007; James and Aadland 2011; James 
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and James  2011; Karl  1997,  2007; Larsen  2005; Mainguy  2011; Neumayer  2004; 
Ogunleye 2008; Stevens and Dietsche 2008).
3. The oil and gas sector, local content, and local participation
From the liberal economic perspective, the extractive sector is expected to create 
employment for the local population, especially during the construction of infra-
structure (Campbell  2001; Warhurst  2005; World Bank  2004). In 2002, the 
International Labour Organization (ILO) estimated that the oil industry employed 
more than 2 million workers in production and refining (World Bank 2004). The 
ILO further estimated that each job in oil production or refining indirectly gen-
erates between one and four jobs in related industries (World Bank  2004). In 
Ghana, for instance, Tullow Ghana estimated that 180–200 Ghanaians would be 
directly employed by their company, and another 600–800 by contractors during 
oil exploration and production (Tullow 2012).
While the oil industry is considered to be providing employment op por tun-
ities, some studies have observed that employment in the sector is generally fall-
ing in most parts of the world (Azapagic 2004). Other studies have observed that 
the majority of the jobs are not benefiting the communities in which the oil pro-
duction is occurring. It is a common trend in the oil industry to fill the majority 
of extraction-related jobs with foreign workers, who can be exploited and denied 
legitimate claims to wages, benefits, and compensation (Karl  2007; Smith and 
Dorward 2014). Azapagic (2004) similarly argues that there is an increasing trend 
in the industry for companies to contract out or outsource labour. This implies 
that local people are less likely to benefit from new jobs and business op por tun-
ities. A typical example, according to him, is the ‘fly-in, fly-out’ operations that 
bring workers from different parts of the world to exploration sites on the pretext 
of a lack of a locally available skilled workforce.
The high expectation of employment in the oil sector often leads to a massive 
movement of people, especially the youth, to oil-producing areas. Many of these 
young people do not get employment and end up engaging in various social vices 
for their livelihood (Okuthe 2015). In the city of Sekondi-Takoradi, Obeng-Odoom 
(2014) observed that many of the young women who had migrated to the city since 
the discovery of oil in 2007 were in commercial sex work. Darkwah (2013) has 
observed that several young Ghanaians have rushed to acquire skills related to the 
oil industry and are still waiting to get employment in the sector. She, however, 
bemoaned that several of these young people are losing hope in the oil sector des-
pite the high expectations they had had on the discovery of oil in 2007.
Due to the challenges in promoting local interests in business and employment 
in the oil and gas sector, the concept of local content and local participation has 
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now been emphasized in extractive sector policy. Local content refers to jobs or 
value-added that are created anywhere in the domestic economy as a result of the 
actions of an oil and gas company. It can also refer more narrowly to jobs that are 
created in the neighbourhood of the oil production plant. Local content may even 
refer to the provision, by the oil company, of infrastructure (schools, medical 
facilities) that is not an input into its own production but intended for the benefit 
of the local population—either of the nation generally or the neighbourhood of 
the installations (Tordo et al. 2013).
Increasing local content has therefore become a policy priority in many 
resource-rich developing countries, among both mature and recent entrants to 
the industry (Tordo et al. 2013). The purpose of LCPs in the oil and gas sector is 
generally to encourage the participation and development of national labour, 
goods and services, technology, and capital. LCPs are viewed from different per-
spectives. Tordo et al. (2013) have argued that LCPs should be concerned not only 
with an immediate increase in local content such as employment, but also with 
actions such as training in appropriate skills that will lead to a longer-term 
increase in employment and related benefits to local citizens.
4. Policy and legislative development on local content and 
local participation in Ghana’s oil and gas value chain
4.1 Policy development process
In the quest to maximize benefits from oil and gas resources for Ghanaian citi-
zens, the government embarked on policy and legislative development from the 
moment oil and gas were discovered, in 2007. Taking lessons from the mining 
and forestry sectors, where fiscal benefits had eluded the citizens of Ghana 
(Akabzaa et al. 2007; Ayelazuno 2014b; Ayine 2001), the state started to marshal 
policies to avert the paradox of plenty. Subsequently, a coherent policy with the 
following objectives was developed to regulate the nascent oil and gas industry 
(Ministry of Energy 2009):
 • to maximize the benefits of oil and gas wealth generation on a comprehen-
sive local content platform by maximizing the use of local expertise, goods 
and services, job creation for people, businesses and financing in all aspects 
of the oil and gas industry value chain and retention of the benefit within 
Ghana
 • to develop local capability in all aspects of the oil and gas value chain through 
education, skills and expertise development, transfer of technology and 
know-how and an active research and development portfolio
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 11/01/20, SPi
144 Local Content Law and Practice in Ghana
 • to achieve a degree of influence or control over development initiatives for 
local/domestic stakeholders
 • to achieve at least 90 per cent local content and local participation in all 
aspects of the oil and gas industry value chain within a decade
 • to increase the capabilities and international competitiveness of domestic 
businesses and industrial sectors
 • to create oil and gas and related supportive industries that will sustain eco-
nomic development.
A review of the 2010 local content policy suggests that the government has 
shown a commitment to ensuring that Ghanaian citizens participate in the own-
ership of businesses in the oil and gas industry. The policy specifically mandates 
that priority should be given to Ghanaians in the award of oil blocks, oil field 
licences, and oil extraction licences and in all projects for which contracts are 
awarded. In this regard, the government is committed to building the capacity of 
local firms to attain international competitiveness and enable them to contribute 
effectively to the growth of the nascent oil and gas industry.
In terms of goods and services provision, the policy mandates that all op er-
ators in the oil and gas industry shall as far as practicable use goods and services 
produced by or provided in Ghana for their operations in preference to foreign 
goods and services. It was the hope of the government that after the commence-
ment of operations, the participation of Ghanaians in value-added would be at 
least 10 per cent initially, with a 10 per cent increase annually in the provision of 
goods and services.
Regarding the employment of Ghanaians, the policy mandates that all op er-
ators in the oil and gas industry should ensure that opportunities are given as 
far as is possible for the employment of Ghanaians having the requisite expert-
ise or qualifications in the various levels of the operations. The operator should, 
within twelve months of the grant of a licence (or the effective date of a 
Petroleum Agreement), submit to the relevant regulatory agency for approval a 
detailed Annual Recruitment and Training Programme for the recruitment 
and training of citizens of Ghana in all job classifications and in all aspects of 
petroleum ac tiv ities, which may be carried out in or outside the country. The 
policy mandates the operators to detail in their recruitment plans the following 
targets of employment of Ghanaians: at least 50 per cent of management staff at 
the beginning and 80 per cent after five years; at least 30 per cent of technical staff 
at the beginning and 80 per cent after five years; and 100 per cent of all other staff.
The policy also mandates that all operators should provide for the training of 
Ghanaians in all aspects and phases of petroleum production through scholar-
ships, industrial training for students, and other financial support for education. 
To enhance the capacity of Ghanaians, the government intends to support local 
training and technical institutions to develop the requisite capacity, to international 
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standards, to train Ghanaians to the levels required by the industry in drilling, 
catering and housekeeping, and other support services. Special attention will be 
given to ensure the indigenization of oil and gas technologies. The policy also 
makes provisions to ensure equal opportunities for men and women in the oil 
and gas industry.
4.2 Legislative development process
Legislation on local content in petroleum activities in Ghana dates back to 1984, 
when the PNDC Law 84 enacted the Petroleum Exploration and Production 
Decree, 1984. Section 23 of the Decree provided for the employment of Ghanaians 
and the preference for Ghanaian goods and services in the exploration and pro-
duction of petroleum in Ghana. In 2016, the PNDCL 84 was replaced by the 
Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act 2016 (Act 919). Act 919 mandates 
that qualified Ghanaian citizens are to be given the opportunity of employment in 
all aspects of the petroleum industry. Section 61(1) of Act 919 further provides 
that Ghanaian firms are to be given preference in the supply chain of materials, 
equipment, machinery, and consumer goods.
In 2013, the Parliament of Ghana passed the Petroleum (Local Content and 
Local Participation in Petroleum Activities) Regulations, 2013 (LI 2204). This was 
aimed at developing local capacities in the petroleum industry’s value chain for 
sustainable economic development (Ministry of Energy  2009). Local content 
refers to the use of Ghanaian local expertise, goods and services, people, businesses, 
and financing in oil and gas activities (Ministry of Energy 2009). The LI mandates 
that every Petroleum Agreement or petroleum licence between Ghana and a for-
eign company must have at least 5 per cent equity participation of in di gen ous 
Ghanaian companies. It is also meant to increase the capability and inter nation al 
competitiveness of domestic businesses and to create petroleum and related sup-
port industries to sustain Ghana’s economic development. The LI also provides 
that entities in the petroleum industry must submit plans for their compliance 
with local content requirements regarding the provision of goods and services. In 
addition, it requires entities in the petroleum sector to transfer advanced technology 
and skills related to the petroleum activities and their recruitment and training 
programmes to the Ghana National Petroleum Corporation (GNPC) or the 
Petroleum Commission. Representatives of IOCs working in the local oil sector have 
pledged to cooperate with the state in the implementation of LI 2204 (Tullow 2012).
The government is seeking to rely on the regulation to achieve at least 90 per cent 
local participation in all aspects of the petroleum value chain by 2020. This 
expectation is, however, widely considered unrealistic. According to Olsen (2013), 
no country has ever achieved 90 per cent local content in the history of pet rol eum 
production. The highest ever achieved is 74 per cent by Norway in 1994. This 
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therefore raises questions about the workability of the local content legislation 
and whether any company can abide by the law in Ghana.
5. Implementation of the local content policy  
and law on oil and gas in Ghana
5.1 Institutional arrangements for local content implementation
To implement the local content law on oil and gas in Ghana, the Petroleum 
Commission was established in 2011 by the Petroleum Commission Act, 2011 (Act 
821). The Commission is mandated to regulate, implement, manage, and co ord in-
ate activities in the upstream petroleum sector. The Commission has a designated 
department responsible for monitoring IOCs in the implementation of the local 
content law. The Commission is responsible for promoting and monitoring local 
content policy, advising the energy ministry on petroleum project negotiations, 
and monitoring and evaluating field appraisals, development, and production 
activities. To ensure effective monitoring of the implementation of the local con-
tent policy and law in Ghana, the Commission has broadly categorized the oil 
and gas industry as follows:
 • International Oil Companies—international companies with petroleum 
agreements undertaking exploration and production activities
 • International Service Companies—foreign com pan ies providing services to 
IOCs
 • Local Service Companies—local companies providing services in the oil 
industry.
The energy ministry is responsible for overseeing and ensuring full imple-
mentation of the local content and local participation policy. A Local Content 
and Local Participation Secretariat has been established, as well as a National 
Local Content Committee within the ministry, to oversee the implementation 
of the policy. An Oil and Gas Business Development and Local Content Fund 
has been established to support local capability development aspects of the local 
content framework. The fund will be used primarily for education, training, and 
research and development in oil and gas. Sources of the fund will include a con-
tribution from licensed operators (at amounts specified in the applicable 
Petroleum Agreements), oil and gas revenue, levies, grants, and other support 
from Ghana’s Development Partners. The Energy Ministry will oversee the dis-
bursement of the fund.
CSOs, particularly NGOs and the media, play important roles in supporting 
good governance in the new oil era in Ghana. CSOs act as pressure groups to 
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force government and IOCs to abide by the local content law and policy. Notable 
CSOs playing such roles in Ghana include the Africa Centre for Energy Policy 
(ACEP), the Natural Resource Governance Institute, and the Civil Society Platform 
on Oil and Gas.
6. Current level of goods and services supplied  
by Ghanaian companies
In line with the local content policy and legislation, goods and services as shown 
in Table 7.1 are earmarked for indigenous Ghanaian companies.
As at the end of 2016, 776 companies were registered with the Commission to 
provide either direct or indirect services ranging from catering/hospitality services, 
logistics supplies, and freight forwarding to fabrication and waste management 
services. These consisted of 480 local companies (companies with at least 51 per cent 
Ghanaian equity ownership), 201 foreign companies, and ninety-five joint venture 
(JV) companies. Figures from the Petroleum Commission show progressive growth 
of local firm registration from 2012 (Figure 7.1).
The Africa Centre for Energy Policy (2017) has recorded that in 2016 the 
Jubilee/TEN Field Partners (Tullow Ghana Limited, Kosmos Energy, Anadarko, 
GNPC, and Petro SA) awarded contracts worth about US$1.37 billion, out of 
which indigenous Ghanaian companies were awarded contracts worth US$489 
million (35 per cent) and non-indigenous Ghanaian companies US$884 million 
(65 per cent). The ACEP report further noted that between 2014 and 2016, there 
was a significant and progressive increase in contracts awarded to indigenous 
companies: US$152 million in 2014; US$249 million in 2015; and US$489 million 
in 2016. ACEP (2017) also reported that between 2014 and 2016 ENI Ghana 
Exploration and Production Limited spent a total of US$6.3 billion in developing 
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the Offshore Cape Three Points (OCTP) Field. Contracts worth about US$1.76 
billion (28 per cent) during this development process were awarded to indigenous 
Ghanaian companies, while contracts worth US$4.54 billion (72 per cent) were 
awarded to international companies. In total, about 250 indigenous Ghanaian 
companies benefited from these contracts (companies with at least 51 per cent 
Ghanaian equity ownership). The Petroleum Commission in 2016 also reported 
specifically the value of services provided by local and international firms to two 
IOCs (Tullow and ENI); details are given in Figures 7.2 and 7.3.
In the area of fabrication, some indigenous Ghanaian companies are making 
impressive strides. For example, Belmet7 and Seaweld Engineering Services Limited 
participated in the fabrication of the suction piles and module stools, respectively, 
for the OCTP FPSO. Specifically, Belmet7 invested about US$8 million in their 
fabrication yard at the Takoradi Port in 2013 and have since produced sixteen 
suction piles for the OCTP field and a gas export manifold for the TEN Field. 
According to ACEP, this development is the first of its kind in West Africa. 
Other companies, including JVC, Orsam, Harlequin, and Group Five, have 
fabricated jumpers, sleepers, mud mats, riser bases, and manifolds in Ghana. 
In all, over 15,000 tonnes of steel have been fabricated in Ghana for the oil and 
gas industry.
Installation of subsea infrastructure is another area of interest in local content 
development in Ghana. An indigenous Ghanaian company (Sri Emas Limited) 
won over US$300 million worth of contracts for the transport and installation of 
subsea umbilicals, risers, and flowlines (SURF) as well as the transport and instal-
lation of the gas export sealine for the OCTP project. The project management 
and major procurement is led and carried out in-country by Ghanaians, and 
some other aspects of the scope of work are subcontracted to other Ghanaian 
companies (Africa Centre for Energy Policy 2017).




















Figure 7.1 Progress of local firm registration with Petroleum Commission
Source: Petroleum Commission (2016), copied here with permission.
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As shown in Figures 7.2 and 7.3, although the picture appears promising, it is 
below the country’s expectation in its local content policy objective of achieving 
50 per cent of local participation in the supply chain within a decade. Several fac-
tors have contributed to this. The Petroleum Commission has noted that few 
indigenous companies participate in the middle and higher supply chain ac tiv-
ities. Most indigenous companies are concentrated at the lower levels of the sup-
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Figure 7.2 Foreign and local firms’ supply of goods and services to Tullow Ghana 
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Figure 7.3 Foreign and local firms’ supply of goods and services to ENI Ghana 
Exploration and Production Limited
Source: Petroleum Commission (2016), copied with permission.
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7. Recruitment, training, and promotion of Ghanaian  
nationals for jobs in the oil sector
Section 5.4 of the 2010 Local Content and Local Participation policy framework, 
which focuses on the employment of Ghanaians in the oil industry, stipulates the 
following milestones:
 1. at least fifty per cent (50 per cent) of the management staff of IOCs are 
Ghanaians from the start of petroleum activities [and]
 2. at least eighty per cent (80 per cent) within five (5) years after the start of 
the petroleum activities
 3. at least thirty per cent (30 per cent) of the technical staff are Ghanaians 
from the start of petroleum activities of the licensee and the percentage 
shall increase to at least eighty per cent (80 per cent) within five (5) years 
after the start of petroleum activities and ninety per cent (90 per cent) 
within ten (10) years; and other staff are one hundred per cent (100 per 
cent) Ghanaians.
As at the end of 2015, the total number of people employed in the upstream 
sector was estimated at 6,940. Of these, 5,590 (81 per cent) were Ghanaians and 
1,350 (19 per cent) expatriates (Buah 2016). In comparing the employment statis-
tics with the local content targets, it is observed that the targets for management 
staff and other staff have been met. However, there is a huge gap in the area of 
technical staff, especially engineers and technicians (Ahwireng 2016). The 
Petroleum Commission has begun taking steps to bridge this gap. For example, 
the Commission negotiated for 20 per cent of the engineering design of SURF 
for the TEN project to be executed by Ghanaians through GNPC-Technip 
Limited (a JV company).
It is also worth noting that some of the IOCs are prioritizing Ghanaians in the 
execution of their projects. For instance, 25 per cent of engineering man hours for 
the construction of ENI’s ongoing gas processing plant at Sanzule is being executed 
by Ghanaians. Also, both Kosmos Energy and Tullow Oil now have Ghanaians 
managing their Ghana offices in fulfilment of their local content commitments 
(Africa Centre for Energy Policy 2017).
It has been observed that there exist huge salary disparities between Ghanaian 
employees and foreign employees of IOCs. These disparities have recently led to 
protests among local staff of IOCs. The Petroleum Commission in its attempt to 
understand the reasons behind the disparities has come to the realization that 
most of the Ghanaian staff lack the requisite technical skills needed for the oil and 
gas industry. The Commission concluded that, although Ghanaians possessed 
academic qualifications, they lacked practical skills and competencies to fill 
en gin eer ing and technical areas of the oil and gas industry (Africa Centre for 
Energy Policy 2017).
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8. ‘Local local’ content
‘Local local’ content is a term used to describe how local content initiatives are 
used to address specific needs at project-affected communities. Since the oil dis-
covery and subsequent development of local content policy and law, several 
stakeholders, such as community leaders and civil society, have called for the oil 
industry to provide benefits to local communities likely to be affected by oil pro-
duction and related activities. Although these calls have not been successful in 
several extractive countries, advocacy and agitation for this framework of local 
content have continued unabated.
The IOCs have responded in various ways to the ‘local local’ content debate in 
Ghana. For instance, in the contract for site preparation for the OCTP onshore 
gas receiving facility in Sanzule, all the 140 unskilled and semi-skilled workers 
were employed from the eighteen project-affected communities; catering, driving, 
and hospitality services were all provided by companies from the communities; 
and Sri Emas (an indigenous Ghanaian company) was awarded a contract worth 
US$300,000 to construct a road bridge connecting the farming communities of 
Adubrim to the cocoa-growing areas of Ellembelle in the Western Region (Africa 
Centre for Energy Policy  2017). According to the community liaison officer of 
Kosmos Energy, the company has prioritized ‘local local’ companies in communi-
ties in the Western Region for the award of unrestricted contracts. For instance, it 
has prioritized local restaurants to supply food during workshops and meetings.
Although ‘local local’ content is being promoted in the extractive sector as a way 
of meeting local communities’ interests, it is not prioritized in Ghana’s local content 
and local participation policy and legislation, which has no specific references to 
‘local local’ content. This has raised concerns among local actors in coastal commu-
nities in the Western Region, who have questioned their benefits from the oil find 
since they are likely to suffer from any negative consequences of the oil industry. 
The demand for local benefits of the oil industry by coastal communities in the 
Western Region has received much attention in the literature (Ackah-Baidoo 2013; 
Ayelazuno 2014a; Mohammed et al. 2014). The question, however, is how to ensure 
that ‘local local’ firms meet the standards of the IOCs. This may require a policy 
focus and commitment of the IOCs and the Petroleum Commission to support 
‘local local’ firms in their efforts to contribute to the supply chain in the oil industry.
9. Challenges of local content implementation in  
Ghana’s oil and gas sector
9.1 Local business capacities in the oil and gas industry
There is a constant assertion from IOCs that indigenous companies have chal-
lenges in meeting international standards in the industry. A body of literature 
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largely agrees that indigenous companies are poorly structured and have limited 
capacity to do business in the oil and gas industry in Ghana (Africa Centre for 
Energy Policy 2017; Asafu-Adjaye 2010; Asamoah 2012; Asante and Owusu 2014; 
Boyefio and Ochai 2014). The literature asserts that IOCs find it difficult to iden-
tify suitable Ghanaian suppliers because of limited information or records on 
them. Local SMEs are also challenged by limited information on supplying ser-
vices to IOCs, which denies them opportunities to benefit from the supply chain 
of the oil industry.
Another fundamental challenge of local SMEs is that they lack skilled person-
nel to provide services that meet the standards of IOCs. Local SMEs are noted for 
not prioritizing skills training of their staff and do not invest enough to acquire the 
skilful manpower needed to deliver quality services on time. They have limit ed 
financial capacity to deliver on large contracts, which is largely due to the fact that 
financial institutions in Ghana do not trust their creditworthiness. A common 
feature of local SMEs, as noted in the literature, is that they are mostly not certi-
fied to international standards such as the International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO). International certification is a prerequisite for doing busi-
ness with IOCs. Therefore, its absence is a disincentive for IOCs to engage with 
local SMEs. These standards apply to the environment, health, and safety (EHS), 
insurance requirements, and business ethics, including anti-bribery policies.
The Petroleum Commission has noted these challenges and is of the view that 
some indigenous companies have the capacity to supply some goods and services 
along the value chain of the petroleum industry. The Commission has begun sev-
eral capacity-building efforts for indigenous companies to expedite the develop-
ment of skills and know-how through the formation of joint ventures. The 
Commission also encourages partnerships and the pooling of resources among 
indigenous companies in order to deliver goods and services to the appropriate 
standards. The Commission is currently also developing an electronic portal to 
make information on upstream companies available to indigenous companies to 
enable them take advantage of upcoming opportunities. Some of these initiatives 
will be discussed in ensuing sections.
9.2 Discrimination against indigenous companies
Arguably, the dominance of international suppliers in the supply chain of the oil 
industry in Ghana gives the impression that the capacity of local SMEs is deliber-
ately underutilized. As noted by Boyefio and Ochai (2014), the Ghanaian oil 
industry is currently dominated by foreign manufacturers or suppliers of goods 
and services that could ordinarily be made or supplied by local SMEs or firms. 
They noted that, although most IOCs profess support for local content, the reality 
is that they prefer to deal with their global suppliers for a number of reasons and 
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are reluctant to break such supplier relationships. There is a general perception 
among indigenous SMEs that it is difficult to identify the entry point(s) to the 
oil and gas value chain—where to begin and who to deal with at the IOCs. There is 
also a general perception that IOCs often deliberately refuse to patronize in di gen ous 
SMEs, which they believe do not have the requisite capacity to meet their standards; 
instead, they would rather contract similar services from Côte D’Ivoire. It is 
therefore important for further studies to understand the mode of operations of 
SMEs in Côte D’Ivoire which put them at an advantage over those in Ghana.
9.3 Regulatory institutional challenges
Despite the tremendous efforts by the Petroleum Commission to ensure effective 
implementation of the local content law, several concerns have been raised about 
the capacity of the Commission. In order to ensure strict compliance by IOCs, 
there is a need to establish measurable and monitorable indicators at the various 
IOCs. This calls for technical ability within the Petroleum Commission. The tech-
nical competence of the Commission in this regard is, however, questionable, 
since the Commission itself is relatively new and, more generally, the exposure of 
Ghanaian technical staff to the oil and gas industry is limited.
In addition to the technical challenges, the Petroleum Commission, since its 
establishment, has operated as a pure public-sector institution in Ghana. One 
current characteristic of Ghana’s public sector is the high influence of partisan 
politics. The appointment of management and technical staff to the Commission is 
partisan and tenure in office depends on the tenure of the political party in power. 
For example, since the change of government in 2017, several management and 
technical staff of the Commission have been replaced. Institutional memory and 
learning therefore become questionable, and IOCs may take advantage of the 
inconsistency in monitoring resulting from leadership change to ill report progress 
on the implementation of local content policy. Interviews with the Commission’s 
senior management suggest that some IOCs have provided distorted and incon-
sistent reports on local content implementation. The Commission, however, finds 
it difficult to verify the information due to a lack of institutional records coupled 
with an absence of designated officers to crosscheck for confirmation.
10. Options for increasing local participation in  
the oil and gas industry in Ghana
In the quest to enhance the capacity of Ghanaian firms to take advantage of local 
content policy and legislation, several initiatives have been instituted in the con-
text of public–private partnership (PPP) arrangements. In 2015 the Petroleum 
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Commission, upon recognition that Ghanaians possessed academic qualifications 
but lacked practical skills and competencies to fill engineering and technical roles in 
the industry, began to conduct needs assessments. The Ghana Upstream Internship 
Program (GUSIP) was developed to recruit young school leavers as interns in 
selected oil companies to gain industry experience. Petroleum Commission 
records indicate that the first batch of interns recruited by Tullow Ghana Limited 
in 2016 has completed a one-year training programme (Africa Centre for Energy 
Policy  2017). The Commission also encourages upstream com pan ies as part of 
local content development to organize supplier development programmes for 
their subcontractors.
With regard to financial assistance, Act 919 mandates the Commission to 
establish a Local Content Fund to provide financial resources for citizens and indi-
genous Ghanaian companies engaged in petroleum activities. The Commission has 
developed modalities for the establishment of this fund, which when completed 
will increase access to finance for indigenous companies. The Commission has 
also initiated discussions with the financial sector to ease the credit constraints 
and address the bane of prohibitive interest rates and other credit challenges for 
upstream companies.
One major government-initiated PPP promoting local content in the oil and 
gas sector was the Enterprise Development Centre (EDC), which started in 2013 
and was spearheaded by the (then) Ministry of Energy and Petroleum and the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry. The five-year initiative was jointly sponsored by 
the Jubilee Partners (Tullow Oil, Ghana, Kosmos Ghana, Anadarko, Petro SA, 
and the GNPC) to provide capacity-building support to SMEs in Ghana inter-
ested in benefiting from the oil and gas supply chain. The EDC provided services 
such as business training, capacity-building programmes, advisory services, 
access to markets, and information, and also acted as a focal point for co ord in-
ation between SMEs and the oil and gas companies and their contractors. The 
EDC had developed a comprehensive database of local SMEs and had trained and 
integrated about 400 SMEs into the supply chain of the oil industry. The activities 
of the EDC have, however, been suspended since August 2016 due to lack of 
funds. Records from the EDC office indicate that only about twenty-two of the 
400 SMEs were ever awarded contracts by IOCs after receiving training. As dis-
cussed earlier, this situation is largely attributable to the discriminatory tendency 
of the IOCs against local SMEs and the poor capacity of those SMEs. Although 
the initiative had funding challenges and could not achieve as much as expected, 
the government and the IOCs need to revisit the concept with modifications and 
promote such support services to ensure the capacity development of local firms 
so that they may effectively participate in the oil industry in Ghana.
Another initiative is Invest in Africa (IIA), a cross-sector group of companies 
(local and international) working together to support local enterprises in 
Ghana. IIA established the African Partner Pool in October 2014 as an online 
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business-networking platform. This initiative connects credible local businesses 
to in vest ors and provides capacity-building programmes for SMEs. A main activ-
ity of IIA is the Business Linkage Programme, which was launched in July 2015. 
The programme provides two years of expert business support to local businesses 
to help them win clients, access finance, meet international standards, and export 
to new markets. About thirty-one SMEs have benefited from this initiative so far.
The Supply Chain Development (SCD) programme is an initiative supported 
by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) that seeks 
to improve the competitiveness of local SMEs operating in the oil and gas sector. 
The programme develops capacities of SMEs in the areas of EHS, procurement 
best practices, information technology, and quality management. So far, 394 indi-
viduals and 206 SMEs have been trained in SCD, and fifty-two training work-
shops have been run. Beneficiaries of the SCD programme have won fifty-six 
contracts worth over US$16 million with oil and gas companies.
The Association of Ghana Industries (AGI) is another platform that helps 
SMEs take advantage of opportunities in the oil and gas sector. The AGI creates 
opportunities for businesses to interact and exchange business ideas, lower the 
cost of doing business in Ghana, and improve the local business climate. The AGI 
organizes support services for its members in variety of areas, including business 
plan preparation and business advocacy advice. The AGI has organized several 
exhibitions and conferences aimed at helping SMEs understand the local content 
issues in the oil and gas sector and to participate in the industry.
Ghana Supply Chain (Pyxera), a US-funded institution, also provides capacity-
building programmes for SMEs in the industry. Pyxera has provided various 
technical training programmes for SMEs in the industry.
11. Conclusion and policy recommendations
While Ghana’s local content policy and legislation on the oil and gas industry 
have the potential to stimulate broad-based economic development, which is 
ne ces sary to alleviate poverty and ensure sustainable economic and social devel-
opment, its implementation has had mixed results. Four years on from the pass-
ing of the Petroleum (Local Content and Local Participation in Petroleum 
Activities) Regulations (LI 2204), it can be said that the country has made limited 
progress in both the employment of Ghanaians and enabling local firms to enter 
the supply chain of the industry. The principal reasons for this slow development 
are that the oil industry uses specialized inputs and requires complex technolo-
gies, which are often in short supply in underdeveloped economies such as 
Ghana. It is therefore important for Ghana to beware of trying to meet local con-
tent targets at all cost, since that may reduce the effectiveness of the oil and gas 
supply chain.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 11/01/20, SPi
156 Local Content Law and Practice in Ghana
Nevertheless, the available literature largely recognizes that the implementation 
of LI 2204 and the local content policy has yielded some positive results in terms 
of job creation and increased use of Ghanaian goods and services. It has brought 
IOCs closer to Ghanaian SMEs and has given many SMEs the confidence to 
approach IOCs and offer services. Between 2010–17, some 4,000 contracts and 
purchase orders worth over US$1.3 billion were awarded to indigenous com pan ies 
(Africa Centre for Energy Policy 2017). The requirement for foreign com pan ies to 
form JVs with indigenous Ghanaian companies under regulation 4(6) of LI 2204 
has granted a number of Ghanaian companies access to the technologies and 
operations of their international JV partners. As a result, Ghanaian participation 
in the award of contracts is currently over 20 per cent in both Tullow Ghana 
Limited and ENI Ghana Exploration and Production Limited (Africa Centre for 
Energy Policy 2017).
Despite increased local participation, however, indigenous companies 
 continue to face various challenges, as enumerated above. Although LI 2204 
specifies a sliding-scale target for increase in local participation over a period, 
the limited capacity of Ghanaian companies makes it difficult to achieve these 
targets. To make the situation worse, the majority of indigenous companies do 
not specialize in the industry and therefore end up investing little in efforts to 
increase capacity. Indigenous companies tend to concentrate on providing the 
‘low-hanging fruits’ instead of venturing into the high-earning services that 
propel this industry.
To achieve the effective implementation of LI 2204 and local content policy, 
the following actions are recommended:
 1. The Petroleum Commission should intensify its monitoring function and 
promote specialized skills development and transfer of technology to 
Ghanaians. It is further recommended that the government amends the 
local content regulations to bridge the salaries and wages gap between 
expatriates and Ghanaian employees, as has been done in Angola and in the 
Middle East and North African (MENA) region. This will minimize the 
incidence of labour upheavals in Ghana.
 2. Lack of financial support is a common barrier to the operations of indigen-
ous Ghanaian companies. Worse is the high cost of borrowing. Intense 
competition from international players with cheaper access to finance from 
international financial markets crowds out local companies. The need for 
specific financial support for local SMEs in the oil and gas supply chain is 
necessary to enhance their competitiveness in the industry. Enterprise 
development initiatives aimed at the stimulation, incubation, and promo-
tion of local SMEs is necessary for the long-term involvement of local SMEs 
in the industry.
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 3. Revising some of the LI targets to more practical or reasonable levels 
considering the in-country capacity is also recommended. As noted earlier, 
some of the targets of the LI and policy are ambitious. For example, the 
LI’s minimum targets for the employment of Ghanaians and participation 
of local companies are 90 per cent and 50 per cent, respectively. As noted 
by Olsen (2013), no country has ever achieved these targets in the oil 
industry—not even developed nations.
 4. The need for strategic partnerships between local firms and foreign firms is 
also recommended. For example, foreign and local companies should be 
allowed to work together where the foreign company provides a technology 
transfer to the indigenous company.
 5. The state should impose import and customs duties on specific goods in 
support of its local content policy. This will protect non-competitive local 
producers. Corporate income tax might also be used to incentivize local 
ownership. For example, in India domestic companies are subject to tax at a 
rate of 30 per cent, while foreign companies bear a 40 per cent rate.
 6. Since IOCs generally avoid engaging local technical staff, it is recom-
mended that minimum local employment obligations, minimum salaries, 
and training requirements are imposed on them through legislation. Some 
job categories could be reserved specifically for Ghanaians with special 
skills in such jobs. Exemption might, however, be granted on a case-by-case 
basis by the relevant state authority. This would promote local workforce 
recruitment and progression.
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Reflections on Investment  
Surges and New Gas
Alan R. Roe
1. Introduction
This chapter is a follow-up to an earlier paper that looked in broad terms at many 
of the issues that today face Mozambique—a country that is expected to shortly 
benefit from very large volumes of new natural gas discoveries (Roe 2018).
Section 2 below describes the investment surge that has already been prompted 
by the new gas discoveries. Section 3 summarizes some recent literature that 
examines the effects of such surges in other country contexts. Section 4 then looks 
at some of the economic numbers that have been attached to the likely boost to 
Mozambique’s economic activity as a result of huge volumes of new gas production. 
Section 5 describes the main aspects of the disappointing economic outcomes 
that have so far been seen through 2018. Section 6 selectively analyses some of the 
implications of these outcomes for future policy. Section 7 concludes the chapter 
by exploring the epidemiology of a large public investment surge—an issue rele-
vant to the further surge that is still anticipated. In following this sequence of 
argument, the chapter throws light on a number of more general questions that 
arise in the context of this volume. In particular: how well prepared are the 
authorities to deal with the revenue volatility associated with their resource 
wealth? Has public sector project selection been cognizant of the nature and time 
horizons of natural resource revenues? And is public expenditure management 
more generally well oriented to manage those resource revenues?
2. Mozambique’s investment surge post-2010
First, what do the data show? National accounts data (Figure 8.1) for the period 
from 2005 through 2016 clearly indicate the unique nature of the period after 
2010. Prior to that, the investment share of gross domestic product (GDP) in 
Mozambique had typically hovered at or below 20 per cent of GDP, with much 
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lower figures in the years prior to the 1992 peace settlement: as low as 3–5 per cent 
(mid-1980s).1 By contrast, in the five years after 2012, the investment share of 
GDP was well in excess of 40 per cent. Recent IMF projections suggest that even 
higher investment rates may be seen through 2019 (see later in this section). This 
big change was associated mainly with a strong surge in foreign direct investment 
(FDI) arising from the initial outlays for the LNG developments described in the 
earlier paper.
In a recent detailed analysis, Toews and Vezina (2017) assessed the relationships 
between the initial and large surge of FDI associated with the gas discoveries and 
the further FDI that has been attracted to Mozambique as a consequence. 
Specifically, using a project-level FDI data set compiled by fDi Markets,2 they find 
across countries in general, ‘that in the two years following a large discovery, non-
extraction FDI inflows increase by 58 per cent, the number of FDI projects 
increases by 30 per cent, the number of sectors targeted and of source countries 
increase by around 19 per cent and the number of jobs created increases by 
54 per cent’ (Toews and Vezina 2017: 3).3 In short, an FDI surge based on extrac-
tives generally results in a parallel boost to non-extractive FDI. The underlying 
hypothesis based on earlier research by Alfaro and Charlton (2013) is that 
the  development potential of FDI is often associated with quality FDI in the 
 non-extractive sectors (especially services and manufacturing) rather than in the 
extractive industries alone: a point that was elaborated also in Roe (2018: section 3).
Additional to this FDI activity, Mozambique from about 2013 should have 
experienced a significant additional increase—this time in public investment 
activity—associated with the very large external loans to various government-
linked organizations contracted on the assumption that Mozambique would 
quickly become a global gas exporter. In spite of audit activities subsequently 
1 But it occasionally exceeded 30 per cent in a few later years as particular mega-projects were 
developed.
2 Part of the Financial Times Group; see fDi Intelligence (2016).











2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Gross capital formation Exports of goods and services Imports of goods and services
Figure 8.1 Investment shares of GDP, 2005–16
Source: Author’s illustration, based on data for Mozambique from the United Nations Statistical Office, 
https://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama/resQuery.asp.
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organized around the loans (reported to be as high as US$2.32 billion), considerable 
uncertainty still surrounds them. They seem to have been contracted in complete 
disregard for the standard principles of good public project selection—a point 
relevant to one of the questions posed at the end of Section 1. Certainly there was 
a stark inconsistency in these loans, in terms of both their magnitudes and their 
maturity structures, relative to what was then known about the volume and tim-
ing of the revenues from natural gas.
These loans contracted at the end of the era of President Guebaza in 2013–14 
are described in more detail in the earlier paper. In the absence of the audit 
results, it is not possible to numerically square the large amounts involved 
(~20 per cent of the country’s GDP) with the already large investment boost that 
is visible in the national accounts data as shown in Figure 8.1. But certainly there 
should have been some further boost from the investments associated with them.
Significantly, a recent IMF Regional Economic Outlook (IMF  2018b) presents 
projections suggesting that the unusually high investment rate shown in Figure 8.1 
may actually be exceeded in the period through 2019. Specifically, the investment 
rates shown by the IMF for Mozambique for 2018 and 2019 are 54.7 per cent and 
86.3 per cent of GDP respectively.
3. The effects of an investment surge
The older literature on development based on early growth theories would have 
anticipated a strong and unambiguously positive effect of increased levels of 
investment on a country’s rate of GDP growth.4 It is noted that Mozambique was 
a star performer, certainly in African terms, in the late 1990s and through the first 
decade of the new millennium. However, there is no evidence in the numbers 
shown above of the growth spurt that might have been expected to result from 
the large FDI inflows after 2010 and the other investments associated with signifi-
cant new public borrowing. Paradoxically, growth in the period since about 2013 
has been weaker than at any time in the past twenty years. Further, the projec-
tions from the IMF Regional Economic Outlook of April 2018 (IMF 2018b) suggest 
that the growth rate through 2019 will remain below 3 per cent.5
There are a variety of special factors than can account for at least some of the 
lacklustre growth record of the most recent past. These factors are described in 
the earlier paper. Nonetheless, the co-existence of a very high investment rate 
with weak growth outcomes remains a significant puzzle.
4 For example, in the so-called ‘big push’ models that were popular in the 1950s and 1960s, but also 
in most longer-term development plans that many developing economies were producing in that 
period and that some countries are still producing. See, for example, Rosenstein-Rodin (1961) and 
Murphy et al. (1989).
5 Although later IMF updates now anticipate a slightly better growth performance through 2018.
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However, as the recent literature shows, such a combination is not in fact that 
unusual. In particular, a 2014 paper by Andrew Warner examines data for 124 
low- and middle-income countries and probes in detail some twenty-four cases 
of identifiable public6 investment booms and their impact on GDP growth in the 
period 1960–2011.7 His results show some small instantaneous impact of the 
boom investments on GDP per capita. However, that impact is not sustained 
when the investment boom variable is lagged two to four years.8 So aside from 
the small instantaneous gains, there is little evidence of the ongoing productivity 
enhancements from increased investment levels that might be expected.
One possible rationale for his results is that the instantaneous gains come from 
Keynesian-type demand effects, especially in countries with under-used capacity. 
By contrast, the evidence from most of his sample countries is that the supply-side 
effects (of investment on the production function and productivity) are generally 
weak and more usually non-existent. Why might this be the case? Following 
examination of three investment boom cases in greater detail (Bolivia, Mexico, 
and the Philippines), Warner suggested several common features of decision-
making in these countries that together result in low-productivity investment:
 • a failure to select public investments by reference to sound economic 
criteria
 • a systematic tendency to use over-optimistic predictions of prices, cost, and 
impacts
 • a lack of information at the time of implementation to identify the likely 
(true) rates of return on investments
 • inertia in investment programmes: investments once started are likely to 
continue to command finance even when the conditions needed for success 
deteriorate
 • a high degree of vulnerability of public investment decisions to abuse for 
personal or political motives.
It is a plausible hypothesis that Mozambique’s recent poor record reflects in 
part the consequences of most if not all of Warner’s five common features of 
decision-making around public investment. A striking contrast to these three 
country cases is offered by the cases of Taiwan and South Korea that Warner also 
examined. He shows that these two countries in particular shared several positive 
6 It is important to note that Warner’s study relates to public investment. The results do not neces-
sarily carry over to investment in general.
7 His methodology differs from earlier cross-country investment econometrics in that it did not 
seek to estimate the average relation between public capital and GDP over time but rather focused 
only on those time periods when there were major and identifiable investment drives.
8 The coefficients on these variables being statistically insignificant and occasionally with the 
wrong sign.
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common features of higher levels of investment. In particular larger investments 
were highly focused, with clearly defined objectives and subject to high levels of 
discipline to control, for example, cost overruns.
Similar findings more directly relevant to an investment boom based on large 
oil and gas discoveries have been presented in a recent paper by James Cust and 
David Mihalyi (2017). They coin the term ‘presource curse’ to distinguish its pro-
positions from those of the more familiar ‘resource curse’.9 The presource curse 
deals with the period that is typically relatively short (but of uncertain duration) 
between the discovery of any new resource and the start of production. 
Specifically, they examine 236 giant discoveries of oil and gas (larger than 500 
million barrels) in forty-six different countries in the period since 1988.
The results were mixed. Countries that the authors categorized as having 
weaker political institutions typically failed to achieve not only the IMF forecasts 
for growth, but also the average growth rates of the countries’ own past, which is 
unfortunately the situation that applies to Mozambique (see Figure 8.2 and the 
following analysis). But other countries, with stronger institutions, typically see 
growth rates that at least match those of the past and also conform with the IMF 
forecasts. So it is a mixed story. Arguably, its most striking aspect is the absence of 
the assured growth bonanza that the public and politicians of most countries dis-
covering new oil and gas reserves typically expect to see. Further, their results tell 
us that it is merely the promise of resource abundance rather than its actual 
 realization that can give rise to any growth-retarding effects that are involved 
9 The latter focuses on the long-term negative consequences for the economy from resource 
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Figure 8.2 GDP growth rates, 1996–2017 (%)
Source: Author’s illustration, based on data from the World Bank, https//:data.worldbank.org/idicator/
NY.GNP.
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in  this new variant of the resource curse. These results also seem directly and 
alarmingly relevant to what has been experienced in Mozambique!
4. Mozambique expectations and realities
In the past two decades, Mozambique has followed a pattern evident also in 
 several other extractive-dependent low- and middle-income countries. Specifically 
in the period 1996–2012, the country saw a large increase in its percentage 
dependence on extractives activity measured in terms of exports. Back in 1996 
the extractives share of the country’s total export earnings was just 6 per cent 
(metals) and 8 per cent (when coal, oil, and gas are included). By 2012 those num-
bers had risen to 36 per cent and 72 per cent respectively—a pattern of increase 
seen also in several comparator countries, including Rwanda, Mali, Tanzania, and 
Burkina Faso (for details, see Roe and Dodd  2017). The export dependence of 
Mozambique on extractives further increased through 2014, in spite of much 
softer prices after 2012 and even though, by that stage, there had been no 
 additional export boost from the newly discovered gas.
However, after 2010 and the new gas discoveries, strong expectations quickly 
emerged that the additional revenues from natural gas would hugely increase the 
country’s already significant levels of extractive dependence—including in terms 
of both exports and government revenues. Within a few years of the initial dis-
coveries, the IMF was sufficiently confident about these new prospects not only to 
construct but also to publish a model that projected the likely future levels of 
macroeconomic impacts from the natural gas and the associated LNG produc-
tion (IMF 2016). In brief, they showed the following:
 • Assuming LNG production began in 2021, the two main operators 
(Anadarko and ENI) could eventually construct a total of thirteen onshore 
LNG trains and four FLNG trains. The total production volume of LNG 
could reach 89 million tonnes per annum by 2028.
 • The average annual growth rate of real GDP between 2021–5 could reach 
24 per cent, and the share of the LNG projects in total nominal output of 
Mozambique could exceed 50 per cent by the mid-2020s.
 • The total fiscal revenues from the LNG projects throughout the entire pro-
ject period until 2045 could reach about US$500 billion. By the late 2020s, 
the fiscal revenues from the gas projects could account for more than 50 per 
cent of total fiscal revenues.
A look back to the dismal growth numbers for the period 2016–18 (Figure 8.2 
above) quickly confirms how dramatic the statement in the second of these 
 bullets appears. A reference to IMF comparative data on the government revenue 
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collections from extractives indicates that the achievement of the 50 per cent 
shown in the third bullet would turn Mozambique into a world leader in this 
 particular respect.10
These and other, more detailed numbers from the IMF projections as pub-
lished in January 2016 are shown in Figure 8.3. In terms of export revenues and 
the future balance of payments more generally, the IMF projections suggested that 
Mozambique’s dependence on exports of LNG alone would approach 75 per cent 
by the mid-2020s. This compares with the 68 per cent export dependence for all 
extractives products in 2014, shown in the Roe–Dodd analysis. With the benefit 
of hindsight, it is questionable whether the IMF should have published these very 
bullish numbers, given the question marks that would have qualified the projec-
tions at the time they were made. There is no hard evidence that the publication 
of the numbers impacted government decision-making, but certainly they are 
10 In the IMF comparative data for the period 2000–13 (for countries that are either metals producers 
or have some combination of metals and oil and gas), the best-performing country in terms of the 
government revenue take from extractives was Botswana, with 45 per cent. No other country in the 

























































































































































































































Contribution of the LNG projects to real GDP growth
(%)
Fiscal revenues from the LNG projects
(% of GDP)
Share of LNG revenues in total scal revenues
(Trillions of metical, %)
Share of the LNG projects in nominal GDP
(Trillion of metical, %)
LNG projects
Rest of the economy


















100.0LNG projectsRest of the economy
LNG share in nominal GDP (right)
LNG fiscal revenues
Non-LNG fiscal revenues 






















State participation Dividend withholding tax
Subcontractor withholding tax
Royalty
Figure 8.3 Selected numbers from the 2016 projections of the Rovuma benefits
Source: IMF (2016a).
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more, rather than less, likely to have fostered an optimistic mood within government 
that may have influenced expenditure and borrowing decisions.
Regrettably, that anticipated economic boost has not yet materialized; the small 
increase in GDP growth seen in 2017 (following the large collapse after 2015) is 
attributed mainly to improved coal exports and agricultural production (AfDB 
2018). Indeed, in a very real sense, the ‘bust’ has come before the ‘boom’ that the 
IMF projections and most other commentators were expecting back in early 2016! 
The unprecedented high investment numbers described above have not been 
translated into anything approaching a boom. Indeed, they have foreshadowed 
what seems likely to be a sustained period of deep economic difficulty for the 
economy.
There is an obvious question about what might have been done differently to 
avoid, or at least moderate, the ‘irrational exuberance’ that has contributed to this 
difficult situation. The answer relates in part to specific decision-making pro-
cesses in Mozambique about which we have insufficient knowledge to comment 
in detail. However, it is reasonable to suggest that these processes (at least through 
2013–14) were impaired by some or all of Warner’s common failings of decision-
making as listed earlier. So, the remedy going forward is to look in detail at these 
possible explanations and to make corrections as needed.
What we do know with certainty is that the problems to which the unfortunate 
(presource curse) reality gives rise are manifest most obviously in the country’s 
fiscal situation. We can examine this first in relation to borrowing. Standard 
 economic reasoning would suggest that there is a perfectly legitimate case for 
increased public borrowing in the time period between any major new discovery 
and the actual start of production of that resource. However, any increased 
 borrowing still needs to be cognizant of both the fiscal productivity of the extra 
spending (i.e. how much extra tax revenue will it generate and how quickly?), and 
the additional debt service in the period before the large expected extractive rev-
enues actually accrue. If we relate this logic to the EMATUM bond issue of 2013, 
one problem is immediately obvious and should have been obvious at the time 
when the loan was contracted. The bond issue had a coupon rate of 6.305 and a 
maturity date of 2020. So even if the very optimistic projections of the IMF 
(Figure 8.3) had proven to be correct, that loan would have needed to be fully 
repaid before even one dollar of the additional gas revenues might have been 
available in the government coffers. Thus the servicing of the new loan (both 
interest and capital repayment) between 2013–20 had to impose itself fully on the 
pre-existing government revenues.11
11 Since that burden of additional debt service in the event could not be met, the solution has been 
to exchange the original bonds for notes but with a much higher coupon rate (10.5 per cent) and a 
bullet payment maturity date of 2023.
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This might not in itself have been such a problem if fiscal revenues more generally 
had responded in a buoyant fashion to the investment boom that we have 
described. But this did not happen, in part because there was at best only a  limited 
direct tax yield from those investments, and partly because the indirect tax yield 
that might have been expected from an early boost to the growth of incomes and 
GDP has not materialized (Figure  8.2). Figure  8.4 documents some relevant 
trends in Mozambique’s fiscal revenues in greater detail.
The left-hand panel in Figure 8.4 shows that since 2013–14 the levels of govern-
ment revenues relative to GDP have been either flat or in decline. There has not 
been a boost to government revenues anything like sufficient to cover the extra 
debt service costs that are now called for. Specifically, the interest alone on public 
debt was already equal to some 20 per cent of total government revenues by 2018 
(over 4 per cent of GDP as compared to 1 per cent or less in 2012 and 2013), and is 
projected to rise to well over 25 per cent of those revenues by 2019 (IMF 2018a). 
This clearly represents a huge shock to the fiscal accounts and one that has caused 
a remarkable readjustment of the IMF’s own assessment of Mozambique’s debt 
sustainability, as evidenced in the comparative graphics shown in Figure 8.5.
Specifically, the latest available (January 2018) assessment by the IMF suggests 
that the government now needs to commit almost 30 per cent of its total revenues 
(net of grants) to meet debt service obligations, but with an even higher level of 
revenue commitment when the EMATUM balloon payment is due in 2023.12
The situation could have been eased somewhat if the grant receipts from exter-
nal donors had held up in the face of the changing situation. But as the third 
panel in Figure 8.4 indicates, these grants have in fact fallen substantially since 
2012. In 2012, 2013, and 2014, grant receipts were the equivalent of 5.1 per cent, 
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Figure 8.4 Selected fiscal trends, 2012–18 (% of GDP)
Source: Author’s illustration, based on IMF (various).
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5.2 per cent, and 4.2 per cent of GDP, respectively. But in the four years to 2018 
they have declined to the equivalent of only 1 per cent of GDP, with an even lower 
 figure projected for 2020 (IMF 2018a). The April 2016 suspension of the IMF pro-
gramme in Mozambique was followed fairly swiftly by similar suspensions or 
reductions in support from the World Bank and other donors such as the EU, 
France, the United Kingdom, and Canada. In July 2017, Japan announced that it 
too was freezing £100 million in grants and loans pending a new agreement with the 
IMF. Thus the direct fiscal impact of the new borrowing (~5 per cent of GDP of 
additional interest payments, as shown in Figure 8.4) has been compounded by the 
further hit (~4 per cent of GDP) associated with the reduction of grant receipts.
5. A few implications
There are many implications of the abrupt turn-about in Mozambique’s economic 
prospects since 2016. In this section we consider just a few of these.
5.1 The fiscal starting point
It is now a reasonable assumption that investment and production in both ENI’s 
Area 4 Coral project and the Area 1 project of Anadarko will be delayed with sig-
nificant production now unlikely before about 2024. It is reasonable to assume 
that the profile of outcomes shown by the IMF projections will be broadly similar 
but with a much-delayed start date in terms of production and extra revenues to 
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Figure 8.5 IMF debt sustainability assessments
Note: Debt sustainability assessments (DSAs) (left) December 2015, and (right) January 2018.
Source: IMF (2016a)
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So Mozambique will begin the era of new gas production in a very different 
and much more difficult fiscal situation than was anticipated even three years ago. 
Specifically, it is likely to enter that era with a primary fiscal deficit of over 6 per cent 
of GDP and an overall deficit including interest payments of around 10 per cent of 
GDP13 (but as high as 12 per cent excluding grants).14 So, as of the time of writing 
(mid-2018), the country faces at least six more years during which further high 
rates of private investment will co-exist with a situation in which there will need to 
be severe fiscal restraint, ongoing high debt ratios, and initially low growth rates.
Even when the enlarged revenues from the new gas do eventually materialize, 
they most likely will need to be committed quite heavily to deal with the still high 
rates of debt and debt service. Indeed, economic theory suggests that it would be in 
the interests of the country to accept such a prioritization of its own expenditures. 
See, for example, van der Ploeg and Venables (2017: 10). This is not a proposition 
that would have been prominent in the Mozambique discussions back in 2016, 
but with a coupon rate on the newly restructured debt now in excess of 10 per cent 
and a poor record on domestic public investment decisions, it is difficult to argue 
against it.15
5.2 Foregone opportunities
Earlier, pre-2016, analysis had suggested that Mozambique’s future gas revenues 
could enable the country to make a major dent in its chronic social welfare deficits. 
For example, Witter and Jakobsen (2015) compared the expected annual revenues 
from new gas—smoothed over a thirty-year period—with an independent assess-
ment of the annual shortfalls of education and health spending.16 The results of 
this comparison for Mozambique and five other African countries with major 
new oil and gas or metals discoveries are shown as Figure 6 in Roe (2018) 
Mozambique was expected to be in strong position in this regard relative to most 
of the comparator African countries that were also assessed. Specifically, the 
anticipated annualized revenues from the new gas would have been fully equal to 
the size of Mozambique’s estimated education financing gap (4 per cent of GDP 
annually) and to over 50 per cent of its larger health financing gap. Sadly, as we 
can see from Figure 8.4, these possibilities—at least in the medium-term future—
have been fully extinguished by the loss of fiscal space associated with additional 
13 IMF Article IV (2017a: Table 3).
14 IMF Regional Economic Outlook of April 2018 (IMF 2018b).
15 A point that gains weight from the fact that Mozambique is now in a weak bargaining position 
vis-à-vis its creditors.
16 Based on the amount of spending needed to achieve specific health and education outcomes as 
explained fully in their paper. See also Witter et al. (2015).
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interest costs and the reduction of grant funding from donors: a total squeezing 
of fiscal space equivalent to some 9 per cent of GDP!
5.3 Macroeconomic choices
The starting point is much worse than was expected but some important principles 
still govern the macroeconomic choices that Mozambique will face. For example, 
intertemporal optimizing models of the type developed by van der Ploeg and 
Venables (2017) lead to the result that the greater the capital scarcity in an econ-
omy, the bigger the fraction of any increment in total assets that should be allocated 
to domestic capital.17 Notwithstanding the large new private inflows expected in 
relation to the new gas discoveries, the public sector in Mozambique will remain 
capital-constrained for several more years. Hence, based on this result, any gas 
surplus when it does begin to emerge should arguably be concentrated first on 
building domestic capital rather than accumulating balances in, for example, a 
sovereign wealth fund (see also section 5.4).
The caveats to this conclusion relate to two main factors, namely (1) the pres-
ently unsustainable level of the country’s external debt, and the strong influence 
that this accords to external creditors; and (2) major questions about the capacity 
of the country to decide on, design, and implement sound public investments.18 
The combination of these two factors suggests, first, that in the next few years at 
least any windfall revenues should be heavily committed to help reduce levels of 
debt; and second, that even in the absence of the debt-servicing problem, the 
country would be well advised to build a pipeline of good and economically viable 
public projects and improve its capacity effectively to manage these. The hard 
reality of the first of these points is confirmed by the August 2018 proposal by the 
so-called Global Group of Mozambique’s Bondholders that they should be paid 
portions of Mozambique’s future natural gas revenues as part of the restructuring 
of the country’s Eurobonds.19
5.4 A sovereign wealth fund
The theoretical and practical arguments also combine to suggest implications for 
a possible sovereign wealth fund (SWF) in Mozambique. The establishment of an 
17 In the limiting case where the country is completely shut out of capital markets, the whole of any 
increase in assets goes to domestic capital formation.
18 This capacity problem might include, for example, a lack of capacity to design and develop pro-
jects; weak arrangements for project selection and cost–benefit processes; and limited capacity to 
procure, implement, and monitor projects.
19 Reported in Further Africa, 5 August 2018. The group asked not to be identified on the grounds 
that their proposal had not been publicly announced.
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SWF has become almost de rigueur for the newly oil-and-gas-rich economies of 
sub-Saharan Africa, including Mozambique and also Tanzania—a country that 
faces similar challenges. An SWF is taken as a signal to both local and international 
observers of a country’s seriousness about managing its new resource wealth, 
including its capacity to resist short-term populist and political pressures to spend 
quickly. Unfortunately, the lofty rhetoric is often far removed from the realities 
that surround the setting up and operation of such a fund, and Mozambique’s 
record over the past few years has already undermined its reputation in this 
regard. Many other things needs to happen before the mere establishment of an 
SWF could play any sort of signalling role as to the country’s financial probity.
Nonetheless, Mozambique in recent years has made several partial commit-
ments to the establishment of an SWF. These are described in my earlier paper. 
However, the radical change in the country’s fiscal circumstances means that 
there is now little possibility or indeed any credible case for establishing an SWF 
in Mozambique in the foreseeable future. The country now faces several years of 
significant budget deficits and, given these, it seems inconceivable that its budget-
ary and political processes would be able to commit even 0.5 per cent or 1 per cent 
of GDP annually into an SWF. Imagine the political infighting at budget time 
associated with preserving such an annual transfer (and far less the accumulating 
balance) untouched. Even in the unlikely event that this were to prove politically 
possible,20 the amounts involved would be unlikely to be of any real significance 
to the future generations that they might be assumed to serve. Mozambique’s 
population today is around 30 million, and it has a per capita income below 
US$500. So, a 1 per cent annual contribution to an SWF would yield only about 
US$150 million annually or US$1.5 billion over a ten-year period, augmented 
by interest returns but reduced by administrative costs (that would be high in 
percentage terms). Given the anticipated rise in population over that ten-year 
period, this would deliver a per capita amount of around US$35!21
The case against an SWF in the near future is further strengthened not only by 
the theoretical argument regarding capital-scarce economies, but also by the 
point that such funds have a number of different possible objectives as spelled out 
by, for example, van der Ploeg and Venables (2017) and in Roe (2018): to transfer 
funds to future generations; to establish a ‘parking fund’ pending a supply of 
sound investments; and to build a stabilization balance against future extractives 
volatility. Problematically, these three motives require quite different types of 
20 Similar challenges have proven too much for other countries, such as Ghana and especially 
Chad. See, for example, Bawumia and Halland (2017).
21 A 2016 blog compared the cases of Norway—the benchmark of successful SWFs—and Tanzania. 
In twenty-five years, the Norwegian SWF had accumulated assets that had grown to US$1 trillion by 
the end of 2017. That is equivalent to US$178,000 for every one of Norway’s five million inhabitants 
(adults and children), or more than US$700,000 for a typical family of four (Roe  2016). SWFs in 
Tanzania and pari passu Mozambique are in fundamentally different situations from that of Norway’s 
SWF, and in no realistic sense can they draw on the Norwegian SWF as their model.
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investment funds of foreign assets (e.g. short-term maturities for the ‘parking 
fund’ but longer-dated securities for supporting future generations). Not only 
does this complicate the administrative challenge of running the SWF, but it 
might also mean that the fund needs multiple legal structures and investment 
mandates, even if for reasons of administrative convenience these are all managed 
by the same government agency.
Once Mozambique has passed through the difficult medium-term period of 
fiscal adjustment that now seems unavoidable and there is some emerging fiscal 
space, there would be a case for establishing some sort of stabilization fund to 
help manage future gas/LNG price volatility. Thus far the authorities seem not to 
have adequately recognized the inherent difficulties of managing their risks of 
revenue volatility. But this does not seem to be an issue that can be addressed in 
the near-term future through the use of an SWF. Similarly, there may be a case for 
a parking fund—but only in the medium term—as gas revenues build. In the 
meantime, Mozambique needs to rely on more traditional counter-cyclical fiscal 
measures to address future commodity price cycles, but to do so subject to the 
pre-existing constraint of a major ongoing fiscal deficit.
5.5 Investing for structural transformation
Capital scarcity combined with the sobering experience of the poorly conceived 
public investments of 2013–14 conveys a strong message about the need for a sig-
nificantly different Mozambique approach to public investment: an approach that 
would be both more strategic and more conscious of the longer-term objective of 
structural transformation. It must surely be recognized—notwithstanding the 
immediate pressures of the fiscal deficit—that extractives activity and the revenues 
they will eventually bring can boost the economy significantly in the next several 
years, but should not be seen as the long-term future of the economy. The extrac-
tives boost should rather be seen as an opportunity to stimulate a whole range of 
non-extractive activities that have the potential to continue to generate incomes 
and jobs into the very long-term future, when the present extractive resources are 
declining if not fully depleted. In other words, it should be seen as an opportunity 
to support a major structural transformation of the economy, a transformation 
that has been seen only intermittently in Mozambique’s past history.22
22 As shown in the UNU-WIDER paper (Cruz and Mafambissa  2016), around 80 per cent of 
Mozambique’s labour force is still engaged in agriculture, livestock, forestry, and fisheries, and work-
ing with low-productivity technologies. Notwithstanding the high rates of GDP growth achieved in 
most years since the turn of the millennium, the manufacturing share of GDP stood at only 9.4 per cent 
by 2016 an almost identical figure to that recorded in 2001.
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A recent Chatham House paper by Paul Stevens et al. (2015),23 reminds us in 
general that extractives are always a depletable resource (even though the time 
horizon for depletion can be very long in some cases). Because of this reality, 
other productive activities will in time need to replace them. This reality opens up 
a very wide range of new policy challenges for Mozambique, as for other govern-
ments hosting major extractives resources. This is because it requires a significant 
level of buy-in by, and coordination between, a wide variety of government min-
istries and agencies, involving not only the mainstream agencies—finance, plan-
ning the central bank, etc.—but also the set of agencies that deal directly with 
petroleum, gas, and/or minerals (such as MIREM, ENH, INP, and ENHL).24 This 
is particularly pertinent in relation to Mozambique’s national oil company, ENH, 
given its central role in the financing of the new gas investments, and the very 
large downstream investments for which it will be responsible.25
A broader take on the transformation agenda is obtained by noting the lessons 
from international experience, as expounded by Östensson (2017), that in many 
countries such as Mozambique there is often a great deal of knowledge of exactly 
why rates of business start-ups and supply responses more generally are so rela-
tively weak—even in spite of the stimulus of very large new investments in some 
few sectors such as extractives. The causes include the generally poor climate for 
doing business, the numerous additional constraints that confront small and 
medium businesses, the weaknesses of credit availability and costs, inadequate 
infrastructure, numerous disincentivizing weaknesses in the regulation and 
taxation of businesses, and more. Much of this litany certainly applies in the case 
of Mozambique. This being the case—and given the long-term vision referred to 
above—it may be much better to prioritize systematic programmes to address 
these business climate constraints than to emphasize apparently easier (but 
narrower) policy devices of, for example, fixing local content targets directed 
 narrowly at a few extractives companies.
So to conclude on this point, the future public investment challenge for 
Mozambique can be argued to involve three main elements. First, it is vital to put 
in place much improved arrangements for the management of public investment 
in the context of a sound overall medium-term framework for public finance 
management. A useful recommendation for Mozambique to pin down greater 
23 As further developed by Lahn and Stevens (2017).
24 Ministry of Mineral Resources and Energy; Empresa Nacional de Hidrocarbonetas EP; Instituto 
Nacional de Petroleo; and Empresa Nacional de Hidrocarbonetas Logistics, respectively.
25 See also the useful analysis of national oil companies by Heller et al. (2014). In view of the 
present uncertainties about the timing of the gas investments in Mozambique, it is not fully clear how 
large will be the revenue take that will accrue at least initially to the ENH once the large LNG revenues 
begin to materialize. However, a limited insight into this is available from the IMF fiscal data projec-
tions shown in Figure  8.3. Even if ENH receives only the element of total revenues referred to in 
Figure  8.3 as ‘state participation’, it would still be receiving the equivalent of 3–5 per cent of GDP 
annually over the life of the LNG activities.
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detail on this matter would be to arrange for a diagnostic (based on an application 
of the NRGI’s well-tested Benchmarking Framework)26 to identify where existing 
practices/processes most need improvement.27
Second, there is a need for a high-level vision of the future structural possibilities 
based on the new gas and the country’s need for long-term economic 
 trans formation. That vision would not only define the long-term economic future 
to which the country can aspire, but also try to find ways to sustain this vision 
consistently, in spite of the many short-term pressures, political factionalism, and 
election-driven incentives that will undoubtedly be capable of dislodging it.28
Achieving an institutional structure that could produce and sustain such a vision 
would be no easy task in a country such as Mozambique, which struggles with many 
factional elements (some regionally based) in its governance arrangements. But 
recognizing the need for a change of approach among a core of senior politicians and 
administrators would be a useful first step. Further, at a time when the fiscal pres-
sures will force many difficult decisions, it may well be opportune to look for a unity 
of long-term purpose that might otherwise be elusive. Some earlier Mozambican 
efforts relevant to this proposition are described in the earlier paper (Roe 2018).
Third, it would be useful in the context of an ambition to use extractives to 
catalyse more rapid structural change to develop a concerted attack on the many 
(known) constraints in the business environment that hold back a larger supply 
response to new opportunities. This is a more difficult policy agenda both to 
design and implement than would be a mandated programme of local content 
requirements. But given the numerous sectoral multiplier effect ripples that 
 follow potentially from a large FDI boost in a sector such as extractives it would 
be likely to have a much larger pay-off in terms of both new jobs and broader 
development.
6. The epidemiology of the investment boom problem
This chapter has documented some of the seriously disappointing outcomes that 
have emerged in the wake of Mozambique’s investment surge: a ‘bust’ has indeed 
26 It has so far been used in Ghana, Myanmar, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Tanzania, and in a partial 
fashion elsewhere.
27 In addition (but not discussed in this chapter) is the significant challenge arising from the way 
the country is managed/administered from the capital down to the local level from a PFM perspec-
tive, both in terms of mitigating negative impacts and leveraging potential positive impacts.
28 In drafting this paragraph, I am conscious of the present chapter’s omission of any discussion of 
the many complex and dangerous political economy problems that have the capacity to derail even the 
best of economic strategies. This gap can be redressed in part by reference to several sources that focus 
on the presently difficult political economy of Mozambique, including the Bertelsmann Institute 
(2016). The problems to which that paper refers have been rendered much more worrisome by the 
intensification of violent attacks in 2018 (including house burnings and beheadings) by extremist 
groups, especially in the Macomia District in the northern Cabo Delgado province (Opperman 2018).
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preceded any significant ‘boom’. All the indications now are that a further surge in 
investment will occur in the next few years as the production in the major natural 
gas fields begins. Given this outlook for the next few years, this chapter concludes 
by summarizing the epidemiology29 of a public investment surge as discussed 
more fully in my earlier paper: namely the various linkages in the chain of events 
that run from a possible surge in private and public investment and into other 
components of a country’s macroeconomic and fiscal situation.
In conducting this analysis, this final section draws heavily on the modelling 
presented in a paper by Buffie et al. (2012) that was developed to enhance the 
IMF’s DSA.30 Their model suggests several components/weaknesses of the trans-
mission mechanisms (from an investment surge to economic growth) as follows.
6.1 Macroeconomic problems
A public investment surge (e.g. possibly in response to a new extractive discovery 
and the FDI that results from that) could in principle crowd-in further private 
activity and so be a very positive force for stimulating enhanced rates of growth. 
But that crowding-in effect will work in textbook fashion only if certain familiar 
macroeconomic difficulties are well managed: especially the following:
 • Public investment choices are made to avoid poor (infra-marginal) projects 
with low rates of return.
 • The absence of absorptive capacity constraints in the economy that can raise 
investment costs and lower the returns on any new public and private in-
vestment. Most economies will be pushed nearer to any such constraints by 
enhanced levels of FDI.
 • The avoidance of a real exchange rate appreciation that would generate off-
setting negative pressures on the economy’s traded sectors. Once again, in 
most economies enhanced levels of FDI will put some upward pressure on 
the real exchange rate and further public investment could easily work to 
exacerbate such effects.
To ward off the various potential problems suggested by this listing, 
Mozambique requires a high-quality capacity in economic analysis, modelling, 
and forecasting that could provide informative forward-looking information 
29 Epidemiology being ‘the study of how diseases occur and spread and the strategies that can be 
engaged to manage and limit the effects of such diseases’ (British Medical Journal).
30 Their model uses a neoclassical production function in which both public and private capital are 
productive. But it also builds in parameters that recognize explicitly that spending on public invest-
ment does not always imply a commensurate increase in the stock of (productive) public capital: 
because of leakages caused inter alia by intra-marginal projects or possible absorption problems.
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better to guide fiscal policy, but also macroeconomic policy more generally: for 
example, by anticipating the problems associated in particular with the second 
and third bullet points above.31 Such capacity is very rare in African countries, as 
was confirmed by the recent AfDB study on the topic (AfDB 2017). But the mod-
elling technologies do exist and the capacity in the country could be developed/
strengthened, provided there was a sufficiently strong commitment from senior 
policymakers.
6.2 Fiscal financing problems
In the absence of immediate and adequate new revenues from the extractives 
 discoveries, the funding of any public investment surge requires by definition 
some mix of higher tax revenues, higher levels of borrowing (concessional, non-
concessional, domestic, or external), or more foreign aid. However, that unavoid-
able reality runs into various problems including the following:
 • The likelihood of an increased tax-take is undermined by the same caveats 
shown above, namely that there may be crowding-out effects, and in addition 
by the fact that most direct benefits from enlarged public investment—even 
if generally positive—accrue to the private sector. In reality, as in the case of 
Mozambique, the marginal collection rates (i.e. the tax collections on a typical 
extra unit of private activity) are typically low. See, for example, Toews and 
Vezina (2017).
 • Although the imposition of user fees on new public infrastructure can miti-
gate the problem of low marginal rates of tax collection, such fees are rare in 
lower-income countries and collection rates even when user fees are  imposed 
are typically poor.
 • Some of the most strategically important public investment in the future 
will need to be in human capital and sub-national institutional changes, and 
such investment is unlikely to yield significant short-term gains in tax 
revenues.
The mitigation of problems in this area requires the modelling/projection cap-
acity to incorporate realistic estimates of how particular possible public expend-
itures will influence future rates of growth, and the likely enhancement of the 
additional tax-take that may result from such growth, taking into account the 
31 The absence of transparent revenue forecasting commonly results in unrealistic expectations of 
immediate benefits by both politicians and the public. The uncertainty about the nature of the realistic 
future is exacerbated by the lack of forecasting capacity in most African countries, as documented by 
the AfDB (2017). That report demonstrates how few African countries have the relevant models to 
adequately address the forecasting task.
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inherent difficulties just listed. This enhancement would, of course, be comple-
mentary to ongoing efforts to improve the effectiveness of tax administration in 
general.
6.3 Transition problems
Even if any new public investment programme is self-financing in the long run, 
there may be difficult transition problems, such as a need for short-term increases 
in tax rates that could further harm private activity. As the Mozambican experi-
ence after 2014 illustrates, there are in principle several ways to deal with these 
transition problems including the following:
 • Additional concessional borrowing (and/or aid) could in theory limit the 
need for a difficult fiscal adjustment. However, as evidenced by the actual 
outcomes in Mozambique after 2014 (see Figure 8.4), these sources of funding 
are just as likely to diminish as increase in amount following an extractive 
windfall.
 • Additional domestic borrowing may also provide some help, but the magni-
tude of such help is seriously limited because: (1) it generates no additional 
 resources for the country’s balance of payments and so any public investment 
surge so financed is likely to be accompanied by declining private invest-
ment plus consumption; and (2) in thin financial markets such as those in 
Mozambique, significantly increased domestic borrowing seems certain to 
cause harmful interest rate increases.
 • Additional non-concessional borrowing, as the Mozambican authorities have 
found, can limit the need for a difficult fiscal adjustment initially, but even 
so such borrowing has to be consistent in amount with various possible 
inefficiencies of the public investment if unsustainable debt dynamics are to 
be avoided.
This logic may not be of much immediate comfort to the policymakers who 
now need to deal with Mozambique’s currently difficult macro and fiscal adjustment: 
any comfort they can draw from increased extractives revenues is still several 
years away. But at least that logic does help to emphasize one of the main  messages 
from this chapter, namely that future public investment has to be much more 
carefully and strategically managed than in the past. In the absence of significant 
public funds to spend on development priorities such as improved public infra-
structure and other public spending to complement the arriving FDI, the onus 
falls much more on qualitative improvements to the public sector institutional 
arrangements. These improvements in turn hinge on making any public spend-
ing and policy activity more productive in themselves and also more effective in 
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leveraging the many new opportunities that the future extractives boom will 
stimulate.
How exactly this general message about public policy translates into specific 
policies and actions is beyond the scope of the present chapter, but is addressed in 
some depth by other authors (see, for example, Dietsche and Esteves  2018). 
However, the component ingredients of the appropriate policies/actions would 
include skills development, general business development and support, arrange-
ments for shared infrastructure and other partnering activities with the private 
sector, and a coherent structure for encouraging more downstream activity.
Finally, we can return to the various questions posed in our introduction to 
this chapter. The analysis above suggests that Mozambican policymaking to date 
has not been well attuned to the very difficult (and new) issues that are associated 
with a major increase in natural resource wealth—either in terms of the public 
expenditure choices that this increase requires or in terms of the broader long-
term planning and new fiscal and other policy stances that are ideally called for. 
Hopefully this chapter provides a framework for thinking about the component 
issues and some embryonic ideas for improved arrangements in the future.
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The Construction Sector in Mozambique
António S. Cruz, Francisco Fernandes, Fausto J. Mafambissa,  
and Francisco Pereira
1. Introduction
The construction sector in Mozambique has long played an important role in the 
economy, with an annual average growth rate of 12.8 per cent between 1993–2015. 
However, this sector proved to be vulnerable to economic fluctuations such as those 
which emerged after 2014 with the macroeconomic and debt  crisis, and faces 
challenges which will have to be addressed through long-term sector policies.
International experience shows that investment in infrastructure and human 
capital can play a key role in economic development by enabling expansion in activ-
ities, deeper intersectoral integration, and structural transformation in the long run. 
However, when countries face high construction costs, this can negatively affect the 
quality of public infrastructures, as is the case for road networks. Moreover, bottle-
necks affecting construction companies prevent them from expanding their produc-
tion, which leads to an increase in costs and prices when there is a surge in demand.
As evidence indicates that Mozambique is experiencing similar trends to other 
countries, this study aims both at identifying the main bottlenecks affecting the 
construction sector, and at presenting policy measures that could reduce produc-
tion costs and enable this sector to respond to increases in demand.
After the introduction, Section 2 presents the conceptual approach to con-
struction and development, while Section 3 briefly describes the evolution of the 
Mozambican economy. Section 4 presents the construction sector’s historical 
background, economic structure, and dynamics; the structure of construction 
and building materials companies; construction costs; and procurement issues. 
Section 5 identifies bottlenecks and advances recommendations, and Section 6 
summarizes the findings of the study.
2. Construction and development: conceptual approach
The construction sector—civil and public works—has a broad value chain in 
terms of both production and labour market (Figure 9.1). The sector uses a wide 
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network of inputs, while providing positive externalities to other activities and 
generating multiplier effects upstream and downstream due to features such as:
 • wide and diversified range of clients—public, semi-public, and private large, 
medium, and small companies, down to self-construction





inputs and services 











Import, production and saleof 
building materials (e.g.):
. Wood industry and carpentry
. Siderurgy /basic metallurgy
. Electric material




. Asphalt and bitumen






. Inspection, arbitration, award 
and technical opinion
. Teaching, research, 
dissemination, and extension
. Quality control
Import and production of 
equipment and accessories 
(e.g.):
. Construction machinery and 
equipment (concrete mixers, 
hand truck, cranes, and other 
heavy construction machinery
. Workshop machines and tools
. Transportation equipment
. Safety equipment





. Public works (schools, 
hospitals, other services)









. Real estate services




. Citizen public services
Determinant factors of demand: Degree of economic development, economic context, level of 
public expenditure, investment in other sectors, pro-cyclical activities (higher expansion in positive 
periods; deeper recession in negative periods
Clients: State, autarchies, families/individuals, local and multinational companies, small traditional 
promoters
Demand
Impact of the Construction Sector on the Product: Direct impact; on employment; multiplier effects
Figure 9.1 Construction sector production chain
Source: Authors’ illustration based on personal experience and Perobelli et al. (2016).
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 • multidisciplinary engagement of specialties and technologies to deal with 
concrete, water, electricity, soils, carpentry, and built-in machinery
 • a diversified offer from companies with large means, capacities, and tech-
nology alongside companies with a limited use of advanced technologies 
but abundant use of labour.
The role of the construction sector in economic dynamics and structure has been 
studied for various countries (Perobelli et al. 2016). The following aspects are seen 
as relevant for Mozambique and are being further explored:
 • While national economies experience cyclical trends, either positive or 
negative, construction tends to have a pro-cyclical reaction, with expansions 
more marked than those of the global economy in positive phases of the 
cycle and deeper recessions in negative periods.
• Mozambique presents evidence of a 12.8 per cent average annual growth 
rate for the construction sector, when the gross domestic product (GDP) 
was expanding at 7.9 per cent in the period 1993–2014. More recently, 
construction grew 1.1 per cent in 2016, when GDP growth was decelerating 
at a rate of 3.8 per cent (INE 2017a).
 • In developed countries there is a tendency to reduce the participation of the 
construction sector in GDP, with greater reliance on maintenance expend-
itures rather than on new investments. Conversely, in developing countries 
GDP growth can be accompanied by an over-growth of the construction 
sector, relying on greater demand for public works and works to support 
new economic units.
• As illustrated in sections below, the construction sector has over-grown 
compared to GDP, in particular in 1993–2014. Although a lower degree of 
reliance on maintenance expenditures has been a policy trend for devel-
oping countries like Mozambique, it is debatable whether this is the best 
approach, or whether alternative policies would be feasible and might lead 
to better results.
 • Promoting the integration of the construction sector with other sectors is a 
more effective policy instrument than promoting only direct expenditures 
on the sector.
Construction sector linkages with other sectors in the economy are shown in 
Figure 9.1. These linkages occur in the following stages:
 • Upstream: the larger the capacity of building materials and equipment 
enterprises, the smaller the need to import.
 • Main chain: the activity of the construction sector generates employment 
and creates added value.
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 • Downstream: the downstream chain comprises companies producing 
 furniture, household and office equipment; supplying energy, water, sanitation, 
irrigation, and communication services; providing infrastructure maintenance, 
decoration, banking, finance, insurance, and legal services. This chain also 
includes the provision of education, health, and other services to citizens 
and businesses.
3. Overall evolution of the national economy  
since independence in 1975
After independence in June 1975, Mozambique went through three major trans-
formations with deep implications for the income levels and general living condi-
tions of its citizens. The first transformation was the implementation of a centrally 
planned economy based on a one-revolutionary-party state, run by Frelimo.1 In 
1976 an armed conflict began with the former Rhodesia and later with the 
Republic of South Africa, as well as a civil war2 with Renamo.3 From 1975 to 1986 
GDP per capita declined by 44.4 per cent, with the level of activity in the construc-
tion sector declining, as was happening in many other sectors (Sulemane 2002).4
The second transformation began in 1987 when the government introduced a 
structural adjustment programme,5 moving thus from a centrally planned to a 
market-oriented economic system. After the end of the civil war in 1992, the 
first democratic and multiparty elections followed in 1994. In the next two 
 decades, political, economic, and social reforms were implemented, developing and 
strengthening democratic institutions and mechanisms. GDP grew at an average 
annual rate of 7.9 per cent from 1993 to 2014 (Figure 9.2), while general living 
conditions in the country improved gradually (Arndt et al. 2016; Committee of 
Counsellors 2013; GoM 2001; IMF 2004; PoM 2005; Ross 2014; Tarp et al. 2002). 
Construction activity boomed in this period.
The high-growth period was not enough to lift about half of the increasing 
population out of poverty (Castel-Branco 2012, 2015; Cunguara and Hanlon 2010; 
Mosca 2014). The poverty headcount index reduced from 69.4 per cent in 1996–7 
to 49.2 per cent in 2014–15, but income distribution inequality increased, as indi-
cated by the Gini coefficient, from 0.40 in 1996–7 to 0.47 in 2014–15, with even 
1 Frelimo is the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Mozambique Liberation Front), which has 
been in power since independence.
2 The authors consider this armed conflict a civil war (Arndt and Tarp 2017; Cruz and Mafambissa 
2016; Oeter 1997; Pereira 2017), even though there is polemic about it in the literature (Coelho 2004; 
Gersovitz and Kriger 2013; Ghaddar 2016).
3 Renamo is the Resistência Nacional de Moçambique (Mozambique National Resistance), the 
armed opposition to Frelimo. It has been the main opposition party in parliament since 1994.
4 The decline of 44.4 per cent refers to GDP/capita in 2003 constant prices.
5 Programa de Reabilitação Económica (PRE) in the Portuguese language.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 11/01/20, SPi
Cruz, Fernandes, Mafambissa, and Pereira 187
higher levels of inequality in the larger cities (MEF 2016: 10, 27). From a longer-
term perspective, the positive economic and social developments did not yet rep-
resent a perceptible structural economic transformation of the country (Cruz and 
Mafambissa 2016).
From the early 2010s onwards, the policy focus shifted to high-value natural-
resource exploitation and to the increase in demand for non-concessional loans for 
public investment and guaranties. In 2015, the country entered a macroeconomic 
crisis, mainly due to biased policies, which was aggravated in April 2016 after hidden 
government debt became known to the public (Francisco  2018; Hanlon  2016; 
IMF 2016; Wirz and Wernau 2016). At this stage the country had entered the third 
transformation cycle, with signs of a weaker democratic system. In 2016–17, the 
annual growth rate of GDP slowed to 3.8–3.7 per cent—close to the annual popula-
tion growth rate of 3.4 per cent (IMF 2018; INE 2017a, 2018b, 2018c). The construc-
tion sector was particularly affected, growing only 1.1 per cent in 2016 (INE 2017a).
4. Construction sector analysis
4.1 Historical background in Mozambique
The construction industry in Mozambique was created in the first half of the 1900s, 


































































































Figure 9.2 High-growth period on average for Mozambique, for about two decades 
up to 2014
Source: Authors’ illustration based on INE (2017a, 2018b).
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The main construction activities were carried out by non-resident Portuguese 
companies or by foreign consortia of companies. As Portugal had a tradition of 
good-quality construction, it allowed the skills development of local craftsmen, 
which was a source of cheap labour.
In 1974–5, the Portuguese left Mozambique. This mass emigration of com-
pany owners, managers, and technicians left the network of companies almost 
deactivated, including construction companies. The Mozambican government 
took the opportunity to fill those positions with Mozambicans, by creating 
Management Commissions6 occupied by the most qualified personnel with 
support from technicians in the state bureaucracy. This decision allowed the 
companies to continue their operations, employing thousands of Mozambican 
workers. Construction companies were under the state supervision of the Public 
Works Ministry.
From the beginning of the regional conflict with neighbouring countries and 
the civil war in 1976 until the 1992 peace agreement, the construction market was 
constrained and localized due to the lack of both security and investment fund-
ing. These factors added to the inefficient running of state companies, and the 
restriction of foreign currency imposed by the central bank led to the bankruptcy 
of many dozens of companies.
After the peace agreement in 1992, the construction sector expanded and con-
tributed to the economic growth in the country. The average share of construc-
tion sector value added in total GDP was 2.2 per cent for the entire period of 
1993–2016 (Table 9.1). In 1993 this share was only 1.7 per cent, but it increased 
gradually afterwards, up to 2.3 per cent in 2015. The high rate of expansion of 
the construction sector between 1993 and 1998 was due to public investment in 
replacing infrastructures destroyed during the war, the return of private investment 
in infrastructures—such as the Maputo–Witbank Highway—and large-scale pro-
jects, like the rehabilitation of 1,750 km of energy power lines from Cahora Bassa 
6 Comissões Administrativas de Gestão, in the Portuguese language.
Table 9.1 Construction growth was particularly dynamic up to 2015, %
(Time periods) 1993–98* 1999–2004* 2005–15* 2016* 1993–2016*
Construction/GDP** 2.8 2.5 1.8 2.1 2.2
Construction value 
added growth rate***
21.0 6.1 12.0 1.1 12.3
Notes: *Annual arithmetic average in the column; **based on values at current prices; ***based on 
values at constant 2009 prices.
Source: Authors’ calculation based on INE (2017a).
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Hydroelectric (HCB) power plant, feeding South Africa and Zimbabwe at a cost 
of US$175 million (Murison 2003; Ross 2014).
Road networks, railways, and electric-energy lines were reopened and rehabili-
tated. Development corridors linking Mozambique to the hinterland countries of 
Malawi, Zambia, and Zimbabwe or to hinterland provinces of South Africa were 
reopened or newly constructed. Family savings gradually increased, allowing for 
the expansion of own-account construction. The number of construction and 
building materials companies increased across the country, and in particular in 
the Maputo province. Production of woodwork, cement, and metal products 
increased (Cruz et al. 2014).
Between 1998 and 2004, foreign direct investment (FDI) expanded for new 
projects: Mozal7 aluminium smelter in Beluluane, Maputo province, amounting 
to US$1.34 billion; and Sasol natural gas exploitation in Temane, Inhambane 
province, costing US$400 million (Andersson 2002; Ross 2014: 27, 28, 31). Most 
of the aluminium output is exported for the international market and the natural 
gas is sold to South Africa. These projects are capital-intensive, and are loosely 
integrated in the domestic economy.
After a period of slower growth in 1999–2004, the construction sector acceler-
ated its growth rate again in 2005–15, to 12 per cent. Besides public investments in 
infrastructures, foreign capital has been directly invested in the Kenmare Heavy 
Sands project in Moma, Nampula province, since 2004, and in the Rio Tinto/
Vale/JSPL/Beacon Hill mineral coal mines in Moatize, Tete province, since 2007. 
FDI reached US$592 million in 2008 (Bank of Mozambique 2017). Since 2009, 
ENI and Anadarko have been investing in projects exploring natural gas in the 
Rovuma basin, offshore in the north of the country (Ross 2014). FDI reached a 
maximum value of US$6.2 billion in 2013, equivalent to 38 per cent of GDP, and 
then declined to US$3.1 billion in 2016 (Bank of Mozambique 2017; INE 2017a).
Up to 2014, the government invested in schools, hospitals, roads, railways, 
ports, communications, and administration services. Economic growth allowed, 
and was influenced by, the increase in public investment in infrastructures, 
contributing to construction activity expansion, in 2010–14 (Table 9.1; Figure 9.3). 
The influence of public investment on the dynamics of the construction sector 
has previously been documented (Lopes 2007).
Since 2015, Mozambique has faced a particularly unstable macroeconomic 
environment, in which economic activity has begun to decelerate, with inflation 
pressures and the sharp depreciation of the metical8 against the main foreign 
currencies. The metical/US$ exchange rate9 depreciated by 42.6  per cent and 
7 Mozal aluminium smelter construction phase I in 1998–9, expansion phase II in 2002–3.
8 The metical (MT) is the Mozambican currency.
9 This depreciation affected other main exchange rates, namely MT/euro and MT/rand.
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57.7 per cent in 2015 and 2016, respectively (Hanlon 2017). The annual inflation 
rate rose from 10.6 per cent in 2015 to 23.7 per cent in 2016 (INE 2016, 2017c).
Despite the low GDP growth rate of 3.7 per cent expected in 2017, the 
 macroeconomic situation improved modestly, as the exchange rate of the metical 
against the US dollar appreciated during the year, and inflation decelerated to a 
single digit, 5.7 per cent in December 2017 (IMF  2018; INE  2018a,  2018b). 
Nevertheless, imports are still relatively expensive, and construction companies 
are facing a depressed market demand for building services. The underlying 
economic and financial crisis in Mozambique since 2015 has affected the 
 construction sector (Table 9.1). The state investment budget has been significantly 
cut, while most of the private sector has held back new investments, thus reducing 
demand for construction activities (Figure 9.3). About half of the private con-
tractors are facing pre-bankruptcy, according to the Mozambican Federation of 
Contractors, in 2018 (FurtherAfrica 2018).
4.1.1 Financing sources for construction projects
After independence in 1975, the main public infrastructures were built or 
 rehabilitated through State Budget funding. From 1993 onwards, most of the funds 
came from international aid or international concessional loans. Throughout the 
past two decades, the contribution of domestic public funds gradually increased 
as a percentage of the investment State Budget (Ross  2014: 147). Exceptionally, 
the Maputo–Gauteng Transport Corridor was financed through a public–private 


























































Total state budget/GDP (right axis) Investment budget/GDP (right axis)
Construction budget/GDP (right axis) GDP (le axis)
13.5 13.7 13.0
Figure 9.3 Construction volume in the state budget is fluctuating, but was increasing 
up to 2013
Source: Authors’ illustration based on GoM (2011–15, 2016a, 2017).
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In the 2000s and 2010s, private funds participated in financing investment 
in railways which were designed to transport mineral coal from the inland 
mines to the ocean ports for export (GoM 2014: 26).10 As of 2010, the govern-
ment changed its policy and obtained external loans at market interest rates to 
finance selected public infrastructures (GoM 2014: 9; IMF 2010: 18, 19, 20, 41; 
Verdade 2010).11
4.1.2 Structure of companies in the construction sector
In 2014–15, there were 2,097 construction companies12 operating in the formal 
sector in Mozambique, according to the enterprises census (Figure 9.4). Small 
10 Mozambique’s ‘Integrated Investment Plan (Program): Priority Infrastructures for 2014–2017’ 
has information on the dimension of public investments, such as road kilometres and power plants’ 
production capacity, and the total investment cost (GoM 2014: 30, 31, 32).
11 Before 2010, non-concessional external borrowing was negligible (IMF 2010: 18).
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Figure 9.4 Formal small construction companies correspond to 81.4% of the total 
(2014–15)
Source: Authors’ calculation based on Salvucci (2018); the original income distribution classification 
comes from Allen and Johnsen (2008: 15).
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 11/01/20, SPi
192 The Construction Sector in Mozambique
companies with fewer than 50 workers represent 81.4 per cent of the total. However, 
68.5 per cent of construction workers are employed in large companies. The 
information on the total number of construction companies in the formal sector 
varies according to the source, signalling a shortfall in the quality of data publicly 
available. For instance, Maugeri et al. (2015) report a total number of 2,493 
construction companies in the formal sector, based on a Ministry of Public 
Works, Housing and Hydric Resources (MOPHRH) source. One explanation for 
this disparity in the total number of formally registered companies could be the 
difference in classification.
The number and structure of construction companies in the formal sector, 
classified by activity type in 2014–15, is as follows:
 • 1,164 companies (56 per cent) are dedicated to the construction of 
buildings.
 • 680 companies (32 per cent) work on civil engineering, including services to 
large infrastructure projects, such as highways, roads, bridges, and water 
transportation networks.
 • 253 companies (12 per cent) are specialized in construction activities, including 
demolition, preparation of construction sites, electric installations, plumbing, 
air conditioning, carpentry, plasterboard frames, floors, and various finishing 
services (INE 2017b: 14).
Companies are classified into seven classes according to various criteria. Two 
relevant classification criteria, ‘Maximum value of each work’ and ‘Minimum 
equity capital’, are reported in Table 9.2. In 2014, micro and small construction 
companies—classes 1–3—represented 67 per cent of the total number of con-
struction companies in the formal sector in Mozambique (Table 9.2).
Most companies are located in Maputo, under classes 1–3 (MOPHRH 2014). 
The market size and dynamics allowed for a large number of class 1 companies—
also considered micro—to operate in Maputo province. Micro companies also 
operate in large numbers in Sofala and Nampula provinces. Small companies of 
classes 2 and 3 are mostly attracted to Maputo city and province. The provinces of 
Inhambane, Nampula, and Sofala occupy the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th places for these 
small companies.
4.1.3 Institutional features
Construction companies need to be registered at the Registry Notary13 in order to 
develop their activities, presenting documented proof of their technical, economic, 
13 Companies need to request permission to operate from MOPHRH. The permission—Alvará—
should be granted by the Registration Committee. In Maputo city, the Registry Notary is called CREL.
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and financial capacity (ACIS  2008; MOPHRH  2015; Sutton  2014). They pay a 
permit fee as detailed in Table 9.2.
At present, the Unique Registry falls within the competence of the Functional 
Unit for the Supervision of Acquisitions, which creates and maintains the Unique 
Registry of Contractors of Public Works, Suppliers of Goods and Service Providers, 
as well as providing instructions for the use, maintenance, and updating of the 
Unique Registry, including by electronic means (GoM  2016b: clause 4). These 
contractors are eligible to participate in contracting by the state.
National companies benefit from a preferential margin of 10 per cent of the value 
of the contract, without taxes, for public works contracts and service-rendering 
on public works tenders (GoM 2016b: clause 28).
In order to follow up on contract compliance regarding works, as well as the 
provision of goods and services, for state institutions, a National Council for 
Construction is currently being set up. This advisory body will aim at improving 
contracts and the quality of works, and promoting the participation of national 
contractors and technicians in large infrastructure projects.
Given the size of the public budget involved, a Roads Fund (FE) was created to 
manage public funds used to finance the construction and rehabilitation of roads 
and bridges. The FE operates with funds from international institutions (e.g. 
World Bank and African Development Bank) and other countries (e.g. European 
countries, United States, Canada, Japan), and public funds from Mozambique. 
This pool of funds finances the activities of the National Roads Administration 
(ANE), which is in charge of managing investment projects.
Table 9.2 Number and structure of construction companies in the formal sector, 2014
Class Classification criteria  Rate charged 
for issuing the 
permit*









1 2,000 20 0.001 126 6
2 3,400 50 0.0008 210 10
3 10,000 150 0.00032 1,069 51
4 20,000 500 0.00030 272 13
5 60,000 1,500 0.00020 189 9
6 200,000 5,000 0.00012 42 2
7 + 200,000 10,000 0.00018 189 9
Total    2,097 100
Note: *Applied to the maximum value of each work. The number of companies by class is 
estimated using the shares given by Maugeri et al. (2015) and applying this to the total of 2,097 
construction companies in 2014–15 (INE 2017b). The information in Maugeri et al. (2015) is based 
on MOPHRH (2014).
Sources: Authors’ calculation based on INE (2017b), Maugeri et al. (2015), and MOPHRH (2015).
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4.2 Building materials sector
In Mozambique, there are 184 companies operating in the formal building materials 
sector (MOPHRH 2014). This is a limited number of enterprises, given the size 
and dynamics of the construction industry. Only a few subsectors have scale 
economies, such as the cement companies. Most companies operate in areas with 
a large volume of activities, and a smaller number operate in fragmented and 
regional markets. There is a possibility that the number of companies is small due 
to the existence of other companies operating in the informal sector.
The number and structure of building materials companies in the country, 
classified by size, are shown in Table 9.3. As the data displayed in the table reveal, 
the building materials industry is skewed towards micro and small firms com-
pared to the construction industry. In the latter, one-third of companies belong to 
class 4 or higher, which are medium and large companies. Conversely, 9 per cent 
of the companies are medium and large in the building materials industry. It is 
likely that micro and small companies tend to become informal, in order to sur-
vive financially.
The latest data14 from MOPHRH indicate three structural features of the con-
struction sector in Mozambique:
 • First, most of the companies operating in the construction and building 
materials industries are micro, small, and medium. Due to their size and level 
of experience, it is hard for these companies to compete with international 
companies from South Africa, Portugal, or China.
 • Second, the building materials companies face strong competition from 
imported materials.
 • Third, there is a high concentration of construction companies in Maputo 
province, while building materials companies are strongly represented in 
Sofala and Nampula. One hypothesis is that the latter can better compete 
14 Information based on interviews with officials from MOPHRH and working reports, in 2017–18.
Table 9.3 Number and structure of building materials companies




Micro (1–9 full-time workers) 57.61 106
Small (10–49 full-time workers) 33.15 61
Medium (50–299 full-time workers) 7.07 13
Large (300 or more full-time workers) 2.17 4
Total 100.00 184
Source: Authors’ calculation based on MOPHRH (2014).
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with imports from South Africa, due to transportation costs to the centre and 
north of the country. Moreover, in these parts of the country there are rela-
tively fewer companies in the formal sector.
4.3 Construction sector value chain
The value chain in the construction sector is complex, and imposes a significant 
cost on this industry. In order for the sector to develop, it would be necessary for 
upstream and downstream activities to operate in a synchronized way:
 • About 15 per cent of the upstream value chain15 is produced in Mozambique, 
which includes the wood industry and carpentry, producing floors, frames, 
doors, and windows; the ceramic industry, producing tiles, roof tiles, and 
tubing; the cement industry; and the extraction of stones and sand.
 • All other upstream components are produced outside the country and are 
imported, accounting for about 85 per cent of total upstream products. 
These other products are basic metals, ironmongery, pipes and fittings, sanitary 
ware, glass, electrical material, fuels, asphalts, bitumen, and other metallic 
and non-metallic inputs.
The main upstream value chain includes specialized technical services, such as 
studies and projects, inspection, surveys, laboratory tests, and quality control. For 
current projects, these services are 100 per cent supplied in the country. But for large 
projects such as large bridges, dams, or special buildings, these services have to be 
imported. The downstream value-chain activities are mentioned in Figure 9.1, above.
The importance of knowing the value chain lies in the fact that public policies 
and strategies can be formulated to encourage local production upstream, main-
stream construction, and, sometimes, the national economy. Section 4.4 provides 
an analysis of the production costs, bottlenecks, and potential.
4.4 Construction costs, household income levels,  
and procurement issues
Among various construction costs, this study focuses on a selected few as follows:
 • housing—representing private construction costs
 • hospitals—public
15 Information based on interviews with officials from MOPHRH and working reports, in 2017–18.
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 • boreholes—rural living conditions
 • roads—public, and transaction costs in the economy.
Housing construction and financing is related to household income levels. Based 
on available information from 2014–15, Table  9.4 shows the household income 
distribution as a share of total population.
The FinMark Trust considers that formal bank credit benefits only the high-
income group in the cities in Mozambique (Allen and Johnsen 2008). The Housing 
Promotion Fund (FFH) and microfinance institutions provide limited credit for a 
small share of households across different income levels.
Households in the low-income group in rural areas and in the cities build their 
own houses, mostly from local building materials. This construction can also be 
developed by informal building companies. The construction cost of this type of 
housing is relatively low compared with the cost in the formal construction 
sector. An international comparison indicates that in Mozambique there was a 
house-roofing improvement of about 20 per cent, against about 10 per cent in 
Tanzania and much lower results in Zambia and Nigeria, between the mid-1990s 
and the mid-2010s (MEF 2016: 81).
The indicators shown in Table 9.5 demonstrate that the proportion of households 
in Mozambique that benefited from housing quality facilities between 2002/3 and 
2008/9 represents an improvement also for lower-income families.
Regarding formal-sector housing construction, an international comparison 
reveals that construction costs tend to be 34 per cent to 73 per cent higher in 
Maputo than in the closest neighbouring countries’ major cities, Johannesburg 
and Dar es Salaam (Figure 9.5). In July 2017, a district hospital construction in 
Maputo city cost US$2,500/m2, which was 34 per cent higher than in Johannesburg, 
and was even 72  per cent higher than in Shanghai, China (AECOM  2017). 
Construction costs in Maputo are high due to the costs of importing building 
Table 9.4 Household income distribution as a share of total 
population, 2014–15
Household monthly income level, US$ % of total population
Up to $150 (low income) 90.01
$150–500 (low-middle) 8.75
$500–1,000 (high-middle) 0.87
More than $1,000 (high) 0.37
Total 100.00
Note: This income estimation is based on average household expenditure on 
consumption. Therefore, it may represent an underestimation of income levels.
Source: Authors’ calculation based on Salvucci (2018); the original income 
distribution classification comes from Allen and Johnsen (2008: 15).
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materials, machinery, and equipment. Compliance costs (mainly engineers’ fees 
and plan-drafting fees), marketing, finance, and holding costs are also particularly 
high in Maputo (CAHF 2017).
In 2009, the average cost of constructing a positive water point (borehole) in 
Mozambique was US$8,981, including supervision for a depth of up to 43 metres 
Table 9.5 Proportion of households benefiting from housing quality facilities
Housing facilities IAF 2002–3, % households IOF 2008–9, % households
Durable roofing 25.8 30.2
Durable walls 14.2 17.9
Electric lighting 6.9 13.3
Toilet/latrine 11.2 16.0
Notes: Percentage of households out of total number of households at national level. IAF: ‘household 
survey’; IOF: ‘household budget survey’. IAF is also a household budget survey.




























Residential: Average Multi Unit High Rise (July 2017)
Residential: Generic Formal House (2015–2016)
Figure 9.5 Formal housing construction costs are higher in Maputo than in 
neighbouring cities
Notes: (1) The methodology and sources of information to estimate construction costs are not 
provided in AECOM (2017). The website http://www.aaqs.org contains additional information. 
(2) The ‘generic formal house’ is a 46m2 house plus a 9m2 balcony (total 55m2) (CAHF 2017).
Source: Authors’ illustration based on AECOM (2017) and CAHF (2017).
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(UNICEF 2011). In 2008, the average cost of constructing a negative borehole 
was US$13,032.16 UNICEF considered that construction costs in Mozambique 
were comparable to those in other countries, except for the cost of pumps, which 
were more expensive in Mozambique. Danert et al. (2009) provide information 
on prices or costs,17 but in some cases do not indicate the depth of the well:
 • Kenya: US$8,400 for a 70-metre-deep well, in 1996
 • Niger: US$10,000 for a 60-metre-deep well, in 2005
 • Nigeria: US$11,700 for a 60-metre-deep well, in 2006.
The World Bank (2005: 83) considered that sinking a borehole with a hand-
pump cost:
 • US$10,000 per borehole: Mozambique
 • US$5,000–7,000 per borehole: Malawi, Tanzania, Zambia, and Ghana.
Road construction requires quite detailed specification to allow a meaningful 
comparison of costs. For instance, it would be hard to compare the average unit 
cost of US$751/km for asphalt overlays for three roads—in Cabo-Delgado, Niassa, 
and Zambézia provinces—in Mozambique for the period 2014–16 with the unit 
cost of US$110/km in Tanzania or US$33/km in the Dominican Republic for 
asphalt overlays of 40–59 mm in the years 1996–8, since these are two different 
road types (Collier et al. 2013; MPD 2014).
Alexeeva et al. (2008) provide a useful international basis for comparison. 
With an average unit cost of US$278.7/km (2007 dollars), Mozambique was 
the third-least expensive country among seven African countries for two-lane 
inter-urban road rehabilitation and reconstruction. Congo (DRC) was the least 
expensive country at US$228.9/km, and Kenya the most expensive at US$955.8/km. 
Mozambique has high maintenance costs: the average maintenance cost per km 
of a two-lane inter-urban road was US$197.1/km in Mozambique, against US$87.9/
km in Zambia. From the same paper (Alexeeva et al. 2008), the average unit cost 
of asphalt concrete in Mozambique was US$154.4/m3, while it was US$182.8/m3 
in Tanzania. Portland cement concrete cost US$160.6/m3 in Mozambique and 
US$177.8/m3 in Tanzania. When using a regression model to try to identify 
factors18 explaining the unit costs, the ‘government index’—measuring corruption 
16 MCA (2013) and WASHCost (2011) present similar costs. A negative borehole is a ‘non-productive’ 
one, i.e. ‘dry, low yield, or saline’ (UNICEF 2017).
17 Danert et al. (2009: 2) mention the difference between price and cost: price = ‘cost + overheads, 
taxes, profit, and a margin for risk (e.g. dry holes, payment delays, insecurity, and breakdown)’. For the 
examples provided, it is not always clear if the authors are referring to cost or price (WASHCost 2011).
18 Alexeeva et al. (2008) discuss other factors which are not mentioned here, such as GDP/capita 
and fuel prices.
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levels—influences the cost of asphalt concrete, and the ‘corruption perceptions 
index’ from Transparency International also influences both activities. In other 
words, the higher the corruption levels, the higher the unit cost. Average cost 
 overruns for Mozambique were 18.6 per cent, compared with the lowest-cost 
county, Congo (DRC), with 12 per cent, and the highest-cost country, Nigeria, 
with 39.7 per cent.
Collier et al. (2013) also attempt to explain factors—or drivers—influencing 
road construction unit costs among different countries, and measure the relation-
ship between changes in the drivers and percentage change in the unit costs. 
These factors are listed here, since they seem to be relevant to Mozambique. In 
summary, unit costs are higher where there is:
 • a higher level of corruption
 • more rugged terrain
 • a longer distance to markets
 • a higher level of country conflict
 • weaker public investment capacity
 • a poorer business environment
 • worse infrastructure quality.
Measures to reduce corruption levels might shift the focus, but might not 
change the overall trend. For instance, auditing construction projects with regard 
to the content of cement or clay might lead to an increase in job positions within 
the projects for family members of officials. When governments implement trans-
parency initiatives by publishing unit costs in order to prevent overpaying, firms 
tend to collude, creating cartels. This would also increase unit costs.
Examining ‘red flags’,19 Mozambique presents the highest number among twelve 
African countries (Alexeeva et al.  2008).20 The highest-frequency red flags for 
Mozambique are:
 • ‘delay in completion more than 30 per cent of the contract duration period’ 
(time overrun)
 • ‘half or more firms buying bidding documents don’t bid’
 • ‘contract value more than 20 per cent higher than estimate’
 • ‘difference between contract price and read-out bid price is > 10%’.
19 Red flags are ‘alert indicators of the potential entry points of corrupt activities in the procurement 
of road sector projects’ (Alexeeva et al. 2008).
20 The countries examined were Congo (DRC), Congo, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Madasgacar, Malawi, 
Mozambique, Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. These comparisons could be more reliable 
considering that even in industrialized countries there are high-value public infrastructures, with 
longer delays and much higher construction costs than the original estimate.
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Concluding from the literature review on construction costs:
 • It is necessary to improve the quality of public information on input statistics, 
outputs, technical specifications, costs, market prices in Mozambique, and 
reliable international comparisons.
 • Expansion and improvement in housing construction has occurred at all 
levels of household income. The informal sector seems to supply lower-income 
housing. Banking and formal-sector credit mostly benefit the smaller group 
at the top income level.
 • Construction costs for formal-sector housing and public buildings tend to 
be higher than in neighbouring countries. One of the factors is the high 
import cost of machinery, equipment, intermediate materials, and special-
ized services.
 • Road construction costs in Mozambique are about average compared with 
the costs for other African countries. However, maintenance costs are rela-
tively high.
 • There is a need to improve the business environment such that private com-
panies can operate without fear of arbitrary penalties (Berkel et al. 2018).
5. Construction sector: bottlenecks and recommendations
The construction industry has great potential to act as a catalyst for comprehen-
sive growth, job creation, capital formation, absorption, and technological devel-
opment. But despite its potential for promoting structural transformation and 
economic development, the industry faces institutional barriers, among others, 
which appear to remain the biggest obstacle to its growth. Based on a ‘strengths/
weaknesses and opportunities/threats’ (SWOT) analysis21 for the construction 
sector in Mozambique, a set of recommendations is presented below, following an 
illustration of such analysis:22
 • Issue: labour force
• weaknesses:
• lack of qualified personnel in companies, at various levels: manual 
worker, technician, and manager
• lack of formal training, training programmes, and on-the-job training.
• opportunities:
• expansion of university education in the areas of engineering and 
management.
21 The SWOT analysis is based on authors’ experience and interviews with MOPRH personnel 
in 2017–18.
22 This chapter does not present a SWOT table.
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• threats:
• inflow of foreign labour, with high costs, in the context of lack of 
training for locals
• technical and professional education still does not respond to demand 
in quantity and quality.
Following the identification of bottlenecks which the construction sector is 
facing, the playing field in this sector can be improved through a set of policy 
measures, such as:
 A. Improvement of the state’s organizational, technical, and human capacity to 
apply regulations and fight against corruption; and its supervision regarding, 
for instance, the licensing of the activity, licensing of works, conducting of 
tenders, importing of goods and services, and land use management:
 i. improving the quality of tender documents, with clear rules on the criteria 
for qualification of tenderers and their tenders, such that ministries 
and UFSA23 ensure that existing inspection systems are applied and 
that permanent improvements are introduced—considering grading 
technical proposals with more than 30 per cent weight over global 
evaluation score
 ii. introducing up-to-date and efficient land registry systems, approving 
master and detailed plans, and reserving 30–40  ha of state land for 
future priority investments for each structure plan
iii. significantly improving surveillance systems24 at all stages of the land 
allocation process—Land Use and Exploitation Rights (DUATs) or 
building permits
 iv. creation by the state of appropriate legislation that allows banks to con-
sider land as a guarantee in transactions, for example, by deepening the 
concept of capital gains and infrastructure improvements on the land.
B. Establishment of clear policies and strategies to boost and develop the na-
tional construction industry and reduce the degree of dependence of the 
construction sector on the use of external inputs:
 i. promoting policies and incentives to increase integration in the con-
struction sector (national building materials and equipment industry, 
technical engineering services, construction services, public and private 
investments, and financing)
 ii. continuing to improve the institutional rules and mechanisms for 
prioritizing and programming public investments, which have been 
published in the ‘Integrated Investment Plan (Programme)’
23 UFSA = Unidade Funcional de Supervisão de Aquisições (Functional Acquisition Supervision 
Unit).
24 Considering the example of the Millennium Challenge Account programme in Mozambique.
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 iii. systematically including a provision for public infrastructure mainten-
ance in the state budget
 iv. technical solutions and technologies for the use of available local 
materials, and innovation for the processing of local raw materials 
available in the building materials industry
 v. establishing common programmes involving the organization of 
entrepreneurs, socio-occupational organizations, and partners for the 
national development of the sector
 vi. tracking late payments by the state in construction contracts and 
taking policy measures for prevention and penalization
 vii. ensuring that the recent VAT refund measures are carried out efficiently, 
foreseeing penalties for cases of negligence or corruption
viii. establishing more favourable agreements regarding the use of external 
financing rules.
 C. Promoting the acquisition of technologies and technical means as well as 
the technical quality of work, in order to obtain greater efficiency and higher 
productivity in the sector and allow for greater competitiveness:
 i. ensuring technology transfer and technical training through partner-
ships with external companies
 ii. state investments in research into technologies and building materials 
appropriate to the country’s conditions
iii. developing sustainable business-financing mechanisms, through public 
funds or concessional credit, while considering that this would be a 
temporary policy
 iv. better-qualified intervention by associations of entrepreneurs and 
socio-professional associations, for capacity building and certification 
of companies and professional technical careers
 v. promotion of qualification and retraining courses at all levels.
6. Conclusion
Since 1993, the construction sector in Mozambique has played a mixed role in 
GDP growth, improvement of living conditions, and structural transformation. 
The share of its value added over GDP increased from 1.7 per cent in 1993 to 
2.3 per cent in 2015. The construction sector value added grew at an average 
annual rate of 12.8 per cent in 1993–2015, well above the GDP growth average of 
7.9 per cent. From a qualitative point of view, this sector has contributed to long-
term economic expansion, and to the creation of basic infrastructures by improv-
ing the health and education conditions for families and communities. Housing 
construction has been growing and its quality has been improving since 1993. 
Transportation and communications infrastructures have also been improving. 
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Buildings for private businesses, government, and other not-for-profit services 
have been expanding and improving in quality. Construction sector and building 
materials companies have been growing, with a learning-by-doing process in 
various construction industry skills for the national labour force.
However, significant challenges remain in terms of social and economic 
analysis for prioritizing and programming public investment projects; the 
analysis of investment projects and their impacts on agricultural, fisheries, 
manufacturing, and other services; supervising and improving the quality 
of  infrastructure investments; creating a provision for public infrastructure 
maintenance in the State Budget; focusing on investing in training and its 
quality; and improving the provision of public information on input statistics, 
outputs, costs, and prices for domestic construction activities and reliable 
international comparisons.
Mozambican construction companies have not yet reached the stage of diversi-
fied and sustainable development that would enable them to weather the down-
turn of the business cycle. They have not been able, so far, to compete with other 
big international construction companies on large infrastructure projects. The 
business environment in the country is not yet conducive to the expansion of the 
formal sector to include larger numbers of micro, small, and medium companies, 
hence the need to reduce unnecessary interference and costs.
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Local Content and the Prospects 
for Economic Diversification 
in Mozambique
Evelyn Dietsche and Ana Maria Esteves
1. Introduction
Mozambique has captured the attention of the international energy community 
because of the significant exploration successes achieved since 2010 in the off-
shore Rovuma Basin located along the country’s northern coastline. However, 
prior to these successes, the country’s extractive resources sector had already 
taken off, triggered by the liberalization of the country’s economy in the late 1990s 
and the entry of regional energy players in the onshore oil and gas (O&G) sector. 
South African energy company Sasol has been producing and exporting natural 
gas from the onshore Pande and Temane fields in the Mozambique Basin from 
around 2004 (ILPI  2013). In addition, miners have invested in exploiting the 
country’s hydropower capacity to produce aluminium from imported feedstock, 
as well as producing the country’s coal and other mineral resources.
There are considerable expectations that the extractives sector will contribute 
to economic and social development by means of procuring locally produced 
goods and services and hiring Mozambicans. For example, Sutton et al. (2015: 10) 
suggest that ‘the offshore gas industry offers Mozambique a unique opportunity 
to build up the country’s industrial capability by integrating local companies into 
the supply chain of the multinational firms’. Looking at the policy environment, 
this chapter argues that the prospects for ‘local content’ to provide the link 
between the extractive industries and the economic diversification of the local 
economy are extremely challenging.1 Improving the lives of ordinary Mozambicans 
will require much more than a booming natural resources sector.
Previous UNU-WIDER studies have underlined that most Mozambicans con-
tinue to survive on rural subsistence livelihoods ‘working in agriculture, livestock, 
1 See Dietsche (2014, 2017) for a broader discussion on this subject.
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forestry and fisheries, applying traditional manual and low-productivity technology’ 
(Cruz and Mafambissa 2016: 1). At the same time, the country is known for its 
foreign-funded mega-projects exporting natural resources existing next to a very 
small formal private sector dominated by micro, small, and medium  enterprises 
(MSMEs).2 According to the 2016 African Economic Outlook, 99 per cent of all 
Mozambican enterprises are either run by individual entrepreneurs or comprise 
micro-enterprises with fewer than five employees (AfDB et al. 2016). The success 
in attracting foreign investors to pursue mega-projects has not been matched 
with equal success in transforming the domestic economy: for many citizens liv-
ing conditions have hardly improved. The flipside to the country’s industrial pol-
icy approach of supporting foreign-funded mega-projects is that it has failed to 
address more fundamental constraints to developing the domestic private sector, 
especially in relation to non-extractive natural resources and the (agro-)processing 
of these resources in-country.
Until the mid-2000s the country was broadly heading in the right direction—
or so it seemed. After gaining independence from Portugal in 1975, Mozambique 
underwent several fundamental changes. Initially, it tried a centrally planned 
economy along the lines of nationalist and socialist principles, but then shifted 
towards developing a market economy in the mid-1980s. The country also experi-
enced a brutal war that lasted nearly two decades, but then turned towards peace 
when the two opposing parties, FRELIMO and RENAMO, signed the Rome 
General Peace Accords in 1992. Elections held in 1994 marked the introduction of 
a multi-party presidential democracy, replacing the one-party system that had 
been adopted at independence.3 These developments gave the impression that the 
country was on the path to achieving socio-economic change.4 Economic growth 
rates have been impressive, and are presumed to have been driven by the  country’s 
ability to attract foreign investment.5
However, the most recent economic outlook offers a very different picture: the 
country faces a fiscal bust that materialized before the expected boom of its 
extractive resources sector has even taken off. This puts a serious dampener on 
the country’s prospects for its significant hydrocarbon and other extractive 
resources contributing to economy diversification and lifting ordinary Mozambicans 
2 Sutton et al. (2015) found that thirteen firms account for three-quarters of the country’s export 
earnings. More than 60 per cent of these earnings come from four primary industries, with one single 
firm dominating in each: aluminium (Mozal); electricity (Hidro); ores (Kenmare); and gas (Sasol). 
These authors’ analysis of a ‘stratified’ sample of forty dominant firms suggests that about one-third 
are of foreign origin, one-third are industrial start-ups that date back to pre-independence, and one-
third are post-independence industrial start-ups.
3 See Addison (2003) for several chapters on the dynamics underpinning Mozambique’s economic 
and political transitions from a centrally planned to a market economy and from war to peace, and the 
potential challenges already foreseen in the early 2000s.
4 See Hanlon (2017) for a critical assessment of these developments and the role that donors have 
played.
5 See also Roe (2018a).
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out of poverty—particularly if one takes into account that these prospects are 
thought to arise primarily from wisely reinvesting the revenues generated by the 
sector. The question that this situation has given rise to is: what options are left 
for the incumbent government to ensure ordinary Mozambicans will benefit 
from the sector over the next decade—as opposed to the later 2030s when, realis-
tically, the country could eventually see a meaningful increase in tax revenues 
arising directly from the sector?
The chapter starts with an introduction to the country and the generally posi-
tive outlook for its extractive resources sector, as well as a brief summary of its 
fiscal situation. Against this background, the chapter draws attention to some 
aspects of the country’s policy environment that are relevant for the proposition 
that the country can diversify its severely skewed domestic economy on the back 
of the impending rise of its natural gas and broader extractive resources sector. 
The final section summarizes.
2. The country and its extractive industries
Undoubtedly, Mozambique remains one of the poorest countries in the world. 
With a gross domestic product (GDP) of US$12.35 billion and GDP per capita of 
US$1,300, it is ranked 222nd out of 229 countries.6 On the Human Development 
Index it ranks 181st out of 188 positions, sharing the ranking with South Sudan, 
and lower than the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (UNDP 2016). About 
two-thirds of the population reside in mostly remote rural areas and survive on 
subsistence livelihoods. Of the country’s 28 million inhabitants, roughly two-thirds 
are under the age of 25.7 Those living in urban areas are concentrated mainly 
around Maputo (around 1.2 million) and Matola (around 0.9 million). Only about 
one-third of urban employment is considered formal (Orre and Rønning 2017).
The country gained independence in 1975, following a decade-long liberation 
struggle that ended four centuries of Portuguese rule. Two years into exercising 
sovereign rule, the country slipped into a very brutal and economically devastat-
ing political war. Individual human development indicators have improved since 
the war ended in 1992, but the country started from a very low level and con-
tinues to trail behind the sub-Saharan African average. In 2015 the percentage of 
the population with at least some secondary education was only 2.8 per cent for 
women and 8.0 per cent for men, compared to the sub-Saharan African average 
of, respectively, 25.3 per cent and 33.9 per cent (UNDP 2016). Secondary school 
6 See http://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/mz.html (accessed 12 
March 2018).
7 See also http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/reports/reportwidget.aspx?Report%5FName
=CountryProfile%26Id=b450fd57&tbar=y%26dd=y%26inf=n&zm=n%26country=MOZ (accessed 12 
March 2018).
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enrolment is still well below 20 per cent and nearly half of the population above 
the age of 15 is considered illiterate.8
It is clear that in order to improve its human capital, the country needs to 
 balance existing and prospective mega-projects with investment in domestic 
 capital to boost its domestic economy. This poses a serious challenge for the pub-
lic sector, because what might be good (enough) for large capital projects does 
not suffice to build the human and institutional assets required to support a more 
diversified, yet rural-based, economy.
In contrast to the country’s challenging social background, the long-term 
 outlook for the country’s extractive resources sector remains distinctly positive, 
for three reasons.9 First, since 2010 the country has made international headlines 
because of the exploration successes achieved in the Rovuma Basin offshore of 
the Cabo Delgado Province:
 • Italy-based ENI (25 per cent)—in partnership with ExxonMobil (25 per 
cent) and CNPC (20 per cent), as well as Galp Energia (10 per cent), Kogas 
(10 per cent), and the Mozambican state-owned oil company ENH (10 per 
cent)—are building a floating liquefied natural gas (FLNG) facility with a 
capacity of 3.4 mtpa (million tonnes per annum) to bring the first 5 tcf 
(trillion cubic feet) of the assessed 16 tcf of recoverable gas from Offshore 
Area 4 to the market. According to an ENI press release, this is the first 
FLNG facility to be built in sub-Saharan Africa, and only the third in the 
world.10 The facility is being built by contractors TechnipFMC and JGL 
Corporation, and is expected to be completed around 2022.
 • US-based Anadarko (26.5 per cent)—in partnership with Mitsui (20 per cent), 
the state-owned ENH (15 per cent), Videsh (16 per cent), Bharat PetroResources 
(10 per cent), PTT E&P (8.5 per cent), and Oil India (4 per cent)—had worked 
towards reaching a final investment decision for an onshore liquefied natural 
gas (LNG) plant to produce the 75 tcf of re cov er able gas that Offshore Area 1 
has been assessed to hold.11 At the time of completing this chapter, 
Occidental had bought Anadarko with an agreement that Total would 
acquire Anadarko’s Mozambique assets.12
Although developing the above fields has taken longer than had initially been 
hoped for, the sector continues to evolve, and at a faster pace than in some other 
countries in the region.
8 See http://uis.unesco.org/en/country/mz (accessed 21 March 2018).
9 For example, these are summarized by Cooperação Alemã (2018).
10 See the press releases at: http://www.eni.com/en_IT/media/2017/06/eni-launches-coral-south-
project-in-mozambique?lnkfrm=asknow (accessed 21 March 2018).
11 The project website is available at: http://www.mzlng.com/The-Project (accessed 21 March 2018).
12 See: https://clubofmozambique.com/news/just-in-anadarko-mocambique-area-1-affirms- 
commitment-to-lng-project-press-release-139514/ (last accessed 28 August 2019).
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Second, since 2004 the South African energy company Sasol has been producing 
and processing natural gas onshore in the country’s more southerly Inhambane 
Province. Most of this gas has been exported to South Africa, where it is mainly 
used as feedstock for the chemicals industry. Some gas is also sold to markets in 
Mozambique, where it is mainly used for electricity generation, covering about 
20 per cent of the country’s demand. Although not in the same category as the 
developments in the northern Rovuma Basin, SASOL’s early investments in the 
previously stranded Pande and Temane fields in the Mozambique Basin have 
contributed to the country learning about how the O&G sector works and to 
evolve the legal and regulatory framework governing the sector.13 In addition, 
Sasol’s interests are located along the Maputo Development Corridor connecting 
the deep-water port in Maputo with the South African provinces of Gauteng, 
Northwest, Limpopo, and Mpumalanga, and with Gaborone in Botswana 
(Östensson 2017).
Third, despite already playing a significant role in the global production of sev-
eral minerals, Mozambique’s mining sector is still only considered to be at an 
early stage of development. Its potential is largely untapped, including gold 
deposits in the provinces of Niassa, Tete, and Manica. Mozambique holds some of 
the world’s largest coal deposits, as well as commercially important deposits of 
graphite, iron ore, titanium, apatite, marble, bentonite, bauxite, kaolin, copper, 
and tantalum.
Vale, the Brazilian multinational mining company, has invested in producing 
coking coal and has been exporting since 2011. Coal concessions formerly held by 
Rio Tinto were bought by ICVL (65 per cent) and its partner Tata Steel (35 per cent) 
in 2014. They are producing and exporting thermal coal. Investments focusing on 
the mining and processing of heavy sands have been led by Kenmare Resources, 
BHP, and others. In international mining news, Mozambique also features as a 
country that is poised to gain from rising demand in those types of minerals that 
are required for the global transition to a low-carbon economy. Several compan-
ies are investing in graphite, for example, Syrah Resources (Australian) expected 
to commence production in 2018.14
In summary, the country’s extractive resources industries are expecting a 
boom. This should be good news for the country, in theory. As highlighted by two 
related UNU-WIDER papers, these industries could significantly boost the econ-
omy for several years, if not decades (Roe 2018a, 2018b). This expectation builds 
on much the same logic that has underpinned the country’s current economy, 
13 ex post assessments of the agreements Sasol negotiated with the Mozambican government have 
raised several questions about the ‘fairness’ of the fiscal and commercial terms that came about in the 
early 2000s, when the respective gas fields discovered in the 1960s had been left stranded for decades 
and the surge in prices from the mid-2000s to its peak in 2014 had not yet unfolded. At that time, it 
was not a forgone conclusion that producing this gas would necessarily be commercially attractive.
14 See Mining Weekly, 5 December 2017.
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where export-oriented mega-projects, financed and operated by foreign investors 
and exploiting the country’s extractive resources, dominate the economy (Sutton 
et al. 2015).
A small counter-balance is provided by a limited number of also primarily 
 foreign-financed companies engaged in construction and in light manufacturing 
for the domestic market, including some larger-scale and several smaller-sized 
investments exploiting non-extractive natural resources (e.g. agro-food, sugar, 
cotton industry). The rest of the economy consists of a mixed portfolio of largely 
informal micro- and small-sized Mozambican enterprises (Lachler and Walker 
2018; Orre and Rønning 2017).
The idea that Mozambique’s economy can be diversified on the back of its 
extractive resources sector would seem, prima facie, a rather theoretical and per-
haps far-fetched proposition. More realistic would seem the suggestion of some 
observers who purport that, strategically, the country should balance its growing 
dependence on extracting and processing mineral resources with more proactive 
support for other, more labour-intensive industries. Cruz and Mafambissa (2016), 
for example, argue that Mozambique’s ‘industries without smokestacks’ hold par-
ticular potential. They see it as a possibility that the country could feasibly achieve 
international competitiveness and create formal jobs and self-employment 
opportunities in the production of fruits and vegetables, in agro-processing, and 
in various tradable services. With most Mozambicans living in rural areas, it is 
these industries that can support the growth of MSMEs, producing goods and 
services for demand that is sustained independently and beyond the O&G sector. 
Lachler and Walker (2018) also suggest that transforming the rural economy is 
critical for Mozambicans to benefit from better jobs in the private sector.
3. Facing up to the fiscal crisis
As Roe (2018b) has outlined in detail, recent IMF Article IV consultations have 
concluded that the country’s public finances are in a dire state (IMF 2018). The 
debt-to-GDP ratio has shot up to around 130 per cent from just around 40 per cent 
in 2012—notably after achieving Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) debt 
relief in the 1990s (IMF 2018: Figure 4). The annual fiscal deficit now stands at 8 
per cent of GDP, and for the past three years the country has defaulted on its debt 
service. To restructure the public debt incurred with private lenders, the govern-
ment needs to agree a respective programme with, and place its public finances 
under the watch of, the IMF. Invariably, this means constraining and reprioritiz-
ing public spending.
The sad part to this story is that after the large offshore hydrocarbon finds 
along the Cabo Delgado Province had become public knowledge, overtly promis-
ing projections were made about the future government revenues that would 
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arise from these fields.15 These projections were premised on (1) the assumption 
that field developments would go ahead, and (2) more or less informed guesses of 
what the negotiated fiscal terms, cost structures, and timelines of the envisaged 
developments might be. These projections contributed to inflated expectations 
about the availability and timing of future public funding and enticed the public 
authorities to relax their fiscal prudence and loosen control over financial 
management.
Public debt has been driven up by (1) higher public spending and heavy inter-
national and domestic borrowing, and (2) publicly guaranteed loans amounting 
to US$2.3 billion (equivalent to 20 per cent of the country’s GDP) incurred from 
around 2013. The latter remained undisclosed until 2016, when it transpired that 
state-owned enterprises had incurred these liabilities with commercial lenders. 
Not only did these loans breach the country’s Constitution, but also its HIPC 
commitments and other fiduciary safeguards embedded in the public financial 
management system.16 An independent audit (the so-called Kroll investigation) 
has provided a good idea about what happened in that short period of just a 
 couple of years. The full extent and use of the hidden loans—and who were the 
responsible decision-makers—has not been disclosed.
As Roe (2018b) has outlined, tight monetary and fiscal policies aimed at restor-
ing fiscal sustainability will require reducing and reprioritizing public spending 
over the next decade. Meanwhile, the timelines for the development of the envis-
aged LNG projects have been pushed back several times. This suggests that add-
ition al revenues from the Rovuma Basin fields will not flow before the second half 
of the 2020s at the very earliest. Further, if and when they start to flow, they will 
likely already be earmarked for debt-reduction purposes. Perhaps it would be rea-
sonable to assume that the country should not expect more meaningful increases 
in public revenue before some point in the 2030s.
For the domestic economy this means that the public debt burden is poised to 
crowd out even further the already weak local private sector. The signs pointing 
to this include high interest rates for MSMEs17 and a build-up of public-sector 
payment arrears, including the refunding of value-added tax (VAT).18 A recent 
15 One such set of projections was provided by the IMF’s FARI model (Fiscal Analysis of Resources 
Issues). These projections are discussed by Roe (2018a, 2018b).
16 Ironically, formal assessments of Mozambique’s de jure public financial management have 
awarded the country high marks and commented on the country’s impressive systems at the centre. 
However, de facto performance has not met expectations, because political-administrative capacities 
on the ground have undermined budget execution as set out in approved budgets and medium-term 
expenditure plans. Andrews (2013) provides a political-economic analysis of this.
17 In accordance with the General Statute of Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (Law 44/2011), 
the definitions for MSMEs in terms of number of workers are the following: micro enterprises are 
companies with four or fewer employees; small enterprises are companies with 5–49 employees; and 
medium-sized enterprises are companies with 50–100 employees.
18 See Further Africa (2018a). This announcement cautioned that in the short term the government 
only had funds to pay less than 20 per cent of its accumulated arrears. In response, affected companies 
warned of the risk of mass bankruptcy.
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survey has already picked up a decline in the stock of MSMEs (UNU-WIDER 
2018). Thus, if prospects for Mozambican MSMEs did not look overtly good prior 
to the fiscal bust, they certainly do not look good now.
The business environment will worsen further if the provision of public goods 
and services deteriorates from already low levels. This will undermine invest-
ments in human and other forms of domestic capital, which is just what 
Mozambique desperately needs (Roe  2018b). There is a risk of a widening gap 
between the skills and entrepreneurial capabilities available in the country and 
those required by foreign investment projects and their supply chains (Östensson 
2017). Such a prospect does not bode well for expectations that ‘local content’ can 
provide the silver bullet for diversifying the economy.
For foreign investors, the fiscal situation also increases their perceived political-
economic and socio-political risks. Invariably, they will factor (or most probably 
already have factored) these into their project economics, with knock-on effects 
for the actual revenue that will (eventually) be collected from the sector. Several 
recent studies have attested to very low levels of domestic capacity in, and institu-
tional barriers faced by those sectors that are relevant for the development of the 
extractive resources sector, such as the construction industry (Cardno 2015; Cruz 
et al. 2018; Maugeri et al. 2015) and the metals engineering and manufacturing 
sector (Lemos and Scur 2014; Sutton et al. 2015). This makes projections about the 
positive impacts arising from the planned projects, for example in terms of 
additional jobs, seem overly optimistic. At the very least, such impacts should not 
be taken for granted, even if economic models and multipliers make them seem 
real. More important is to cast a critical eye on the supply-side conditions that 
will be necessary for such impacts to become real.
4. The policy environment
With no additional revenues forthcoming from the extractive resource sector in 
the near term, the onus lies on improving the policy environment in non-
monetary ways to support the domestic private sector to pull through the dire 
times that the country is facing over the next decade. This means tackling the 
barriers that hinder entrepreneurial Mozambicans in rural areas becoming more 
pro duct ive and sustaining a growing number of MSMEs. This is different to giv-
ing in to the demands that existing entrepreneurial elites may be lobbying for in 
terms of capturing a share of the resource rent associated with the production of 
extractive resources.19
19 See Melia (2015) for a stylized, comparative assessment of Mozambique’s political economy of 
extractive resources.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 11/01/20, SPi
Dietsche and Esteves 217
This section examines the policy environment for diversifying the domestic 
economy on the back of the extractive industries. It starts off with a brief sum-
mary of the political trajectory that has led to the fiscal bust before the boom and 
the challenges the incumbent government faces. Next, it reviews the country’s 
evolving approach to industrial policy and its achievements in terms of enabling 
the growth of domestic MSMEs. Third, it examines the potential for ‘local con-
tent’ and corporate ‘social investment’ to support economic diversification and 
local economic development.
4.1 Political trajectory of the policy environment
In the post-independence civil war era from 1975 to 1992, Mozambique’s first 
president, Samora Machel, kept with the political spirit of the time and organized 
the country as a one-party state. He embraced both nationalist and socialist pol-
icies, guiding a centrally planned economy based on a long-term plan for indus-
trialization. This included the 1975 Constitution establishing that all natural 
resources belong to the state. Land was nationalized and still today cannot be 
owned by individuals or organizations; it can only be acquired on lease from the 
state. Private-sector organizations (e.g. schools, clinics) and commercially valu-
able property (e.g. rental housing) were also nationalized. State-owned enter-
prises increased sharply in numbers and a good number of these still exist today.20
Just two years after achieving independence, the country was plunged into a 
brutal war, fought between the ruling liberation party FRELIMO (Front for the 
Liberation of Mozambique) and its opposition RENAMO (National Resistance 
Party of Mozambique), the latter receiving funding at the time from white-ruled 
Rhodesia and later also apartheid South Africa. This war lasted seventeen years 
and a heavy human cost was paid, leaving many injured by landmines, killing an 
estimated one million people, and forcing about five million Mozambicans to 
seek refuge in neighbouring countries. After nearly two decades, the FRELIMO 
president, Joaquim Chissano, and RENAMO leader, Afonso Dhlakama, agreed to 
the Rome General Peace Accords that brought peace in 1992.21
The transition to a multi-party presidential republic from 1992 to 2005 paved 
the way for the country to move on from the nationalist and socialist economic 
model of the post-independence era and towards a gradual opening up of the 
economy for private investment.22 A significant marker was the first investment 
20 The 2018 IMF report mentions loss-making state-owned enterprises as a risk to the country’s 
financial sector.
21 See various chapters in Addison (2003) for more background on how the transition from con-
flict to peace came about.
22 Hanlon (2017) casts a critical retrospective eye on the role that donors have played during this 
era and the implications in relation to the country’s contemporary debt crisis.
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in the O&G sector, when Sasol agreed to develop the previously ‘stranded’ gas 
onshore field in the Inhambane Province. When the first multi-party elections 
were held in 1994, the democratic transition came about without pressure from 
urban protests against the incumbent regime, unlike in most other African coun-
tries (Bratton and Van de Walle  1997). The incumbent president, Joaquim 
Chissano, won the elections and continued to head the government until 2005. 
The country achieved relative political stability and was hailed for its pursuit of 
economic and public-sector reforms. This period also introduced the first steps 
towards the decentralization of political power in the spirit of the 1992 Peace 
Accords, albeit in a manner that has favoured FRELIMO.
This positive-looking trajectory started to take a negative turn from 2005, 
when President Armando Guebuza took over from Chissano. In the following 
decade, he spearheaded a political culture that favoured centralized political 
power paired with the cementing of top-heavy elite capitalism, nurturing party-
political alliances (Bertlesmann Stiftung 2016; Orre and Rønning 2017). His presi-
dency struck observers for its willingness to yield and wield political power 
through a system of granting the necessary public licences to a small and pol it ic-
al ly well-connected economic elite (Cruz et al.  2014). This well-connected oli-
garchy has been eager to capture the rents associated with economic liberalization 
and the increasing foreign investments into the resource-based industries. Some 
commentators had already pointed to this risk looming over the country, based 
on observing how state assets and natural capital were privatized, especially in the 
aftermath of the war and even before Guebuza had taken over the presidency 
(Addison 2003).23 Hindsight appears to trace the origins of the present fiscal situ-
ation to the Guebuza era.
Elections held in October 2014 passed the presidency to Filipe Nyusi. He is said 
to be departing from the path that Guebuza and his allies had favoured and 
the style of political decision-making they had nurtured. The first challenge for the 
Nyusi government has been to get to grips with the fiscal situation and restore 
trust with multilateral and bilateral development partners. The second challenge 
has been to ease the internal political tensions that flared up under the Guebuza 
presidency and which Nyusi has so far been able to contain on the basis of a fra-
gile ceasefire. In view of the local elections that took place in October 2018 and 
the general elections taking place in 2019, Nyusi is banking on progressing with 
the decentralization of power to resolve this political subject, pending since the 
1990s.24 In early February 2018, the government proposed constitutional changes 
23 It was Guebuza who, in 1975, as interior minister had been responsible for the ‘24-20’ order 
which forced 200,000 Portuguese residents to decide between adopting Mozambican nationality or 
leaving the country within 24 hours with a maximum of 20 kg of luggage.
24 In October 2013 RENAMO called off the Paris General Peace Accords, in relation to which a 
fundamental point of contention has been for the decentralization of political power negotiated in 
1992. The Guebuza government had taken a strong position against RENAMO’s demands, whereas the 
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redistributing political power to the level of the country’s provinces. The National 
Assembly approved these changes in May 2018 (Further Africa 2018c). The third 
challenge is to figure out how, in spite of the dire fiscal situation and the con-
strained budget over the medium term, the country can take advantage of the 
positive outlook for its extractive resources sector and build human and other 
forms of domestic capital that the country so desperately needs.
4.2 Industrial policy and MSME development
Examining the approach the country has taken to industrial policy to date can 
provide clues on how the country can take advantage of the positive outlook for 
its extractive resources sector.
Over the years, several policies, strategies, and plans have been put in place 
with the aim of achieving industrial development and strengthening MSMEs. 
To name a few, these policies, strategies, and plans have included the visionary 
Agenda 2025, which stresses governance, human capital, and economic devel-
opment and underscores the need for investments to achieve productivity 
increases in the agriculture and fisheries sectors. Then, there is the Five-Year 
Plan (2015–2019), intended to serve as the key medium-term programming 
instrument to implement Agenda 2025. A raft of additional strategies have 
included the National Development Strategy (2015–35), the Strategy to Improve 
the Business Environment (known as EMAN II), the Export Strategy (2012–17), 
the Strategy for Employment and Vocational Training (2006–15), the Strategy 
for the Development of the Private Sector (2013–22), and the Strategic Plan for 
the Development of the Agricultural Sector. A District Development Fund has 
also been set up for the purpose of delivering loans and other financial services 
to enterprises in rural areas.
Alongside this, the country has entertained a forward-rolling Industrial Policy 
and Strategy (IPS) as the overarching framework for growing and diversifying the 
economy since the mid-1990s. The first IPS (1997–2006) was introduced in the 
context of the Structural Adjustment Programme that guided the country in 
adopting a liberal approach to re-establishing a market economy. It stressed that 
the government and its state apparatus are responsible for promoting a friendly 
environment that offers attractive and transparent incentives to private (foreign) 
investors. Arguably, this approach set the country on a new path and enabled the 
Nyusi government has taken a more conciliatory stance. More recently, it has become less clear to 
what extent RENAMO continues to pose a threat to FRELIMO. During the time in which this chapter 
was being written, RENAMO leader Afonso Dhlakama died, on 3 May 2018, in his mountain hideout 
in central Mozambique (Further Africa 2018b). In contrast to FRELIMO’s tensions with RENAMO, 
there is also the view that different factions within FRELIMO pose a greater threat to the incumbent 
presidency.
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first large-scale investments in the extractives sector, including bringing to  market 
the previously ‘stranded’ natural gas of the Mozambique Basin.
The second IPS (2007–15) introduced several additional measures to provide 
more active support to industrialization. These have included establishing the 
Institute for the Promotion of Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (IPEME), 
tasking it with the responsibility to promote and support MSMEs. The second IPS 
also promoted several industrial development zones, including the Nacala Rapid 
Development Zone, the Maluana Technology Park, and the Beluluane Export 
Processing Zone. The latter is located next to the Maputo Development Corridor, 
which hosts the Mozal smelter and associated suppliers, as well as several other 
anchor projects.25 The Mozal smelter imports raw material from Australia and 
elsewhere through the deep-water port in Maputo and uses hydroelectricity from 
Cahora Bassa dam to produce aluminium.
Observers have been especially critical of the achievements of these two IPSs as 
these have left the economy and its manufacturing sector in a mixed state of 
affairs (Cruz et al. 2014, 2016). While foreign investments in mega-projects have 
given the country international visibility and export earnings, they have not (yet) 
contributed more substantially to public finances. For example, Sasol only became 
a top corporate tax payer in 2015, after its ten-year cost-recovery period ended in 
2014. At the same time, it is hard to imagine that the tax base has broadened 
beyond the extractive industries, when MSMEs are reported to be in decline and 
the labour market has not changed as much as could have been expected, given 
the economic growth recorded. In addition, prestige developments, such as the 
various resource corridors and special development zones, have at best delivered 
mixed results (Mtegha et al. 2012).
The current government introduced the third and most recent IPS (2015–24). 
Although it continues to underline the need for MSME development, it recog-
nizes that the two preceding IPSs fell short of their expected outcomes. Under the 
third IPS, the Ministry of Industry and Commerce (MIC) has introduced a 
new strategy for MSME development, tasking the IPEME and its Provincial 
Directorates of Industry and Commerce with its implementation. This includes 
extending the IPEME’s territorial reach to provide MSMEs with more localized 
services by means of eight business development centres (COrEs) and business 
incubators maintained in the provinces of Maputo, Tete, Manica, and Cabo 
Delgado, and the districts of Catandica, Chiuta, Caia, and Mocuba. The MSME 
strategy itself comprises five priorities: (1) improve the business environment; (2) 
increase the capacity of MSMEs; (3) improve access to financial services; (4) 
improve market access; and (5) strengthen monitoring and coordination 
25 Initially a joint venture project led by BHP Billiton, Mozal Aluminium is now operated by 
South32 (47.1 per cent), the miner that was demerged from BHP Billiton in 2015. See http://www.
south32.net/what-we-do/places-we-work/mozal-aluminium (accessed 29 March 2018).
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mech an isms. A key aspiration is that MSMEs will be able to take advantage of 
demand arising from, as well as around, extractive industry projects for locally 
produced goods and services.
In addition to the MIC’s new MSME strategy, the current government also 
launched a new National Programme for Sustainable Development (2015–2030). 
It is referred to as the ‘Estrela Project’ and it is led by the Ministry of Land, 
Environment and Rural Development. The aim is to improve rural electricity, 
banking, water, infrastructure, and technology.
The aspirations set out in the MIC’s MSME strategy has prompted the World 
Bank-funded Mining and Gas Technical Assistance Programme (MAGTAP)26 to 
conduct several studies to support its implementation. These set off from the 
question: which sector niches could potentially provide opportunities for local 
MSMEs in the mining, oil, and gas sector, and where and to what extent do these 
overlap with the sector priorities set by the IPS III?27 The hypothesis behind this 
question has been that it makes sense to support local production of goods and 
services for which there is also demand beyond that arising from the extractive 
resources sector.
The first MAGTAP study split potential opportunities into two sets of goods 
and services: (1) those that overlap with the five priority industries targeted by the 
MSME strategy; and (2) those that comprise so-called transversal services, defined 
as bearing relevance not only across the five priority industries but also beyond. 
Such transversal services include, for example, HVAC (heating, ventilation, air-
conditioning), cargo transportation and logistics, rental services, accounting and 
financial services, supply of office consumables, and waste management. This 
study has suggested that, at least in theory, there could well be opportunities for 
MSMEs to link up with the extractive and related industries.28
The second study asked: to what extent do the constraints raised by existing 
studies on MSMEs apply to the identified niche areas?29 A survey by FinScope 
(2012) and a study by USAID (2013) served as the benchmark. Both studies high-
light which factors undermine MSME development:
 • Lack of finance, deficits in human resources, inadequate infrastructure, and 
corruption and inefficient public processes and public–private relationships 
are among the most mentioned factors that make for an unfavourable busi-
ness environment and poor public goods and services provision.30
26 See World Bank (2018). MAGTAP’s overall objective is to strengthen the capacity and govern-
ance systems of key institutions, managing different aspects of the extractive resources sector.
27 See Community Insights Group and EnergyWorks (2017a).
28 See Appendices in Dietsche and Esteves (2018) for a fuller coverage of the results of the 
MAGTAP studies.
29 See Community Insights Group & EnergyWorks (2017b).
30 The UNU-WIDER-supported MSME survey conducted in 2017 also mentions these factors 
(UNU-WIDER 2018).
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 • Internal factors, such as weak organizational capacity and poor business 
management practices, undermine MSMEs’ abilities to meet quality stand-
ards, achieve certification, and upgrade their applied technologies.
By conducting interviews with around 100 MSMEs, this study drilled deeper 
into the identified niche areas. On this basis, it concluded that across the two sets 
of goods and services focused on by the first study, there are two groups of 
MSMEs that face somewhat different constraints:
 • The first group comprises MSMEs offering services that require a higher 
level of management sophistication. These services include (a) specialist 
geological, laboratory, and waste management services; and (b) logistics and 
transport maintenance services. Mozambican companies offering these ser-
vices tend to be somewhat larger and more often meet the definition of 
medium-sized companies.
 • For this group, the good news is that while their management capabilities 
are not yet what they ought to be in order to qualify as certified suppliers 
to the extractive industries, they are nevertheless close enough to warrant 
targeted interventions that would get them to this point.
 • The second group comprises MSMEs that offer a diverse set of goods and 
services, including goods and complementing services such as construction 
materials, camp-site equipment, chemicals, and HVAC equipment, as well as 
more generally the transversal services mentioned above. Mozambican com-
panies offering these goods and services tend to be smaller and less sophisti-
cated, including micro-enterprises offering anything from catering services 
to office consumables, to accounting and financial services, to specialized 
consulting services.
 • This group would primarily benefit from basic and general enterprise 
development support, as opposed to seeking to qualify these companies 
as certified suppliers.
In conclusion, the conundrum is that in order for these two groups to build 
linkages with the extractive industries, enterprises would require different sets of 
policy interventions: enterprises offering the services comprising the first group 
would need very targeted supply-side support to reach the milestone of certified 
supplier status. On the demand-side, local content stipulations could possibly 
complement this support. Meanwhile, the enterprises offering the goods and ser-
vices that marked the second group are much further from being able to supply 
directly to lead operators and their lead contractors. Enabling these types of enter-
prises to benefit from possible induced linkages would best be achieved by sup-
porting MSMEs more generally and across all sectors. However, the policies, 
strategies, and plans with which previous governments have tried to support 
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MSME development have not been particularly effective, especially with regard to 
that part of the economy that matters most for the majority of Mozambicans. The 
efforts tried to date do not appear to have tackled more fundamental constraints 
that undermine rural-based economic and social development.31 This raises the 
question of whether more recent efforts, set in the context of the impending 
resources boom, could make a difference.
4.3 Local content and social investment in  
local economic development
Local content stipulations tend to target the demand-side of bringing local enter-
prises into the supply chain of foreign-funded investment projects. In parallel, 
corporate local content development programmes may also support supply-side 
interventions to qualify local enterprises as certified suppliers.
On the demand-side, the announcement was made in late 2014 that the 
 government was embarking upon drafting a sector-specific local content bill to 
provide a legal and regulatory framework for the participation of Mozambican 
businesses and citizens in extractive industry projects. In response, several com-
panies that were already invested in the sector commissioned studies that con-
firmed that Mozambique already has a diverse range of general and sector-specific 
policies, strategies, laws, and regulations in place setting out local content ob ject-
ives and stipulations.32 Box 10.1 highlights some of these (without claiming 
comprehensiveness).
Notably, it could be seen as a positive sign that the present government has not 
rushed into finalizing the bill, which to date remains pending and continues to be 
discussed among key stakeholders. Other countries in the region have pursued a 
different approach and have put out sector-specific local content laws mandating 
ambitious quantitative procurement targets. In practice, however, such legislation 
has delivered rather mixed outcomes (Östensson 2017).
The proposed Local Content Bill of 2014 triggered a debate that demonstrated 
the different positions that domestic stakeholders hold and that needed to be rec-
onciled. One position has promoted a principle-led approach that seeks to focus 
local content on ‘value added in the country’. This position emphasizes the ‘use of 
local factors of production’ and the ‘development of local value chains’ to diver-
sify the economy. It also appears to go along with a reflective-realist understand-
ing of the existing capabilities of the private sector, with a view to identifying and 
focusing on niche areas where the extractives sector could most likely source 
31 See Dietsche (2014) for a broader discussion on this subject.
32 See also OECD (2017). USAID/DAI (2015) compiled a detailed but unpublished stocktake of 
national content provisions in existing legislation.
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competitive factors of production from within the country. It is said that 
 stakeholders in the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF), as well as the 
majority of stakeholders in the Ministry of Mineral Resources and Energy 
(MIREME), have been in favour of this position.
The other position maintains that local content stipulations should oblige 
locally registered foreign suppliers of goods and services to ensure they meet 
mandatory targets on Mozambican co-ownership. A respective target of 15 per cent 
has been quoted, with the Mozambican private sector said to have been lobby ing 
for this position. Supposedly, the technical argument put forth to underpin this 
position is that such ownership participation would support technology transfer 
and deliver dividend income to nationals who would re-invest in the country. 
At the same time, there are some doubts about whether those lobbying for this 
position are genuinely interested in entrepreneurship.
Box 10.1 Local content objectives and stipulations
The Policy and Strategy for Mineral Resources (Resolution No 89/2013 of 31 
December) and the associated Implementation Plan (2017) contain several 
local content references, including (1) to promote local entrepreneurship and 
the creation of partnerships through the entire value chain of the natural 
resources industry sector; (2) to give priority to increasing benefits to national 
operators/companies and promote the establishment of SME cooperatives and 
associations; (3) to give priority to the exploitation of natural resources bene-
fiting the development of local communities; (4) to train professionals (e.g. 
geologists, geochemists, mining engineers, and petroleum engineers, as well as 
legal and taxation experts, contract negotiators, and auditors); and (5) to 
encourage the participation of women.
The Mining Law (Law No. 20/2014 of 18 August) requires that foreign legal 
entities providing services to mining operations associate with Mozambican 
legal entities, and that mining operators give preference to local products and 
services, and ensure the employment and professional training of Mozambican 
workers. The law also demands that mining contracts stipulate minimum 
standards for local procurement and employment and training of Mozambicans. 
The Mining Regulations (Decree No. 31/2015 of 31 December 2015) guide the 
procurement of goods and services.
The Oil & Gas Law similarly stipulates that foreign companies providing 
services to the petroleum operations associate with Mozambican individuals 
or companies, and that rights holders of petroleum operations must give pref-
erence to local products and services when these are comparable in quality, 
quantity, and availability and do not cost more than 10 per cent more than 
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If it was agreed that some form of ownership participation was to be required, 
there are also different opinions on whether such participation should be 
de livered via carry arrangements benefiting selected individuals, or whether 
bene fi ciar ies should bring their own resources to the table—that is, at least shar-
ing the risks in exchange for the rewards that equity participation should deliver. 
In terms of implementation, it is understood that the MEF is taking the lead in 
advancing the pending Local Content Bill, while subsequent local content regula-
tions would be drafted by MIREME. The MEF is also planning to establish a small 
unit that would undertake relevant sector analyses to inform as well as monitor 
the implementation of the eventual Local Content Act.
imported goods and services, including taxes. The law also stipulates that 
prod uction-sharing contracts contain stipulations on local procurement and 
employment and training of Mozambicans.
The Regulation on the Resettlement Process Resulting from Economic 
Activities (Decree 31/2012 of 8 August 2012) requires that affected communi-
ties are given opportunities to benefit directly from investment projects.
The Regulation for the Contracting of Foreign Citizens in the Petroleum 
and Mining Sectors (Decree No. 63/2011 of 7 December 2011) applies to for-
eign and domestic employers and to all foreign employees, imposing a quota 
regime stipulating that the share of foreign employees as a percentage of the 
company’s workforce can only be 5 per cent for employers with more than 100 
employees; 8 per cent for companies with 10–100 employees; and 10 per cent 
for employers with up to 10 employees. In addition, there is a Strategy for 
Training Human Resources for the Mineral Resources Sector (2010–20). 
Furthermore, the Investment Law (2004) requires that applicable investment 
projects create a minimum of twenty-five work places for directly employed 
Mozambicans starting in the second year of operation, and that the 
Mozambican workforce is provided with opportunities to acquire professional 
qualifications.
The Natural Gas Master Plan expresses the expectation that the O&G sector 
will support industrial development delivered by MSMEs developing around 
the country’s mega-projects. It anticipates that specific measures will be put in 
place to promote the growth of MSMEs in and around the value chain of O&G 
projects. It also suggests that increased tax revenues will be put towards stimu-
lating MSME development. A set of indicators has been spelled out to guide 
project approvals. These seek to evaluate investors’ commitments towards 
using Mozambican suppliers and they suggest that investors develop and pro-
pose detailed action plans.
Source: Authors, based on the discussed laws and regulations.
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Less clear is what role the MIC and its IPEME will play. The MAGTAP studies 
have stressed that the IPEME is ill prepared to support the enterprises of Group 
A, as it does not have the knowledge and experience required to guide supplier 
development for the specialist areas of expertise within which these enterprises 
operate. Direct participation in extractive industry supply chains requires meet-
ing high international standards, not least because the sector entertains a very low 
level of tolerance for late and below-standard delivery.
Other supply-side interventions include the experiences gained with local 
content programmes delivered in the past. Often quoted is the Mozal-related 
Mozlink programme, which originated in the early days of the Mozal smelter 
and was led by the International Finance Corporation (IFC). At one stage it 
included the participation of several foreign companies invested in Mozambique. 
The results of this programme appear to have been mixed and the programme 
no longer exists.33 All primary references to the programme ceased following the 
programme’s  evaluation conducted around 2009/10. One conjecture has been 
that not all of the suppliers developed under the programme have been of the 
type adding value in-country. No other third party has stepped up to take on the 
role that the IFC had sought to play.
In summary, recent efforts suggest an inconclusive picture regarding 
whether ‘local content’ can really contribute towards building the domestic 
capital that is required to diversify and structurally transform the country’s 
economy for the benefit of its rural-based population. Some experimental 
efforts appear to be underway that could positively contribute to some local 
companies achieving certified supplier status (Lemos  2016; Lemos and Scur 
2014).34 However, the litany of challenges that MSME surveys and studies have 
flagged as constraints to private-sector development suggests that claims por-
traying the country’s ex trac tive resources sector as the silver bullet to build up 
the country’s industrial cap acity could be grossly overpromising, at least over 
the next two decades.
Another recent effort that could hold some potential in support of rural-based 
economic development is the Policy for Corporate Social Responsibility for the 
Mineral Resources Extractives Industry,35 which the president approved in May 
2015 and which the (then) minister of mineral resources and energy followed up 
33 The authors are aware that individual companies have continued with their own supplier devel-
opment programmes.
34 This includes providing selected small and medium-sized companies in manufacturing and in 
the construction and building materials industry with management training and consulting services 
aimed at improving productivity and firm performance. For additional assessment of the construction 
sector, see also Cruz et al. (2018), Maugeri et al. (2015), and Cardno (2015).
35 Presidential Decree No. 11/2015 of 16 May 2015.
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with a regulatory Implementation Guide36 that was approved in December 2016. 
These documents speak to the objective of ensuring that the sector contributes to 
local economic development by oil, gas, and mining companies developing and 
implementing comprehensive social investment plans and, in some cases, negoti-
ating local development agreements (Boletim da Repùblica  2017: 100, authors’ 
translations). Corporate efforts to deliver benefits beyond their core business are 
expected to prioritize human capital development, local business links, and prod-
uct ive employment creation, and help local companies develop economic ac tiv-
ities around oil, gas, and mining projects.
Although the language of the corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
Implementation Guide overlaps with that more commonly featuring in local con-
tent debates, the target beneficiaries are quite different. The focus is on the local 
level, where sub-national public authorities struggle to deliver public goods and 
services critical to building rural-based domestic capital. Here, the guide leaves it 
open to what extent social investment efforts are negotiated to focus more nar-
rowly on supplier development, or whether they may want to target broader 
enterprise development to meet the expectations and needs of impacted rural 
communities and their respective district and provincial authorities.
From this bottom-up perspective, the expectations are typically to support 
income generation and (self-)employment opportunities through investments in 
local capabilities and helping local MSMEs innovate and adopt new technologies, 
with a view to tapping into potential demand for locally produced goods and ser-
vices. Corporate efforts to support this type of enterprise development in col -
labor ation with sub-national authorities, communities, and delivery-oriented 
development partners could hold some potential to bring to the fore and jointly 
tackle some of the barriers that hinder entrepreneurial Mozambicans in rural 
areas from becoming more productive and accessing markets. However, to date it 
has remained unclear if the incumbent government still supports the uptake of 
the CSR Policy and Implementation Guide and if and how companies will actu-
ally be able to implement these.
Perhaps there lies an opportunity in the country’s predicament of unlikely sub-
stantial additional resource revenues over the medium term, despite a booming 
natural resources sector, if this encourages collaborative efforts supporting private 
sector development from the bottom up. This chapter does not have space to 
delve into the qualitative details of the institutional arrangements that have so far 
undermined the development of MSMEs. It concludes on the note that it would 
seem wise to scrutinize these aspects more closely and bring them into the 
national debate about extractives and development. There is the risk of 
36 Ministerial Order No. 8/2017. The original goes by the Portuguese title of ‘Guião Implementação 
de Política de Responsibilidade de Social Empresarial para a Indústria Extractivo dos Recursos 
Minerais’ (Government of Mozambique 2017).
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overpromising on the delivery capacity of local content in a country context in 
which the gap is particularly wide between most of the inputs that the sector 
 procures and hires, and those which the local economy produces.
5. Summary
This chapter has set off from the positive long-term outlook of Mozambique’s 
extractive resources sector and the expectation that it will contribute to economic 
diversification and social development, not least by means of procuring locally 
produced goods and services and hiring Mozambicans. The chapter has argued, 
however, that even so, the prospects are challenging for this sector to link up with 
the local economy and to contribute to its diversification. Beyond foreign-funded 
and export-oriented mega-projects, the country’s formal economy is very small, 
rural-based, and dominated by entrepreneurs operating at the lowest level of the 
MSME spectrum.
The current fiscal situation, in combination with the delays experienced in 
developing the offshore natural gas sector, undermines the assumption that add-
ition al revenues from the sector could be used to finance visionary strategies and 
plans aimed at achieving economic diversification and transformation through 
the spending of these revenues. Thus, the chapter has asked the question: what 
other options are there for the government to ensure its citizens benefit from the 
extractive resources sector? It has cautioned against optimistic projections over-
promising positive impacts and has argued that the onus lies on improving the 
policy environment for broader and rural-focused private-sector development, 
not least to balance the growing dependence on extracting and processing min-
eral resources. A stock-take of the policy environment has evolved over time and 
highlighted that the incumbent government faces the challenge of building 
much-needed human and other forms of domestic capital in ways that do not rely 
solely on spending additional revenues.
While there are some signs of departing from the unfortunate path the preced-
ing government has followed, the jury is out on whether more recent efforts to 
support MSME development will deliver such domestic capital building. In the 
context of potential opportunities offered by the demand arising from the ex trac-
tives sector, the results of a series of MAGTAP studies has suggested that there are 
two mutually non-exclusive choices: to focus more narrowly on supplier develop-
ment, possibly benefiting a few companies achieving ‘certified supplier’ status as 
the pre-condition for participating directly in the sector’s value chain; or to sup-
port enterprise development more broadly, recognizing that Mozambique’s non-
extractive economy is distinctly rural-based. The chapter’s discussion of recent 
efforts made to encourage local content and social investment in local economic 
development has delivered an inconclusive picture regarding the former and 
 cautiously pointed to the opportunities associated with the latter, because it offers 
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at least the potential to innovate around supporting the ‘industries without 
smokestacks’ that some observers have highlighted as the key to the country’s 
development.
For the foreign companies already invested in Mozambique, it seems clear that 
they will have to ‘up their game’ in terms of the qualitative efforts they have to put 
into linking up their investment projects with the domestic economy—whether at 
the level of the national economy, or at the level of the particular provinces, 
 districts, and communities where their operations are located.
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Adapting to New Realities
Mark Henstridge
1. Introduction
Large volumes of natural gas have been discovered offshore Tanzania. Current 
official estimates suggest proven reserves of 57 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of gas,1 
which is a lot of gas.2 To put it into context, the price for liquefied natural gas 
(LNG) in Asia for most of 2018 was around US$10 per million British thermal 
units (mmbtu), which values 57 tcf at US$55 billion: equivalent to about ten times 
the 2018 Tanzanian GDP, and about US$10,000 per person. The investment in the 
projects that would be needed to produce such gas is also large—it would be the 
biggest set of investments in Tanzania ever, with a total cost estimated at almost 
the same order of magnitude of GDP: potentially around US$44 billion 
(Baunsgaard 2016).
With such big numbers associated with the offshore natural gas, it is not hard 
to imagine the fantastic prospects of increased wealth and accelerated develop-
ment that are tantalizingly almost within the government’s grasp. The reality is 
that these numbers are indeed fantasy: the perceived scale of any revenue based 
on the numbers would be wildly overestimated. What matters is not the stock of 
reserves, but the value of any flow of production.
Any expectation that there will be a boom any time soon will be sorely disap-
pointed. Not only does the commercial viability of the array of investments by 
private companies needed to produce, liquefy, and ship LNG need a minimum 
price higher than that achieved in the recent past, but project viability also needs 
reduced risk. Such investments face an array of risks, including technical, market, 
and policy risks. In the end, as well as prices, costs, and risks, a key determinant 
1 Ministry of Energy and Minerals quarterly reports (MEM, various years), though estimates of the 
amounts of gas that could potentially be produced are lower.
2 The units used to calibrate stocks and flows of gas and liquified natural gas (LNG) are potentially 
confusing. As well as industry-specific units for pricing, a mix of imperial and metric units is used for 
both stocks of reserves and flows of production. There is a conversion table included in each annual 
publication of the BP Statistical Review of World Energy (www.bp.com/statisticalreview).
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of the scale of any potential resource revenue is the time it will take to bring 
reserves to production: the longer it takes, the smaller any revenue will be relative 
to a growing GDP or population.
There have been a number of careful estimates of the likely scale and timing of 
the prospective boom which show a consistent picture of modestly material, but 
not transformative, revenue to government. They are reported here after a discus-
sion of key assumptions in making such projections, and the risks that surround 
Tanzanian offshore gas.
I then look to embed the projections in a brief discussion of two topics relating 
to the role of natural resources in growth, structural change, and industrializa-
tion: first, the interactions between public policy and the risks faced by large-scale 
investment in natural resources; second, the way in which an array of public 
 pol icies condition the impact of actual and prospective natural resource projects 
on wider matters of economic growth, structural change, and industrial 
development.
2. The magnitude and timing of a  
prospective resource boom
The official estimate of gas reserves in Tanzania is 57  tcf, but the estimates of 
 actually ‘recoverable’ gas reported by the companies which have done the ex plor-
ation are lower, perhaps below 30  tcf (Baunsgaard  2016; see also Scurfield and 
Mihalyi 2017). In any case, this is a significant quantity of gas, but it is deep under 
the sea far offshore. Any resource boom will be determined by flow of production 
and any associated revenue flows to government—which, in turn, are a function 
of the costs of capital investment and the cost of production; the recovery of those 
costs as part of earning a return on investment; and the structure of the fiscal 
terms which shape the shares of government and investor of the dollar net present 
value (NPV) of the project.
In this section, the factors which shape production volumes and costs, LNG 
prices, and the nature of the fiscal terms are set out. A key determinant of a 
boom—if in the end there is one—is time: the longer it takes to bring gas reserves 
to production, the smaller the boom relative to GDP or on a per-person basis.
Projections of gas production are in part determined by geological, engineering, 
and commercial risks and constraints. There is a minimum feasible flow of gas 
production needed to make the facilities for production, transport, and liquefac-
tion of gas work efficiently. For offshore gas in Tanzania, that minimum ‘anchor 
volume’ of production is large, representing so much gas that it outstrips the 
capacity of Tanzania to absorb it, so almost all would be exported as LNG—hence 
the need to have a liquefaction plant.
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To put the scale into context, it is useful to look first at the volumes of reserves 
and production onshore. As well as the large-scale offshore discoveries, Tanzania 
also has onshore or shallow water fields at Mnazi Bay and Songo Songo, shown in 
Figure 11.1. They are much smaller than the offshore discoveries: Mnazi Bay has 
technically recoverable gas estimated at just 0.3  tcf, while Songo Songo holds 
0.7 tcf, compared with recoverable gas reserves estimated at a total of 29–37 tcf 
between the two main offshore consortia.3 However, the smaller quantities of 
shallow water or onshore gas can be brought into production more quickly and 
more easily, and so at a significantly lower cost. Songo Songo has produced since 
1974. Production from Mnazi Bay by the companies Maurel et Prom and 
Wentworth Resources started in 2015, with the gas being delivered to Dar es 
Salaam via pipeline for power generation.
In April 2018, construction on the Kinyerezi II gas-fired power station was 
completed and the facility was opened by President Magafuli, with the project 
expected to be commissioned at full capacity of 240 megawatts (MW) in October 
2018 (The East African 2018). The use of onshore and shallow water gas in power 
generation has supported a significant addition to Tanzania’s generating capacity, 
and gas production had increased from 78  million standard cubic feet per day 
(mscuf/d) in 2012 to 132 mscuf/d in 2016, with scope for further increases in line 
with the ambition for more investment in gas-fired power generation, to around 
200 mscuf/d.4
To put this into context, the ambition of production of 200 mscuf/d of gas for 
power generation is equivalent to 2.1  billion cubic metres (bcm) or 1.5  million 
tonnes of LNG: below, we discuss the prospect of volumes of LNG from Tanzania 
of the order of 15–20 million tonnes. Taking just 10 per cent of 15 million tonnes 
of LNG for domestic use would mean 1.5 million tonnes of LNG: the equivalent of 
around 200 mscuf/d, or a doubling of gas hoped to be going into power gen er-
ation. This point illustrates the scale of potential LNG exports relative to ex pect-
ations of gas consumption in Tanzania.
The offshore gas is 80–100 kilometres offshore Tanzania, in water depths of up 
to 2,000 m and a further 4,000 m below the seabed. The reserves have been dis-
covered by two separate consortia of international oil and gas companies across 
several ‘blocks’. One consortium is led by Statoil as the operator, and includes 
ExxonMobil (Block 2). The other is led by Shell, following their takeover of BG 
Group, and also includes Ophir (Blocks 1, 3, and 4). The location of Blocks 1, 2, 3, 
and 4 is illustrated in Figure 11.1.
3 On Songo Songo reserves, see Orca Exploration Group (2017); on Mnazi Bay reserves, Wentworth 
Resources (2018); on the offshore blocks, Baunsgaard (2016) and Scurfield and Mihalyi (2017).
4 See World Bank (2017) for production data; expectations for onshore and shallow water produc-
tion going into power generation are drawn from a 2013 private briefing by BG Group for Oxford 
Policy Management.
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2.1 Risks
There is an interaction between solving the geological and engineering challenges 
and the commercial constraints and risks. The higher the capital costs required, 
and the longer the time it takes to build and install facilities, the more secure an 
investor will need to be in the expected return on investment, and the risks that 
surround it. There are, broadly, two sets of risks apart from the technical geo-
logic al and engineering risks. These are the market or commercial risks, and the 
policy risks: the extent to which there is stability in the set of legal and regulatory 
measures, and the commercial agreements, which amount to a coherent ‘author-
izing environment’ for a major natural resource project.
2.1.1 Geological and engineering challenges
There is a combination of geological and engineering challenges to producing and 
transporting gas from the bottom of the sea over a long distance. The gas from 
each of these different fields comes from different depths, and comes to the level 
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of the seabed at different temperatures and pressures. Differential pressures mean 
that different gas fields cannot simply be plugged in to each other without careful 
management of relative reservoir and pipeline system pressures. The gas from dif-
ferent fields may also have a different mix of the butane and propane which makes 
up natural gas. These have to be blended, either at the wellhead on the seabed or 
onshore, and the longer hydrocarbons—natural gas liquids (NGLs)—have to be 
stripped out from the production flow of propane and butane. In addition, one 
feature of the seabed between several of the gas fields and the shore is a canyon, 
on the scale of the Grand Canyon, across which a pipeline will have to run to 
transport the gas from the sub-sea wellhead installations to the shore.
Such challenges can be overcome: but they need to be carefully evaluated, and 
engineering design work will need to be completed to meet them. The cost of 
engineering solutions will not be clear until such work is done—during a succes-
sion of engineering design projects starting with the preparatory ‘pre-Front End 
Engineering Design’ (pre-FEED) work—and it all takes time. The operator of a 
consortium of investors will typically incur the costs of pre-FEED work when the 
main parameters of a project are clear, even if they still face ongoing market and 
commercial risks.
2.1.2 Market and commercial risks
A key market risk relates to the price that can be secured for exports of LNG. The 
current expectation is that East African gas will go to Asia. During 2017, prices 
for LNG imports to Japan were significantly lower than the average for the previ-
ous decade: an average of US$8.61/mmbtu for the year, compared with an average 
of US$12.15/mmbtu for the ten years 2007–16. The extended period of higher 
prices reflected a mix of circumstances. LNG prices had been strong in Tokyo 
while Japan was importing gas to generate power after Japanese nuclear plants 
failed safety standards in 2002, were damaged by the tsunami of 2004, and suf-
fered the Fukushima disaster of 2011. In addition, LNG had been priced using a 
formula that related gas prices to the oil price, and oil prices had been above 
US$50 per barrel for most of the period 2005–15. Figure 2 shows crude oil and 
natural gas prices from 2014 to late 2018.
The average price of LNG imports to Japan during the first ten months of 2018 
rose to US$10.40/mmbtu—a 21 per cent increase over the average for 2017. Figure 
2.5 in chapter 2 in this volume illustrates the extent to which Asian LNG prices 
continue to move in a similar way to crude oil prices, and the volatility of hydro-
carbon prices. According to Scurfield and Mihalyi (2017) (of which more later), 
the level of prices in 2017 and 2018 is still below the long-run price of US$14/
mmbtu that would make investment in Tanzanian LNG viable on the basis of the 
rate of return international companies usually require on capital investment, but 
not far off the US$11 that they argue could make investment possible.
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‘Henry Hub’ in Louisiana, the part of the US gas pipeline network that serves 
as a reference point for market pricing of gas across the US. The average price at 
Henry Hub for the first ten months of 2018 was unchanged over the average for 
2017, at a shade under US$3/mmbtu.
What matters for assessing the market risks for large investments in LNG is the 
prospects for the price in the future. The recent past, together with some ex pect-
ations about the changes in global gas markets, provides some guidance for 
thinking about the future. There are at least three factors to bear in mind: (i) the 
sustainability of the LNG pricing link to crude oil and the scope for integration of 
global gas markets; (ii) expectations for demand for LNG in Asia; and (iii) ex pect-
ations for supply of LNG.
The link between LNG prices and the oil price is eroding. This is related, in 
part, to an increasing integration in global gas markets through LNG. The volume 
of gas traded as LNG more than doubled between 2000 and 2010 to nearly 
300  bcm, and increased further to 393 bcm in 2017.5 The growth in LNG now 
includes a link between the increase in supply of gas in the United States, where 
new ‘tight’ and shale gas supplies have recently turned the United States into an 
exporter of LNG. This supply shock helps explain why the US gas prices at Henry 
Hub, shown in Figure 11.2, are lower than LNG prices in Asia. In economics, the 
market price under competition is set by the intersection of supply and demand 
curves at the margin. As US exports grow, they add to the marginal supply of 
LNG across the Pacific and so put downward pressure on prices in Asia.
The link between oil prices and LNG prices is also eroding because there is 
dissonance between what LNG buyers want, which is short-term price flexibility, 
and what LNG suppliers need, which is long-term price stability. There has been a 
steady increase in the share of LNG traded on the basis of spot prices. Between 
2010 and 2017, the number of cargoes of LNG traded on a spot basis more than 
doubled from 500 to over 1,000. The proportion of LNG trade accounted for by 
spot pricing increased from 12 per cent in 2010 to 25 per cent in 2017 (Shell 2018).
Although the price for LNG import to Japan did increase to over US$10/
mmbtu in 2018 to close in on the recent decade-long average price, it cannot be 
assumed that this is now a stable price level. The erosion of the link with oil prices 
and lower-cost marginal supplies of LNG from the United States simply sustained 
downward pressure on prices. However, there are forecasts of increased demand 
for gas, and hence LNG, in Asia, and there is some analysis of expected supply of 
LNG based on recent patterns of investment in liquefaction plants, which may 
shift the price outlook for the medium term.
5 Data from the BP Statistical Review of World Energy, available at https://www.bp.com/en/ global/
corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html (accessed 23 December 2018), 
and from BP (2018).
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The biggest changes in gas markets in Asia are in China. Gas demand in China 
has more than doubled from just over 100 bcm in 2010 to nearly 250 bcm in 2017. 
Over that period, China’s imports of LNG have gone up from around 10 bcm in 
2010 to around 40 bcm (Shell 2018). Both China’s total gas demand and imports 
of LNG exceeded industry consensus forecasts in 2017.
Increased demand for LNG, in particular in Asia, is a key feature of the forward-
looking outlook exercises conducted by both Shell and BP: Shell projects a 
55 per cent increase in LNG trade, or an additional 200 bcm, by 2035; BP projections 
show a significantly higher increase—an 85  per cent increase in LNG, or an 
additional 335 bcm, over the same period.
Increases in supply of LNG can be expected over the two years to 2020 because 
there remains some major investment in LNG supply, much of it from Australia 
for the Asian market, coming on-stream in the next two years: an estimated add-
ition al 40 bcm in additional supply capacity is expected in both 2018 and 2019, 
but not much more after that. The Shell LNG outlook argues that there is a risk of 
a lack of supply investment around the middle of the next decade. This is possibly 
relevant to Tanzania given that the ‘Final Investment Decision’ (FID) for the off-
shore gas has been postponed a number of times, and is now not expected before 
2022. A key party to investment in offshore gas in Tanzania will be Shell. At the 
same time, there are alternative new sources of supply, not least Mozambique, 
which has more than twice the recoverable reserves of Tanzania and is a few steps 
further along the path towards first production.6
2.1.3 Policy risks: the ‘authorising environment’
Progress on the development of a project of scale and complexity requires work to 
solve geological and engineering challenges. But that work will not start until 
there is some degree of confidence in the policy environment for the project. For 
example, as touched on above, a consortium of investors will typically only incur 
the costs of pre-FEED work when the main policy and commercial parameters of 
a project are clear. Pre-FEED work is an essential input to an FID. And the more 
detailed and intense engineering work—FEED—usually starts when there is a 
clear Host Government Agreement (HGA) in place which defines the project, the 
associated fiscal terms, and their implications for the commercial case for an 
investor, given the market and commercial risks they face.
The policy risks come in two broad groups. One is the legal and regulatory 
requirements which cover fiscal terms and other formal obligations on a project. 
The other is the extent to which there is sufficient clarity in the roles and 
6 Reserves in Mozambique are estimated at 100–80  tcf, compared with the official reserves for 
Tanzania reported at 57 tcf. It was reported in August 2018 that Anadarko was targeting the first half of 
2019 for FID in Mozambique (see Offshore Energy Today  2018), with plans to export 12.88  million 
tonnes a year, which is equivalent to 17.5 bcm a year.
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responsibilities across government for working with the consortia investing in a 
large and complex project. The administrative processes that confront the investor 
will be part of the assessment of the risks associated with any given set of 
 policies—which combine in an assessment of how straightforward it is to do busi-
ness. Section 3 below lays out these two broad categories of risk in more detail.
2.2 Projections: production and prices
The geological, engineering, and market risks surrounding offshore gas in 
Tanzania suggest that there might be no production any time soon—especially 
when the policy risks set out below are also taken into account. However, in look-
ing at what could be feasible given the scale of reserves, a number of scenarios 
have been used as the basis for estimates of potential public revenue. There are at 
least three published exercises in projecting expected volumes of production, and 
their timing. Henstridge and Rweyemamu (2017) updated the model used in an 
earlier study that was published by the Africa Development Bank and the Bill & 
Melinda Gates Foundation.7 Scurfield and Mihalyi (2017) is part of a series of 
briefs on natural gas in Tanzania published by the Natural Resources Governance 
Institute (NRGI). Baunsgaard (2016) is an IMF ‘Selected Issues Paper’ which 
accompanied the 2016 IMF Article IV Consultation on Tanzania, and which 
updated earlier work reported more extensively in a 2014 Selected Issues Paper 
(Baunsgaard 2014).
Because the scale of reserves and of production are such that the only feasible 
use for almost all the gas will be LNG exports, the assumptions on production 
become a function of the capacity of each ‘train’ for liquefying gas.8 The min-
imum production of gas will be the minimum needed to make one train work. 
Most modern trains process around 5 to 6 million tonnes of LNG a year—equivalent 
to between just under 7 bcm and almost 9 bcm a year. Each study has broadly 
comparable assumptions on production, which include a steady state of 
15–20 million tonnes of LNG each year, with the liquefaction plant building up to 
three or four trains.
There are a range of price assumptions in each study, reflecting the drop in 
prices in 2016. Baunsgaard (2016) and Scurfield and Mihalyi (2017) share the 
observation that prices need to be at least US$11/mmbtu before investment 
7 The AfDB/BMGF (2015) publication is ‘Background Paper 2’ on the timing and magnitude of 
new resource revenues, which was a background paper to a report, Delivering on the Promise, on the 
possibilities for increased investment in human development that could arise from new resource- 
rev enue opportunities in six countries in sub-Saharan Africa.
8 The term ‘train’ refers to the linked set of cooling plants that turn natural gas into a liquid at a 
temperature of −161°C.
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becomes feasible, even if their estimates on rates of return to the investor are 
lower than most usually accept.
The assumptions on the capital investment costs are broadly similar as well: a 
total of around US$44 billion—comparable in order of magnitude to the US dol-
lar value of Tanzanian GDP. The consistency across all the assumptions used in all 
three studies is not wholly unsurprising. The scale and complexity of producing 
LNG with offshore gas can be reasonably inferred, though the details of fiscal 
terms are not all in the public domain.
2.3 Projections: fiscal terms and cost recovery
To make projections of potential revenue, the fiscal terms have to be modelled, 
including the ‘cost recovery’ provisions for investors to have a relatively early 
recovery of the costs of capital investment, which shapes both the expected return 
on investment and the shares of the NPV of the project between the government 
and the investor. The larger the provision for early cost recovery, the higher the 
return on investment—which could mean that the government can take a larger 
share of the total NPV of the project over its lifetime—but the smaller the imme-
diately available revenue to government.
The fiscal terms on a large hydrocarbon investment, sometimes referred to as a 
‘petroleum operation’ to distinguish it from the taxation of a normal corporate 
entity, uses a mix of instruments. To model revenue to government, the assump-
tions for capital investment costs, operating costs, volumes of production, and 
prices for a petroleum operation are combined to construct a sequence of cash 
flows. The applicable fiscal terms are then applied to give estimates of the profi t-
abil ity of the project for the investor, and the revenue going to government.
There are at least two broad trade-offs which any set of fiscal terms will resolve. 
One is between the share of the ‘rent’ from the project which goes to the govern-
ment and the share which goes to the investor. This is usually calculated on an 
NPV basis, where future cash flows are discounted by how far into the future they 
are—meaning a dollar to be received in ten years’ time is discounted relative to a 
dollar received today. The share going to government on that basis might go down 
if the fiscal terms deliver more revenue earlier on: this could be through a tight 
ceiling on cost recovery which increases the ‘profit gas’ available for sharing, or 
through changes in the terms on the carry-forward of investment allowances. 
When the government gets earlier revenue, the investor will need to have rela-
tively more of the rest of the NPV to offset risks associated with the length of time 
it takes to go net cash flow positive.
The other trade-off for the government is that the more ‘progressive’ the 
implicit tax schedule, the higher the share of volatility in the public finances. 
What this means is that the more the government gets of any ‘up-side’ in rent 
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when the price goes up, the more volatile will be the revenue stream as it amplifies 
any volatility in sales prices. When sales are made through long-term contracts, 
this effect is somewhat limited. But if there are sales on the growing spot market 
for LNG cargoes, there will be a bigger challenge of volatility in the management 
of the public finances.
The fiscal terms for Tanzania are assumed to be those reflected in the current 
Production Sharing Agreements (PSAs). They are not in the public domain, and 
are therefore approximate. There is a more detailed discussion of the modelling 
challenges and options in Scurfield and Mihalyi (2017).
The results for revenue to government from Henstridge and Rweyemamu 
(2017) are presented in Figure 11.2. The left-hand panel shows an estimate of the 
amounts that go to government from each of the main instruments in the fiscal 
terms as at 2014, expressed in terms of constant-price 2012 US dollars. The take 
from a fixed-percentage royalty shows as flat during the plateau of constant pro-
duction, with a constant-price assumption. The step increase in receipts from 
profit share shows after eleven years of production, which is the time when capital 
cost recovery is complete and profit gas increases, and at the same time receipts 
from corporate income tax (CIT) kick in and there would be some dividends 
from the share in the consortium held by the state through a national company.
The right-hand panel of Figure 11.2 shows three variants of price assumption, 
the high scenario being 25 per cent above the central case, and the low price scen-
ario being 25 per cent below it. The revenue projections are expressed as a share 
of GDP, which is assumed to be growing in line with UN population projections of 
workforce growth and with an assumption on trend growth in labour productivity 
that had led to an assumption of real GDP growth of the order of 7 per cent. Also 
arguably optimistic is the start date of 2021, which was not wholly realistic at the 

























High scenario (+25% - US$14.38/mmbtu)
Low scenario (-25% - US$8.63/mmbtu)
Figure 11.2 Revenue projections in Tanzania
Source: Author’s construction based on Henstridge and Rweyemamu (2017).
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The right-hand panel provides an illustration of volatility: even with constant 
plateau production and a constant-price assumption, the profile of revenue is dif-
ferent at different price levels. This is partly a result of the pattern of receipts 
under the fiscal terms illustrated in the left-hand panel, and partly because a 
higher price means that cost recovery is completed sooner rather than later: that 
feature of the fiscal terms means that when prices do move around from year to 
year, revenue to government can be more volatile than spot prices for LNG.
The start date for production is dependent on the date of the FID. It is a 
decision based on analysis of considerable preparatory work, such as the pre-
FEED work referred to above, as well as appraisals of the full panoply of risks, 
op por tun ities, and alternatives. The FID for the upstream gas developments 
under both consortia, and the construction of the liquefaction plant that both 
would use, was once thought to be feasible in 2016. At the time of writing, at the 
end of 2018, it is not expected until 2022 at the earliest. The time between FID and 
the first production of gas is a minimum of five years—hence the modelling of a 
2021 start date based on a risk-free assumption on construction and a 2016 FID 
date (as referred to above)—but delays are likely, and gas production might not 
start until eight to ten years after FID. Such a delay means that any projection of 
revenues based on constant US dollars leads to a shrinkage of revenues relative to 
GDP or when expressed as dollars per person.
The costs of delay for any given configuration of costs, production, prices, and 
fiscal terms are illustrated in Figure 11.3. Compared with production starting in 
2021, a ten-year delay reduces the average revenue over the life of the project by 
about half when expressed as a percentage of non-resource GDP, from 1.7 per cent 
to 0.9  per cent—given the assumption that GDP continues to grow—and by a 
quarter when expressed as dollars per person, from US$33 to US$25 per year. 
This is because both the economy and the population are growing, and any given 
scale for a project diminishes over time in relative terms. The point that Figure 11.3 
underscores is that delays are costly to all concerned.
In sections 3 and 4 I set out two areas of public policy which matter for making 
the most of this sort of natural resource: (i) the policy which changes the risks 
and opportunities for the project (section 3); and (ii) some elements of public 
policy more broadly which shape whether there is scope for a contribution to 
growth, structural change, and industrialization (section 4).
3. Public policy and risk
There are, broadly, two aspects of public policy which shape the risks faced by a 
complex large-scale natural resource project. One is the legal and regulatory 
requirements which cover fiscal terms and other formal obligations on a project; 
the other is the extent to which there is sufficient clarity in the roles and 
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responsibilities across government for working with the consortia investing in a 
large and complex project.
3.1 Legal and regulatory requirements
As discussed earlier, for a contractor to commit to the initial pre-FEED phase of 
planning, and then to FID, there needs to be a reasonable degree of certainty over 
the laws, regulations, and commercial agreements that will govern the project. 
This is not yet the case in Tanzania.
In 2015 an incomplete legal and regulatory environment was strengthened 
when the Petroleum Bill received presidential assent: the Act is a major piece of 
legislation which: (i) expands the provisions regulating upstream petroleum 
operations that were previously governed by the Petroleum (Exploration and 
Production) Act, Cap. 328 (PEPA); (ii) includes mid- and downstream petroleum 
product supply operations (previously regulated by the Petroleum Act, Cap. 392); 
and (iii) provides regulation of the mid- and downstream natural gas activities.
While the 2015 Act is the cornerstone for activities of the oil and gas sector in 
Tanzania, there were several areas where greater clarity in the broader legal 
















2021 2023 2025 2027 2029 2031 2033 2035 2037 2039
US$ per person % GDP
Year production starts
Average revenue per person (US$, lhs) Revenue (% GDP, rhs)
Figure 11.3 The costs of delay
Source: Author’s construction based on Henstridge and Rweyemamu (2017).
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projects for upstream production of gas are also evaluating the joint LNG plant. 
There is a question of the extent to which the projects are treated as being inte-
grated, both from a regulatory point of view and in terms of whether they consti-
tute an integrated taxable entity. The operations of upstream gas production and 
an export LNG plant are distinct from traditional downstream activities, such as 
the transport, distribution, and sale of gas for the domestic market. It is preferable 
for large integrated gas projects which span upstream and midstream to have a 
single regulator to ensure consistent regulation and effective project execution and 
operation of the gas/LNG value chain. However, in the Act the construction 
and operation of export liquefaction facilities (and other related activities such as 
gas processing, storage, and jetties/marine facilities) are considered part of the 
midstream and downstream regulated activities alongside domestic transporta-
tion and distribution and the sale of gas to the market in Tanzania.
In addition, the Act provides exclusive rights over the natural gas midstream 
and downstream value chain to the NOC, the Tanzania Petroleum Development 
Corporation (TPDC). This provision might not be beneficial for efficient devel-
opment of gas resources, particularly in areas where the NOC has no experience, 
for example in large-scale gas liquefaction. In an integrated gas/LNG value chain, 
the upstream contractors are looking to establish their interest in the liquefaction 
plant in line with their upstream participation interests so as to secure common 
incentives between owners and users of the LNG plant. This is important to 
ensure cost-effective execution and operations. It also provides lower risk for the 
investors in upstream production.
As well as the broad legal framework provided by the Petroleum Act 2015, 
there are some specific laws, regulations, and contracts needed for even the pre-
paratory work on a large-scale LNG project to start. A key step is an HGA for the 
LNG plant. The discussions on the HGA were reported to have started in 2017 
with the aim of completion by late 2018, although press reports suggest differ-
ences remained at October 2018 (see, for example, Ng’wanakilala 2017, 2018). The 
HGA will need to settle the question of how much the upstream gas production is 
integrated with the liquefaction of gas for export, which will affect the commer-
cial viability of each investment and the associated risks. A key variable is the 
tolling fee if one is charged for liquefaction, or the price of upstream gas if the 
ownership of the gas is to pass to the operators of the LNG plant before export. 
This is because the tax liabilities of each part of the gas value chain could change, 
depending on whether integration creates one taxable entity, or whether the fiscal 
terms and other obligations in the PSAs that were negotiated between 2005 and 
2007 would simply apply to upstream production.
However, at the same time, there are some commercial risks associated with 
the viability of those PSAs. Since they were agreed, a new model PSA was published 
in 2013. The analysis done by Scurfield and Mihalyi (2017) for NRGI suggests that 
a straight application of the terms of the model PSA to the gas projects in Tanzania 
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would increase the minimum sales price needed to clear the threshold for 
 investment from US$14/mmbtu to US$21/mmbtu.
Under normal circumstances, there would be little risk of a fundamental 
re nego ti ation of PSA fiscal terms. However, Tanzania now has a mix of laws 
that raise precisely such a risk. They are: (i) the Written Laws (Miscellaneous 
Amendments) Act 2017 (‘Amendments Act’); (ii) the Natural Wealth and 
Resources (Permanent Sovereignty) Act 2017 (‘Sovereignty Act’); and (iii) the 
Natural Wealth and Resources (Review and Re-Negotiation of Unconscionable 
Terms) Act 2017 (‘Contract Review Act’). These laws appear quite targeted at 
mining. But they significantly elevate risks in any evaluation of the commercial 
opportunities and risks that an international investor in gas would undertake. 
For example:9
 • The Sovereignty Act appears to require approval of any mining or petroleum 
agreements by the National Assembly, which has the authority to require 
renegotiation of any existing or future arrangements. Review includes scru-
tiny for ‘unconscionable’ terms under the Contract Review Act; in addition, 
any clause that subjects the contract to the jurisdiction of an international 
arbitration body might be deemed unconscionable—the Sovereignty Act 
stipulates that disputes relating to resource extraction be adjudicated in 
Tanzania. This appears to rule out industry-standard arbitration clauses, and 
would need to be reconciled with the obligations of Tanzania’s bilateral 
investment treaties.
 • There are a number of changes to income tax and other laws which appear to 
change the fiscal terms, for example: (i) the expiry of depreciation allowances 
for natural-resource prospecting, exploration, and development after ten 
years of production—which may imply that companies would not be able to 
recover the full cost of a phased expansion in a project; (ii) the exclusion of 
cost oil/gas from gross income, which changes the calculations of taxable 
income for petroleum operations and deductions for depreciable assets 
whose costs are recouped through cost oil/gas; and (iii) royalties are no 
longer deducted from taxable income, which broadens the tax base.
The cost of elevated risks of this sort comes in the time it will take to work 
through the mitigations that any international investor would look to make when 
assessing the case for committing significant investment capital to a complex pro-
ject in Tanzania. These considerations are not limited to extractives. The Dangote 
Group has invested US$650m in a cement plant in Tanzania. Aliko Dangote is 
9 Woodroffe et al. (2017) provide a thorough and considered guide to these laws, on which the 
observations of the next two paragraphs are based, which draws on the published versions as submit-
ted to Parliament.
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reported later in 2017 as saying that, ‘They’ve scared quite a lot of investors and 
scaring investors is not a good thing to do’ (Financial Times 2017). In this en vir-
on ment, perhaps there is little surprise that the negotiations on the HGA appear 
to have taken longer than hoped (see, for example, Lewis 2018).
In addition to the HGA, or as part of it, there will need to be agreement on the 
site lease for the LNG plant, and an LNG Marine Rights Agreement; a Project 
Development Agreement on co-operation for FEED and beyond will need to be 
established between TPDC, as the national oil and gas company, and the inter-
nation al investors; and ‘Upstream Implementation Arrangements’ by block will 
also be needed—which will include the operationalization of ‘Domestic Market 
Obligations’ (DMO) terms and conditions, for which the price of gas delivered for 
domestic use in Tanzania will be key to further shaping the commercial case for 
the international investors: the more gas is required for delivery domestically at a 
price below parity with international prices, the less favourable the commercial 
case for investment.
The cost of elevated risks and additional complexity comes in the additional 
time it takes to finalize the basis for moving forward with the project: recall that 
the HGA is a necessary step before embarking on the engineering work in the 
FEED necessary to find solutions to the engineering challenges that have not yet 
gone away, and that delay progressively reduces the value of the natural asset rela-
tive to GDP or to the population of Tanzania.
3.2 Policy co-ordination and the authorizing environment
Too often the transformation of resource wealth into prosperity fails not because 
of a lack of the correct policies, but because of a weak underlying system of 
 governance. Implementation of policies and strategies in the oil and gas sector 
will require co-ordination and an authorizing environment across a range of 
different government institutions.
The Ministry of Energy and Minerals (MEM) is the lead policy and adminis-
trative institution and plays a co-ordinating role with other institutions in the sector, 
many of which are its affiliates. Working alongside MEM, the nationally owned 
petroleum company TPDC is the national partner in all petroleum ventures. The 
potential conflict of interest given that TPDC still holds policy and regulatory 
roles in addition to its commercial role is being addressed through the restructur-
ing of the company to take on a purely commercial role, and the portioning off of 
its upstream regulator role to a new independent regulatory body, the PURA. The 
Energy and Water Utility Regulatory Authority (EWURA) role is confined to 
midstream and downstream regulation.
Looking towards taxation and revenue collection, the Ministry of Finance 
(MOF) is the lead policy institution, but MEM and TPDC also play an important 
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role in setting royalty and profit-sharing terms at the project level. The Attorney 
General is also involved in negotiation and devising contracts. In terms of rev-
enue collection, several institutions have roles to play in relation to different 
components. Among the institutions involved, the Tanzania Revenue Authority 
(TRA) collects income taxes from gas companies, while MEM collects the large 
share of non-tax revenues from petroleum activities via TPDC, including royal-
ties, licence fees, application fees, annual rent, and profits from oil and gas. The 
MOF collects revenues from equity holdings, and local authorities collect a local 
service levy from mining companies. Tax audits are carried out by the TRA. These 
institutions play similar roles in relation to all other economic agents in the 
economy.
Co-ordination on environmental and community issues is also complex. The 
Vice President’s Office (VPO) is the lead policy institution in this domain, and 
has to co-ordinate with MEM and the national agencies on policy issues. 
Compliance and enforcement of law is implemented by the National Environment 
Management Council (NEMC), in co-ordination with local authorities. 
Meanwhile the Ministry of Labour and Employment leads on the formulation 
of labour, labour market, social security, and employment policies, while the 
Ministry of Lands, Housing and Human Settlements Development has to approve 
land allocations for extractives use.
Two key challenges pervade when it comes to co-ordination on the full range 
of issues required to harness natural gas for development. First, the fact that many 
of these institutions lack the authority to convene high-level decision-makers 
from partner institutions on a regular basis means that they tend to operate in an 
environment of inadequate information. Second, without high-level oversight to 
direct activities, there has been no one to oversee organizational roles and respon-
sibilities, opening possibilities of ‘mission creep’ where institutions work beyond 
their mandate, sometimes leading to potential conflicts of interest, while lack of 
engagement or inaction has meant that other institutions are not doing the work 
that they should be.
4. Public policy and the contribution of natural 
resources to growth, structural change,  
and industrialization
Public policy will influence the impact of natural resources on economic develop-
ment in, broadly, four phases, aligned with the phases through which a natural 
resource project goes as it is developed and as it operates. Policy will condition: 
(i) construction jobs and skills training; (ii) the environment for private business 
investment—which can increase ahead of the development of the natural 
resource, and which includes ‘local content’ that seeks to support firms who can 
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be part of an international supply chain and other externalities, such as the effect 
on the standards of operations and management if managers can provide a transi-
tion of international business and management practices from multinational 
companies involved in the oil and gas investments and value chain into other 
business activities; (iii) appropriate fiscal policy management in the face of pos-
sibly large and volatile macroeconomic flows as the revenue arrives; and (iv) the 
efficiency and focus of public investment, including in infrastructure and other 
forms of public capital. In this section I focus on the first two, and only briefly 
touch on the last two.
4.1 Jobs and construction
The construction phase of an LNG investment entails building or assembling a 
sophisticated facility to condense natural gas to a liquid by cooling it to −161°C 
(−260°F), and the associated infrastructure so that the gas can be exported by 
ship. There is likely to be a material impact on the labour market for a range of 
semi-skilled and skilled workers, such as construction workers, bricklayers, metal 
workers, carpenters, plumbers, and electricians. It has been estimated that some 
4,000–5,000 jobs would be created directly during construction of LNG facilities 
in Tanzania. This compares with a number of jobs on other LNG construction 
projects ranging from around 2,000 in Australia to 8,000 in Angola (OPM 2013).
Training will be essential for secure project delivery, and it may well need a 
specific initiative: there are not the skilled people to meet this demand, even if the 
requirements number just a few thousand in a labour force numbering in the 
millions. An assessment of vocational and educational training needs concluded, 
among other findings, that: (i) those graduating from ‘vocational education and 
training’ are not directly employable; (ii) the trades which will be needed are not 
being taught; (iii) in any case, the training is low quality (VSO  2013,  2014). 
However, most of the areas in which training would be needed to fill the jobs cre-
ated as part of the investment in hydrocarbons were not sector-specific: the VSO 
assessment showed that a significant number of the skills needed are transferable. 
These include the skills needed in metal work, building works, civil engineering 
and infrastructure, mechanical work, and electrical work.
As argued in the framing chapter (chapter 2 this volume), more and better con-
struction skills are important for strengthening the contribution of a boom when 
‘Dutch disease’ leads to an appreciation of the real exchange rate. That ap pre ci-
ation raises the returns to non-tradables, including non-traded capital, which is 
mainly buildings. If the construction sector is weak, the supply of structures is 
inelastic and the real estate boom is more in prices than buildings. If, however, 
there are growing numbers of people with transferable construction skills, the 
supply of structures is more elastic and the boom is then more in the supply of 
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buildings, and relatively less a real estate price boom. Therefore a widespread 
 programme of vocational training to a standard good enough to permit trainees 
to work on the construction phase of a natural resource project means a stronger 
and more elastic supply of people with the skills which will be in demand as the 
boom kicks in.
4.2 Externalities and private investment
One of the ways to show that an apparently large investment in oil or gas produc-
tion is at the same time very small is to point out that when it is in operation, it 
creates very few jobs directly. Although it takes several thousand people to build 
an LNG plant, only a few hundred are needed to operate it. This then points to the 
scope for linkages with the domestic economy, in particular in a local supply 
chain, as a key source of impact on growth, structural change, and industrialization.
Perhaps the best summary of this opportunity was given by John Sutton at the 
launch of the ‘Enterprise Map of Tanzania’, his review of industrial capabilities: ‘If 
oil industry supply chains can be fully integrated with Tanzania’s domestic indus-
trial sector, then the payoff to medium-term growth will be huge . . . No single 
issue in Enterprise policy is more important right now’ (Sutton and Olomi 2012). 
The emphasis in Sutton’s analysis of the opportunity is on the development of 
firm capabilities—meaning, essentially, the organizational ability to get things 
done, including through absorbing and innovating by using new ideas or ways of 
doing things. Sutton gauges capabilities in terms of quality and productivity. As 
he put it in his Gilman Rutihinda Memorial Lecture: ‘Crude measures such as an 
“x per cent local content rule” are ineffective: rules of this kind are too easily cir-
cumvented, and may generate an unfortunate bias in the supplier base towards 
those activities that contribute little to the development of the host country’s 
industrial capabilities’ (Sutton 2014).
The economic structural change in Tanzania since 2000 has been driven by a shift 
of workers out of agriculture. Only agriculture and mining achieved within-sector 
labour productivity gains from 2000 to 2010: it was the between-sector shifts of 
workers out of agriculture which led to all gains in average productivity in the 
economy.10 At the same time, of all jobs created outside agriculture, 83 per cent were 
in the informal sector, mainly in micro-enterprises or self- employment. Tanzania’s 
enterprise survey data suggest that even in the formal sector, firm-level labour 
productivity fell in almost all non-agricultural industries. Overall, there are very 
few individual industries in which innovation and technology absorption seem to 
10 The analysis underpinning these conclusions is reported in a detailed background paper on 
Tanzania for the ‘Pathways Commission’ (Salam et al.  2018) looking at the opportunities and chal-
lenges of new technology for economic development.
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be working to raise productivity. In other words, there should be great scope to 
use the opportunities of a prospective international supply chain for gas to 
strengthen firm capabilities—and scope for improvements in prod uct iv ity that 
could come from foreign direct investment (FDI) into Tanzania associated 
with strengthening firm capabilities—of both nationally owned and foreign-
owned firms. In looking to be practical, Sutton argued for a small and effective 
local content unit rather than such rules. A local content department was estab-
lished in 2015 in the National Economic Empowerment Council (NEEC) in the 
Prime Minister’s Office, with responsibility for local content strategy. However, 
MEM has taken the lead in the development of the gas sector’s local content policy 
and legislation.
The policy framework for local content in Tanzania has emerged in the last few 
years.11 In November 2017, the local content regulations for the 2015 Petroleum 
Act, published by MEM, came into effect. They reflect the 2015 Energy Policy. The 
policy and legal framework prioritizes local participation in the gas value chain, 
rather than developing linkages. ‘Participation’ seems to mean ‘a progressive and 
comprehensive integration of Tanzanian citizens into all aspects of the petroleum 
industry to ensure maximization of benefits’ in the National Energy Policy.
The regulations set out minimum local content levels for both employment of 
nationals and the use of goods and services across the value chain, with signifi-
cant penalties for non-compliance. However, the policy is somewhat inconsistent: 
the definition of ‘local’ varies, but allows an 85 per cent foreign-controlled joint 
venture to quality as a ‘local’ company. The implicit definition of local goods or 
services includes those which are ‘locally available’, which could include goods 
imported into Tanzania by a foreign-owned company. However, at the same time, 
the Non-Citizens Act 2014 limits foreign participation in economic activities in 
Tanzania.
The policy approach in Tanzania therefore takes a literal sense of ‘local’ con-
tent, combined with uncertainty on what it means in practice. It is not a policy 
approach which is mindful of the development of firm capabilities for improved 
productivity in Tanzanian firms more broadly.
4.3 Fiscal policy management and public investment
The third and fourth channels for impact on growth and structural change are 
through the public finances. The offshore gas finds have yielded revenue through 
receipts from sales taxes and personal income taxes that have been bolstered by 
the activity surrounding exploration. But there has of course been no direct 
11 The policy and legal context is thoroughly analysed in Scurfield et al. (2017).
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rev enue, and none can reasonably be expected until the late 2020s. Accordingly 
I only touch on these two issues here—they have been widely discussed in a range 
of writings elsewhere—in light of the establishment of a fiscal framework for oil 
and gas in 2015.12
Parliament approved a fiscal framework for the management of oil and gas rev-
enue in 2015, which is integrated into the overall fiscal and budget framework, 
reinforcing rather than fragmenting it. It codifies a fiscal rule with a threshold at 
3 per cent of GDP. If revenues are below that threshold—as expected in the pro-
jections discussed above—then they can go to finance a non-gas budget deficit. 
Above 3 per cent of GDP, they are saved. The stock of savings can be drawn down 
at a limit of 3 per cent of GDP. At the same time, there is a ceiling on recurrent 
expenditure—which is that it is limited to increase by nominal GDP—and a 
 ceiling of total expenditure of 40 per cent of GDP. A summary and brief analysis 
by Baunsgaard (2016) highlights some threshold effects around 3 per cent of GDP, 
and contrasts the application of these rules with those that would follow 
 constructs such as the permanent income hypothesis (PIH).
However, neither this fiscal rule nor PIH use a broader economic con sid er-
ation, which is that in transforming gas from a sub-soil asset into a flow of 
expenditure it should, in principle, be treated as a capital financing item: as an 
asset transformation this is a rearrangement of the public-sector balance sheet. 
The further transformation from the dollar receipts as the government share of 
the rent, through public investment into public infrastructure or other public 
assets, should in principle be evaluated against the relative costs and benefits of 
the alternative investments. The accumulation of human capital through better 
health status, or through improvements in literacy, numeracy, and the other 
learning outcomes which contribute to a productive labour force, are to be 
included in such an evaluation of the costs and benefits of alternatives.
In reality, however, there are considerable limitations on the public sector’s 
ability to manage such flows of investment efficiently. And in practice, there will 
be some investments (such as roads) that are relatively more straightforward to 
administer than others (such as materially improved learning outcomes) even as 
Tanzania falls woefully short on both.
5. Conclusion
This review of the prospects for a boom from natural resources in Tanzania points 
to the conclusion that there probably won’t be one.
12 See, for example, work by the Collaborative Africa Budget Reform Initiative on revenue manage-
ment in the extractive sector (CABRI 2016).
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First, the costs of extracting large quantities of gas from deep under the sea far 
offshore are high compared with immediate market price prospects; second, the 
array of risks facing the billions of dollars of investment needed to produce 
 offshore gas are high. Those risks are partly technical—there are engineering 
problems to solve—and partly related to the markets for LNG, and there are also 
significant policy risks.
The government has reinforced the policy risks: the trio of laws passed in 
2017—the Amendments Act, the Sovereignty Act, and the Contract Review Act—
has postponed the prospects of the preparation for an FID, as evidenced by 
on going negotiations on the HGA for the LNG plant. Had there been an FID in 
2016, as was once thought possible, and production starting in 2021, the average 
rev enue during the project would have been 1.7 per cent of GDP. If the FID does 
not take place until after 2022, as currently expected, and there are further delays 
as technical, market, and policy risks are navigated, and production starts ten 
years later in 2031, then the average lifetime revenue will nearly halve. Some of 
that forgone revenue is a result of market risks materializing; much is simply the 
cost of delay. The progress of broadly similar investments in Mozambique pro-
vides a hint of what might have been for Tanzania. In addition, the prospect of 
large-scale offshore gas supporting economic transformation is dimmed by the 
approach to local content being focused on ‘participation’ rather than meeting the 
broader challenge of raising productivity through strengthened firm capabilities. 
This approach looks unlikely to support growth, structural change, or 
industrialization.
After early hopes of a boost to growth and industrialization that pulled in 
advice from many sources on how to manage revenues, and the exploration of the 
lessons to be learned from other countries which took place back when gas prices 
were still high in Asia, it is disappointing that the prospects of production and the 
potential contribution to growth have faded.
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The Construction Sector in Tanzania
Geraldine J. Kikwasi and Cecilia Escalante
1. Introduction
From simple tools and temporary shelters to the need for more permanent 
structures that would complete the transition from a nomadic lifestyle to settle-
ments, we can say that construction is as old as humans. Industrialization made 
materials available on a great scale and improved the manufacturing techniques 
that made it possible to cope with urbanization. By transforming the environ-
ment through, for example, housing, roads, bridges, water, health, and power 
infrastructure, the construction sector is a key enabler for social and economic 
development worldwide.
In the last decade, Tanzania has experienced relatively high economic 
growth, averaging 6–7 per cent a year (World Bank 2018b). The construction 
sector has played a key role in this growth. Figure 12.1 shows the gross domes-
tic product (GDP) in percentage growth rates and the annual growth of the 
industry and construction sector. Despite the deceleration of the economy in 
2013, the industry has since seen growth rates above of those of the general 
economy.
While the industry and construction sector has generally performed well over 
the years, within this sector it is the mining and quarrying and the construction 
activities that are leading the growth. Figure 12.2 presents the annual growth rates 
of these two activities as well as the manufacturing sector. As can be seen, while 
the three activities have experienced positive growth rates, the mining and 
quarrying and construction activities feature greater levels of growth. In fact, 
since around 2010, Tanzania has witnessed further natural gas exploration, which 
may explain the steeper line of growth rates for mining and quarrying activities 
in recent years.
Tanzania is on the path from being a low-income to a middle-income country 
(MIC). Investment in fixed assets has grown strongly and has boosted economic 
growth. Between 2005–16, the country experienced gross fixed capital formation 
(GFCF) rates in the range of 25–34 per cent of GDP. While all the activities that 
form the GFCF have experienced a sustained increase in value, construction is 
the sector that contributes the largest share (see Figure 12.3).
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Figure 12.1 Gross domestic product by kind of economic activity: percentage growth 
rates, 2007–17
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Figure 12.2 Within industry and construction: percentage growth rates, 2007–17
Note: Constant 2007 prices.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from NBS (2018).
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NBS (2018) attributes the country’s growth in the construction sector to an 
increase in construction activities, mainly the construction of commercial and 
residential buildings and ongoing infrastructure projects. These include the 
Standard Gauge Railway (SGR), expansion of Mwanza airport, construction of 
bridges at TAZARA and the Ubungo intersection in Dar es Salaam, construction 
of the Manyoni to Tabora road, the Songosongo natural gas project, which 
involved the construction of a 512-kilometre pipeline from Mtwara to Dar es 
Salaam, the Madimba Processing Centre, and the infrastructure for Phase 1 of the 
Dar es Salaam Rapid Transit Bus.
Despite promising growth, a number of constraints have hindered the 
 performance of the sector. NBS (2013) and Clyde & Co (2013), among others, 
identify the following challenges:
 • inadequate capacity of local contractors and consultants
• inadequate and erratic work opportunities
• inefficient procurement systems
• occasional financial mismanagement in public/private sectors
• poor working environments
• low-technological equipment















Electricity and water supply
Construction
Wholesale and retail trade and hotels and restaurants
Transport, storage, and communication
Financial intermediation, real estate, and B.S
Public administration, education, health, and O.S
Figure 12.3 Gross fixed capital formation by kind of economic activity at current 
prices, 2005–17
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from NBS (2018).
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• inadequate capital
• unfavourable donor conditions
 • application of inappropriate delivery practices.
Leeds (2016) sets out the four main challenges facing the construction sector. 
These are: poor productivity and productivity which is a result of easy entry and 
stiff competition; poor project performance; a skilled labour shortage; and sus-
tainability concerns. These, along with the concerns that have traditionally 
impacted the sector on the continent, such as constantly rising project costs, cor-
ruption issues, lack of skilled labour, on-site safety, and capital supply constraints 
(Bonface 2015), hinder the successful development of the sector.
We will explain the structure of the construction sector and analyse its 
main  actors and the key drivers of development. The information presented 
was collected through interviews with relevant stakeholders, desk review, and 
publicly available information mainly from the Tanzania National Bureau of 
Statistics (NBS).
2. Structure of the construction sector
The Tanzanian construction sector is made up of the Ministry of Works, 
Transport, and Communication and its agencies, consultative body, regulatory 
boards and clients, suppliers of construction materials and equipment, consulting 
firms, construction enterprises, private firms, and professional associations.
2.1 Ministry of Works, Transport and Communication (MoWTC)
The ministry is responsible for policy formulation, planning, overseeing, and overall 
coordination of the transport and communications infrastructure. The institutions 
under the MoWTC that deal directly with the construction sector include:
 a) Agencies:
 i) The Tanzania Building Agency (TBA), responsible for the maintenance 
and development of government buildings.
ii) The Tanzania National Roads Agency (TANROADS) and the Tanzania 
Rural and Urban Roads Agency (TARURA). These agencies are respon-
sible for the maintenance and development of the road network. 
TANROADS manages the trunk and regional network. Since July 2017, 
TARURA is dealing with the district urban and rural road network pre-
viously managed by the local government authorities (LGAs).
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iii) The Tanzania Electrical, Mechanical, and Service Agency (TEMESA). 
TEMESA is responsible for providing efficient and effective electrical, 
mechanical, and electronic services, reliable and safe ferry transport 
services, and the hiring of equipment to government institutions and 
the public at large.
 b) Boards and Councils:
 i) The Roads Fund Board (RFB), established by The Road Tolls (Amendment 
No.2) Act 19981 (RFB 2018) started operations in 2000 with the man-
date of advising the roads minister on new sources for road and fuel 
tolls, the adjustment of the rates of existing roads and fuel tolls, and on 
regulations for the collection of road and fuel tolls for the purpose of 
ensuring an adequate and stable flow of funds to road operations. The 
RFB is also the main source of funding for the maintenance of the road 
network in Tanzania.
 ii) The National Construction Council (NCC) is a consultative body 
responsible for promoting and providing strategic leadership for growth, 
development, and expansion of the construction sector, with an emphasis 
on the development of local capacity.
iii) There are three bodies that are separately responsible for regulating the 
activities of the actors in the construction sector. The Contractors’ 
Registration Board (CRB) registers, regulates, and develops the capacity 
of contractors, while the Engineers’ Registration Board (ERB) and the 
Architects’ and Quantity Surveyors’ Registration Board (AQRB), in 
addition to their administrative activities, also oversee the conduct of 
their members and the consulting firms in the sector.
 c) The Public Procurement Regulatory Authority (PPRA) ensures that the 
procuring entities and LGAs adhere to the provisions of the Public 
Procurement Act 2011 and its 2013 Regulations 2013.
There are also a number of associations that represent consultants and contrac-
tors. These include: the Tanzania Institute of Quantity Surveyors (TIQS), Architects’ 
Association of Tanzania (AAT), Institute of Engineers Tanzania (IET), Association 
of Civil Engineering Consultants of Tanzania (ACET), the Tanzania Civil 
Engineering Contractors’ Association (TACECA), the Contractors’ Association 
of Tanzania (CATA), and the Association of Citizen Contractors of Tanzania 
(ACCT). These associations collectively protect the interests of their members 
and promote their activities.
1 The Act was revised in 2006 and is now referred as the Road and Fuel Tolls Act, CAP 220 
(Revised 2006).
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2.1.1 Architects and Quantity Surveyors Registration Board (AQRB)
The AQRB, established by the Architects and Quantity Surveyors (Registration) 
Act No.16 of 1997,2 is responsible for registering and regulating the activities of 
architects, quantity surveyors, allied disciplines, and consulting firms. As at 
December 2017, the AQRB had 466 architects and allied disciplines on its register. 
Almost 90 per cent of those registered were local architects, 6.8 per cent were 
foreign architects, and the rest were landscape architects, interior designers, and 
architectural technologists. Similarly, during 2017, the Board registered a total of 
439 quantity surveyors and allied disciplines: 402 local and two foreign quantity 
surveyors, fifteen building surveyors, and twenty construction managers. The 
AQRB currently has 236 architectural firms, 124 quantity surveying firms, one 
building surveying firm, and one interior design firm on its register.
While both disciplines have increased their numbers since 2000, quantity sur-
veying has done so at a faster rate. In 2000, the number of registered quantity 
surveyors was half the number of registered architects. These figures have been 
similar in recent years but do not take account of the graduate register, which 
has 198 graduate architects and 247 graduate of quantity surveyors and allied 
disciplines (Figure 12.4).
2.1.2 Engineers Registration Board (ERB)
The ERB is a statutory body established under the Engineers Registration Act 
No.15 of 1997 as amended in 2007.3 The Board is responsible for the registration 
and regulation of engineering activities and the conduct of engineers and 
2 Repealed and replaced by Act No. 4 of 2010.
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Figure 12.4 Trend of registration of architects, quantity surveyors, and allied 
disciplines, 2000–17
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data collected at the offices of the AQRB (2018).
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 engineering consulting firms. At the end of December 2017, the Board had on its 
register 20,135 engineers in the categories of graduate engineers, graduate 
incorporated engineers, incorporated engineers, professional engineers, temporary 
professional engineers, and consulting engineers. The majority of registered 
engineers were graduates, who represented over 63 per cent of all registered 
engineers. There has been a rising trend of registration of engineers for the past 
ten years (Figure 12.5).
During the same period, the ERB had on its register 314 engineering consulting 
firms, the majority of which (71 per cent) were local and 29 per cent were foreign. 
Statistics from the ERB reveal that between 2013 and 2015, foreign consulting 
firms executed 165 projects against 3,217 projects undertaken by local firms. 
While local firms had more projects, the figures also reveal that foreign firms got 
high-value projects. Foreign contractors were awarded less than 5 per cent of the 
total number of projects in those three years at a total value of TZS8,285.5 billion 
(US$3.6 million), while local contractors’ projects had a value of TZS5,781.05 billion 
(US$2.5 million).
2.1.3 The Contractors Registration Board (CRB)
The CRB was established under CRB Act No.16 of 1997 as amended in 2008.4 
Similar to the above-mentioned boards, it is responsible for the registration, 
regulation, and development of contractors. The Board registers five types of 
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Figure 12.5 Trend of engineers’ registration, 2000–17
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data collected at the offices of the ERB (2018).
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contractors: building, civil works, mechanical, electrical, and specialist contractors. 
These contractors are further categorized into local and foreign contractors, a 
classification that depends only on the nationalities of the shareholders of the 
company. Collectively, these are classified into seven classes (with I being the 
highest class), which cater for building, civil works, and electrical and mechanical 
contractors. Specialist contractors are restricted to classes I–III. Foreign contrac-
tors are restricted to classes I and II for all types of works except specialist works 
where foreign contractors can be in classes I–III. Over the past nine years, the 
number of registered contractors has increased from 5,125 to 8,669 (Figure 12.6), an 
increase of 69 per cent.
In Table 12.1 we observe the distribution of registered contractors by category 
and class. The general distribution of contractors by size reveals that the great 
majority of registered contractors are concentrated in classes IV–VII (small con-
tractors), accounting for 84 per cent of the total, with Class VII alone accounting 
for 34 per cent of the total. The rest are divided between class I (large contractors), 
accounting for 5.3 per cent, and Classes II–III (medium contractors), accounting 
for 10.6 per cent. This supports the work of the Tanzania NBS (NBS 2013), which 
shows that the Tanzanian construction sector takes the form of a pyramid struc-
ture. In this structure most of the weight is closer to the ground, with a few large 
firms at the top and many small and medium firms at the bottom. Building and 
civil contractors represent about four-fifths of the total number of contractors, 
accounting for 42 and 37.9 per cent, respectively.
The class in which a contractor is registered is important for determining the 
maximum value of any single contract that this firm can access. Foreign contrac-
tors account for only 2.4 per cent of the total number of contractors but represent 
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Figure 12.6 Trend of registration of contractors, 2008–16
























Table 12.1 Distribution of contractors by categories and class as of December 2016
Type Class I Class II Class III Class IV Class V Class VII Class VII Total
Foreign Local Total
Building 52 70 122 53 57 251 756 760 1,643 3,642
Civil 33 34 67 18 56 230 636 1,175 1,106 3,288
Electrical 24 23 47 9 11 59 77 108 333 644
Mechanical 12 7 19 1 4 14 36 45 57 176
Specialist
Building 6 9 15 8 9     32
Civil 25 12 37 38 185     260
Electrical 26 41 67 95 156     318
Mechanical 34 52 86 66 157     309
Total 212 248 460 288 635 554 1,505 2,088 3,139 8,669
Source: Authors’ calculations based on CRB (2017).
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concentrated in class VII, which accounts for 36.2 per cent of the total number 
registered. Table 12.2 presents the values of work allowed for each class of contractor. 
Class I contractors are allowed to undertake works of unlimited value, while the 
rest are restricted to certain thresholds per contract. The involvement of local 
contractors in work opportunities has been low as they execute many projects of 
low value, leaving the large share to foreign contractors. Similar to the case with 
the foreign consulting firms, statistics from the CRB reveal that, in terms of the 
number of projects and value, between 2011 and 2017 foreign contractors exe-
cuted 1,019 projects with a value of TZS17,085.29 billion (US$7.43 million) and 
local contractors executed 17,344 projects with a value of TZS8,239.03 billion 
(US$3.58 million). Assuming these figures represent the total of all projects, it 
Table 12.2 Class limit for any single contract (in million TZS)
Type Class Class limit  
(mil. TZS)
Type Class Class limit 
(mil. TZS)
Civil One Unlimited Specialist building One Unlimited
 Two 8,000  Two 800
 Three 4,000  Three 300
 Four 2,000    
 Five 1,100 Specialist civil One Unlimited
 Six 500  Two 800
 Seven 200  Three 300
Building One Unlimited    
 Two 5,000    
 Three 3,000 Specialist mechanical One Unlimited
 Four 1,800  Two 800
 Five 900  Three 300
 Six 400    
 Seven 200    
Mechanical One Unlimited Specialist electrical One Unlimited
 Two 3,000  Two 800
 Three 1,500  Three 300
 Four 900    
 Five 450    
 Six 250    
 Seven 150    
Electrical One Unlimited    
 Two 3,000    
 Three 1,500    
 Four 900    
 Five 450    
 Six 250    
 Seven 150    
Source: Reproduced from the Contractors Registration (Amendments) By-Laws, 2017 (United 
Republic of Tanzania 2017).
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seems that foreign contractors carry out about 5.5 per cent of the contracts but 
get 67 per cent of the available funds.
To reverse this trend, the Public Procurement Act 2011, its 2013 Regulations, 
and 2016 amendments made provisions for preferring, and exclusively preferring 
local individual contractors or firms registered as local contractors. Sections 54 
and 55 of the Public Procurement Act provide for national preferences and 
exclusive preference for local persons or firms.5 A procuring entity can therefore 
grant a margin of preference of up to 10 per cent to local firms or associations 
between local and foreign firms where the contracts for works, consultancy, or 
non-consultancy services are to be awarded on the basis of international tender-
ing or selection, or national competitive tendering or selection in which foreign 
firms participate. Similarly, an exclusive preference scheme for local persons or 
firms applies to procurement not exceeding a value of TZS 10,000 million 
(US$4,348) for works, and TZS 2,000 million (US$870) for goods, consultancy, or 
non-consultancy services where financial resources are exclusively provided by a 
Tanzanian public body.
The number of contractors in Tanzania has been increasing in recent years 
(Figure 12.3). This has led to stiff competition and many other challenges as firms 
compete for fewer available resources. These challenges have been extensively 
studied (Materu 2001; Baitani and Mullungu 2007; Khoza 2007; Musingi 2007) 
and include a lack of finance and financial support, shortage of construction 
equipment, shortage of skilled labour, inadequate management skills, unfavourable 
regulatory environment, and high cost of doing business. Moreover, Muhegi and 
Malongo (2004) add that stiff competition, high equipment hire rates, and a lack 
of qualified staff are problems that the contractors have been facing for quite 
some time in Tanzania. According to the recent study by Mwombeki (2017), firms 
mention that delayed payment; lack of capital to finance the project; lack of busi-
ness and financial management skills; inadequate equipment and plant in the 
construction sector; and corruption during procurement and project execution 
are the main challenges contractors currently face. Interviews with contractors, 
clients, and consultants confirm the challenges found by the previous studies. 
Table 12.3 summarizes the most-cited challenges.
2.2 Clients
Clients in the construction sector always come and go, particularly those from 
the private sector. Clients in the public sector are agencies, ministries, LGAs, and 
5 Regulations 30 to 43 of the Public Procurement Regulations prescribe how to realize these two 
and other preference schemes.
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parastatal organizations such as the ministries of education, health, water, works, 
transport and communication, also municipal and district councils.
Every client who intends to erect a structure for use by the public must ensure 
there are adequate resources to accomplish the project in terms of finance and 
technical personnel. However, that has not always been the case particularly with 
LGA clients. Kikwasi (2011a) identifies the main challenges with LGA contract 
works as being a lack of sufficient funds to complete the project and inadequate 
capacity to manage the contracts. As well as identifying these challenges, Musingi 
(2007) finds additional challenges, namely inefficient utilization of resources due 
to an inadequate number of contractors in their locality and low-quality works. 
Similarly, NBS (2013) states that the inadequate capacity in the public sector is 
due to a lack of appropriate technical and managerial skills, understaffing, 
inadequate working facilities, poor remuneration, and bureaucracy. In a more 
recent study, Malongo (2015) finds that the contractors’ problems perceived by 
clients are contractors not using qualified staff, poor knowledge of tendering 
procedures, lack of financial and project management skills, and lack of equipment. 
These challenges and many others contribute to the poor performance of projects 
and the sector at large.
3. Behaviour of construction prices
According to the Centre for Affordable Housing Finance in Africa (CAHF 2017), 
building a generic 55m2 house in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania is cheaper than in 




Most local contractors cannot adequately manage projects, but, 
foreign firms engage them as subcontractors and their 
performance is acceptable.
2 High equipment 
hire rates
Many companies hire equipment and/or plant but rates are very 
high for local contractors to afford.
3 Stiff competition There are more than 8,000 registered contractors in Tanzania 
who struggle for few work opportunities.
4 Low financial base Local contractors cannot afford to tender for projects that require 
high levels of bid security and annual turnover because of their 
financial base.
5 Lack of capital Local contractors lack the capital to acquire the necessary 
equipment and facilities for the project.
6 Late payment Some clients do not honour interim payment certificate as per 
contract.
Source: Authors’ compilation from interviews with contractors, clients, and consultants carried out 
in 2018.
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14  main African cities. At US$26,750 dollars, the cost of such a house in the 
urbanized Dar es Salaam is about half of what a person in Kampala, Uganda has 
to pay and 2.36 times cheaper than building the same house in Nairobi, Kenya. 
However, it is estimated that the country has a deficit of 3 million housing units 
and that demand increases by about 200,000 units annually (CAHF  2017). 
According to CAHF (2015, 2016, 2017), the cost of building the cheapest house in 
Tanzania fell from US$20,992 in 2015 to US$17,874 in 2017. Some of this reduc-
tion in cost can be attributed to the increased supply and lower price of cement 
associated with recent investments in cement factories, in particular, the Tanga 
Cement Company Ltd and Dangote Cement Plc. According to data from the 
National Construction Council (NCC 2016) price index for cement has been rela-
tively stable since 2005. However, the index price for labour has increased steadily 
since 2005. In fact, the labour price index increased from 6,879.40 in January 
2010 to 22,358.06 units in January 2016.
Studying the NCC (2016) data, we observe that other important materials for 
the construction sector, such as iron sheets and steel pipes, have seen relative 
stability in the past decade. However, important components, such as fuel and 
diesel, have fluctuated or, as in the case of hardwood in 2013 and later in 2016, 
have experienced big jumps.
3.1 Investment shocks in the construction sector
The majority of construction contracts have been affected by the fall of the 
Tanzania shilling against the US dollar. Implementation of some of these con-
tracts depends on the importation of materials and equipment, which drain the 
stock of the foreign currency in the country. As the exchange rate escalates, this 
increases government and private investors’ expenditure on projects. The instabil-
ity of the local currency has led to most large projects being awarded wholly or 
partly in foreign currency. Contracts with durations of two years and more attract 
the use of a price adjustment formula which uses indices to compensate contrac-
tors for changes in the price of labour, materials, and equipment. If there is a dras-
tic increase in the indices, the cost of construction increases, leading to suspension 
or delay of the project. The current practice has been to state a limit of variation 
of price in the contract. Investors in public–private projects are likely to withdraw 
or bargain for a longer term of investments upon increases in construction costs.
Currently, the Tanzanian government is implementing large infrastructure 
projects such as the Standard Gauge Railway (SGR), construction of bridges at 
TAZARA and the Ubungo intersection in Dar es Salaam, and the deepening 
of ports at Dar es Salaam and Mtwara regions. These projects expend a large part of 
the country’s foreign currency reserves and thus put the local currency at risk of 
depreciating. Similarly, most of these projects have clauses that allow the use of a 
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price adjustment formula, which uses both local and foreign indices to compensate 
contractors in the event of price changes.
4. Key bottlenecks to supply response
In section 2, we mentioned some of the challenges that contractors and consultants 
face in the sector. In this section, we will address in depth the most important 
constraints to sector supply response: access to land, construction permits, skills, 
and availability of materials and equipment.
4.1 Land issues in Tanzania
Tanzania has embarked on an industrial economy course that puts pressure on 
land governance. The Land Act 1999 provides for three categories of land: general, 
village, and reserved:
 • General land: public land that is not reserved land or village land and includes 
unoccupied or unused village land.
 • Village land: as defined in the Village Land Act, 1999, is an area declared to 
be village land under and in accordance with Section 7 of the Act and 
includes any transfer or land transferred to a village.
 • Reserved land: land reserved, designated, or set aside under the provisions of 
listed laws (Land Act 1999: Section.6); these include: environmental protec-
tion areas, such as national parks, forest reserves, and wildlife reserves, 
including marine parks, and areas intended and set aside for spatial planning 
and future infrastructure.
General land is the category that is expected to be utilized by the construction 
sector for development. Land acquisition and registration is still a major problem 
in Tanzania. Kironde (2009) assessed land governance in the country and con-
cluded that there were major challenges in registering land and improving land 
information systems, urban land management, and the management of public 
land, expropriation, and dispute resolution. Similarly, Mugabi (2013) highlights 
the challenges in land ownership in rural areas, which include: conflicts over land 
especially between farmers and livestock keepers; persistent land disputes resulting 
from the rapid expansion of towns encroaching on surrounding farming areas; 
tenure conflicts between customary and granted land rights; alienation of the people 
through accumulation of land by big national and multinational companies, leaving 
small-scale producers landless; absence of adequate and coordinated land informa-
tion; and land insecurity among small landholder farmers, especially women.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 11/01/20, SPi
270 The Construction Sector in Tanzania
An interview with an official from the Ministry of Lands, Housing and Human 
Settlement Developments reveals the following challenges associated with 
planning:
 • lack of master plans for LGAs. Out of 133 LGAs, only ten have prepared 
master plans and eighteen have plans in progress
 • inadequate staff in the land sector—only 35 per cent of LGAs are staffed in 
this area
 • informal settlement accounting for 60 per cent of housing
 • regularization
 • slow registering of villages—only 10 per cent of the 12,500 villages are 
registered.
Tanzania’s performance on issues related to land is not promising. A recent 
study by the World Bank (2018a) ranked Tanzania 142 out of 190 in the regis-
tering property category, which examines the steps, time, and cost involved in 
registering property, based on a standardized case of an entrepreneur who 
wants to purchase land and a building that is already registered and free of 
title dispute.
4.2 Issuance of construction permits in Tanzania
The World Bank’s (2018a) Doing Business (DB) collects information on the pro-
cedures an entrepreneur needs to follow and the time and cost to complete those, 
in order to operate a business. The DB report considers ‘dealing with construction 
permits’ as one of the criteria for doing business. Obtaining a construction permit 
involves a number of steps including land location, land rent clearance, applying 
and obtaining building permits, and construction inspections and certification. 
The DB Tanzania report (World Bank 2018a) details twenty-four procedures for 
getting construction permits, including obtaining location plans, registration 
with regulatory boards, and inspection by LGA officers. According to the World 
Bank, Tanzania has fallen in its ranking for processing and issuing construction 
permits––from 126 in 2015 and 136 in 2016 to a low of 156 in 2017, out of 190 
countries. The Tanzania Private Sector Foundation (TPSF  2014) states that in 
Mwanza, the municipality issuing a construction permit takes up to 131 days to do 
so. Ninety of these days are spent at the approval meeting, which requires coun-
cillors and officials to approve each application to provide a building permit. This 
is similar to the figures reported by the World Bank (2018a), which showed that it 
took 184 days to obtain a permit, out of which ninety days were taken up with 
approvals by councillors. The TPSF (2014) has identified the following challenges 
in issuing construction permits in Tanzania:
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 • the wide distances (physical separation) between the key departments and 
offices responsible for scrutinizing and processing building/construction 
permits
 • inadequate collaboration between the Tanzania Investment Centre (TIC) 
and LGAs
 • a one-size-fits-all approach to processing and issuing construction permits. 
The processing and requirements of construction permits are the same 
regardless of the type or size of project
 • lack of awareness among applicants about procedures and requirements, 
including methods for charging fees for scrutinizing and issuing construc-
tion permits
 • unclear rules of the environmental management officers in scrutinizing and 
processing construction permits
 • a lack of by-laws to support and/or facilitate processing/issuing construction 
permits for specific projects.
Aiming to alleviate these challenges, the TPSF (2014) has recommended the 
following short-term and long-term measures to improve processing of construc-
tion permits:
 • The processing and issuing of construction permits should be left to the 
technical staff of LGAs.
 • Councils need to engage private-sector professional firms to do the inspec-
tion instead of waiting for council officers to visit sites at every stage of 
construction.
 • Differentiate size of investment projects in processing and issuing permits.
 • Each council should prepare a simple one-page leaflet freely available to the 
public, outlining key steps, issues scrutinized/checked, average costs, and 
number of days or time required to accomplish a procedure.
 • Create a one-stop centre in each LGA for the processing and issuing of 
construction permits.
 • LGAs to be supported in using ICT in the processing and issuing of 
 construction permits.
 • Review legislation, regulations, and preparation of by-laws to enhance 
processing and issuing of permits.
An interview with an official from the permit-issuing section of one of five 
municipalities in Dar es Salaam revealed that the process for obtaining a permit 
has recently been shortened. He added that the Government of Tanzania has 
directed municipalities to ensure that the planning and construction committees 
make decisions on issuing permits within one month. This has reduced the duration 
of processing permits from ninety to thirty days. The official also disclosed 
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that most of the challenges related to issuing construction permits have since 
been addressed, but challenges remain on the users’ side as some applicants are 
not aware of urban regulations, and some clients construct structures that are 
different to approved designs/plans, which brings problems in later stages of 
the process.
4.3 Skilled labour
WEF (2017) has identified the technical and management skills of the labour force 
as one of the challenges for Tanzania to address if it is to reach middle-income 
country (MIC) status by 2025. Despite the government’s efforts in expanding 
access to education, by 2014 only 15.79 per cent of the population aged fifteen or 
more had some level of secondary education and 1.3 per cent had university 
education (NBS 2014). In fact, 72 per cent of the population of Tanzania had only 
seven years of education in 2014. Tanzania ranks 106 out of 130 countries in the 
Global Human Capital Index, which measures how well countries are developing 
their human capital according to four categories: capacity, deployment, develop-
ment, and know-how (WEF 2017). Breaking down the index, Tanzania ranks 
second-to-last (129th) when measuring the share of people employed in occupations 
that require tertiary education out of the total employed (CLFG 2017).
The Five-Year Development Plan II (FYDP II) (2016/17–2020/21) (URT 2016) 
recognizes the challenges of skills in Tanzania. One of the key actions of the plan 
is to target higher levels of foreign direct investment (FDI) and other private-sector 
financial flows to improve skill levels in the labour force through better internship 
programmes. The skill challenges the country faces also affect the construction 
sector. A recent report by Lema (2017) finds a shortage of skills in the construc-
tion sector. Lema further explains that the internationally recommended ratio is 
1:5:25 for engineers, technicians, and artisans respectively. However, the current 
ratio in Tanzania is 1:0.2:2.6, reflecting the country’s 10,000 construction profes-
sionals, 2,000 technicians, and 26,000 artisans, which is far from the expected 
figures of 10,000, 50,000, and 250,000 respectively. The shortage of architects 
and quantity surveyors was also noted by Mcha (2010), who established that only 
10 per cent of LGAs had architects and quantity surveyor professionals as part of 
their staff. Kikwasi (2011b) evaluated construction skills at management level and 
found that telecommunication, materials, and water resource engineers were 
available only by special arrangement.
Interviews with contractors, clients, and consultants reveal skill shortages in 
various areas (Table 12.4). The most cited are: inadequate exposure of graduates to 
professional skills; lack of technicians; and lack of formal training for artisans. 
The two regulatory boards, ERB and AQRB, have internship programmes 
for  graduates in engineering, architecture, and quantity surveying and allied 
disciplines. The ERB supervises the Structured Engineers’ Apprenticeship 
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Programme (SEAP) which is funded by the Government of Tanzania for three 
years, and the AQRB supervises the Enhanced Articled Pupillage Programme 
(EAPP) for two years, which is jointly funded by the Government of Tanzania 
and the AQRB. Due to limited financial resources, the two programmes only 
admit a small share of graduates.
The manpower in the construction sector is far below that expected. An extract 
from regulatory bodies (Table 12.5) indicates that the number of registered pro-
fessionals and technicians is still low compared to potential employers. For 
instance, there are only 6,657 engineers and 439 quantity surveyors who are 
expected to serve all potential employers. On the other hand, there are only 727 
technicians available for consulting firms and contractors. This supports the 
findings of Lema (2017) that there is a significant gap in the skill demand–supply 
in Tanzania. Interviews with regulatory officials reveal the following efforts to 
address the challenge of an inadequate number of technicians in the sector:
 • Tanzania’s government has extended study loans to students in technical 
colleges instead of to university students only.
Table 12.4 Construction skills shortages
S/N Skills challenges Remarks
1 Inadequate exposure There are many graduates with certificates but who have no 
skills and lack exposure to perform duties related to their 
professions.
2 Technicians There is a lack of technicians in engineering and architecture 
as most of the technical colleges that used to train technicians 
have been upgraded to universities.
3 Materials engineers It is difficult to get engineers who specialize in materials 
engineering or have the necessary skills in construction 
materials.
4 Railway lines, mining, 
oil and gas, airport 
and dam construction
Tanzania is spending most of its development funds in the 
construction of standard gauge railway line, oil and gas and 
mining, which demand specialist skills. There are no skills at 
all at middle management level and no technicians, 
particularly in the mining and oil and gas sectors.
5 Project managers There are very few professionals with the necessary skills and 
experience to take up the role of project manager.
6 Engineers Some contractors fail to register companies because they 
cannot find engineers to employ.
7 Foreign experts Some contractors are allowed to engage foreign experts 
because there are no such skills in Tanzania.
8 Artisans Most artisans lack formal training, as well as knowledge in 
construction theories and drawings.
Source: Authors’ compilation from interviews with contractors, clients, and consultants carried out 
in 2018.
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 • The government has been advised to revive old technical schools to impart 
technical skills to students in secondary school.
 • The government has been advised to encourage the Vocational Education 
Training Authority (VETA) to take on the role of training technicians.
 • The government is to restrict upgrading of technical colleges to universities.
4.4 Construction materials and equipment
The manufacturing and supply of local construction materials, such as cement, 
reinforcement steel, paints, ready-mixed concrete, and roofing materials, have been 
on the rise in Tanzania. The country has five big cement factories: Twiga Cement 
Factory, Tanga Cement Company Ltd, Tanzania Portland Cement Company Ltd, 
Mbeya Cement Company Ltd, and Dangote Cement Plc. The fairly recent increase 
in the number of big cement players in the local market seems to be responsible 
for the country’s stable cement prices. In 2017, a 50kg bag of cement was sold at 
US$4.5 in Tanzania, which is almost half the price in neighbouring Kenya and 
Uganda where it is US$8 and US$8.5, respectively (CAHF 2017).
While there are big companies supplying other construction materials locally, 
the country is a net importer of construction materials and machinery (Deloitte 
2016), mainly from China, which accounts for more than a third of the total 
imports (34 per cent), followed by India and South Africa with 14 and 5 per cent, 
respectively. The challenge of locally available and imported building materials in 
Tanzania is that of quality. Most of the construction materials on the market, both 
manufactured and imported, are expected to be of substandard quality.
Companies that hire equipment and/or plant machinery in Tanzania include: 
EFFCO Solutions (T) Limited, Kays Logistics Company Ltd, Torya Machinery 
Ltd, Armani Investment Limited, and CMTL Logistics. In addition, Mantrac 
Tanzania Ltd is the sole authorized dealer of CAT construction equipment in 
Table 12.5 Comparison of registered professionals, technicians, and 
potential employers
S/N Potential employees Potential employers
 Specialization Number Organization Number
1 Consulting engineer 531 Contractors 8,814
2 Professional engineer 6,657 LGAs 133
3 Q/Surveyors 439 Consulting firms 674
4 Architects 466 Agencies and ministries 29
5 Technicians 727 Private employers various
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data collected from the offices of the AQRB, 
CRB, and ERB, and from CLGF (2017).
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Tanzania. It is evident that the availability of construction equipment has been 
improving, with more companies investing in the hiring and supply of new 
and used construction equipment. However, contractors are constrained by 
inadequate capital to acquire such equipment and/or plant. Muhegi and 
Malongo (2004) point out that contractors face several challenges related to 
equipment and machinery when budgeting for and delivering projects. For 
example, there is a limited/small capital base and, usually, not readily available 
equipment or high hire rates.
Interviews with contractors, clients, and consultants undertaken in 2018 reveal 
challenges associated with construction materials and equipment (Table  12.6). 
The challenges related to construction materials are high cost and low quality of 
imported materials and unavailability of locally produced materials. Similarly, 
challenges associated with equipment and/or plant are a lack of capital for acqui-
sition, quality, and high cost of hiring.
5. Conclusion and policy recommendations
The construction sector is responsible for creating the necessary infrastructure to 
support most of Tanzania’s development and economic activities. The key 
 bottlenecks for the development of the construction sector emanate from land 
Table 12.6 Challenges associated with construction materials and equipment
S/N Challenge Remarks
1 Local materials Locally produced materials such as aggregates, sand, and 
gravel are not readily available in regions other than Dar es 
Salaam.
2 Imported materials Most materials are imported and there are few well-
established suppliers in Tanzania, which makes construction 
materials expensive.
3 Quality of materials The advancement of technology has brought about a variety of 
materials with no guarantee of quality.
4 Unavailability of 
construction materials
Imported materials for specific projects such as railway line 
construction, mining, oil and gas are not readily available.
5 Equipment and/or 
plant hire rates
Most plant hire companies are based in Dar es Salaam, they 
are not readily available in the regions and hire rates are 
higher than in Dar es Salaam by almost 40 per cent.
6 Equipment owning Most firms lack the capital to purchase the basic equipment 
needed for construction.
7 Unavailability of 
equipment
Construction equipment is not readily available.
Source: Authors’ compilation from interviews with contractors, clients, and consultants carried out 
in 2018.
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acquisition, construction permits, skills, and quality/availability of materials and 
equipment. Obtaining land for development is still a major challenge, as most of 
the challenges listed in the works of Kironde (2009) and Mugabi (2013) still exist. 
Most of the land is unplanned, attracting informal settlements and necessitating 
regularization. Construction permits still take a long time to issue, but the gov-
ernment has directed LGAs to reduce the time for processing these by shortening 
the approval period from ninety to thirty days. In addition, the government has 
set up a task force to prepare building codes. Construction skills in Tanzania, as 
in many other countries, are still in short supply. The findings of Lema (2017) and 
Kikwasi (2011b) still hold true. There are insufficient engineers, architects, and 
quantity surveyors and related disciplines to meet demand. Likewise, the sector 
has an acute shortage of technicians and qualified artisans. The availability and 
quality of construction materials is also an area of concern. The sector depends 
on imported materials, which are expensive but with no guarantee of quality. 
Construction equipment/plant have also emerged as a challenge, as owning them 
requires capital and hire rates are high for local contractors to afford. Contractors, 
who constitute a major part of the construction sector, and the sector at large, 
have been persistently facing challenges. The challenges of inadequate manage-
ment skills, stiff competition, and the high cost of hiring equipment, identified in 
this study have also been identified by Materu (2001), Khoza (2007), Muhegi and 
Malongo (2004), and Mwombeki (2017).
From the above evidence, the proposed institutional and policy reforms neces-
sary for the development of the sector relate to skills shortages, raw materials, 
contractors’ challenges, construction permits, and access to land.
5.1 Raw materials and construction equipment/plant
Tanzania’s dependence on imports of building materials and equipment poses 
a threat, as big investments are currently ongoing and others are planned to 
achieve the objective of making Tanzania a middle-income country. The fifth-term 
government has embarked on implementation of the FYDP II’s first objective 
of industrialization, with the broad aims of: becoming a semi-industrialized 
nation by 2025; developing sustainable productive and export capacities; becoming 
a regional production, trade, and logistics hub; and promoting industrial skills. 
One of the priority sectors is building and construction. Institutions charged 
with the implementation of the plan should prioritize investments in construc-
tion materials. The poor quality of local and imported materials has been 
noted. The Tanzania Bureau of Standards (TBS) is mandated to undertake 
quality control measures for products of all descriptions and to promote stand-
ardization in the sector and in commerce. The TBS is to devise a mechanism, 
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such as the Confederation of Tanzanian Industries (CTI) recommendation of 
creating an anti-counterfeit task force and a public–private advisory committee 
on counterfeits, to ensure that locally produced and imported materials are of 
acceptable quality.
There are various equipment plant hire companies in Tanzania. The main chal-
lenge has been less that of availability and more that of unregulated hire charges. 
The government should form or identify an agency that will register and regulate 
the activities of plant hire companies.
5.2 Skills shortage
The available statistics reveal a shortage of skills, and the construction sector is 
among those affected by lack of exposure to graduates and inadequate techni-
cians. One of the targets of the FYDP II is to improve skill levels in the labour 
force through better internship programmes. The ERB and AQRB regulatory 
boards have internship programmes that expose graduates to various features of 
construction projects. These programmes are constrained by financial resources. 
The government should allocate financial resources to such programmes as part 
of implementing the plan. To increase the number of technicians and enhance the 
skills of artisans, the government should facilitate and promote technical schools 
and technical colleges to offer technical education, restrict upgrading of technical 
colleges to universities, and recognize and regulate the skills of artisans.
In addition, it will be important to direct resources to more science- and 
mathematics-oriented subjects. According to a study conducted by the Government 
of Tanzania, in 2014 up to 80 per cent of the firms interviewed (which includes all 
sectors) stated that the occupations that were and are expected to continue to be 
in demand are based on science and mathematics subjects. However, in 2013 
about 24 to 30 per cent of the government funding through the Higher Education 
Student’s Loan Board (HESLB) was directed to science-related programmes, 
which is not surprising as the admission of students to higher education institu-
tions in engineering, medical, natural sciences, and ICT accounted for only 
20.5 per cent of the admissions (TRC 2014). Funding for science-oriented 
 institutions, student loan schemes, and awareness campaigns about the skills needed 
in the next decade, among others, should be areas of focus for the government if it 
is to close the skills gap and move to a middle-income, semi-industrialized country. 
A further priority should be to support the development of a highly skilled labour 
force outside Dar es Salaam in intermediate cities that already offer some infra-
structure and levels of development that will contribute to early gains. Some 
LGAs far from the coastal region in Tanzania have expressed a problem in recruiting 
locally qualified staff.
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5.3 Access to land and construction permits
The fifth-term government embraces an e-government system. The constraints 
that are currently experienced in land governance and permit processing could 
be minimized by using ICT. The ministry responsible and LGAs should subscribe 
to e-government systems and ICT in the processing of permits and land govern-
ance. Similarly, the ministries responsible should expedite the preparation of a 
Building Act and its regulations that will guide all building construction activities 
in the country.
5.4 Contractors’ challenges
The CRB organizes and conducts annual consultative meetings that identify 
challenges and make recommendations. The government and sector stakeholders 
are aware of these challenges. As contractors form a major part of the construction 
sector, stakeholders and the government should endeavour to address these 
challenges as follows:
 • Inadequate business and management skills: CRB should conduct skills 
needs assessments and engage experts in the area to train contractors on a 
yearly basis.
 • Delayed payment to contractors: Contractors should make proper use of 
clauses in the conditions of contracts and/or provisions of the Public 
Procurement Act 2011 and its regulations to deal with clients who delay their 
payments.
 • The Public Procurement Regulatory Authority should ensure all procuring 
entities abide by sections 54 and 55 of the Act and related regulations when 
engaging in procurement of works. This in turn will develop the capacity of 
local contractors and address issues of management skills, capital, and 
equipment where joint ventures, associations, or partnering apply.
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Are There Benefits for Tanzania?
Mia Ellis and Margaret McMillan
1. Introduction
Tanzania has an abundance of natural resources, and in recent years there has been 
debate about how best to manage these resources. The focus is on understanding 
how extractive industries of mining and natural gas can be harnessed to benefit 
Tanzania’s development. Extractive industries are typically capital-intensive, thus 
directly creating few jobs. Yet, a number of countries have managed to exploit 
natural resources for industrialization and widespread wealth accumulation 
(Van der Ploeg 2011). Aware of this, African governments are seeking ways to better 
integrate natural resource extraction with local economies. In Tanzania and 
elsewhere, a key initiative for achieving this integration is local content legislation.
Because of the role that multinational corporations (MNCs) play in the ex trac-
tive industries of developing countries, benefits of natural resources are not 
always felt by local communities. Traditionally, the policy focus has therefore 
been on how to accrue benefits from resources through taxation, royalties, and 
licences (Hansen et al. 2015). Though this management of natural resource rev enues 
is an important topic, it is beyond the scope of this chapter (Tordo et al. 2013). 
Instead of this traditional policy focus, in recent years there have been efforts to 
generate broader growth benefits from natural resources through local content 
provisions that increase local participation in the extractives value chain (Tordo 
et al. 2013).
A general definition of local content is the incidence of domestic inputs—
including capital, labour, and intermediate products—into the value chain 
(Hansen et al. 2015; Kolstad and Kinyondo 2017). This encompasses most other 
definitions of local content, which include specifications for local labour involve-
ment, purchases of local inputs and services, and local ownership of firms 
(Hansen et al. 2015; Kinyondo and Villanger 2017). In general, local content pol icies 
represent an attempt by the government to ensure that the benefits of a national 
resource are going to the country. Approximately 90 per cent of resource-rich 
countries have some form of local content requirement (Lange and Kinyondo 
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2016). Some critics of local content assert that it reduces overall welfare by distorting 
allocative efficiency (Lange and Kinyondo 2016). Others argue that when designed 
correctly, local content can support the development of the domestic economy in 
a way that offsets its costs (Altenburg 2011; Chang 2002).
The first goal of this chapter is to assess local content policy in Tanzania. We 
begin with a description of the legislation and institutions surrounding local con-
tent policy in Tanzania. While we provide historical context, our main focus is on 
legislation enacted over the past ten years. We then evaluate these policies using 
both qualitative and quantitative evidence. The qualitative evidence relies primar-
ily on a review of a series of studies in which participants in the industry were 
interviewed and results synthesized. Our first quantitative exercise uses panel 
data from the Annual Survey of Industrial Production (ASIP) to examine trends 
in employment and worker training by mining firms pre- and post-2010 local 
content legislation. Our second quantitative exercise uses the 2013 Census of 
Industrial Production (CIP) to estimate multinational corporations’ (MNCs) 
potential to contribute to the local economy by computing employment (local 
and foreign and skilled and unskilled), worker training and total expenditures on 
raw materials (locally procured and imported).
The second goal of this chapter is to summarize other developing countries’ 
experiences with local content policy, especially those in Africa. Lessons from 
other countries suggest that the effectiveness of local content policy has varied 
significantly across countries. While most countries have seen increases in local 
employment in extractives, there have not been consistent increases in procure-
ment of local goods and services. Furthermore, there is limited evidence of 
growth in linkages between extractives and non-resource sectors, especially link-
ages with sideways industries such as finance.
We find that Tanzania has enacted significant legislation surrounding local 
content over the past ten years; 2016–18 have been especially active as new legisla-
tion has attempted to strengthen local content requirements. This legislation 
ranges across provisions mandating employment generation and training, local 
procurement, the use of local financial services, and promotion of technology 
transfer and inter-sectoral linkages. Using operating data from Tanzanian mining 
companies, we also find evidence of increases in local content MNCs in terms of 
employment and training post 2010-legislation, as well as significant value in local 
content in 2013, especially in terms of procurement of goods and services. This 
suggests that there may be further indirect benefits of local content, through 
bene fits accrued to the non-resource sector firms providing goods and services.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the 
state of extractive industries in Tanzania and describes the legislation regulating 
these industries and local content in Tanzania. Section 3 describes the institutions 
established to regulate local content legislation and monitor its effectiveness. In 
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section 4, we evaluate the impact of local content policy in Tanzania. Section 5 
evaluates the magnitude and potential of local content to impact the local 
 economy. Section 6 describes other developing countries experiences with local 
content legislation, and section 7 concludes.
2. Local content legislation in Tanzanian  
extractive industries
The last decade or so has seen a significant increase in Tanzanian legislation 
 surrounding local content, including acts with provisions for local procurement 
of goods and services, local employment, and local firm ownership, as well as 
provisions intended to increase transparency and accountability in extractive 
industries. Overall, recent legislation has reduced the favourability of natural 
resource agreements for MNCs, increased government power in extractive indus-
tries, and imposed new local content regulations on foreign firms. This section 
will discuss new provisions in natural resource legislation that affect local content 
in ex trac tives overall, as well as sector-specific regulations.
2.1 General legislation
In 2014, the Non-Citizens Act was signed into law, which regulates employment 
of foreign employees. It requires that companies employing foreign workers 
develop a succession plan for the replacement of a foreign worker with a local 
worker, before expiration of the maximum total permitted stay in the country 
(normally five–ten years) (Kinyondo and Villanger  2017). The succession plan 
must also detail a proposal for knowledge and expertise transfers from the for-
eign to the local worker during the employment period, in such a way that the 
citizen can successfully take over the work (Kinyondo and Villanger 2017).
The government joined the international Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative (EITI) in 2009, and in 2015 passed the Tanzania Extractive Industries 
Transparency and Accountability Act (TEITA). The act establishes the Extractive 
Industries Transparency and Accountability Committee (EITA) as an independent 
government entity intended to serve as an oversight body for extractive indus-
tries, promote citizen participation in and awareness of said industries, and 
ensure that the benefits of said industries are verified, accounted for, and utilized 
for the betterment of Tanzanians (NRGI 2016). TEITA also requires both govern-
ment agencies and extractive industries companies to provide accurate and timely 
information to the Tanzanian EITI (TEITI) (Lange and Kinyondo 2016). This was 
intended to both regulate the use of government revenues from the petroleum 
sector and to increase transparency (Lee and Dupuy 2018).
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Three new acts were passed in 2017 amending past laws and establishing new 
requirements. These acts have sector-specific requirements, which are discussed 
in the following sections, but also have significant provisions affecting extractive 
industries as a whole. The first act passed in 2017 was the Natural Wealth and 
Resources (Permanent Sovereignty) Act, also known as the Permanent Sovereignty 
Act. The act states that the people of Tanzania have permanent sovereignty over 
all natural wealth and resources and that ownership and control of said resources 
will be exercised by the government on the people’s behalf (Woodroffe et al. 2017). 
It also requires that in the interest of ensuring permanent sovereignty over natural 
resources, any disputes related to extractive industries must be handled by 
judicial bodies or other entities established in Tanzania (Woodroffe et al. 2017).
Also passed that year was the 2017 Natural Wealth and Resources Contracts 
(Review and Re-negotiation of Unconscionable Terms) Act, also known as the 
Unconscionable Terms Act. The act requires that any mineral or petroleum agree-
ments be submitted to the National Assembly, which now has the authority to 
review and renegotiate all existing and future agreements (Woodroffe et al. 2017). 
If involved parties fail to reach an agreement on renegotiation of ‘unconscionable’ 
terms, the terms will be treated as expunged; it is not clear how this will affect the 
rest of the agreement (Woodroffe et al. 2017).
The third act passed in 2017 was the Written Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) 
Act, also known as the Miscellaneous Amendments Act. While it primarily gov-
erns the mining sector, it does include a few specific provisions that apply to 
extractive industries in general, such as reducing allowances given to MNCs and 
also prohibiting certain stabilization agreements. These measures are intended to 
reduce favourable allowances for foreign firms, and to increase government 
 control over agreement terms.
2.2 Mining sector
Mining regulation in Tanzania has historically lacked specific quotas, monitoring 
mechanisms, or incentives and sanctions. Past experiences with mining are a 
major driver of the current sentiment towards petroleum in Tanzania (Lange and 
Kinyondo 2016). However, the three acts passed in 2017 represent a recent and 
significant attempt to reclaim Tanzania’s mineral resources. This section presents 
background information on the mining sector and its local content policies, and 
discusses the current legislation governing the sector.
2.2.1 Background
Tanzania is a host to many mineral resources, including gold, tanzanite, 
 diamonds, uranium, coal, and nickel (Hansen et al.  2015). The first policy sur-
rounding mining and local content was the 1979 Mining Act. This required 
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licence applications to include a plan for local procurement of goods and services 
(Makene et al. 2012). How well this law was actually enforced remains unclear, as 
there were few foreign firms engaged in the sector (Lange and Kinyondo 2016).
Following the increased liberalization of Tanzania’s economy in the 1980s, the 
World Bank released a 1992 report criticizing local content, recommending that 
foreign investors be treated the same as domestic firms, and discouraging the 
use of the mining sector as a tool for employment generation (Lange and 
Kinyondo 2016). The subsequent Mining Act of 1998 did not include any mention 
of local content; however, it did offer generous value-added tax (VAT) exemptions 
to foreign investors (Lange and Kinyondo 2016). In the 1990s, there was a rapid 
increase in foreign direct investment (FDI) in mining, primarily in gold. Partially 
due to favourable concessions, revenues were significantly less than expected 
(Lange and Kinyondo  2016). For example, among the five mines established 
between 1999 and 2005, two did not pay the required 30 per cent corporation tax, 
and the other three only began paying the tax seven, nine, and eleven years into 
operations (Lange and Kinyondo 2016). By 2008, Tanzania had become the third 
largest producer of gold in Africa, but its annual revenues were less than US$30 
million (TMAA 2015).
2.2.2 Current local content
This experience led to public criticism of the government’s handling of foreign 
investment, and in 2010 a new mining act was passed (Lange and Kinyondo 2016). 
This 2010 Mining Act is the primary legislation governing the mining sector and 
its associated local content provisions. With regard to local content, it includes 
provisions to promote forward and backward linkages, requires MNCs seeking 
prospecting and mining licences to draw up a list of goods and services that could 
be bought locally, and attempts to promote training and skills transfers.
The 2017 Miscellaneous Amendments Act amended the Mining Act of 2010, 
instituting new rules for governance of the sector, as well as provisions affecting 
contract and local content requirements (Woodroffe et al. 2017). For example, it 
established the Mining Commission to regulate the sector, increased royalties on 
a number of minerals, and increased local and government involvement in the 
holding and sale of minerals. For example, earnings from mineral sales must now 
be kept in local financial institutions, except when distributed as profits. It also 
prohibits the export of raw minerals for beneficiation outside of the country. If 
the capacity for beneficiation exists in the country and the law is properly 
enforced, then this will be instrumental in allowing Tanzania to participate in a 
greater share of the value chain.
Regarding specific references to local content, this act states that applications 
for new licences must include a local content plan. This local content plan is not 
specifically defined, but likely refers to the plans also required by the act regard-
ing local procurement, training and employment, and technology transfer 
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(Woodroffe et al.  2017). For example, the act specifically requires that mineral 
right-holders give preference to goods produced or available in Tanzania, and to 
services provided by Tanzanian citizens or local companies. They must produce a 
procurement plan detailing a strategy for use of local goods and services covering 
at least five years. If such goods and services are not available, they must be pro-
cured from companies that are engaged in joint ventures with a local company, 
with the local company holding at least 25 per cent of the venture. A local 
company is defined as one that is either 100 per cent owned by a Tanzanian 
citizen or a joint venture at least 50 per cent owned by Tanzanian citizens 
(Woodroffe et al. 2017).
The act also includes requirements for training and employing Tanzanians. In 
addition to annual reports on achievements in utilizing Tanzanian goods and ser-
vices and a local supplier development programme, rights holders must submit 
an annual report on their programme for training and recruiting Tanzanians. 
This report should include information on a clearly defined training programme 
for the company’s Tanzanian employees as well as a commitment to knowledge 
transfer. The act specifies that technology transfer is the shared responsibility of 
government and mineral right-holders, though it does not provide details on the 
implementation of such technology transfers (Woodroffe et al. 2017).
The 2017 Permanent Sovereignty Act also included significant amendments to 
the 2010 Mining Act and expanded local content requirements. The act makes 
illegal any agreement that does not fully secure the interests of Tanzanian citizens 
and the state. It requires that any natural resource contract provide for both state 
and citizen participation and expands existing requirements for Tanzanian par-
ticipation from special mining licence-holders to all mineral right-holders. It 
stipulates that the government will have no less than 16 per cent free carried inter-
est in the capital of mining companies (Woodroffe et al. 2017). It also prohibits the 
exportation of raw minerals for beneficiation outside of the country, and requires 
that agreements include a commitment to establish beneficiation facilities within 
Tanzania, though exemptions to this rule may be granted under some circum-
stances (Woodroffe et al. 2017). In general, this act moves to reclaim control of 
natural resources, giving the government greater authority as well as imposing 
requirements to keep mineral resources inside Tanzania.
Most recently, in January 2018, the Tanzanian government adopted the Mining 
Regulations on Local Content Policy (Kasanda and Liu 2018). This stipulates that 
Tanzanian companies are given first preference when competing for mining 
licences, and that at least 5 per cent of the participating interest in any company 
competing for a licence must be Tanzanian-owned (Woodroffe et al. 2017). In this 
policy, a Tanzanian company is defined as being at least 51 per cent owned by 
Tanzanian citizens, where Tanzanian citizens hold at least 80 per cent of senior 
executive and management positions and 100 per cent of non-managerial and 
other positions (Woodroffe et al.  2017). Furthermore, any company providing 
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services to a mining company must incorporate a joint venture in which 
Tanzanians have at least 25 per cent equity in the venture (Woodroffe et al. 2017).
The policy also stipulates that firms must give priority to Tanzanians for 
employment opportunities as well as make reasonable efforts to provide training, 
and certain types of positions (for example, all junior and mid-level positions) 
must be entirely filled by Tanzanians (Woodroffe et al.  2017). The policy also 
includes provisions requiring that the foreign firm implement technology trans-
fer programmes, that they make use of Tanzanian legal and financial services, and 
that they transact business using a bank account at a Tanzanian bank (Woodroffe 
et al. 2017).
The policy requires that mining firms submit an annual local content plan as 
well as an annual performance report (Woodroffe et al. 2017). This new policy sets 
up a Local Content Committee (LCC) to oversee and implement the regulations. 
Among other powers, the LCC may launch investigations into mining firms that 
it believes may be operating through a ‘front’ (an evasive practice in which a com-
pany is presented as a Tanzanian company simply to fulfil local content require-
ments) or engaging in bid rigging (Woodroffe et al. 2017). Finally, the policy sets 
up a Common Qualification System, which will be used to verify contractors’ 
capacities and capabilities, evaluate the application of local content, track and 
monitor performance and feedback provision, and rank and categorize mining 
service companies (Woodroffe et al. 2017).
2.3 Oil and natural gas
In many ways, hydrocarbon resources are seen as a second chance to take advan-
tage of Tanzania’s natural resources to benefit the local population. Following the 
national sentiment that Tanzania did not benefit from the surge in minerals 
extractive FDI in the 1990s, local content policies surrounding petroleum have 
been somewhat stricter than those historically attached to the mining industry 
(Hansen et al. 2015). Given that the natural gas sector is just beginning to develop 
in the country and it will take many years for production to actually commence, 
Tanzania has a window of time in which to optimize its extractive industries’ 
regulations to ensure that local communities get the maximum benefits possible.
2.3.1 Background
Though the term petroleum normally refers to oil, in the Tanzanian context it is 
used to refer to both the oil and natural gas sectors. Exploration activities for 
petroleum resources began as much as sixty years ago, but so far no oil reserves 
have been found in the country (TEITI 2017). As such, the discussion of the oil 
and natural gas sector is limited to a discussion of natural gas. Natural gas 
resources were discovered as early as the 1970s, but commercial production did 
not begin until 2004 (Lange and Kinyondo 2016; Lee and Dupuy 2018). Increased 
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exploration in the 2000s led to the development of new policies, including the 
Petroleum Act of 2008 (since replaced) and the Natural Gas Policy of 2012. In 
2007 the government opted for production sharing agreements for petroleum 
resources, which give the government the right to audit investors’ accounting 
records. This decision was likely informed by the experience with the mining 
sector, in which companies were suspected of over-reporting expenses and 
under-reporting earnings to reduce taxable income (Lange and Kinyondo 2016).
In 2010, there were major discoveries of offshore natural gas reserves. The 
found reserves are estimated to total around 57 trillion cubic feet (Lee and 
Dupuy 2018; NRGI 2016). The International Monetary Fund estimated that this 
discovery could generate US$3–6 billion in annual revenues once fields begin 
production (Kolstad and Kinyondo 2017). Companies are in negotiations with the 
government for many projects related to these resources, including plans for a 
liquid natural gas plant (Lange and Kinyondo 2016; Lee and Dupuy 2018). There 
are expectations that Tanzania will become one of the world’s biggest exporters of 
natural gas in the coming decades (Lange and Kinyondo 2016). Sixty-six per cent 
of the Tanzanian population supports exporting natural gas, and the discoveries 
of these new resources could eventually enable Tanzania to become energy inde-
pendent (Lee and Dupuy 2018). As a result, it is clear that this industry offers huge 
potential that must be carefully managed. These recent discoveries have spurred 
the Tanzanian government to develop new local content policies intended to 
increase job and business opportunities for Tanzanians (Kinyondo and 
Villanger 2017).
2.3.2 Current local content
In 2014, Tanzania published the Draft One Local Content Policy. This policy 
 suggested requirements for local content in petroleum extractives, stating that at 
least 10 per cent of goods and services used by MNCs must be sourced locally 
(Kolstad and Kinyondo 2017). The policy envisions an attempt to develop base-
line information on current capacity and capabilities for Tanzanian-owned com-
panies to become suppliers (NRGI  2016). The policy did not address how the 
government would deal with improving local capacities, and it also lacked detail 
on specific regulations for midstream activities, such as the transport of extracted 
petroleum and gas prior to refinement (Kinyondo and Villanger 2017; Lee and 
Dupuy 2018).
This draft policy informed much of the 2015 Petroleum Act, which is the pri-
mary legislation governing the petroleum sector in Tanzania (Kinyondo and 
Villanger  2017; NRGI  2016). It covers upstream, midstream, and downstream 
petroleum activities and contains several clauses related to the use of local labour 
and procurement restrictions (Kinyondo and Villanger  2017; Lee and Dupuy 
2018). The act set up new roles for governance of the petroleum industry and 
establishes a local content in the National Economic Empowerment Council 
(NEEC) (Lee and Dupuy 2018; Scurfield et al. 2017).
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Regarding more specific local content terms, the act includes requirements 
that licence-holders, contractors, and subcontractors give preference to goods 
produced or available in Tanzania, and to services provided by Tanzanian citizens 
or local companies (NRGI 2016). It defines a local firm as one 100 per cent owned 
by a Tanzanian citizen or a company that is in a joint venture with Tanzanians 
whose participating share is at least 15 per cent (NRGI  2016). If a firm cannot 
source locally available goods and services, they must be purchased from a firm 
in a joint venture with a Tanzanian company, in which the Tanzanian company 
has at least a 25 per cent share. To enforce these requirements, the act stipulates 
that MNCs provide a detailed local supplier development programme (Calignano 
and Vaaland  2018). The act also states that the government can revoke a firm’s 
licence if it consistently fails to comply with approved local content plans (Lange 
and Kinyondo 2016). The act also includes provisions promoting the training and 
recruitment of Tanzanian citizens (NRGI 2016).
Most recently, the government passed the 2017 Petroleum (Local Content) 
Regulations, under the 2015 Petroleum Act (Scurfield et al. 2017). Some of these 
regulations formalized local content requirements provided for in the 2015 act. 
For example, it requires preference to be given to Tanzanians in all employment 
levels, and states that both unskilled and semi-skilled positions may only be given 
to Tanzanians (Scurfield et al. 2017). It also establishes minimum levels of local 
employment in more skilled positions. The regulations allow for more flexibility 
than the 2015 Petroleum Act. For example, it permits other business arrange-
ments to be formed in the case where joint ventures are not possible (Scurfield 
et al.  2017). Also, the government is allowed to give several exemptions; for 
example, they may exempt a company from the semi-skilled requirement, or 
from the joint venture/business arrangement requirement. These regulations also 
allow for fiscal incentives to be given to encourage gas companies to develop local 
capacity and supplier training programmes.
Finally, the most recent acts passed in 2017 have some important implications 
for the oil and gas sector. The Miscellaneous Amendments Act requires pet rol-
eum agreements to ensure equitable distribution of benefits, and to favour 
national interest, participation, transparency, and accountability (Woodroffe et al. 
2017). The Permanent Sovereignty Act reinforces this, making it illegal for any 
agreement to not fully secure the interests of the Tanzanian people and requiring 
that they further Tanzania’s permanent sovereignty over natural wealth and 
resources (Woodroffe et al. 2017).
3. Management of local content policies in Tanzania
According to Ovadia (2017), there are at least nine government agencies 
and  groups with direct authority over petroleum and mining. The primary 
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regulator is the Ministry of Energy and Minerals (MEM). In the mining sector, 
the mining commissioner has primary regulatory authority. In the gas and 
oil  sector, the commissioner of the MEM has had less authority since the 
2015  Petroleum Act, which established and transferred regulatory authority to 
Petroleum Upstream Regulatory Agency (PURA). The state oil company Tanzania 
Petroleum Development (TPDC), also plays a role in drafting and implementing 
oil and gas policy. Finally, the Energy and Water Utilities Regulatory (EWURA) 
conducts regulation of midstream and downstream oil and gas activities 
(Ovadia 2017).
There are numerous ministries and agencies within the Tanzanian government 
that hold responsibility for local content policies and extractive industries. How 
authority is spread among these agencies has not always been clear (Ovadia 2017). 
It is crucial that this responsibility is clarified, as the government can fulfil several 
important roles in promoting local content. It can increase local firm participa-
tion by ensuring that all stakeholders are aware of the local content mandates and 
that MNCs have information about the quality and skills of local suppliers, and by 
providing local firms with information about the needs of MNCs (Calignano and 
Vaaland 2018; Hansen et al. 2015). One effort towards this goal has been the estab-
lishment of a Common Qualification System in the 2017 Petroleum Local Content 
Regulations, which is a database containing details of local suppliers approved by 
the government (Woodroffe et al. 2017).
Further efforts by the government should work to ensure that both MNCs and 
local firms are aware of one another’s capabilities and demands and are able to 
take advantage of all possible collaborations. Sutton (2014) specifically recom-
mends the establishment of a local content unit (LCU) to achieve these goals. 
Such a unit would oversee and regulate local content policies and help to develop 
linkages between MNCs and local firms. The LCU, as proposed by Sutton (2014), 
is an administrative body with two primary roles: negotiating with MNCs and 
developing local capabilities through enterprise development programmes. It is 
important to understand what MNCs are looking for in their suppliers, and to 
understand how prepared domestic firms are to meet those needs. Training 
 programmes can then be implemented to increase local capacity, based on the 
specific capacities identified.
Following this advice, in 2015 Tanzania created the Local Content Department 
in the NEEC, within the Planning Unit of the Office of the Prime Minister, and 
instructed this department to take the lead on local content issues. The Local 
Content Department is mandated to coordinate the government’s local content 
policy and work with the different agencies and ministries that hold authority 
over local content. However, its overall impact as of yet is unclear as the unit is 
largely in the planning phase (Sen and Logan 2016). Future research is needed to 
understand the effectiveness of this unit and to determine whether it is truly 
assisting in the creation of local content.
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4. Evaluating Tanzania’s local content policies
4.1 Qualitative research
There is a significant body of work focused on the design and effectiveness of 
local content policies in both the mining and oil and natural gas sectors in 
Tanzania. However, most of these studies make use of qualitative research 
 methods or present quantitative summaries of the state of local content (ACET 
2017; Lange and Kinyondo 2016; Ovadia 2014). This represents a significant gap in 
the literature on extractive industries and local content, and future efforts should 
be taken to conduct more rigorous empirical analysis of the relationship between 
local content policies and local content creation.
Furthermore, all analysis of the actual effectiveness of local content policies in 
Tanzania is limited to the mining sector, as natural gas operations have not yet 
commenced. One example of the sort of qualitative and descriptive analysis pre-
sent in the mining sector is a study by Lange and Kinyondo (2016), who make use 
of interviews and statistics from the TMAA to argue that local content in the 
mining sector has failed to increase the share of domestic employment in foreign 
firms or to increase local procurement of goods and services relative to foreign 
procurement.
In addition to understanding the direct value of local content, it is useful to 
understand whether indirect benefits of extractive industries have been created 
through linkages with non-resource sectors. A study by Hansen (2013) found that 
horizontal linkages with the mining sector are rare, and that when they exist, ver-
tical linkages are weak. By reviewing the existing literature on these linkages, 
Hansen finds that the vertical linkages with local firms that do exist tend to be in 
transport, cleaning, catering, and security. However, in some cases even this 
procurement is not truly local, as the supplier firms are simply importing and 
reselling goods with little value-added, or in other cases are not actually 
Tanzanian-owned.
However, there are some examples of successful local provision of services. For 
example, up to 2007, all mining firms used foreign catering services. However, in 
recent years a Tanzanian catering firm, AKO catering, has managed to become 
the primary supplier of catering services to large-scale mines (Lange and 
Kinyondo 2016). AKO was able to gain a significant market share by providing 
high-quality services at a much lower price that those charged by foreign firms 
(Lange and Kinyondo  2016). This is an example of local content being created 
without the need for a legal mandate, and suggests that MNCs will be interested 
in engaging with local firms if the local service is competitive.
A major weakness to the analysis in this chapter and other studies is the use of 
data from several years ago, which limits any understanding of how more recent 
policies may have taken effect or of how effects may have changed over time. 
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Furthermore, the data are not rich enough for a more rigorous econometric 
ana lysis of the performance of local content in Tanzania, which would allow for 
the identification of any causal relationship between policy and outcome. In 
future research, it would be especially beneficial to develop an understanding of 
how specific components of local content policy impact its effectiveness. Finally, 
there is no existing analysis of the broader spillover benefits of local content 
within the Tanzania economy. As a result, there is still a lot that we do not know 
about the effectiveness of local content legislation in Tanzania.
4.2 Testing for the impact of local content  
policy using the ASIP
A simple way to test for the impact of local content policy in Tanzania is to look at 
local content metrics before and after the implementation of policy. Though local 
content policies have been enacted in the oil and natural gas sectors, these sectors 
are largely non-operational today. Therefore, this section attempts to identify any 
change in the value of local content in the mining sector before and after the 
enactment of the 2010 Mining Act, using data from the ASIP for the years 2008 
through 2012. All tables and figures discussed in this section can be found in the 
online working paper version of Ellis and McMillan (2018). The survey is a com-
plete census of all industrial firms operating in Tanzania that have ten or more 
employees. In 2008 there were just twelve such mining firms; in 2012 there were 
eighteen. This section attempts to understand whether the act affected local con-
tent in any of the following ways: increased employment of Tanzanians; increased 
employment of Tanzanians in higher-skilled positions; and increased spending 
on worker training.
Ellis and McMillan (2018: Figure 1) show the average firm employment of both 
Tanzanian and foreign employees, separated by firm ownership type. The mean 
number of foreign employees in all firms has remained relatively stable from 2008 
to 2012. Pre-2010, the mean employment of Tanzanians in foreign-owned firms 
was relatively stable; however, following 2010 the mean number has increased 
consistently. This suggests that following 2010, foreign firms did indeed increase 
their local content in terms of local employees. This trend is different from the 
trends in jointly and domestically owned firms, which are both less consistent, 
and provides some evidence for a unique response among foreign mining firms 
from the year 2010, which could be attributed to the act.
Ellis and McMillan (2018: Figure 2) also show the percentage of workers in a 
firm who are skilled Tanzanians, separated by firm ownership type. A skilled 
position in this case is defined as managerial and professional staff or skilled 
operatives. From 2008 to 2012, the share of employees who were Tanzanians in 
skilled positions in foreign-owned firms increased slightly, with the increase 
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occurring between 2009 and 2011. The share of employees who were Tanzanians 
in skilled positions in domestically owned firms decreased up until 2010 and then 
increased consistently, though the net change over the period was a decrease. The 
trend in jointly owned firms was inconsistent. This once again provides some evi-
dence that local content in foreign firms has followed a trend distinct from jointly 
and domestically owned firms, and that they may be reacting to the imposition of 
local content laws.
Finally, Ellis and McMillan (2018: Figure 3) show the mean spending on worker 
training in mining firms, broken up by firm ownership type. The spending on 
worker training in domestically owned firms has been stable and low over the 
period, whereas the spending in jointly owned firms was trending upwards 
pre-2010 and has decreased since 2010. On the other hand, the trend in spending 
in foreign-owned firms was varied pre-2010 but has increased consistently since 
2010. The level of spending is also significantly higher in foreign-owned firms 
than jointly or domestically owned firms. Once again, this provides some evi-
dence for a change in local content in mining MNCs following the year 2010.
From these data, it appears that there is some evidence of increased local con-
tent in foreign-owned firms following the year 2010. The trends of local content in 
these firms are distinct from the trends in jointly and domestically owned firms, 
which suggests that it is not simply attributable to market conditions. It would be 
valuable to examine changes in procurement of local goods and services over this 
same period to see if that type of local content followed a similar trend; however, 
these data are missing for mining firms in the ASIP. A further limitation of this 
analysis is that these data only allow for examination of the 2010 Mining Act. 
More recent acts have had much more explicit requirements for local content, 
and it is possible that they have had a greater effect. Therefore, getting recent data 
on mining firms and also collecting current data from natural gas firms will be 
crucial in enabling analysis of the impact of more recent local content provisions.
5. Quantifying the value of local content  
using the 2013 Industrial Census
Given the extensive focus on local content in Tanzania, it is useful to try to esti-
mate the actual value of this local content. This section attempts to do so for the 
mining sector, using the most recent data available from the 2013 CIP in Tanzania. 
All tables discussed in this section can be found in the online working paper ver-
sion of Ellis and McMillan (2018). The CIP data are post-implementation of the 
first local content legislation in Tanzania (2010 Mining Act), but pre-implementation 
of the more recent amendments to the legislation. As such, they may capture 
effects of the 2010 legislation but will not tell us anything about the more recent 
legislative changes. Regardless, the estimates give an idea of the potential direct 
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value of local content. It measures the potential contribution of local content in 
terms of employment generation and training, and then in terms of the value of 
goods and services sourced locally. The decision to focus exclusively on mining 
comes from the fact that natural gas is not yet operational and oil resources have 
not yet been discovered, so we do not have relevant data for the petroleum sector.
The census includes 390 mining firms, 378 (97 per cent) of which are do mes tic-
al ly owned (see Ellis and McMillan 2018: Table 1). The number of firms jumps 
dramatically from 2012 because the 2013 data include firms with less than ten 
employees. There are only ten foreign-owned mining firms in the census, and two 
jointly owned firms. Ellis and McMillan (2018: Table 2) show that these foreign 
and jointly owned firms are much larger than the domestically owned firms. For 
example, while almost 50 per cent of domestic mining firms have fewer than ten 
employees, there are no such foreign or jointly owned firms. This suggests that 
while there are very few foreign and jointly owned mining firms, they may still 
play a major role in mining sector employment. Indeed, the census data report 
that foreign-owned firms employ 8,785 individuals in total, and jointly owned 
firms employ 1,187. Meanwhile, domestically owned firms employ 8,706 workers. 
This tells us that non-domestic mining firms account for just over half of all 
employment in the sector, and that local content policies requiring the employ-
ment of Tanzanians therefore have the potential to create a significant amount of 
employment.
Though these foreign and jointly owned firms play a large role in mining 
sector employment, this is only relevant to local content if they are employing 
Tanzanians. Ellis and McMillan (2018: Table 3) show the breakdown of employ-
ment in mining firms by worker type, including citizenship and whether they 
are skilled. In this case, a skilled worker is defined as someone either in a 
managerial position or a skilled technical position. On average, only 0.34 per cent 
of workers in mining firms are foreign; however, this jumps to 9.27 per cent for 
foreign-owned firms. The share is much lower (1.14 per cent) in jointly owned 
firms, which could indicate that joint-ownership models result in hiring more 
Tanzanians.
Ellis and McMillan (2018: Table 3) also shows that the share of foreign workers 
employed in mining firms is the same as the share of foreign and skilled workers—
this indicates that mining firms do not hire any foreigners for unskilled positions. 
Local content suggests that firms should hire Tanzanians for all positions for 
which they are qualified, which likely tend to be unskilled positions. Therefore, 
the fact that all firms are not choosing to hire foreign workers for unskilled posi-
tions is a hopeful sign for their adherence to local content. Ellis and McMillan 
(2018: Table 3) also shows us that foreign-owned firms employ significantly more 
skilled Tanzanians than domestically owned firms. This indicates that foreign-
owned firms require a much greater share of skilled employees than domestically 
owned firms, and it also suggests that there are Tanzanians with the capacity to fill 
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these skilled roles. This is a positive sign, and is in contrast to the argument that 
locals do not have the skills needed by MNCs.
Lastly, Ellis and McMillan (2018: Table 4) show the average and total spending 
of mining firms on employee training. These training expenditures are only 
reported by firms with ten or more employees; therefore, these numbers do not fully 
represent the mining sector. It tells us that foreign-owned firms spend US$916,283 
on training on average. Meanwhile, domestically owned firms spend just US$2,214 
on average. This suggests that foreign-owned firms are spending a considerable 
amount of money on worker training, in line with the stipulations of local 
content policies.
This evidence suggests that there is significant potential of MNCs to generate 
employment for Tanzanians. Not only do foreign and jointly owned mining 
firms employ more workers overall than domestically owned firms, they clearly 
employ a significant number of Tanzanians, do not limit them to unskilled posi-
tions, and offer more training opportunities than domestic firms. However, it is 
important to look at the contribution of these mining firms in the greater 
Tanzanian context. Overall, the mining sector only employs 18,678 individuals. 
In a country with a population of 50 million, this employment contribution is 
minimal. This draws attention to the broader question of the scope of local con-
tent’s potential, and might indicate that efforts to create linkages between the 
mining sector and other sectors with more employment potential would have 
greater benefits for the country.
The other side of the local content issue is the value of locally sourced inputs. 
Ellis and McMillan (2018: Table 5) shows the mean spending on raw materials 
and services, in 2013 US dollars. Once again, Ellis and McMillan (2018: Table 5) 
report these values for firms with ten or more employees, as only these firms 
report a breakdown of expenditures on imported versus locally purchased raw 
materials. The data show that foreign and jointly owned firms spend significantly 
more on imported raw materials than locally sourced raw materials. This may 
suggest that the raw materials needed are not available locally, or that local con-
tent policies are not being followed. Regardless, it is clear that the money spent by 
MNCs on raw materials is primarily leaving the country. Ellis and McMillan 
(2018: Table 5) also show that average spending on services is much greater than 
average spending on raw materials. While it is possible that some of these services 
are sourced internationally, this may suggest that there is more potential for bene-
fits to local firms through the provision of services, rather than direct inputs.
This analysis leads to a few points. First, regular collection of this sort of data 
will be critical to evaluating the progress of local content policies. It would be 
helpful to have annual surveys of mining firms to collect information on employ-
ment, training, and local procurement of goods and services. Once operations 
commence in the gas sector, this data collection should be done there as well. This 
will be especially helpful in understanding how recent policy changes to local 
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content have impacted the sectors. Furthermore, it would be helpful to add a 
separate module to the ASIP to collect information about both direct and indirect 
linkages between foreign and domestic firms. Finally, it would be useful to include 
a module to collect information about vertical linkages between firms. This would 
allow us to see how the impacts of local content may extend to firms providing 
goods and services for extractive firms, as well as to downstream industries.
6. Lessons for Tanzania from country  
experiences with local content legislation
Because we do not have a deep understanding of the effectiveness of local content 
in Tanzania’s mining sector, and the natural gas sector is too young for there to be 
any measurable benefits, it is useful to look at the experiences of similar coun-
tries. It is especially useful to look at the experience of other countries with local 
content in natural gas, as Tanzania still has time to carefully construct an optimal 
local content strategy. Finally, the analysis of other countries’ experience offers 
some insights into possible mechanisms through which local content’s effective-
ness in Tanzania could be analysed.
6.1 Quantitative analyses
As is the case in Tanzania, most research into local content policies does not offer 
a rigorous empirical analysis of local content’s success (ACET  2017; Tordo 
et al. 2013). Due to the lack of empirical analysis, it is difficult to attribute local 
content creation to actual policies. However, there are two studies, both in 
Nigeria, that attempt to empirically test the benefits of local content policies. It is 
helpful to look at Nigeria’s experience, because its industry is centred around oil 
and  natural gas, and can provide important insights for Tanzania’s upcoming nat-
ural gas activities.
The first was done by Adewuyi and Oyejide (2012), who used a logit regression 
to study the factors determining backward linkages in Nigeria’s oil and gas indus-
try. They conducted a survey of fifteen foreign- and locally owned oil-producing 
firms and 115 oil and gas industry suppliers. The supplying firms were limited to 
those in the two oil cities of Port Harcourt and Warri, which were chosen due to 
their status as centres of oil prospecting, exploration, production, and refining. 
A random sampling method was then used to choose the supplying firms. They 
then administered questionnaires to the top executives at each firm, with twelve 
oil companies and eighty-six suppliers responding. They then regress different 
measures of backward linkages—such as the value spent on locally sourced 
inputs, the extent of information sharing, and labour training—on a number of 
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explanatory variables that include a dummy variable for whether the company 
has used the provisions of the local content policy. The research finds significant 
evidence for the existence of local content in Nigeria, with many firms surveyed 
reporting linkages between foreign and local firms. Furthermore, the logit ana-
lysis shows that local content policies are consistently positively correlated with 
increases in many types of linkages, including the share of inputs sourced locally, 
negotiations of payments and delivery with oil firms, and labour training from oil 
firms. Therefore, the authors argue that this provides evidence that local content 
policies did indeed create linkages in the oil and gas value chain in Nigeria.
A more recent study, also in Nigeria, was conducted by Adedeji et al. (2016). 
First, these authors make use of surveys conducted by other researchers and 
extract information to construct observed variables that represent latent variables 
such as local content policy. For example, they make use of the survey adminis-
tered by Adewuyi and Oyejide (2012) to construct variables measuring local con-
tent policy and backward linkages. They then survey 209 local oil and gas firms in 
the Niger Delta, requesting the firms to indicate the implications of seven local 
content policy and five infrastructure items. The surveys also asked about the 
impact of these items on the firms’ activities in the industry, about cooperation 
with local subcontractors and suppliers, and about local labour demand. The 
researchers then used structural equation modelling to examine the relationships 
between these variables. They find that local content policy is significantly 
positively related to promoting local participation of local firms and in creating 
backward linkages in the oil industry. They also find that local content policy has 
an indirect effect on demand for local labour, through its effects on participation 
and linkages.
These studies present empirical evidence that local content policies for oil and 
natural gas do have a significant impact on creating employment, firm participa-
tion, and sectoral linkages in the Nigerian economy. They highlight the im port-
ance of having detailed survey data on local content to conduct similar empirical 
studies in Tanzania. As discussed in section 5, including modules in existing sur-
veys or conducting new surveys with firms in the mining and oil and natural gas 
sectors to collect information on employment, local procurement, and firm link-
ages will be instrumental in allowing for empirical analysis of not only the general 
effects of local content policy but also the effects of different types of local content 
policy and of local content management.
6.2 Qualitative evidence
In addition to empirical analysis, there is a significant body of work analysing the 
effectiveness of local content policies through qualitative and descriptive research 
methods. Examining how different aspects of local content policy may be 
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eff ect ive, or not, is useful in determining the best design of these policies. For 
example, other countries’ experiences can tell us something about how employ-
ment requirements perform compared to procurement requirements, or what 
aspects of local content policy design are more effective in creating linkages with 
the broader economy.
A comparative study of local content policies in the mineral and oil and gas 
sectors in eight African countries provides several important insights for devel-
oping effective local content policies (ACET  2017). Looking at Burkina Faso, 
Ethiopia, Ghana, Namibia, Nigeria, Mozambique, South Africa, and Zambia, this 
study finds that a lack of available data significantly hinders the ability to quanti-
tatively assess the effectiveness of local content (ACET 2017). The research does 
not distinguish between local content policies that are more effective for minerals 
versus oil and natural gas; however, it does highlight the fact that any local  content 
policies should be carefully tailored to the specific country context (ACET 2017).
Using the data that are available, the study finds that these countries have 
been most successful in promoting local employment and skills development 
(ACET 2017). Furthermore, these gains have been greater in low- and medium-
skill positions, which is relevant in the Tanzanian context, as much of the work-
force is low skilled (ACET 2017). However, as the use of technology in extractives 
increases, the potential of direct employment effects declines (ACET 2017). As a 
result, the impact of employment requirements in local content may be lessened 
in the future. This becomes even more true for fledgling industries, where local 
workers are even less likely to have the necessary skills. This suggests that more 
focus of Tanzania’s natural gas local content policy should be on developing link-
ages that can create indirect employment opportunities through sectors provid-
ing goods and services as inputs as well as in sectors with sideways linkages (such 
as finance). The other conclusion of this finding is that in the future, as extractives 
become more automated, any hope of creating direct employment will require 
that local content policies include strategies for skills development, through both 
MNC and publicly provided training programmes. These policies should be 
developed through coordination with the private sector to ensure they take into 
account both the current and future skill needs of ex trac tive firms.
The evidence on the success of provisions for local procurement of goods and 
services is less clear. Country data suggest that spending on procurement repre-
sents the largest portion of MNC expenditures, indicating that there is significant 
potential for local content creation (ACET  2017). Furthermore, engaging local 
businesses in this way can extend benefits to non-resource sectors of the econ-
omy, create jobs, and promote technology transfers. Ghana, South Africa, and 
Nigeria have all seen increases in local procurement since the implementation of 
local content policies (ACET 2017). However, in other countries, such as Zambia, 
Namibia, Ethiopia, and Burkina Faso, there is minimal evidence of increases in 
local procurement (ACET  2017). The study also finds that there is a need for 
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increased value addition by local suppliers, and that government supplier 
 development programmes can be instrumental in helping local suppliers to 
become competitive (ACET  2017). For example, Tullow Oil Ghana partnered 
with the government to establish an Enterprise Development Center and the 
Jubilee Technical Training Center, which worked to build the capacity of local 
businesses and to develop human capital in technical and vocational skills 
(ACET 2017). The establishment of these centres was a direct response to the 2013 
enactment of local content policies in Ghana and is an excellent example of 
public–private coordination that helps to get locals engaged in the extractives 
value chain (ACET 2017).
There are still other ways through which local content policies attempt to cre-
ate benefits for the wider economy. One important route is through requirements 
to use local financial services. As most extractive industries are capital intensive, 
financing is an important part of these projects. Requirements for the use of 
financial services in local content policies are somewhat rare, but they were 
recently implemented in Tanzania. Another way through which local content can 
assist with local capacity is by requiring certain processes to be completed locally. 
For example, one of the major issues with extractives is that often the raw product 
is exported internationally, and the benefits of all the subsequent activities in the 
value chain are missed by the local economy. Laws that require or incentivize the 
local completion of those processes could be instrumental in generating a wider 
range of benefits from the extractives industry. A similar law was passed in 
Botswana in 2005 for diamonds, which has been critical in capturing downstream 
revenues as well as developing new, high-skill services (Koitsiwe and Adachi 2017).
6.3 Summarizing the evidence
The information presented in sections 4 and 5 shows that there is local content in 
the Tanzanian mining sector and that the trend in local content in foreign firms 
changed post-2010. It is not clear from this information that the creation of this 
local content was caused by the implementation of local content policies, but the 
empirical evidence from Nigeria suggests that it is a possibility. Future research is 
needed to understand the causal relationship between local content policies and 
local content creation, and once the natural gas sector becomes operational, it 
will be important to conduct empirical research on that sector as well. Regardless, 
the preceding information offers several insights into the effectiveness of different 
types of local content policies, and implications for their management.
Evidence from other countries’ experiences suggests that local content policies 
have been most successful in promoting employment generation and skills devel-
opment. This is supported by the data in Tanzania, as Ellis and McMillan (2018: 
Tables 3–4) show that foreign mining firms employ a significant percentage of 
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Tanzanian workers and spend much more on training than do domestic firms. If 
Tanzania wants to further promote direct employment generation and skills 
development in extractives, it will be useful to have some evaluation of the spe-
cific skills that are lacking. For example, there has been no significant, quantita-
tive study of Tanzanians’ existing or potential capacity to engage in the natural 
gas sector (Scurfield et al.  2017). For individual skill development, it would be 
beneficial to establishment partnerships between local training institutions and 
leading international universities, through which new courses can be developed 
and degree programmes can be strengthened (Sutton 2014).
Though there is evidence that local content policies focusing on employment 
and skills can be effective, it is not clear how sustainable or broad these outcomes 
are. For example, though foreign firms spend a significant amount on worker 
training, it is not clear what skills are developed by this training. Furthermore, 
given that extractive industries are not labour intensive and are becoming increas-
ingly automated, it is not clear that direct employment generation will continue to 
be a viable aspect of local content policy in the future (ACET 2017). As a result, it 
is important to look beyond direct employment opportunities and to focus on 
developing linkages between extractive MNCs and local firms in a way that will 
allow for indirect employment generation.
The evidence from other countries’ experiences and the data on the Tanzanian 
manufacturing sector shows less clear progress on procurement of local goods 
and services. Though local content legislation consistently mandates local pro-
curement, this is often hindered by the unavailability of quality goods and ser-
vices. The ACET report demonstrates that many countries have failed to see any 
increase in local procurement since imposing local content requirements, and 
Ellis and McMillan (2018: Table 5) show that foreign firms purchase very few local 
inputs. There is more evidence for the purchase of local services, but the majority 
of spending is still on foreign services. As a result, local content policies could be 
made more effective if actions were taken to improve the capacity of local firms to 
act as suppliers.
7. Conclusion
In recent years there has been a renewed focus on local content in Tanzania. 
Though this has largely been driven by developments in the natural gas sector, it 
has led to policy changes for the mining, natural gas, and oil sectors. The recent 
changes to local content legislation have been clear attempts to reclaim domestic 
control of natural resources and ensure that their benefits accrue to the Tanzanian 
population. However, there are still many issues that must be addressed to ensure 
that local content strategies are most effective. There is limited empirical analysis 
of the effectiveness of local content policies, which is a major gap in the literature.
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Evidence from other countries’ experiences and the data from Tanzania mining 
firms suggest that different aspects of local content policies have varying effective-
ness. Some success has been identified in employment generation and worker 
training, but the level of employment in extractives is generally low and it is not 
clear that this type of local content will be viable in the future. The progress on 
increasing local procurement is not evident, and more effective government man-
agement of the connection between MNCs and local firms is needed. These insights 
indicate that it is especially important to focus on creating linkages that will lead 
to benefits for sectors beyond extractives. However, there is minimal evidence of 
the creation of linkages between extractive industries and other sectors.
Given that the natural gas sector is still in its infancy, it is the ideal time to work 
to develop both local capacity and linkages to other sectors. This will ensure that 
the benefits of Tanzania’s natural resource endowments are creating sustainable 
development for Tanzania’s industry.
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How Much, When, and How Will It Be Governed?
Sebastian Wolf and Vishal Aditya Potluri
1. Introduction
In 2006, discoveries of commercially viable oil reserves in Uganda raised hopes of 
a timely boost to economic growth in the country. Twelve years later, despite 
pressing development needs, Uganda has not yet moved to the production stage 
and is yet to derive significant revenues from the resource. There are good reasons 
to tread slowly. Economists routinely warn of the pitfalls of windfall revenue from 
natural resources, and negative experiences of young petrostates provide caution-
ary examples. In this chapter we attempt to provide a primer on the Ugandan 
journey to becoming a petroleum producer and study the path the country is 
taking to navigate the potential perils of the ‘resource curse’.
We complement previous work with a renewed modelling effort to gauge the 
size and timing of revenue flows. Our estimates are based on updated cost esti-
mates, leaked details of production sharing agreements, and the state of develop-
ment of the infrastructure required for production. We assume that the first oil 
will flow in 2023 at the earliest, and estimate that revenues will average about 
US$2,115 million over thirty-three years in constant 2018 US$ terms. The expected 
revenue will not allow Ugandans to stop working and live off the oil; we estimate 
that it will average US$38 per capita per year over the same thirty-three-year 
span, compared with a GDP per capita of US$797 in 2018.
The Ugandan government’s stated intent is to use oil revenues to boost growth 
and structural transformation through investment in infrastructure at a con-
trolled pace. To this end the Government of Uganda (GoU) has introduced a new 
policy and institutional framework that will govern the management of oil rev-
enues. Adapted from the Norwegian model, the established framework mandates 
that revenues first enter a Petroleum Fund, and then be used either to invest in a 
sovereign wealth fund, or to finance a maximum fiscal deficit of 3 per cent of non-
oil GDP. The sovereign wealth fund is meant to park revenues abroad in times 
when domestic investment absorption is at capacity and/or signs of Dutch disease 
emerge. We identify a number of potential shortcomings of the framework put in 
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place. We point to gaps in the management of volatility, lack of isolation from the 
political cycle, lack of clarity regarding the distribution of revenues to local 
 governments, and a persistent lack of transparency. Weaknesses in public invest-
ment planning and management raise further doubts as to whether the planned 
investments will realize the expected transformational impact.
Our analysis draws on a growing body of work on Uganda’s oil boom that 
 discusses options to manage the revenue inflows, and that evaluates whether 
 certain best-practice oil governance models should be adopted in Uganda 
(African Development Bank  2015; Bategeka and Mawejje  2013; Collier  2011; 
Henstridge and Page  2012; Polus and Tycholiz  2017; Shepherd  2013; World 
Bank  2015). Other work that we build on focuses on the politics behind oil 
governance in Uganda, and argues that power relations in the country, rather 
than technical con sid er ations, are the most important predictor of the eventual 
developmental outcomes from the oil revenues. We also look at the relatively 
long process of commercializing oil. This has been a subject of debate in the 
literature we refer to, as to whether this delay represents deliberate government 
choice or is an early manifestation of inadequate capacity and elite capture 
(Patey 2015; Polus and Tycholiz 2016).
Our chapter complements two further chapters of this book which study the 
role of the construction sector (Colonelli and Ntungire, chapter 15) and local con-
tent policy (Sen, chapter 16) in Uganda to understand how the oil boom to come 
can play a role in the structural transformation of the Ugandan economy.
In section 2, we lay out the timeline of oil exploration in Uganda, and then 
move on to describe the expectations and assumptions regarding the size of the 
boom to come. We then provide our projections. In section 3, we discuss the 
institutional framework that has been put in place to manage oil revenues, and 
comment on its advantages and disadvantages. Section 4 concludes.
2. Timing and sequencing of the oil boom
2.1 Uganda’s oil timeline thus far
2.1.1 Exploration during colonial times
Oil in Uganda has a history that goes back to the late nineteenth century, when 
local communities discovered oil seepages in the Albertine region. Such finds 
were documented by Emin Pasha in 1877 and by British colonial administrator 
and explorer F. Lugard in 1890, the latter being quick to declare ownership of them.
In the twentieth century, exploration was erratic and hindered by geopolitical 
events. In 1925, the British colonial administration conducted a geological survey 
to map possible oil deposits. This survey provided the first official confirmation 
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of the presence of hydrocarbons in the Albertine Graben and generated inter nation al 
interest in commercializing oil reserves in Uganda (Kiiza et al. 2011). In 1938, a 
Johannesburg-based investment company drilled exploration wells and made 
discoveries. More exploration wells were drilled, but these initial attempts were 
soon halted by the Second World War, disrupting the oil market. Some explor-
ation activity resumed in 1952, but this was again halted after a change in colonial 
policy that clustered East Africa into an agriculture zone. Up to independence, no 
reserves of commercial viability were discovered.
2.1.2 Exploration after independence
The political turmoil and insecurity that followed Ugandan independence put a 
brake on exploration activity until the early 1980s, when President Obote resumed 
power. The new government restarted exploration and was assisted by the World 
Bank to fund aeromagnetic surveys over the Albertine region. It also advanced 
the legislative and administrative framework by passing The Petroleum 
(Exploration and Production) Act in 1985 and establishing a dedicated Petroleum 
Unit in the Geological Survey and Mines Department. This Act, along with the 
Petroleum (Exploration and Production) (Conduct of Exploration Operations) 
Regulations of 1993, regulated upstream activities in the oil sector. Political 
in stabil ity in the mid 1980s, however, delayed progress. Soon after the National 
Resistance Movement (NRM) took power in 1986, President Museveni suspended 
negotiations with oil companies. With the aim of endowing Ugandan pro fes-
sionals with stronger bargaining power so that they might negotiate favourable 
contract terms, staff were sent for training to Norway, the United States, and India 
(Rwakakamba and Lukwago 2013).
A few years later, the government signed the first production sharing agree-
ments (PSAs). The first three were signed with Petrofina, a Belgian oil company, 
in 1991, and with Uganda Works and General Engineering Company, in 1995. 
These were, however, cancelled after the alleged failure of the oil companies to 
deliver on the agreed terms. The next agreement was signed in 1997 with 
Heritage Oil and Gas for the exploration rights of Exploration Area (EA) 3A in 
the Semliki basin.1 Under this contract, Heritage conducted the first seismic 
surveys, which considerably increased confidence that significant oil deposits 
were present in the area.
The 2000s were marked by more substantial exploration activity and the 
 emergence of Irish company Tullow Oil as a dominant player in the Ugandan oil 
sector. On the back of increases in the oil price and a decade of stability in the 
country, investments in the region increased significantly and more companies 
showed an interest in drilling exploration wells. The government signed a number 
1 EA3A covered the southernmost part of Lake Albert and its shores, an area stretching from 
Kanywataba to Buhuka (see Wolf and Potluri (2018) for a map).
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of PSAs, and three companies—Tullow Oil, Hardman Resources, and Heritage 
Oil—fielded discoveries. As a result, the commercial threshold of reserves for oil 
extraction was reached in 2006 for EA22, in 2007 for EA3A, and in 2009 for EA13. 
Through several acquisitions, Tullow Oil managed to consolidate rights for all 
Exploration Areas with significant discoveries (EA1, EA2, and EA3A), and 
attracted oil giants Total and CNOOC into a joint venture at equal shares in 2011.
2.1.3 Slowdown of exploration activity and development  
of current legal framework
The five-year period after 2011 was characterized by a substantial slowdown of 
activity in the sector. Four factors contributed to the deceleration. First, the gov-
ernment saw a need to develop a more robust policy and legal framework before 
moving into the production stage. To this effect, the Ministry of Energy and 
Mineral Development (MEMD) approved a National Oil and Gas Policy in 2008, 
and in 2011 parliament imposed a moratorium on the signature of new contracts 
until the requisite legal framework was put in place. Second, the government did 
not want to proceed to the production stage without agreement on a large 
re finery. The president pronounced that he did not want oil to be sold without 
adding value in-country. He wanted a refinery large enough to refine all of 
Uganda’s oil, saturate the domestic fuel market, and export surplus fuel to the 
regional market. Oil companies, on the other hand, had concerns regarding the 
commercial viability of a large refinery and feared ending up in a monopsony. 
Third, several tax disputes arose, leading to litigation between the government 
and the oil companies. Last but not least, a downward trend in the oil price 
beginning in 2014 lowered the oil companies’ incentive to push ahead with 
investments.
With regard to the first of these factors, parliament passed the Petroleum 
(Exploration, Development and Production) Act and the Petroleum (Refining, 
Conversion, Transmission and Midstream Storage) Act in 2013. These Acts estab-
lished the Petroleum Authority of Uganda (PAU) as the regulatory body and des-
ignated the Uganda National Oil Company (UNOC) to manage the government’s 
commercial interest in the sector. Formulated with Norwegian support, the two 
Acts formed the legal basis for the development of upstream and midstream 
capacity. In the same year, the Ministry of Finance approved an Oil and Gas 
Revenue Management Policy. This provided an important signal that the govern-
ment intended to put in place a prudent governance framework to manage the 
expected revenue. Consequently, in 2015, the government passed the Public 
Finance Management Act. This was a landmark legislation that included 
2 EA2 covered most of Lake Albert and its shores, excluding the southern and northern ends.
3 EA1 covered the northern end of Lake Albert, and the confluence area of the Nile called the 
Pakwach Basin.
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provisions on the management of oil resources and gave birth to the Charter for 
Fiscal Responsibility, the Petroleum Revenue Fund, and the Petroleum Revenue 
Investment Reserve. The development of the legal policy and regulatory frame-
work saw extensive support by development partners, most prominently the 
Norwegian government.4
The second and third factors which were slowing down exploration and 
 op er ation al progress were overcome through concessions gained from both the 
government and international oil companies. In 2013, the government accepted 
the oil companies’ compromise on the refinery and agreed to a smaller facility to 
serve only the domestic fuel market, and to a pipeline to export crude oil (see 
sections 2.1.5 and 2.1.6 below). Regarding the tax disputes, the government stood 
its ground and Tullow Oil eventually agreed to pay the taxes demanded in order 
to avoid risking the non-renewal of its exploration licences. External factors also 
improved when in 2016 the international oil price began to recover.
2.1.4 Development of infrastructure required for production
Construction of the required infrastructure for production has been slow. The 
only major oil-related projects completed thus far are the Hoima–Kaiso–Tonya 
road (finished in 2014, this was an entirely GoU-funded project and forms an 
important network to connect oil wells) and an oil waste treatment plant in 
Nyamasoga (finished in 2015). Virtually no progress has been made in the three 
crucial large infrastructure projects, namely the crude oil refinery, the oil pipeline, 
and the Hoima airport.
2.1.5 Critical infrastructure project 1: oil refinery
From the time of its proposal, the crude oil refinery has been a contentious 
 project. President Museveni initially insisted on refining all crude oil in-country 
to increase local value addition and end dependency on fuel imports. The presi-
dent’s views were bolstered by Foster Wheeler’s feasibility study conducted 
in  2010–11, which claimed that a 150,000 bbl/day refinery would generate 
US$1  billion in profits annually through import substitution and export earnings. 
These figures were disputed by the oil companies, which expected local demand 
to be insufficient to render the refinery profitable. The oil companies cited a 
similar situation in Kenya, where the refinery in Mombasa shut down due to lower 
efficiency than the large competitors in the Middle East and India, and other 
failed refinery projects across Africa (Patey 2015). After lengthy negotiations, the 
government changed its view and agreed to a smaller refinery of 30,000 bbl/day 
(scalable to 60,000 bbl/day) to serve the domestic market. The Russian company 
4 The Norwegian government pledged in its third phase of support US$6.5 million for the period 
2015–18. The first and second phases ran from 2006–9 and from 2009–14 at budgets of US$2.58 
 million and US$18.3 million, respectively.
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RT Global Resources was selected as lead investor for the refinery in early 2015. 
However, the deal fell through due to disagreement on the terms, and this led to 
another round of bidding. In early 2018 the GoU signed a new deal on the refinery 
with investors consisting of the Albertine Graben Refinery Consortium (led by 
US-based General Electric). A final investment decision is yet to be taken, making 
the completion date an open question.
The refinery is estimated to have a cost of US$3–4 billion and is to be financed 
to 40 per cent by the GoU. The government’s stake in the project is held by the 
Uganda Refinery Holding Company (which is a subsidiary of UNOC). The 
re finery, as well as the planned airport, will be hosted in the Hoima Oil and Gas 
Industrial Park (New Vision 2018a).5 A major bone of contention at the moment 
is the resettlement of more than 20,000 people in the area that has been earmarked 
for the refinery, complicated by the lack of formal land ownership titles among 
Ugandan residents.
2.1.6 Critical infrastructure project 2: oil pipeline
For the oil companies, the construction of a crude oil export pipeline was non-
negotiable; it was viewed as the only commercially viable and reliable path to 
bringing Ugandan oil to the international market. In late 2013, the government 
accepted the oil companies’ demands for a pipeline, but the choice of route 
quickly became a geostrategic issue. A deal between Uganda and Tanzania for the 
East African Crude Oil Pipeline (EACOP) was reached in 2016, after an informal 
agreement with the Kenyan government was voided. The 1,445 km pipeline will 
be the longest heated pipeline in the world. In addition to the route being more 
cost effective thanks to numerous concessions by the Tanzanian government, 
issues of land acquisition, resettlement, and security played a role in swaying the 
GoU to decide against Kenya. President Museveni was also said to have been 
wary of the Kenyan route due to Uganda’s experience with price surges of fuel 
transiting through Kenya during the 2008 election period (Patey 2015). The gov-
ernments of Tanzania and Uganda are planning to finance 70 per cent of the pro-
ject through international lenders, and 30 per cent through equity from the joint 
venture partners. At an expected cost of US$3.5 billion, it will transport a max-
imum of 216,000 barrels a day, at an expected price of US$12.2 per barrel. As of 
mid-2018, the Tanzanian and Ugandan governments are yet to complete the deal 
through the signature of a host government agreement that assures the investing 
parties’ contractual rights for the Tanzanian section of the pipeline. This is a 
major outstanding issue before a final investment decision can be made. In light 
of this, it is unlikely that the pipeline will start operation before 2022. Consequently, 
oil companies will be unable to begin large-scale production until then.
5 The Industrial Park is also planned to include petrochemical industries and a free zone for export 
production.
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2.1.7 Critical infrastructure project 3: Hoima airport
The international airport in Hoima, which will be Uganda’s second international 
airport, has been deemed necessary to bring in equipment for production that is 
too large to enter the country by road. It is planned to be completed by May 2020, 
i.e. thirty-six months after the start of construction. In 2018, parliament approved 
borrowing of US$318 million for the project. The majority of this sum is to be 
borrowed from UK Export Finance. The construction project has been awarded 
to the Israeli firm SBC Uganda.
2.2 Forecast of size and timing of revenue stream
In planning for oil revenues, an accurate forecast of the potential size and timing 
of the revenue stream provides an important input for fiscal policy decisions, and 
helps determine the choice of institutional framework. Will the revenues be larger 
or smaller than current tax collections, and how will they stack up against aid 
inflows? Will there be more revenues than can initially be absorbed in efficient 
domestic investments? Ever since 2006, when it was proven that oil in Uganda 
was commercially viable, the government, civil society, and researchers have built 
estimates and expectations of the size of the prospective oil boom.
Some of these expectations have already been solidified in infrastructure 
investments, or built into investment plans. The government has run an average 
budget deficit of 4.3 per cent of GDP over the last ten years, mainly to fund 
large infrastructure investments. In part, the investments made or planned provide 
the infrastructure necessary to enable oil production in the Albertine Graben, 
such as roads connecting the different fields, the export pipeline, the refinery, and 
an industrial park including the airport to allow importation of heavy equipment. 
But the scope of public investment extends far beyond the oil-producing regions, 
with three large hydropower dams on the Nile, airport extensions, new railway 
lines, and extensions of the road network to bolster trade (see Table 14.1 for an 
overview of large ongoing or planned public infrastructure projects in Uganda).
Investments funded through debt have seen the stock of public debt increase 
from 26.1 per cent in FY 2012/13 to 37 per cent or US$9.4 bn in FY 2016/17. The 
government plans to further increase its debt stock to 47.8 per cent by FY 2021/22. 
While these debts have not been collateralized against future oil revenues, the 
GoU expects future oil revenues to play an important role in managing its accu-
mulated debt in the medium term, and expects the debt stock to begin declining 
as oil revenues come on stream (Ministry of Finance 2017a).
Yet, forecasts of oil revenue have varied significantly depending on the information 
available at the time they were produced and the assumptions made. To illustrate 
this, we compare assumptions made in forecasts by the World Bank (2010), 
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Bategeka and Matovu (2011) of the Economic Policy and Research Centre, 
Henstridge and Page (2012), Lassourd and Bauer (2014) of the Revenue Watch 
Institute, a joint report by the National Planning Authority, AfDB, and World 
Bank (World Bank 2015), and KAPSARC (2016). All authors point to three major 
sensitivities:
 • international crude oil prices
 • the estimated size of recoverable reserves, and
 • delays in the execution of projects.
Table 14.1 Large (>US$100m) ongoing or planned public infrastructure projects in 
Uganda
Name of project 















480 86% Chinese loan 2012 2018
Karuma dam 2,200 85% Chinese loan 2013 2018
Isimba dam 590 82% Chinese loan 2013 2018
Bridge over the Nile 180 83% Japanese loan 2014 2018
Entebbe airport 
expansion
500 100% Chinese loan 2016 2021
Re-establishment of 
Uganda Air
400 82.5% commercial 
loan
2018 2018
Hoima airport 320 100% British loan 2018 2020
Oil pipeline 3,550 30% equity,  
70% debt
2019 2022
Refinery 3,500 60% equity,  
40% debt
2019 2022
Ayago dam 1,900 unknown 2020 2025
Kampala–Jinja 
expressway
1,000 60% PPP 
investment
2020 2025
Standard gauge railway 
(Malaba–Kampala 
section)
2,300 unknown unknown unknown
Standard gauge railway
(remaining network)
Up to 10,500 unknown unknown unknown
Notes: *Remainder is expected to be funded by GoU. **Excluding operation and maintenance costs.
Source: Authors’ compilation from project documentation, the National Development Plan II, the 
Public Investment Plan 2017/18–19/20, and newspaper articles.
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2.2.1 Critical forecast sensitivity 1: oil price
As the price of oil is notoriously volatile and hard to predict, most authors provide 
several low- and high-price scenarios to illustrate the sensitivity of their rev enue 
models to changes in its price. Among the projections we reviewed, assumptions 
regarding the oil price at the start of production range from US$30 to US$120. By 
coincidence or not, this is about the same range of fluctuation as the actual oil 
price over the period these projections were produced. The earlier studies were 
conducted in a high-price environment and thus were more optimistic over oil 
price assumptions, often assuming a minimum price above US$60. Once the 
price fell to about US$50 in 2015 and then US$30 in 2016, more pes sim is tic 
assumptions were used. The price of Brent has since risen to above US$70 again. 
To provide conservative estimates in the light of the price fluctuations over the 
last decade, we model a lower-bound price scenario with a constant price of 
US$40 (the actual oil price dipped below this level for only ninety-seven days 
over the period 2008–18), a reference-case scenario starting with the current price 
of US$77 and a 2 per cent growth rate, and a higher-bound price scenario starting 
with the current price of US$77 and a 5 per cent growth rate.
2.2.2 Critical forecast sensitivity 2: recoverable reserves
Uncertainty regarding recoverable reserves also has a large impact on the ac cur acy 
of projections. Between 2011 and 2016 the signature of new contracts for exploration 
was halted by a parliamentary moratorium, and exploration thus continued at a 
relatively low pace under existing contracts. Despite this, in 2014, the level of proven 
reserves was revised upwards from 3.5bn to 6.5bn barrels. This increased the esti-
mated range of recoverable oil reserves, from 200m barrels to between 1.2bn and 
1.7bn barrels.6 At this stage, 40 per cent of the total area with potential for petroleum 
reserves had been explored. In late 2017, Australia’s Armour Energy and Nigeria’s 
Oranto Petroleum signed new PSAs with the government for exploration in 
the Kanyawataba EA in Ntoroko district and the Ngassa EA in Hoima district, 
respectively. They plan to drill over 400 new wells in the next 2–3 years (the last 
fifteen years saw 121 wells drilled). The probability of additional discoveries is 
therefore reasonably high, especially given the high drilling success rate of 
87 per cent up to 2017. However, the Ngassa EA and further currently unlicensed 
EAs that make up the majority of unexplored territory are located mostly off the 
shores of Lake Albert. These fields would need to contain significant reserves to 
be commercially viable because exploration and production in a body of water is 
more expensive than on land. It also bears higher en vir on men tal risk.
Adding to the uncertainty over reserves is the potential downward revision of 
already established estimates of recoverable reserves if recovery proves more 
 difficult than expected—which is the reason ‘proven recoverable reserves’ are 
6 Source: Petroleum Authority of Uganda (http://petroleum.go.ug/uploads/resources/
FrequentlyAskedQuestin.pdf [sic]).
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quoted in a relatively large range of 1.3–1.7 bn by the MEMD. The recovery factor 
eventually realized will depend on the development of production cost prices and 
geological conditions on the cost side, and the oil price on the revenue side.
We base our projections on estimates of 1,054 m barrels recoverable reserves 
quoted by KAPSARC (2016), who provide a detailed model of upstream develop-
ment and operational costs for the production fields in EA1, EA2, and EA3A 
based on information from the MEMD. In addition, we assume recoverable 
reserves of 400m barrels for the production fields in EA1A,7 an area for which no 
official estimates have been made public. As a result, our lower-bound and refer-
ence scenarios assume recoverable reserves of 1,454 m barrels, right in the middle 
of the 1.2–1.7 bn barrel range quoted by the MEMD. Our higher-bound scenario 
assumes additional discoveries in the remaining 60 per cent of terrain at 50 per cent 
of the success rate of exploration thus far, i.e. 2,181m barrels of total recoverable 
reserves by 2027.
2.2.3 Critical forecast sensitivity 3: delays
The timing of the onset of production would seem to be the easiest factor to pre-
dict, given that it is largely under the control of the GoU and the contracted oil 
companies. Generally, the projections we have reviewed assume that, in line with 
government plans, production would start within 2–3 years of the publication of 
the relevant studies. Ex post, we know that none of the expectations embodied in 
previous projections regarding the onset of production have been met thus far, 
and that the government has continuously pushed back its schedule to reach first 
oil (Parliament of Uganda 2016). As of 2019 the key infrastructure projects have 
been ready for final investment decisions for two years, but were delayed over a 
tax dispute between the Ugandan government and the joint venture partners, and 
ongoing negotiations between the Ugandan and Tanzanian government regarding 
the oil pipeline. If final investment decisions are finally made in 2020 and con-
struction begins the same year, oil production could start in 2023 at the earliest.
2.2.4 Revenue projections
We base our revenue projections on the production and cost profiles in an 
upstream cost model by KAPSARC (2016) and exploration cost accounts from 
Tullow (2012). Our assumptions on profit sharing are based on leaked production 
sharing agreements. All our assumptions are detailed in Wolf and Potluri (2018) 
for a detailed description of assumptions.
In our reference-case scenario of a US$77 pb oil price in 2018 with a 2 per cent 
growth rate and a balancing 2 per cent inflation rate we project that oil revenues 
will peak at US$4,536 m and average US$2,116m over thirty-three years in con-
stant 2018 US$ terms (see Figure 14.1).
7 EA1A was created in 2012 after EA1 exploration rights expired. It was made up of the area of EA1 
for which no production licence application had been submitted.
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In per capita terms, we project revenues of up to US$83 at peak oil and US$38 
if averaged over thirty-three years. As a percentage of non-oil GDP the oil rev-
enue would be 13 per cent at peak oil and 6 per cent on average, and as a percent-
age of non-oil tax revenue 73 per cent at peak oil and 32 per cent if averaged over 
thirty-three years. The non-discounted revenues are composed of 57 per cent of 
profit oil, 19 per cent of daily production royalty, 15 per cent of income tax, 5 per cent 
of UNOC participation, 3 per cent of withholding tax, and 3 per cent of cumula-
tive production royalty.
The above projections are very sensitive to the assumed oil price. In the event 
of a US$40 flat oil price throughout the production period, but 2 per cent infla-
tion of other prices, the government oil revenue peaks at US$1,177m in constant 
2018 US$—only 26 per cent of the reference case scenario. In the event of a 
US$77 oil price—with a 5 per cent rather than a 2 per cent growth rate, and 
additional discoveries of 50 per cent of the current total discoveries, assumed to 
follow EA1A contract terms, production, and cost profiles—government oil rev-































Figure 14.1 Projected cashflows for lender, international oil companies, national oil 
company, and GoU revenues






























m US$77 with 5% growth
US$77 with 2% growth
US$40 flat
Figure 14.2 Government oil revenue sensitivity to oil price assumptions
Source: Authors’ illustration based on authors’ model.
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these different scenarios, which should be considered lower and upper bounds 
rather than likely scenarios.
3. Is Uganda ready for oil to flow?
Experiences of failure to derive sustainable development outcomes from natural 
resource assets are so common that a vast literature exists on the ‘resource curse’. 
In its introduction, the Natural Resource Governance Charter, an authoritative 
collection of best-practice measures that provides a benchmarking tool for coun-
tries such as Uganda that are in the process of increasing their resource extraction, 
states: ‘Countries with non-renewable resource wealth face both an opportunity 
and a challenge. When used well, these resources can create greater prosperity for 
current and future generations; used poorly, or squandered, they can cause eco-
nomic instability, social conflict, and lasting environmental damage’ (NRGI 2014: 4). 
Grounded in this Charter, the Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI) 
also produces an index that aims to assess the quality of natural resource govern-
ance. The index published in 2017 classified Uganda’s resource governance as 
‘poor’, but improving towards ‘weak’ (NRGI 2017), ranking the country fifty-first 
out of the eighty-nine countries assessed. In this section we aim to provide an 
overview of the governance framework put in place thus far and complement 
previous assessments in identifying areas of weakness and room for further 
improvement.
We first lay out the expectations the government has built for the sector, then 
provide an overview of the governance framework established to achieve the 
goals. We uncover ambiguities regarding the definition of the fiscal anchor and 
the use of the sovereign wealth fund and briefly discuss the vulnerability of the 
fiscal anchor to price and political shocks. Given the relatively small revenues 
there is only a low risk of Dutch disease effects, which should easily be contained 
if a fiscal rule is adhered to. We contrast the fiscal rule the government has chosen 
with other options, and end the discussion of the governance framework with the 
crucial issue of public investment management, which is arguably one of the big-
gest weaknesses in the current governance framework.
3.1 Expectations for the oil sector
‘Vision 2040’, which was adopted in 2007, is the primary policy document that 
establishes the government’s objectives for the coming decades. The headline 
policy goal of this document is to attain upper-middle-income status for Uganda 
by 2032. The objectives are delineated into workable strategy plans via six five-
year National Development Plans (NDPs), which guide the medium-term public 
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expenditure priorities (The Republic of Uganda 2007). The NDP-I (2010–15) was 
published in 2010 and aimed for Uganda to attain middle-income status by 2017 
(The Republic of Uganda 2010). The NDP-II (2015–20) was published in 2015 and 
revised the target year for attainment of middle-income status to 2020 (Republic 
of Uganda 2015a). Recent GDP growth has, however, been slower than anticipated, 
averaging 4.47 per cent over 2012–16 compared with 7.7 per cent for 2007–11.8 
This makes it highly unlikely that Uganda will achieve middle-income status by 
2020. Regardless of whether their goals are realistic or not, the first two NDPs 
provide valuable insights into the direction of the strategic medium- and long-
term policy.
The NDPs identified infrastructure development and employment generation 
as the key outcomes expected from development of the oil and gas sector. Within 
this, the oil pipeline and refinery were prioritized as the large-scale investment 
projects to drive growth. Additionally, Hoima city is to be developed as a strategic 
city for supporting further development of oil infrastructure. The delays are 
evident: Vision 2040 sequenced the oil refinery for completion under NDP-I 
and the oil pipeline under NDP-II (with initial investments as early as the third 
year of NDP-I), but as of 2018, neither project has reached the final investment 
decision stage.
During their construction and future operational stages, these projects are 
expected to create a multiplier effect generating further investments in secondary 
industries such as petrochemicals, plastics, and fertilizers, as well as tertiary indus-
tries such as manufacturing, transportation, construction, and communication 
(New Vision 2018b). As negotiations and contractual agreements for infrastructure 
projects are still being finalized, there is reason to believe that the local economy is 
not in a position to maximize gains from the anticipated investment inflow. 
Although government policy has placed significant importance on local content 
development, progress to develop labour skills and infrastructure has been slow.9
3.2 The current governance framework and its shortcomings
The delays in Uganda’s progress towards oil production have given time to put in 
place a governance framework for the management of oil revenue. The govern-
ance framework for oil revenue is currently defined through:
8 Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank Data (https://data.worldbank.org/country/
uganda).
9 This has been reiterated over numerous reports (Report of the Auditor General (2015), and 
National Strategy for Private Sector Development (2017/18–2021/22) (Ministry of Finance 2017d)). 
With regard to the labour force, Uganda is part of the East African Community’s Common Market 
Protocol, which establishes free movement of labour amongst EAC member nations. While this can 
alleviate the shortage of skilled labour in the country, Ugandan workers need to develop skills at a fast 
rate to take advantage of the opportunities in the oil and gas sector.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 11/01/20, SPi
Wolf and Potluri 317
 • the Public Financial Management Act (2015)
 • the Charter of Fiscal Responsibility (2015), to be updated after every general 
election
 • the Petroleum Revenue Management Policy (2012).
The Petroleum Fund is set up and defined in the Public Financial Management 
(PFM) Act (The Republic of Uganda 2015b). Withdrawals from this fund are to be 
made either to support the annual budget (via transfers into the consolidated 
fund) or to invest into the Petroleum Revenue Investment Reserve (PRIR) (which 
is designed to be a sovereign wealth fund invested abroad). The expected annual 
withdrawals from the Fund are required to be outlined in the Medium-Term 
Budget Framework (MTBF).10 The Petroleum Fund has so far received revenue 
only from taxation. The government withdrew money (Sh.125.3 billion) for the 
first time for the 2017/18 annual budget.
3.2.1 Ambiguity regarding the fiscal anchor and sovereign wealth fund
As per the Petroleum Revenue Management Policy, the government is adopting 
the non-oil, non-grant deficit as a fiscal anchor, eventually to be combined with 
an overall expenditure growth limit. This anchor is to be operationalized through 
the Charter of Fiscal Responsibility, which determines the deficit limit. Section 3.1 
(iii) of the Charter states that the fiscal balance, when calculated without petroleum 
revenues, should be ‘maintained at a sustainable level over the medium term’. 
However, clarification is required on whether the sustainable fiscal balance limit is 
the same as mandated by the East African Monetary Union protocols (at 3 per cent 
of GDP), which must be adhered to by FY 2020/21 according to the Charter 
(Ministry of Finance 2016a). The exact definition of the fiscal anchor for the use 
of oil revenues has been postponed and the Charter is supposed to be updated to 
‘establish specific operational objectives for petroleum revenue management once 
there is certainty of the flow of petroleum revenues’.
The working of the PRIR, which will be held by the Bank of Uganda at the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, is also ambiguous at the moment. 
Appropriations to the PRIR are required to be based on the recommendations of 
an Investment Advisory Committee11 to the minister of finance. However, these 
recommendations are not binding, and it is unclear to what extent they must be 
followed. Ambiguity also surrounds the use of the funds saved in the PRIR, as the 
10 At this stage, the MTBF projects Sh.125.28 billion for oil infrastructure development for 2017/18. 
The MTBF 2018/19–2022/23 does not indicate any fiscal expenses from the oil fund (Ministry of 
Finance 2017c).
11 The Investment Advisory Committee is to comprise four non-public officials (including the 
chairperson) and three government representatives (one each from the Ministry of Finance, Ministry 
of Energy and Mineral Development, and National Planning Authority). The committee has not yet 
been established.
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PFM Act does not regulate withdrawals. It is unclear whether the government can 
only tap into the expected permanent income derived from the reserve, or 
whether withdrawals of the principal are also allowed. By end of December 2017, 
the Petroleum Fund held Sh.422 billion (equivalent to US$114.21 million),12 with 
the PRIR having a zero balance.
3.2.2 Vulnerability to price and political shocks
Another issue that is not addressed in the PFM Act is how the government plans 
to shield itself from the volatility of oil revenues in the event that it uses them to 
finance its deficit. While the fiscal anchor is a good tool to shield the economy 
from large year-on-year changes in government spending, it only works well if 
revenues are consistently above the levels required to finance the non-oil non-
grant deficit targeted by the fiscal anchor. In our lower-bound scenario, oil rev-
enues would not be enough to fund a 3 per cent budget deficit except around the 
peak oil years. Therefore, especially in a situation of already high debt burdens, it 
would be advisable to maintain a medium-term credit line either through paying 
off debt to leave more room for short-term financing or by keeping a balance in 
the Petroleum Fund to help smooth revenue volatility, avoid disruptions to public 
spending and investments, and prevent premature withdrawals from the PRIR.
A further issue of contention with the definition of the fiscal rule (embedded 
in the Charter of Fiscal Responsibility) is that it must be approved by every new 
parliament. This affords the government flexibility to react to unforeseen circum-
stances. However, the downside is that it ties the fiscal rule to the political busi-
ness cycle and leaves fiscal sustainability at the mercy of the powers that be, which 
can lead to irresponsible spending.
3.2.3 Narrow focus on development spending
The use of petroleum revenue is restricted through the PFM Act. Section 58 of the 
Act states that money from the Petroleum Fund can be used either for the national 
budget or for investing in the PRIR; and Section 59 (3) of the PFM Act further 
states: ‘For avoidance of doubt, petroleum revenue shall be used for the financing 
of infrastructure and development projects of government and not the recurrent 
expenditure of government’. Although it appears to be a well-worded maxim, it is 
debatable what does and does not constitute infrastructure and development 
projects—for example, does expenditure on security, which is a component of the 
NDP, count as infrastructure building? Furthermore, since the consolidated fund 
does not earmark its sources for specific allocations and money is fungible, this 
restriction appears void. Another concern is that the current definition in the 
PFM Act omits mention of the necessity to plan for operational and maintenance 
12 At US$1 = Sh.3695.
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expenditure at the time development projects are financed, and in fact prohibits 
paying for these from petroleum revenue. Insufficient provision of operational 
and maintenance funds is already a cause for fast depreciation and low return 
from public investments (World Bank 2016). Another issue is that 6 per cent of 
revenues from royalties are to be appropriated as transfers to local governments 
for development purposes, but it is unclear whether this is to be done as they are 
collected, or whether the transfers can be shifted to other fiscal years.
3.2.4 Mitigating the risk of Dutch disease
Dutch disease has hampered growth in numerous resource-rich African coun-
tries (its insidious effects on Nigeria’s economy and particularly on its agriculture 
sector during the 1970s form the archetype of natural resources precluding 
developmental gains). Studies attempting to estimate Uganda’s exposure to Dutch 
disease suggest that its negative effects are likely to be modest given the expected 
size of the boom (Lassourd and Bauer 2014). One way to mitigate any potential 
impact of the above scenario is to spend at a sustainable level defined by the fiscal 
rules discussed above. Uganda’s fiscal planning in the past has demonstrated 
commitment to adopt sound and predictable planning methods. For instance, the 
Ministry of Finance was one of the early adopters of the Medium-Term 
Expenditure Framework (MTEF). The government should take a similarly pro-
gressive stance on commitment mechanisms for the Petroleum Fund, and pos-
sibly enshrine a fiscal rule in the PFM Act. Another mechanism to shield the 
economy from Dutch disease is to sterilize the effect of changes in exchange rates 
through investment abroad, as planned with the PRIR. Withholding oil revenue 
from the domestic economy can preclude and tame the effects of exchange rate 
appreciation. As the government’s investment absorption capacity is in doubt, 
this method can halt large cash inflows and the subsequent currency appreciation.
3.2.5 How much to spend: the choice of fiscal rule
Wolf and Potluri (2018) illustrate the effect different fiscal rule choices would have 
on the government spending path and conclude that the option chosen by gov-
ernment (assuming the non-oil deficit is set at the EAC deficit norm of 3 per cent) 
is a relatively conservative spending scenario, particularly in the earlier years, 
and especially when compared with hand-to-mouth spending. Hand-to-mouth 
spending not only leaves the government at the mercy of oil price volatility, but 
also front-loads investment, with serious operations and maintenance implica-
tions as well as adverse macroeconomic effects (Adam et al. 2014). The different 
rules considered yield results similar enough to conclude that any rule would be 
better than no rule.
This section has so far focused on the management of oil revenues, and certain 
restrictions on it. However, equally important is the governance of expenditures 
that will be financed from the oil revenues. As Uganda gets closer to oil extraction, 
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the lack of a fiscal strategy to delineate a long-term development ex pend iture plan 
raises concerns. Governance measures defined in the PFM Act will only be put to 
the test after significant revenue from oil exports begins to flow into the Petroleum 
Fund. Up to now, only relatively small amounts of money have been collected in 
the Petroleum Fund through taxes, signature bonuses, or tax settlements with oil 
companies, so the government’s commitment to prudent management of these 
resources has not yet been tested.
3.2.6 Poor quality of public investment management
The government plans to convert oil reserves into assets through public invest-
ments. Its public investment programme has already expanded significantly 
(guided by the NDPs that have placed infrastructure, energy, and transport as 
priority sectors) over the last five years. As more development projects get funded 
through the national budget rather than by donors and development partners, the 
government’s oversight and competency in managing these investments becomes 
more decisive.13 However, relatively poor Public Investment Management 
Assessment (PIMA) scores raise doubts regarding current government capacity 
to significantly expand its public investment portfolio without further reducing 
its already low rate of return. The Ministry of Finance (2017b) estimates that 
Uganda currently loses over 60 per cent of resources invested in public projects 
due to inefficient management.
Recent diagnostic studies by the Ministry of Finance, World Bank, and IMF 
have identified numerous issues in the existing project management system that 
require reassessment and reform. Ex ante analysis carried out during project 
inception and appraisal stages has been weak and limited. Preparation for pro-
jects often starts after they are included in the budget, thereby precluding the pos-
sibility of any appraisal or feasibility study to guide investment decision-making 
(IMF 2018; Ministry of Finance 2016b; World Bank 2016). An internal diagnostic 
study by the Ministry of Finance suggests that the Development Committee 
(which is the approval body for projects at the Ministry of Finance) is ‘not com-
prehensive and faces challenges to standing up to political directives on including 
projects’ (Ministry of Finance 2016b). Furthermore, project evaluations rarely 
consider the external costs of investments such as environmental degradation or 
pollution, which can have negative affects on sectors such as tourism and agricul-
ture. This may thus inflate the profitability of some investments at the expense of 
growth in other sectors.
Under-execution of projects has also been a challenge. In 2017/18, forty-seven 
of sixty-nine projects that were due for completion, as indicated in the Public 
Investment Plan (PIP), needed extensions. Although the energy sector, which 
13 The Public Investment Plan for 2017/18 consisted of 440 projects, of which 317 are funded by 
the GoU.
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features the largest investments, has seen an improvement in its absorption rate 
(from 19 per cent in 2015/16 to 25 per cent in 2016/17), it is still low enough to be a 
cause for concern (Ministry of Finance 2018). Some of these delays are due to 
institutional factors. The IMF suggests that the PIP is over-committed in the 
medium term, which is affecting budget releases. Although the MTEF includes 
projects mentioned in the PIP, the link between the Public Investment Management 
System and the MTEF still requires stronger feedback mechanisms to better cap-
ture progress and thereafter direct funding into areas with higher absorption. 
Additionally, for monitoring purposes, improvements in stocktake mechanisms 
within the Ministry of Finance can allow a more systematic identification of 
medium-term commitments (IMF 2017). As government-funded and externally 
funded projects are not coordinated in the same data systems, an ‘Integrated 
Bank of Projects’ is being implemented at the Ministry of Finance, which is 
expected to ameliorate this problem.
At the concluding stages, project plans often do not include an asset manage-
ment strategy. They also have weak monitoring and evaluation systems to assess 
the quality of service, which results in an under-provision of maintenance and 
support during operational stages. A generally poor maintenance culture in the 
management of assets exacerbates this problem. Though the government over the 
years has increased budget allocations for operations and maintenance (from 
3.4 per cent (2004/5–2008/9) to 8.4 per cent (2012/13–2016/17)), they are still far 
below the global best-practice mark of 20 per cent of total budget (World 
Bank 2016). To improve this, there is a need to develop better feasibility studies 
and a stronger monitoring and project evaluation mechanism.
4. Conclusion
For the first time since its formation in 1998, the Uganda Bureau of Statistics, in 
its 2016/17 household survey, measured an uptick of poverty. Growth in real per 
capita terms has stagnated, averaging about 1 per cent over the years 2012–16, and 
the government has improved its tax take only marginally to just above 13 per cent 
of GDP. Debt levels have risen quickly. Infrastructure has been prioritized over 
service delivery in the use of the little fiscal space available, and the quality of 
service delivery has stalled or worsened. Development partners currently fund 
large parts of the service delivery system, which the government has increasingly 
less appetite for. In the light of these developments, windfall revenues from the 
exploitation of natural resources could provide a welcome fiscal relief to Uganda.
This chapter complements previous work with a renewed modelling effort to 
estimate the size and timing of revenue flows, taking into account recent informa-
tion regarding the size of reserves, costs of extraction, and progress with the 
required infrastructure. We expect that first oil will flow in 2023 at the earliest, 
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and estimate that revenues will average about US$2,116m over thirty-three years 
in constant 2018 US$ terms. The amount of revenue to expect will not allow 
Ugandans to stop working and live off the oil; as per our estimate, revenues would 
average US$38 per capita per year over the same thirty-three-year span, com-
pared with GDP per capita of US$797 in 2018.
In an attempt to transform the natural resource assets into productive assets, 
the government has established a new policy and institutional framework with 
the goal of boosting growth and structural transformation through investment in 
infrastructure at a controlled pace. Adapted from the Norwegian model, the 
established framework mandates that revenues shall first enter the Petroleum 
Fund, and then be used either to finance a maximum deficit of 3 per cent of non-
oil GDP, or to invest in the sovereign wealth fund. The sovereign wealth fund is 
meant to park revenues abroad in times when domestic investment absorption is 
at capacity and/or signs of Dutch disease emerge.
Despite pressing needs, the development of the oil sector has proceeded slowly—
much more slowly than people outside and within the government expected. 
Whether intentionally or not, it seems that so far the Ugandan government has done 
a good job in the sequencing of policy, legislation, and institutional and commercial 
development. Particularly when compared with other African oil producers, such as 
Ghana, which raced from discovery to production in only two years, Uganda is tak-
ing its time to prepare for the onset of revenues. That being said, we identified a 
number of shortcomings in the framework put in place that could become problem-
atic if unaddressed. These include lack of clarity in the management of volatility, a 
lack of isolation of revenue management from the political cycle, uncertainty regard-
ing the distribution of revenues to local governments and a persistent lack of 
transparency. Weaknesses in public investment management raise further doubts 
about the transformational impact of the planned investments.
It is important to note that these are not purely technical challenges, and that 
the political will to improve governance will be the overall deciding factor regard-
ing the benefits that the resource boom will bring for the economy. In economies 
like Uganda’s, the government plays the biggest part in capturing benefits from a 
natural resource boom owing to the small size of the private sector. Whereas this 
chapter has focused mainly on the size, timing, and governance of oil revenues, 
the two other chapters on the oil boom in Uganda that form part of the book 
(Colonelli and Ntungire, chapter 15; Sen, chapter 16) explore in more detail the 
role the government can play to use the oil sector as an engine of structural trans-
formation and diversification.
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Construction and Public 
Procurement in Uganda
Emanuele Colonnelli and Nicole Ntungire
1. Introduction
The construction sector represents the backbone of most developing economies, 
as it provides the foundation for infrastructure development, and it is therefore 
thought to act as a multiplier for all other economic sectors that rely on such 
infrastructure. Uganda is no exception, with conservative estimates from the 
Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBOS  2018) suggesting the construction sector 
directly contributes to approximately 7 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP). 
The construction sector has been growing rapidly over the past decade, in con-
trast to the declining trend observed in some key traditional sectors such as 
manufacturing (see Colonnelli and Ntungire 2018). This growth in the construc-
tion sector is largely attributed to an accelerated rate of execution of public invest-
ment in energy and infrastructure. The upward trend in public investment is 
consistent with the country’s strategy, as outlined in the National Vision 2040 and 
the second National Development Plan, to focus on building its capital stock, as a 
way to address Uganda’s infrastructure deficits and to build production facilities 
to prepare for exploitation of the country’s oil resource.
With respect to the growth of the natural resource sector, the importance of 
the construction sector is self-evident, more so with the recent discovery of an 
estimated 3.5 billion barrel oil reservoir in Uganda’s western and north-western 
Albertine Graben which has attracted considerable investor attention and signals 
strong potential for Uganda’s previously nascent extractive industry to transform 
livelihoods and raise the productivity of its largely agrarian-based economy. 
Estimates from the Petroleum Authority of Uganda (2018) put the value of total 
investments that will be made over the next three to five years, as Uganda transi-
tions to an oil-producing country, at over US$20 billion. Expectedly, a key por-
tion of these planned investments will involve the construction sector, including 
the construction of an oil refinery (US$4.5 billion), the construction of a 1,445-km 
East African crude oil export pipeline to the port of Tonga in Tanzania 
(US$3.55 billion), the construction of a new international airport in Kabaale, 
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Hoima District, and the construction of regional road networks (US$1 billion). 
Despite the promising prospects, the construction sector faces several bottlenecks, 
and the risks of failing to successfully convert investment opportunities into new 
job creation and national productivity growth are high. These new opportunities 
and challenges raise several questions: how much of the increased economic 
activity will be passed to the domestic private sector? Will these opportunities 
motivate efficiency—and transparency—enhancing regulatory changes? Will the 
influx of foreign capital increase or limit competition in the sector? Would cor-
ruption and inefficiency in public procurement still play a major role as a barrier 
to industry development?
These questions are especially important in light of the many challenges that 
have limited sectoral growth among construction firms and other stakeholders in 
their supply chains. These challenges range from difficulties in accessing finance 
to the endemic corruption and limited competition in public procurement, from 
the challenges of local firm capacity development to the information asymmetries 
about market prices and subcontractors’ quality, and the list goes on. We aim to 
shed light on these issues in various ways, acknowledging that these challenges 
are difficult to tackle from a policy perspective, but that several incremental steps 
could be taken, and that Uganda is on an upward and promising trend.
We approach this study starting from the assumption that data are key to 
enlighten the policy debate. Unfortunately, the construction sector is notoriously 
opaque, and data on construction projects for most sub-Saharan countries tend 
to be limited only to a subset of the very largest ones from international donors. 
Nevertheless, we are able to provide novel quantitative evidence from a unique 
database on the universe of public procurement contracts, which allows us to 
study the market structure and several issues that are specific to the construction 
sector. The emphasis in this chapter is therefore on the interaction between con-
struction firms and government spending. We further complement the analysis 
with an original survey of more than 600 construction firms, and with a number 
of focus groups and structured interviews conducted with several public- and 
private-sector organizations and officials.1
The chapter is organized as follows. First, we provide an overview of the con-
struction sector, and we illustrate its market structure using the micro-data on 
procurement contracts and firm-level surveys. Second, we discuss the basics of 
the regulatory framework, with a focus on public procurement and the primary 
stakeholders. Third, we argue about the importance of specific challenges to the 
growth of the sector and their relationships with policy. We then conclude.
1 Unless otherwise specified, all statistics in this chapter refer to authors’ calculations based on the 
original administrative from the Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Authority and survey 
data collected.
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2. Overview and market structure of  
the construction sector
The UBOS defines the construction sector as covering activities that include 
‘ construction of buildings, civil engineering and specialized construction activities’, 
with examples of the latter being ‘plumbing, heat and air conditioning installa-
tions, plastering and glazing, activities related to clearing of building sites, demo-
lition of wreckage of buildings and repair of buildings’ (UBOS 2010–11).
According to data from the latest Census of Business Establishments, collected 
in 2010–11 by UBOS, there are 458,106 businesses in the country, of which only 
653 (0.14 per cent) are in construction (see UBOS 2010–11). However, this number 
may vastly underestimate the importance of construction. First, when looking at 
the employment share, construction accounts for 1.3 per cent of all employment. 
Second, construction tends to be characterized by firms that mostly operate in 
specific but constantly changing construction sites, rather than their headquar-
ters, which makes them less likely to be identified and to respond to census-like 
surveys. A better estimate is the contribution of the construction sector to 
national GDP, which saw the sector account for between 7 per cent (Colonnelli 
and Ntungire 2018) and 13 per cent of GDP according to UBOS (2018), where the 
latter considers a broader definition of the construction supply chain. Furthermore, 
government contracts involving construction account for 57 per cent of the total 
value of public procurement, or a staggering total of 8,451 billion Ugandan 
shilling (UGX), during the period 2010–15.
Lack of micro-data on both the demand and the supply side of the construc-
tion sector makes it difficult to provide a comprehensive picture of this market, 
especially from a time-series perspective.2 Additionally, both demand and supply 
sides of the construction sector are extremely complex, with several key stake-
holders involved.
Fortunately, Uganda’s primary public procurement regulatory agency, namely 
the Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Authority (PPDA), collects 
rich administrative data on all government contracts. The data are directly 
obtained from all central and local government agencies through a compulsory 
mix of paper document submissions and the completion of online data systems, 
which are regularly checked for accuracy by PPDA officials.3 We partner with 
PPDA to fully digitize and harmonize these datasets, which gives us the possibil-
ity to analyse, to the best of our knowledge, the most comprehensive dataset to 
date on public procurement for an African country. In sub-section 2.1 we focus 
2 The last two full Censuses of Business Establishments took place in 2001–2 and 2010–11, with a 
partial update of the dataset in 2006–7.
3 Until 2015, the online system was named Procurement Performance Measurement System. 
Starting in 2015, the system was vastly changed and streamlined, and is currently named Government 
Procurement Portal.
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on such new data to provide a deeper overview of the demand side for construction 
sector services.
Additionally, in 2016, we conducted an original survey of 664 construction 
sector firms, by means of face-to-face ninety-minute surveys of local owners and 
managers. These firms were identified as a stratified sample of firms that have 
ever done business with government agencies in 2014–15.4 The surveys include 
sections on basic business and owner/manager details, management practices, 
employment composition, supply chain linkages, expectations, and the im port-
ance of various challenges to doing business in the sector. In sub-section 2.2 we 
focus on these novel surveys to shed more light on the supply side of the 
 construction sector.
Naturally, all datasets have a specific focus, and ours is biased towards the rela-
tionships between construction and public procurement. This caveat should be 
kept in mind, because we cannot go into details of specific sub-sectors that are 
less dependent on government spending, such as residential construction, where 
households and other private-sector firms play the major role as clients. Similarly, 
we are limited in our analysis of subcontracting among firms, as usually these 
data are subject to less strict disclosure and reporting requirements. Nevertheless, 
what is unquestionable is that the government plays a central role in the Uganda 
construction sector, as the largest projects are fully or partially run by govern-
ment agencies, with local firms reporting that government contracts regularly 
account for more than 70 per cent of their total volume of business. Importantly, 
public procurement plays the leading role in construction sector activities not 
only in Uganda, but in all other East African countries as well.
2.1 Demand side: the role of government contracts
A total of 221 public bodies, or procurement and disposal entities (PDEs), have 
engaged in public procurement activity in the period 2010–15.5 Of these, 143 
PDEs (65 per cent) have contracted at least one construction sector firm, which is 
the focus of the analysis sample used in the text. A further listing of the top 
twenty-five PDEs by number of construction contracts, shows see the dominant 
role played by the Uganda National Roads Authority (UNRA) and the National 
Water & Sewerage Corporation (NWSC);6 however, local governments also 
clearly play an important role for the dispersion of economic activity across geo-
graphical regions.
4 For more information on the sampling frame and other survey details, please contact the authors.
5 All our analysis in this sub-section refers to the period 2010–15, and all numbers are expressed in 
2015 Ugandan shilling, unless we specify otherwise.
6 See Colonnelli and Ntungire (2018).
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We further disaggregate the importance of these demand-side agents in 
(Colonnelli and Ntungire 2018), where we report the splits of PDEs into central 
versus local governments, by region, and by type of government agency.7 Not 
surprisingly, we find that while there are more local (eighty-eight) than central 
(fifty-five) PDEs, the latter account for 47 per cent of all contracts, and for 
94.5 per cent in terms of the total value of contracts. This is informative of the 
highly skewed distribution of public buyers in the market, which is value-wise dom-
inated by a few large government agencies engaging in extremely high-value 
contracts with construction firms. In terms of regional dispersion, we see that the 
majority of PDEs (eighty-four) are located in the central region, which is also 
the area with the dominant PDEs (such as UNRA), thus accounting for the 
majority of contracts (57.6 per cent) and almost the entirety of contract value 
(94.3 per cent). On the other hand, the PDEs in the northern, eastern, and western 
regions account for 16.4, 17.1, and 8.9 per cent of the contracts, and 2.4, 2.0, and 
1.3 per cent of contract values, respectively. Finally, when looking at the classifi-
cation by PDE type, we find that statutory bodies (such as UNRA, Uganda Revenue 
Authority, National Agricultural Research Organization, among others) play a 
crucial role, as they account for 21.5 per cent of the contracts and 76.4 per cent of 
contract values. Most small and medium contracts are instead contracted to firms 
by the local districts, which cover 46.3 per cent of all contracts but only 6.2 per cent 
of the total value.
Moving to the time-series dimension of the data, we can observe the evolution 
of public procurement activity over time (see Figure 3, Colonnelli and 
Ntungire 2018). We observe that while the number of active PDEs playing the role 
of buyers of construction firms’ services has been increasing since 2010, reaching 
a peak of 121 PDEs engaging in at least one public procurement contract in 2015, 
the total number and value of contracts show a more nuanced pattern. This is true 
both when looking at the total number of contracts and total contract values.
To conclude the depiction of the demand side for public procurement, we 
report various summary statistics on construction contracts (see Colonnelli and 
Ntungire 2018). First of all, most construction contracts are labelled as ‘macro’ (a 
total of 11,791, or 83.6 per cent); that is, contracts that broadly require higher  levels 
of documentation, stricter regulatory requirements, and minimum contract sizes. 
In comparison, only 28.2 per cent of non-construction contracts are classified as 
‘macro’ across the other sectors, a clear indication of the importance of govern-
ment contracts for firms in the construction industry. The largest construction 
procurement contract in the data is a contract of UGX315 billion, while the 
median macro contract is of UGX300 million; we also observe a high level of 
dispersion in contract value, indicative of the dominant role played by large 
7 See Colonnelli and Ntungire (2018).
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outliers for aggregate economic dynamics. In terms of sources of financing for 
construction contracts, we find that the vast majority of contracts (10,118 out of 
14,110, or 72 per cent) are funded by the central government, while a smaller set is 
funded by the specific PDE (1,805), and only 560 contracts have been funded by 
international donors. However, the donor-funded contracts are the largest, with a 
median of UGX61 million and a mean of UGX2.1 billion, compared with a mean 
of UGX32.7 million and a median of UGX0.7 billion for central-government-
funded contracts, and UGX18.5 million and UGX0.2 billion for self-funded con-
tracts. We finally observe the distribution of contracts by allocation method: only 
32.1 per cent of contracts are based on fully competitive procurement allocation 
methods (such as open domestic or international bidding), while 23.5 per cent 
require a request for quotations, 6.5 per cent follow a direct procurement method, 
and 37.9 per cent are allocated through various ‘restricted’ methods, with a num-
ber of them requiring pre-selection by the Evaluation Committee from a small set 
of firms, as discussed later. While the primary determinant of the contract alloca-
tion method is the size of a contract, as we can see from the summary statistics, 
these data also indicate that there is considerable discretion involved in public 
procurement, an important topic we return to in later sections.
2.2 Supply side: firm-level evidence
A primary challenge in studying the construction sector in developing countries 
is the paucity of comprehensive data sources on the firms operating in this sector. 
We conduct a novel survey of 664 firms operating in the construction sector in 
Uganda, interviewing firm owners with the goal of collecting information on 
their firm balance sheet, management and personnel structure, experience in 
doing business with the government, and self-reported challenges in operating 
their business.
The firms entering the sample are geographically dispersed, with 37 per cent 
firms located in the central region of the country, 31 per cent located in the eastern 
region, 22 per cent in the northern region, and 10 per cent in the western region 
(see Figure 4, Colonnelli and Ntungire 2018). The firms are relatively young, with 
65 per cent of them having started operations after 2004 and only 10 per cent of 
firms founded before 2000.
Almost all firms (94 per cent) are male-owned and all but six owners were 
born in Uganda. The average age of the firm owner is forty-one years, with about 
10 per cent of firms having an owner younger than thirty years. Interestingly, the 
majority of owners (62 per cent) also own or run an additional business.
Looking at the labour force characteristics of firms we see that the average firm 
has about ten full-time and fifteen part-time employees, while the median is five 
employees (for both variables)—a result of the fact that the distribution of these 
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variables is highly right-skewed, with a right tail of very large firms (see Table 3, 
Colonnelli and Ntungire  2018). The surveyed firms are highly reliant on the 
employment of casual employees, with the median firm employing sixteen casual 
workers over the month before the survey was conducted, with an average of 
twenty-six workers. On average, firms have about two people as managers. The 
median firm does not employ any foreign workers, although a small number of 
firms are heavily reliant on foreign workforce.
We also analyse key balance sheet variables (see Colonnelli and Ntungire 2018: 
Table 4) and find sizeable variation in profits for the past twelve months as well as 
in the number of contracts that the firms currently have. The median firm had 
about US$2,300 of profits in the last year, while the overall average profit was 
about US$13,000. The breakdown of business costs highlight that firms’ greatest 
expenses are on labour costs, costs to buy stock and inputs in production, and the 
costs of renting or buying equipment.
The typical firm currently has only one contract. Importantly, as is evident 
from the data (see Colonnelli and Ntungire 2018: Figure 5), there is large variation 
in the share of business revenue that typically comes from procurement: we see a 
bimodal distribution, with about 28 per cent of firms that usually have close to 
zero reliance on government contracts, and about 42 per cent of firms that are 
completely reliant on procurement as a source of business. Similarly, about 64 per 
cent of firms in the sample have more than half of the value of their contracts 
coming from the public sector.
The data8 also confirms the importance of the public sector as a major source 
of business for construction firms in Uganda, with the average firm having less 
than one private buyer and 2.7 different public-sector bodies, with which they do 
business. The sector also seems highly concentrated, as the self-reported average 
number of competitors of a firm is three. Similarly, a firm does not typically 
obtain inputs and supplies from a large number of suppliers. Interestingly, the 
data further reveals that on average, a large share of these firms’ production is 
outsourced or subcontracted (close to 20 per cent). This is relevant in the context 
of procurement, as the government may find it more difficult to monitor execu-
tion and quality of work in the presence of complex supply chains.
When it comes to the perceived challenges in doing business, firms believe that 
a large number of competitors engage in unfair business practices, like avoiding 
or underreporting taxes, selling below market prices, avoiding labour regulations 
and health and safety regulations, and engaging in collusion. Importantly, the 
average firm owner believes that 71 per cent of competitors engage in corrupt or 
unfair practices to win contracts (see Colonnelli and Ntungire 2018: Table 7). Even 
among the local firms with which the owners report doing business, 40 per cent on 
8 See Colonnelli and Ntungire (2018: Table 5).
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average are believed to be corrupt, while the share is much lower for international 
firms. A good reputation is thought to be an important determinant of the 
 likelihood of doing business with a firm for all owners, and 70 per cent of firms 
state they have some internal control mechanisms to monitor corruption cases 
inside their firm. Finally, while firm owners seem to be very concerned about 
corruption cases in their sector, only 40 per cent of them believe that court 
enforcement works well in Uganda, and the share decreases to 22 per cent when it 
comes explicitly to corruption cases.
3. Regulatory framework and main stakeholders
In this section, we discuss the regulatory framework of the construction sector 
and the role of public procurement in Uganda, with a focus on the main 
 stakeholders in both the public and private sector. The information in this section 
is mostly based on the regulations and guidelines contained in the Public 
Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Act 2003 and the subsequent 2014 
regulations, as well as on various other guidelines published online by the regula-
tory agencies discussed in the following sections. We refer the readers to the 
original text for more details and specific exceptions.
3.1 Public procurement and the central role of PPDA
Part II, Section 5 of the Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Act 
2003 (henceforth the ‘Act’) established an autonomous regulatory body called the 
Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Authority (henceforth, the 
‘Authority’ or PPDA) (see Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets 
Authority 2003). It can be argued that the Authority represents the key player in 
the construction sector in Uganda, as public procurement plays such a central 
role as discussed in section 2. The Authority is also seen as the main anti-corruption 
and transparency agency in the country. The objectives of the Authority can be 
summarized as follows:
 • set the standards and practices for public procurement and disposal systems
 • monitor and ensure compliance to these standards and practices
 • advise the government and public entities involved in procurement on 
 procurement and disposal policies
 • build procurement and disposal capacity in Uganda (Part II, Section 6 of 
the Act).
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Part II, Section 7 of the Act outlines the functions of the Authority. Besides 
policy functions (such as, for example, advising government and public entities 
on best practices and capacity building) and regulatory ones (which include, 
among others, issuing guidelines and regulations, investigating breaches of the 
law, and carrying out performance audits of government contracts and public 
bodies’ performance), PPDA also collects data on management functions and the 
allocation of government contracts. Some of the rich data that PPDA manages 
were illustrated in section 2; additionally, it oversees the maintenance of data-
bases of providers and of online systems for publishing notices of procurement 
opportunities and awards.
As for the organizational structure, the Authority is governed by a board of 
directors appointed by the minister of finance, which consists of between six and 
eight members, including the executive director of the Authority, who is an ex 
officio member and who does not vote, and the secretary to the Treasury or a 
person nominated by him or her (Part II, Section 11 of the Act). The board 
appoints the executive director, who is responsible for the management and oper-
ations of the Authority, as well as for the management of its funds and property, 
and is in charge of the officers and staff of the Authority (Part II, Section 17 of the 
Act). Finally, officers and staff operate in six different departments: Executive 
Director and Corporate Office, Procurement Audit and Investigations, Finance and 
Administration, Internal Audit, Legal and Advisory Services, and Compliance 
and Training and Capacity Building.
3.2 Doing business with the government
The Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Act of 2003 provides rules 
governing all public procurement (defined as any procurement that is funded by 
public funds and by funds generated by a PDE) and public disposal activities 
(defined as the disposal of government assets). Furthermore, eleven regulations, 
which were drafted by the Authority in 2014, provide a comprehensive set of rules 
governing all procurement and disposal activities. In this sub-section, we illus-
trate the main components of these regulations.
3.2.1 Choice of procurement method
The first step in the process for the award of a procurement contract is the selec-
tion of the procurement method. Smaller contracts qualify for micro procure-
ment, which is subject to specific (simplified) regulations. Specifically, for the case 
of construction projects, this method can only be used for contracts with a value 
lower than UGX10 million. The micro procurement requires no written dis clos-
ure or bid; the only requirement is that the PDE evaluates a minimum of three 
quotations from different providers.
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Additionally, as briefly seen in section 2, there are various other procurement 
methods, each subject to different regulations:
 • open bidding (domestic and international)
 • restrictive bidding (domestic and international)
 • request for quotations and proposals
 • direct procurement.
The choice of which method to use depends on guidelines set forth in PPDA 
Regulation 6 and, for each contract, PDEs must detail the reasons that justify the 
use of a specific method. In the following paragraphs, we describe the details of 
each method. Importantly, while simplified compared with the specific details in 
the law, it is evident that a considerable degree of discretion is left in the hands of 
public officials, as will be discussed in more details in section 4.
Open bidding (domestic and international): This is the most transparent and pre-
ferred method, since it involves maximum competition. The PDE must publish a 
bid notice offering the opportunity to participate in the auction to all interested 
bidders. However, a request can be made to the Contracts Committee (discussed 
later in this section) to use a pre-qualification screening to obtain a shortlist of 
potential bidders. This is allowed if the project is highly complex, if the detailed 
nature of the evaluation implies that evaluating several complex bids would require 
a significant amount of time, or when the costs of preparing a detailed bid would 
strongly discourage competition. This method should be used when the contract 
value for the construction project exceeds UGX500 million. The minimum bidding 
period is thirty days for international bidding (open also to foreign providers) and 
twenty days for domestic bidding (open only to pro viders from Uganda).
Restricted bidding (domestic and international): This method is similar to open 
bidding, except that there is no publication of a bid notice. Instead, the invitation 
to bid is restricted to a limited number of potential providers included in a short-
list. Shortlisted firms can come from the Register of Providers (a database main-
tained by PPDA with information on firms interested in doing business with the 
government), officials’ market knowledge, previous experience of providers, or a 
previous pre-qualification.
For construction contracts, this method can be used when the value of the 
contract lies between UGX200 million and UGX500 million. Alternatively, the 
method can be used if there is a limited number of potential providers, or in cases 
of emergency when there is insufficient time for an open bidding procedure.
A minimum of three bidders must be invited to bid or, in case the justification 
for using a restricted bidding method is the limited number of potential pro-
viders, all available potential providers. The minimum bidding period is twenty 
days for international bidding (open also to foreign providers) and twelve for 
domestic bidding (open only to local providers).
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Request for quotations and proposals: This is a simplified method compared 
with open and restricted bidding, as it requires quicker and simpler procedures 
and documentation. Similar to restricted bidding, the invitation to bid is restricted 
to a limited number of shortlisted bidders, which can come from the Register of 
Providers, officials’ market knowledge, or previous experience of providers.
This method can be used when the construction project’s value lies between 
UGX10 million and UGX200 million. Alternatively, the method can be used in 
cases of emergency when there is insufficient time to use other, more competitive 
methods. A minimum of three bids must be obtained from potential providers.
Direct procurement: This method can only be used in an emergency situation, 
when there is insufficient time to use any other procedure, or when the construc-
tion project can only be carried out by one single provider or, in some instances 
specified by the regulations, when an original contract needs to be extended. This 
method can be used for any contract value, provided that the PDE justifies its use 
in light of the above conditions.
3.2.2 Evaluation phase
The evaluation criteria must be clearly specified in the solicitation documents, 
together with a statement of requirements, which clearly defines the quantities 
and specifications of what is to be purchased. Evaluations must be conducted by a 
team of at least three staff, who are approved by the Contracts Committee. All 
evaluations must be based on criteria pre-specified in the solicitation documents. 
There are three stages of evaluation:
 1. Preliminary examination: At this stage, unsuitable bidders and incorrect 
bids are eliminated. Unsuitable bidders are companies that are not regis-
tered or that are not compliant with the legal requirements listed in the 
Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Act. Incorrect bids are 
mostly those that are not accompanied by a bid security and those where 
not all submission requirements are correctly followed.
 2. Detailed evaluation: At this stage, the technical quality of the bids is assessed. 
Depending on which of the five evaluation methodologies (described in 
stage 3) is used, this is done either by comparing the documentation pro-
vided in the bid with the specifications in the solicitation documents or by 
awarding merit points to each bid.
 3. Financial comparison: At this stage, the best evaluated bidder is deter-
mined, following one of five evaluation methodologies, which must be 
specified ex ante in the tender or solicitation documents, and which are 
reviewed by the Contracts Committee to verify they are well suited for 
each given contract:
 a) Quality- and cost-based selection: This evaluation methodology considers 
both the technical quality of the bid and its cost. This is done in two 
steps. First, the technical quality of bids is evaluated, assigning merit 
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points to each bid and eliminating bids below a certain predetermined 
score. Then, the remaining bids are awarded points based on cost. The 
best evaluated bid is the one with the highest weighted technical and 
cost scores (with weights predetermined in advance).
 b) Quality-based selection: This evaluation meth od ology considers only 
the technical quality of the bid, by assigning merit points that determine 
the best evaluated bidder.
 c) Fixed-budget selection: This evaluation meth od ology considers the 
technical quality of the bid, but ensures that the cost of the bid is within 
a pre-specified budget. For bids within this budget, merit points are 
awarded to determine the best evaluated bidder.
 d) Least-cost selection: This evaluation methodology considers the cost of 
the bids, provided that the technical quality of the bids meets the 
minimum technical standard required. In order to determine which bids 
meet the standard, merit points are assigned to the technical quality of 
each bid, and bids below the minimum standard are eliminated. For bids 
that meet this standard, the best evaluated bidder is the least costly one.
 e) Technical compliance selection: A methodology similar to the least-cost 
selection one, except that in the first step there is a simpler pass/fail deci-
sion to determine whether a bid meets the technical standards, instead 
of the assignment of merit points.
3.3 Stakeholders in the construction sector
3.3.1 Main stakeholders in public procurement
The process of procuring government contracts involves several agencies, units 
within agencies, and a number of specific public officials. In this section, we list 
the main such stakeholders, their functions, and how they are organized.
PDEs: All procurement and disposal activities are carried out by procurement 
and disposal entities, or PDEs, as also extensively discussed in Section 2. A PDE 
refers to a ministry or department of the government, a local government, or any 
other body established by the government or intended to carry out public func-
tions (such as a public university or a public hospital).
Entities must plan their procurements at the beginning of each fiscal year, with 
the goal of aggregating requirements into larger contracts, gaining economies of 
scale, and avoiding emergency procurement whenever possible.
Each PDE is composed of an accounting officer, a contracts committee, a pro-
curement and disposal unit (PDU), a user department, and an evaluation com-
mittee, which must act independently and not interfere unduly in the operations 
of others. Next, we discuss these other stakeholders.
Accounting officer: The accounting officer is the person with the overall respon-
sibility for procurement and disposal within the PDE, although s/he is not 
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involved in detailed procurement or disposal work or in making official contract 
allocation decisions. S/he appoints members of the contracts committee and staff 
in the PDU.
Before the procurement process starts, the accounting officer commits funds to 
specific contracts; s/he undertakes assessments of market prices and the unit 
costs for each construction project and s/he advertises bid opportunities. 
Additionally, s/he authorizes payments to providers, signs contracts, communi-
cates decisions to successful bidders, and ensures that contracts are implemented 
in accordance with the award. In emergency situations, the accounting officer can 
sign contracts without the approval of the contracts committee. S/he is also in 
charge of investigating complaints from bidders and of submitting the procure-
ment plans to the secretary of the Treasury and to PPDA at the beginning of each 
fiscal year. In sum, accounting officers hold a considerable share of power in the 
procurement process.
Contracts committee: The contracts committee consists of up to five members: 
a chairperson, a secretary, and a maximum of three other members (including a 
lawyer). Neither the accounting officer nor a member of the PDU may be 
members of the contracts committee. Its main responsibility is to ensure that 
procurement and disposal activities are conducted in compliance with the Act 
and additional regulations. This is done by approving or rejecting recommenda-
tions from the PDU. Specifically, the contracts committee has the power to 
authorize the choice of procurement and disposal procedures, evaluate the 
contract documentation through various evaluation reports, and make amend-
ment to awarded contracts. Finally, and importantly, it approves the evaluation 
committee.
Procurement and disposal unit (PDU): The PDU manages all procurement and 
disposal activities of the PDE (except adjudication of awards), working in con-
junction with the user department and seeking approval of the contracts commit-
tee where appropriate.
In particular, the PDU plans the procurement and disposal activities of the 
PDE, recommends the procedures to follow, prepares statements of requirements, 
prepares and issues the bid documents and the contract documents, and main-
tains a list of providers in archive records.
In addition, it recommends the members of the Evaluation Committee.
Its size and structure and the number and grades of staff are determined by the 
procurement workload of the PDE.
User department: The user department works under the PDU. Its re spon si bil-
ities include the preparation of the annual procurement plan, providing technical 
inputs to the procurement process, and managing contracts once placed.
Evaluation committee: Members of the evaluation committee conduct all evalu-
ations. The members are recommended by the PDU and approved by the con-
tracts committee. The committee has a minimum of three members, and must 
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include at least one person representing the user department and a member of 
the PDU. Some members may be external, if the required level of skills and 
se ni or ity are not available within the PDE.
3.3.2 Additional stakeholders
Several other private- and public-sector stakeholders play an important role for 
the functioning of the construction sector. The following is a list of the main such 
stakeholders:
 • Uganda National Association of Building and Civil Engineering Contractors 
(UNABCEC): This is a professional association that gathers local civil work 
firms. It advocates and lobbies for policy change, with a special interest in 
improving the landscape for domestic construction firms engaging in public 
procurement contracts. UNABCEC has more than 300 members, who bene-
fit through access to data, newsletters, and other activities such as network-
ing events among firms and public officials.
 • Inspectorate of Government (IGG): This is a government agency that plays a 
fundamental role in the enforcement of regulations and in ensuring trans-
parency in the interaction between the private and the public sector. It works 
in close collaboration with PPDA, and its role in ensuring efficient public 
procurement is clearly summarized in its mission to ‘promote good govern-
ance, accountability and the rule of law in public office’ (see Inspectorate of 
Government  2018). Together with PPDA, the IGG is among the primary 
anti-corruption agents in the country.
 • PPDA Appeals Tribunal: It reviews PPDA decisions when a public procure-
ment bidder is aggrieved by a decision made by the PPDA, when a bidder 
alleges that PPDA has a conflict of interest, or when a PDE or any person’s 
rights are adversely affected by a decision made by the PPDA.
 • Africa Freedom of Information Centre (AFIC): This is a non-governmental 
agency with a primary goal of improving transparency in public procure-
ment, so as to increase value for money in government spending. It plays 
an important role in anti-corruption monitoring and is at the forefront of 
the open contracting advocacy, operating across multiple regions in sub-
Saharan Africa.
 • Uganda Revenue Authority (URA): This is a government agency responsible 
for tax collection and compliance among both firms and individuals. It plays 
an important role for construction firms, as the reliance on government 
contracts for firms in this sector makes them especially relevant targets of 
tax audits.
 • Uganda National Bureau of Standards (UNBS): While not its primary 
function, it stipulates standards for ma ter ials and techniques used in con-
struction, therefore playing a crucial role for construction sector firms.
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 • Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBOS): This is the government agency 
responsible for the Census of Business Establishments, which aims to provide 
a comprehensive picture of private-sector activity across all Uganda regions 
and sectors.
 • Architect Registration Board: It controls the registration and certification of 
architects.
 • Uganda Institute of Quantity Surveyors: It regulates the professional practices 
and registrations of quantity surveyors in Uganda.
 • Uganda Institute of Professional Engineers: It regulates the certification and 
practices of professional engineers as well as all matters concerning civil 
engineering. Set up by the parliament, it has the goal of streamlining qualifi-
cations of engineers and practices in the country.
 • Engineers Registration Board: This is a statutory body with a mission to regu-
late and control engineers and their profession.
4. Challenges to sector development and efficiency
As for every other emerging economy in the world, there are several frictions to 
the functioning of private-sector activities in Uganda. The construction sector is 
an especially challenging one in this regard, as it possesses several backward and 
forward linkages with other sectors and is strongly interconnected with the rest of 
the economy. For example, high levels of policy uncertainty and unplanned gov-
ernment expenditure limit growth of the sector, especially given the fact that it 
faces significant sunk costs and large, often irreversible, firm investment in fixed 
capital. Similarly, macro-economic fluctuations and currency devaluations can be 
a drag on construction firms who are typically dependent on bank financing. 
While these are all first-order important issues, they are also extremely hard to 
tackle from a policy perspective. Therefore, in this section we focus on specific 
key issues we think act as barriers to firm and industry development in the 
Ugandan construction sector, and where incremental policy improvements may 
be easier to achieve. Furthermore, our emphasis is on local small and medium 
firms, which are in a weaker bargaining position and hence stand the most to gain 
from efficiency-enhancing reforms.
4.1 Corruption and inefficiency in public procurement
Corruption is often seen as the leading friction to doing business (Mauro 1995), 
with costs being highest for government-dependent firms in developing coun-
tries. Recent evidence further shows that the negative link between corruption 
and economic growth is arguably causal (Colonnelli and Prem 2018). The reasons 
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why sectors like construction are so prone to corruption are several. Obviously, as 
is evident from our previous discussion, construction is the economic sector most 
dependent on public procurement. This, coupled with typically sizeable average 
contracts, gives public officials and politicians many lucrative opportunities to 
illegally extract rent from the private sector. These concerns are magnified when 
we consider that the government plays not only the role of client but also that of 
regulator. Another reason is that, by its very nature, construction costs are diffi-
cult to measure, as construction involves complex non-standard processes with 
high degrees of asymmetric information between buyers and sellers (Kenny 2007). 
Relatedly, output quality is even harder to observe. For example, the quality of a 
billion-dollar road may only be accurately assessed years after the contract has 
been paid out, when potholes and other damages due to sub-par quality construc-
tion materials and processes become apparent to the public. Finally, construction 
also involves an intricate supply chain, multiple inter-sector linkages, and a num-
ber of different private-sector agents, which lead to difficulties for regulators to 
track illegal activity and take proper enforcement actions.
Anecdotal evidence on corruption cases in construction abound. As a large-
scale example, a few years ago a special government commission was set up to 
study the misuse of funds by the UNRA, after several scandals in the construction 
of roads by international firms were uncovered. The commission estimated that 
over a period of approximately seven years, an astonishing UGX4 trillion had 
likely been misappropriated. Furthermore, in a recent report, the IGG uncovered 
(through investigations and complaints) the presence of 1,399 cases of abuse of 
public office, which mostly involved corruption and embezzlement in the public 
procurement process (see Kahungu 2018).
We also report new data we digitized from all PPDA anti-corruption and per-
formance audits they performed during the period 2010–16 (see Colonnelli and 
Ntungire 2018: Figure 6). As the data shows, only 37 per cent (less than half) of 
the audited procurement contracts were found to be fully satisfactory in their 
allocation and execution, with a significant chunk of them (26 per cent) qualified 
as ‘high risk’, namely subject to severe violations including fraud and corruption, 
among other irregularities. An additional piece of evidence comes from the 
suspension (or blacklisting) of 156 providers from participating in public pro-
curement due to corruption violations verified after prosecutorial actions. 
Administrative data from PPDA also shows that about 20 per cent of blacklisted 
firms are still selected for government contracts during the suspension period.
Of course, corruption per se is not the sole problem in public procurement, as 
more benign forms of inefficiency are also widespread. Moreover, it is often diffi-
cult to distinguish between corruption and inefficiency, as many cases fall into the 
grey areas in between. For example, the administrative data from PPDA shows 
that a significant share of construction projects exceeds the original proposed 
costs or is completed with significant delays compared with expectations, or both. 
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While corruption may be a reason behind such efficiency-reducing renegotiations 
of contract terms, other explanations have simply to do with limited cap acity on 
the government’s or provider’s side, who may have each been unable to accurately 
predict the project’s difficulty. An additional example relates to the interpretation 
of discretionary procedures, where officials may simply lack the necessary skills 
to make the most efficient decisions. There is also a host of other cases of seem-
ingly pure inefficiencies and red tape, such as the widely cited issue firms face in 
waiting for government payments for already executed contracts, which disrupts 
their cash flows and adversely impacts their credit repayment ability as well as 
relationships with finance providers.
When it comes to policy implications, it is crucial to aim for big picture changes 
aimed at addressing both corruption and inefficiency in the interactions between 
firms and government agencies. Anti-corruption and performance audits of the 
types performed by PPDA and mentioned earlier, for example, are a well-suited 
policy tool. However, due to budget limitations, these audits only cover a subset 
of the PDEs and a few thousand government contracts are audited every year. 
While there is not enough data to evaluate how successful they are in the Uganda 
context yet, such audits, especially if randomized, have been shown to be quite 
effective in other contexts (e.g. see Avis et al. 2017); providing more resources for 
such activities that combine capacity building with monitoring is likely a prod-
uct ive way forward.
Transparency is also of paramount importance for the construction sector. 
Indeed, one of the primary challenges firms face is that of obtaining timely and 
relevant information on available tenders. Such opacity in the disclosure of tender 
opportunities is therefore seen as a major limitation to competition, as only the 
largest and well-connected firms may end up bidding for a contract. While pri-
vate and non-governmental agencies like UNABCEC and AFIC play an im port-
ant role in trying to increase transparency and awareness among local firms, 
more efforts from the government are needed. The creation of the Government 
Procurement Portal in 2015, which provides timely, online information on all 
government procurement activities with the goal of achieving a full-fledged 
e-procurement system, is the right approach. However, many firms and stake-
holders complain about the limited effectiveness of the current system, due to 
implementation shortcomings. Hence, newspapers and local associations still 
remain the prevalent source of information about tenders for small local firms, 
and competition remains limited. One of the reasons why implementing 
e-procurement has been challenging is that several public agencies lack the 
technology or the skills to do so. This indicates the need for the central government 
to increase efforts towards capacity building of the most remote and less-skilled 
agencies, which to date remain too sporadic. Transparency is also an issue on the 
government side, as our interviews show that officials are often unaware of 
sources of data they can use in the phase of bidders’ screening for example. A 
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practical next step in this direction is that of improving the communication and 
information flows across public-sector agencies (like the URA and PPDA); such a 
policy offers great potential and likely relatively low costs, but is currently hin-
dered by large amounts of red tape.
The issue of transparency is directly linked to regulation. As described in 
Section 3, procurement regulations leave an excessive amount of discretion in the 
hands of public officials, which can often find easy justifications for the use of 
non-competitive methods to allocate procurement contracts. We find evidence 
for this both in the data, where open bidding systems remain the exception rather 
than the rule, and through a number of qualitative field interviews. This is not 
surprising considering, for instance, the presence of vague statements in the key 
metrics of selection for pre-screened firms, such as the reliance on ‘officials’ mar-
ket knowledge’ or the weight on a provider’s ‘previous experience’, without further 
details or directions. There are countless examples like this. The language of these 
regulations must then be tightened, and officials must be subject to more severe 
monitoring (and potentially more severe follow-up penalties) in cases in which 
they abuse such vague regulations for private gains. Regulation is often also dis-
cussed in relation to local capacity building, with a first-order example being that 
of schemes to help local firms compete with international ones. The two main 
such schemes are the preference scheme and the reservation scheme, which in 
sum attempt to subsidize local firms’ bids in open bidding auctions, and to pri ori-
tize specific local sectors and groups of small local firms.9 While these schemes 
are in place, the widespread view of the local construction sector is that enforce-
ment of such schemes is currently largely lacking, due in part to the vague or 
non-existent regulations on follow-up activity in case of schemes’ violations. 
Regulation alone per se is, however, likely not sufficient to improve local firms’ 
abilities to compete, and there is uncertainty over the effectiveness of such local 
schemes (which some argue may even ultimately reduce competition and effi-
ciency by disincentivizing large productive firms to participate in the sector). 
Other initiatives, such as enterprise development schemes and skills-matched 
internships, though long-term oriented, should also allow local firms to develop 
the necessary skills and to be able to attract the talent needed to compete with 
their international counterparts.
Finally, Uganda’s construction sector lacks the necessary regulatory framework 
to enforce compliance to standards and quality, which has led to a consistent low 
quality of skill and labour inputs and therefore low productivity of the sector. 
9 For the sake of brevity, we refer the reader to the following guidelines and regulations for more 
information on such schemes: PPDA Act 2003, Sections 50(1), 50(2) (see Directorate of the First 
Parliamentary Counsel  2003); Local Governments (PPDA) Regulations 2006, Regulation 53 (see 
Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Authority 2006); PPDA Guidelines on Reservation 
Schemes 2018 (see Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Authority 2017); ‘Buy Uganda 
Build Uganda Policy 2014’ (see Ministry of Trade, Industry and Cooperatives 2014).
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 11/01/20, SPi
344 Construction and Public Procurement in Uganda
Currently, the mandate for quality assurance of the construction sector falls under 
the Construction Standards and Quality Assurance Department, Ministry of 
Works and Transport; however, for a more coordinated and comprehensive 
approach the government of Uganda should consider a national body or pro-
gramme that would work closely with the existing private-sector structures (e.g. 
UNABCEC and the Uganda Institution of Professional Engineers) to enforce and 
reward quality.
4.2 Access to finance
The construction industry is a high-risk sector for financers, especially in rela-
tion to the extractive sector, as it often requires significantly high fixed capital 
investments and incurs huge sunk costs. The lack of access to finance is espe-
cially acute for local construction firms whose ability to borrow is limited by 
rigidities in the domestic financial market and a lack of adequate collateral. A 
survey of local and foreign construction firms executing work on donor-financed 
road projects in Uganda found that the typical amount of credit obtained by a 
foreign construction firm was twenty times larger than that obtained by a local 
construction firm (Balimwezo 2009). This sharp contrast in access to financing 
for the domestic construction industry puts local firms at a disadvantage, 
restricting their ability to undertake new projects, recruit skilled labour, or even 
manage current projects. These issues are more and more salient to firms, as the 
influx of international firms, primarily from China, using considerable cheap 
credit from their original countries strongly limits national firms’ competitive-
ness for the same contracts.
Currently, the lion’s share of financing to the domestic construction sector in 
Uganda has been undertaken by commercial banks; but banks have mostly 
short-term liabilities and are therefore not well placed to hold long-term assets 
on their balance sheets, which further hinders borrowing especially for long-
term construction projects. In addition, nominal and real interest rates are high 
(nominal interest rates have remained over 20 per cent for the past ten years), 
making it very costly for firms to borrow from the domestic market. Interviews 
with several construction sector firms reveal that most small and medium local 
firms therefore rely on money lenders (who charge a premium over the average 
market interest rates), as the flexibility they provide is essential for firms, and 
partly justifies the exorbitant associated costs. Other alternative sources of fund-
ing often include family and friends, while development finance institutions 
seem to have very limited traction in Uganda due to perceived excessive bureau-
cracy. All these challenges become particularly relevant for local firms tendering 
for public work contracts. To finance equipment and large contract tenders, and 
in the absence of access to credit, such companies often resort to their own 
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savings or hire used equipment from the local market, further undermining 
their competitiveness and quality of work produced.
A further hindrance to financing for small- and medium-sized construction 
firms is the bid security requirements to deal with government contracts, which 
are often too demanding for these firms. Firms argue that even if they are able to 
obtain the bid security from a bank, typical delays in dealing with government 
agencies make it too costly for them. On the one hand, while the bid security 
must be submitted before the evaluation phase, firms pay significant interest fees, 
which are magnified if the government delays the contract evaluation (which 
firms argue is typically the case, with delays taking up to several weeks or 
months). On the other hand, similar extra interest costs are incurred if the gov-
ernment delays the actual payments for work performed (which again firms argue 
is typically the case and consider these delayed payments to be the primary chal-
lenge in public procurement). All firms interviewed emphasized how strong a 
barrier to directly participating in public procurement and sector development 
the issue of bid security and delayed payments is.
Finding possible solutions for these access-to-finance challenges is no easy 
task, in Uganda or other emerging economies in the region. Here, we focus on 
one possible solution that can help bridge the financing gap for domestic contrac-
tors and that has had success in similar contexts, namely ‘lease financing’. 
Financial leasing is a contractual arrangement that allows one party (the lessee) to 
use an asset owned by the leasing company (the lessor) in exchange for specified 
periodic payments (lease rentals). During the lease period, legal ownership of the 
asset is retained by the lessor. An advantage of this mode of financing is that the 
lessee need not provide collateral, provided s/he has sufficient cash flow from core 
operations to cover the lease rentals. While financial leasing was only introduced 
to the Ugandan financial market in 1994, the market has witnessed significant 
growth over the past decade with potential for rising demand. To date, eleven 
companies offer financial leasing as a product, of these only three are independ-
ent while the remaining eight are ring-fenced divisions of commercial banks. A 
key constraint to further growth of the sector, however, is a less-than-enabling 
policy environment: Uganda has no legislation that regulates the business and 
practice of leasing; while a bill has been submitted to the minister of finance, 
planning and economic development it is yet to be signed and there is no indica-
tion of the bill being signed soon. Moreover, the construction sector remains a 
less-favoured sector for this mode of financing compared with other economic 
sectors such as agriculture and transport, owing to several risks, foremost of 
which is the fact that, as already mentioned, construction contracts are usually 
dependent on untimely government disbursements that make regular lease pay-
ments difficult. Not surprisingly, the firms we interviewed were not optimistic 
about the current framework on lease financing, which remains as of now a 
largely unexplored financing avenue.
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4.3 Marginal costs of construction
Addressing the bottlenecks to supply in the construction sector before the onset 
of investments associated with the transition to commercial oil production will be 
critical, as any constraints to supply may likely translate to higher marginal costs 
and prices, thereby reducing the physical output for a given amount of nominal 
investment.
There is some evidence that marginal costs of construction (particularly for 
public investments) are already rising in Uganda. Construction costs, particularly 
for civil works and non-residential buildings, have outpaced overall inflation 
significantly and appear to be accelerating (see Colonnelli and Ntungire  2018: 
Figure 8). More specifically, whereas prices for the construction sector as a whole 
fell by 0.4 per cent between December 2016 and December 2017, the prices for 
civil works rose by 3.1 per cent (reflecting a surge in public investment). To ensure 
that demand matches supply, the government needs a better understanding of 
local supplier capacity (e.g. through enterprise surveys) as well as a steady and 
reliable flow of information to suppliers on its upcoming investment plans.
5. Conclusion
In this work, we rely on administrative micro-data and new survey evidence, 
combined with structured interviews of local firms and both private- and public-
sector organizations, to describe the role of the construction sector in Uganda. 
Construction is by many considered to be the central sector to focus on for coun-
tries like Uganda that aim to make efficient use of the recent wave of natural 
resource discoveries.
The emphasis of this analysis is on the interaction between government agen-
cies and local firms, as public procurement plays the crucial role of main driver of 
industry growth. The data point to a market structure that is rather concentrated. 
On the one hand, a few government agencies are responsible for the vast majority 
of government procurement and the largest contracts. On the other, the supply 
side of the market sees the presence of a right tail of large firms accounting for 
most of the economic activity. Unsurprisingly, the largest firms tend to be the 
foreign ones. We then illustrate the regulatory framework for public procurement 
in Uganda, with a focus on the organizational structure of the supervisor agency, 
namely the PPDA. We also expand on various other players, in both the private 
and the public sector, that can be instrumental in the efficient development of the 
construction sector.
In section 4, we provide an in-depth analysis of some of the main challenges 
local construction firms face in Uganda. In particular, we discuss the role of cor-
ruption and inefficiency in public procurement as the leading issue to address. 
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Higher levels of transparency and more streamlined regulations are the way 
forward, and Uganda is on a positive trend, but there is a long road ahead. A 
second key channel is the frictions in accessing finance that local firms face, 
which we argue can be alleviated by regulatory changes more favourable to lease 
financing and related tools. We conclude by briefly discussing the importance of 
tracking construction costs and prices at such a time of increasing demand.
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Enhancing Local Content in Uganda
Ritwika Sen
1. Introduction
The recent confirmation and ongoing development of commercial oil and gas 
resources in Uganda has given rise to two complementary effects. The first refers 
to the active engagement and accompanying investment decisions of international 
oil companies (IOCs), global service providers, and other experienced international 
oil industry actors. The second effect consists of an urgent national interest to 
participate in, and maximize the benefits from, anticipated capital investments in 
the burgeoning industry. In preparation, the government of Uganda has developed 
an extensive policy and regulatory framework with the aim to extend the growth 
benefits of the petroleum sector beyond its direct (and exhaustible) contribution 
to the economy. An important component of these policy efforts is ‘local content 
policies’ (LCPs), specifically targeted at enhancing national participation through 
opportunities for employment and productive linkages. LCPs comprise varied 
measures ranging from mandating, negotiating, or incentivizing the use of national 
labour and industry.
Natural resource discoveries offer countries a unique learning opportunity to 
develop the institutional capabilities required to promote local content. Sutton 
(2017) argues that a local content management programme is more likely to suc-
ceed if it starts with a narrow area of operation, such as extractive industries, and 
expands horizontally to a wider range of sectors. Features specific to the oil and 
gas industry also favour the implementation of LCPs, such as: the greater bar-
gaining power of host governments relative to multinational corporations; a clear 
sequencing of work plans and engagement opportunities; and largely formal 
operations which entail the upkeep of regular procurement and tax records. 
However, international experience also cautions against a set of ‘pitfalls’ that often 
contribute to missed opportunities in this area. These include inflated government 
expectations regarding domestic workforce and industrial capabilities; over-reliance 
on regulatory mandates for local content use (or ‘x per cent’ local content require-
ments); delays in the timing of policy interventions relative to industrial activities; 
and, attempting to ‘do everything at once’ (Steenbergen and Sutton 2017).
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This chapter analyses policy options to promote local content in Uganda as it 
transitions into an oil-producing country.1 As new entrants into a global industry, 
prospective domestic suppliers have limited (if any) competencies to provide 
exploration and production-related services or specialized ‘core’ industry operations 
in the short term. However, they can deploy (and upgrade) existing capabilities to 
competitively supply a range of ‘non-core’ or ancillary services to the oil industry, 
such as construction, food and beverages, accounting and legal services. Although 
LCPs typically seek to foster employment linkages, in addition to backward and 
forward productive linkages at the firm level, this chapter focuses solely on 
domestic supplier development aspirations. The analysis comprises an evaluation 
of existing LCPs in Uganda, a mapping of the natural resource value chain, and an 
assessment of domestic firm capabilities to supply the anticipated demand for 
goods and services from oil and gas exporters. This exercise is informed by 
industry interviews, secondary sources, and administrative data, including 
transaction-level value-added tax data from the Uganda Revenue Authority. The 
concluding section proposes policy initiatives to promote a feasible pattern of 
domestic supplier integration in Uganda’s resource value chain.
2. Prospects for local supplier development
Oil and gas exploration in Uganda was initiated by the British colonial adminis-
tration in the 1920s. However, consistent efforts to investigate the country’s 
petroleum potential only began in earnest after the restoration of stability in an 
independent Republic of Uganda. The existence of commercializable oil resources 
was confirmed as recently as January 2006. At present, Uganda’s oil resources are 
estimated at 6.5 billion barrels of oil equivalent, of which around 1.4 billion barrels 
are recoverable.2 In addition, Uganda’s gas resources comprise 170 billion cubic 
feet (bcf) of associated gas (found within the oil) and 500 bcf of non-associated or 
independent natural gas (MEMD 2017).3 To date, commercial oil production has 
not taken place in Uganda, although it is anticipated that joint venture partners 
Total E&P, CNOOC, and Tullow Oil (who are leading the development of oilfields 
already discovered) will commence production by 2020–1.
Prospects for the development of a competitive local supplier base for the oil 
industry in Uganda depend on various factors, not least of which is the magni-
tude of the resource discovery itself. To put the scale of Uganda’s newfound oil 
resources into perspective, Sen (2018: Table 1) compares the recoverable oil reserves 
1 It is anticipated that commercial oil production will commence in the year 2020–1.
2 These estimates are measured in terms of stock tank original oil in place, which refers to the vol-
ume of oil estimated at reservoir temperature and pressure conditions.
3 Wolf and Potluri (2018) provide a detailed account of the timeline of past oil exploration and 
anticipated development and production activities in Uganda.
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of selected oil-producing countries across the world. For example, Nigeria is 
reported to have 37.1 billion barrels of commercially recoverable oil reserves 
remaining, which is projected to last for over forty-nine years at the observed 
daily production rate of 2,053 thousand barrels of oil per day (BoPD). Albeit 
Nigeria’s recoverable reserves were approximately twenty-seven times that of 
Uganda’s proven oil resources as of end-2016.
The Ugandan government anticipates that the country’s proven oil and gas 
resources (to date) will last for twenty to thirty years. As additional exploration 
and appraisal activities planned may lead to further resource discoveries, the esti-
mated production period may in fact be prolonged. The area currently explored 
in the Albertine Graben, where Uganda’s exploration activities are concentrated, 
represents less than 40 per cent of the total area with the potential for production 
(MEMD 2017). Put together, Uganda’s current resource scale and the potential for 
further discoveries suggest the following:
 • The development of supplier capabilities in non-core or ancillary operations 
to service the oil and gas industry needs to be prioritized in the short term. 
This encompasses several less skill and capital-intensive goods and service 
industries that are not specific to the oil industry (e.g. catering, construction, 
transport, and logistics). However, prospective suppliers are required to 
meet demanding industry-specific standards to qualify as approved vendors. 
This will require broad-based public, donor, or corporate initiatives to provide 
business and technical training to local suppliers.
 • Specialization in technologically sophisticated ‘core’ exploration and pro-
duction operations may be useful in the medium to long term. For this 
purpose, targeted training programmes (e.g. shadowing schemes) led by 
international industry actors will be needed to build requisite expertise 
among local firms and the workforce.
Uganda’s oil industry has received cumulative foreign direct investment (FDI) 
inflows worth US$3.4 billion between 2001–16 (Namubiru 2018). Going forward, 
it is anticipated that additional investments of over six times this  magnitude (i.e. 
US$20 billion) will be made over the next three to five years (Ssekatawa 2017). 
Although this represents a critical opportunity for local businesses, their integra-
tion in the supply chains of multinational corporations (MNCs) is unlikely to be 
automatic. An Industrial Baseline Survey commissioned jointly by IOCs in 
Uganda noted that only two sectors (security services and cement manufacturing) 
met the quantity and quality requirements of the oil industry as of 2013 (SBC 
2013). Furthermore, opportunities for supply linkages vary over the life cycle of 
petroleum projects—typically peaking at the engineering, procurement, and con-
struction phase, and plateauing thereafter through production, operations, and 
maintenance. It is anticipated that opportunities in construction activities will 
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commence in late 2019 once the joint-venture partners reach Final Investment 
Decision. This implies that urgent policy action is needed to bolster domestic 
supplier preparedness. Otherwise, the possibility of missed opportunities in 
Uganda (as in many countries before) looms large.
3. The local content management framework
Legal structures governing resource extraction can aid the transformation of 
resource wealth into development. In the context of LCPs, the legal and regulatory 
framework serves to establish the formal ‘rules of the game’ by clarifying policy 
intent and scope, and (in some countries) by establishing targets, metrics, and 
institutional responsibilities for its assessment. Cross-country comparisons of 
local content outcomes in seven Latin American oil- and gas-producing countries 
by Herrera et al. (2016) suggest that a higher level of specificity in legal provisions 
may be associated with better local content outcomes. However, the authors 
observe that this is not a sufficient condition to guarantee desired policy out-
comes, as countries (namely Ecuador and Colombia) with similar legal ‘specificity 
scores’ were reported to have vastly different performance.4 With that caveat in 
mind, this section describes and evaluates existing legal and regulatory require-
ments for local content faced by companies operating in Uganda’s oil and gas 
industry. The principles used for the assessment are threefold: (1) clarity of scope, 
including provisions for measurement; (2) presence of monitoring mechanisms; 
and (3) feasibility of implementation. Evidence for the third criterion has been 
compiled on the basis of industry interviews and a comprehensive audit of the 
implementation of national content in Uganda’s oil and gas sector by OAG (2015).5
3.1 Overview of local content requirements in Uganda’s oil industry
The oil and gas sector in Uganda is guided by the National Oil and Gas Policy of 
2008, whose goal is ‘to use the country’s oil and gas resources to contribute to 
early achievement of poverty eradication and create lasting value to society’. In 
particular, the policy emphasizes the deliberate implementation of national par-
ticipation in oil and gas activities through its objectives (vii) and (viii). These relate 
to optimum state and industrial participation in sectoral activities, the expansion 
of employment opportunities for citizens, and support for the development of 
competencies for national entrepreneurs and the workforce to competitively sup-
ply goods and services to the sector. In addition, a National Local Content Policy 
4 The authors attribute these findings to differences in the business climate between the two countries.
5 The first two criteria conform to the benchmarks used in the comprehensive catalogue of LCP 
frameworks compiled by the ELLA project (Herrera et al. 2016).
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for the Oil & Gas Sector was ratified by the cabinet on 25 June 2018.6 The general 
principles laid out in the policy are further elaborated through the following laws 
and regulations:
 • Petroleum Exploration, Development and Production Act, 2013 (henceforth 
PEDP Act).
 • Petroleum Refining, Conversion, Transmission and Midstream Storage Act, 
2013 (henceforth PRCTMS Act).
 • Petroleum Exploration, Development and Production Regulations, 2016.
 • Petroleum Exploration, Development and Production National Content 
Regulations 2016 (referred to as PEDP NC Reg. in Table 16.1).
 • Petroleum Refining, Conversion, Transmission and Midstream Storage 
Regulations 2016.
 • Petroleum Refining, Conversion, Transmission and Midstream Storage 
National Content Regulations, 2016 (referred to as PRCTMS NC Reg. in 
Table 16.1).
These regulations are augmented through binding provisions incorporated within 
production sharing agreements (PSAs) with licensed operators. These contractual 
clauses provide for the training and employment of suitably qualified Ugandans, 
in addition to the payment of annual training fees to the government ActionAid 
(2017). However, as all PSAs with industry operators have not been made available 
publicly, these have not been included as part of the review of local content 
requirements.
The PEDP Act (2013) and PRCTMS Act (2013) guide the current institutional 
and regulatory framework for the governance of Uganda’s oil and gas sector: the 
Directorate of Petroleum under the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development 
(MEMD) is responsible for policy formulation and the licensing of petroleum 
activities. The Petroleum Authority of Uganda (PAU), established in 2013, is the 
regulatory body responsible for monitoring compliance in the petroleum sector. 
Finally, the Uganda National Oil Company was set up (also in 2013) to manage 
the state’s commercial interests in the petroleum sector. Both the MEMD Directorate 
and PAU consist of National Content Units, with the former leading on aspects 
related to policy formulation, training, and enterprise development, whereas the 
latter primarily focuses on monitoring compliance. However, industry interviews 
indicate that in practice the two institutions encounter some overlap in their 
functions related to the enhancement of national participation (as PAU also 
undertakes initiatives for national content promotion from time to time). For the 
purposes of coordination and effective implementation, it may be advisable to 
clarify institutional responsibilities for local content promotion.
























Table 16.1 Overview of legal requirements for local sourcing and supplier development
Relevant act or regulation [1] Instrument [2] Detailed requirements [3]
Part II Sec. 8 PEDP NC Reg.
Part II Sec. 8 PRCTMS NC Reg.
Preparation of National 
Content Plans
(Qualitative specifications)
Licensees are required to submit plans detailing the prioritization of:
Goods produced or available in Uganda, subject to quality standards and 
timeline requirements
Services offered by Ugandan companies, registered entities, and citizens during 
the evaluation of bids.
Part VIII Sec. 125 PEDP Act
Part II Sec. 9(1) PEDP NC Reg.
Part VII Sec. 53 PRCTMS Act
Part II Sec. 10(1) PRCTMS NC Reg.
Preferential treatment
(Qualitative specifications)
First consideration required for:
(a) Goods and services produced and available in Uganda
(b) Services rendered by Ugandan citizens and companies.
Part II Sec. 9(2–4) PEDP NC Reg.
Part II Sec. 10(2–3) PRCTMS NC Reg.
Joint venture provision
(Quantitative restriction)
(a) Where goods and services required are not available, procurement permitted
from a company involved in a joint venture with a Ugandan Company
Ugandan company must have 48 per cent participating interest (upstream reg.)
Ugandan company must be approved by the PAU, based on
technical and financial competence, experience, active participation, etc.
Part II Sec. 9(6–7) PEDP NC Reg.
Part II Sec. 10(4) PRCTMS NC Reg.
Express authorization 
requirement
Where Ugandan citizens and firms do not meet required quality/competence:
Licensee may use another company with permission from the PAU
This must be within a period specified by the PAU
Licensee may develop a supplier development programme (upstream reg.).
Part II Sec. 11(1–4) PEDP NC Reg.
Part II Sec. 10(4) PRCTMS NC Reg.
Reserved schedule of  
goods and services
(Import restrictions)
(a) Specified list of goods and services to be exclusively provided by
Ugandan companies, registered entities, and citizens
Recommendation for unbundling of contracts to reduce the size, complexity, 
and scope of works for domestic producers
Where required quality of reserved goods and services is not available, licensee 
























Part II Sec. 12–13 PEDP NC Reg.,
Part II Sec. 12–13 PRCTMS NC Reg.
Procurement principles
(Quantitative restrictions)
Mandatory inclusion of national content in bid evaluation criteria
Must account for at least 10 per cent of total evaluation score based on:
• employment and training of Ugandan citizens
• utilization of local goods and services
• proposals for technology transfer
When bids are within 5 per cent of each other based on financial evaluation the 
bid with highest national content will be chosen.
Contracts with a value in excess of US$1,000,000 must contain a labour clause 
mandating the use of Ugandan labour in specific categories.
Part II Sec. 12–13 PEDP NC Reg.,





The PAU shall develop a National Suppliers Database
All oil and gas industry suppliers are required to register
PAU (along with licensees) shall develop qualification criteria
PAU shall undertake qualification of suppliers on an annual basis and invite 
applications through national and international advertisements
PAU is required to publish the list of qualified suppliers on 31 December.
Part II Sec. 23 PEDP NC Reg.
Part II Sec. 23 PRCTMS NC Reg.




Licensees must submit annual plans detailing initiatives for transfer of 
technology, know-how, and skills
They must also submit annual reports of accomplishments
Licensees shall support technology transfer by encouraging joint ventures
Further, licensees are required to organize in-country events to connect 
international companies, Ugandan companies, citizens, and registered entities
Part III Sec. 25 PEDP NC Reg.
Part III Sec. 25 PRCTMS NC Reg.
Reporting requirements (a) Licensees must submit quarterly and annual NC performance reports
(b) A national content performance report must specify:
 • national content expenditure levels
 • employment of Ugandan citizens and foreign workers in hours or days 
worked
 • training and employment of Ugandan citizens (name, job, level)
 • procurement of locally manufactured materials versus imports
 • details of Ugandan companies, citizens, and registered entities contracted
 • technology transfer, R&D, and training programmes undertaken.
Source: Author’s summary based on acts and regulations cited in column 1.
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Table 16.1 provides an overview of regulations to enhance local content through 
requirements for local sourcing and supplier development activities.7 Laws and 
regulations (column 1) have been categorized according to instruments employed 
(in column 2) and their main provisions, which are outlined in column 3. These 
have broadly been classified based on instruments employed, such as preferential 
treatment for Ugandan goods and service providers or joint-venture provisions. 
The upstream and midstream regulations (PEDP NC Reg. and PRCTMS NC Reg.) 
define ‘national content’ as:
 • ‘The level of use of Ugandan local expertise, goods and services, Ugandan 
companies, Ugandan citizens, registered entities, businesses and financing 
in petroleum activities’
 • ‘The substantial combined value added or created in the Ugandan economy 
through the utilisation of Ugandan human and material resources for the 
provision of goods and services to the petroleum industry in Uganda.’
The above definitions clarify two aspects of policy intent: (1) the scope of local 
content pertains to value created in the national economy because of petroleum 
activities; and (2) the contribution to value creation within the national economy 
is conditioned on the nationality of individuals, and the ownership of companies 
concerned (in spirit). Notably, the regulations define ‘Ugandan companies’ as 
those that are incorporated under the Companies Act (2012), provide value 
addition to Uganda, use available local raw materials, employ at least 70 per cent 
Ugandans, and are approved by the PAU.8
3.2 Evaluation of local content requirements
Table  16.1 highlights the use of mandatory local content requirements imple-
mented through preferential treatment for local suppliers, minimum participating 
interests in joint ventures, import restrictions, and procurement provisions. 
Additional procurement principles (not listed in the above summary) related to 
the unbundling of contracts, establishment of tender information offices, and 
requirements to provide feedback to unsuccessful bidders are targeted towards 
improving the likelihood of successful bids by local suppliers. The compilation 
of a National Suppliers Database (NSD) by the PAU is also intended for 
this  purpose. International experience suggests that an assertive (rather than 
7 This is not a comprehensive overview of local content requirements as provisions related to direct 
employment and the training of Ugandan citizens have been omitted.
8 ‘Registered Entities’ are further defined as businesses owned by Ugandan citizens registered 
under the Business Names Registration Act or Partnership Act 2010.
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aspirational) goal-setting approach to local content regulation is more likely to 
succeed only where there is pre-existing capacity among local firms and indi-
viduals to supply the industry (Tordo et al. 2013). In Uganda’s case, a focus on 
implementable outcomes, combined with supplier development initiatives, is 
more likely to yield positive results. This section assesses the various LCPs based 
on these criteria.
3.2.1 Clarity of scope and provisions for measurement
The upstream and midstream national content regulations make explicit provisions 
to foster national industrial participation in the oil and gas sector. While there are 
no mandatory minimum levels specified in relation to this objective, provisions 
related to minimum joint-venture participating interests (48 per cent), the reserved 
schedule of goods and services, and bid evaluation criteria regarding national 
content (10 per cent of the total evaluation score, and a 5 per cent cost margin) 
establish a lower bound. However, there are points of ambiguity in the regulations 
that stem from the definition of ‘Ugandan companies’ and local goods.
As stated earlier, a Ugandan company is defined as one that is incorporated under 
the Companies Act (2012), provides value addition to Uganda, uses available local 
raw materials, employs at least 70 per cent Ugandans, and is approved by the PAU. 
This stringent definition encompasses only a subset of companies registered 
in Uganda, regardless of ownership or control. In other words, a foreign-owned 
company or a subsidiary of a foreign firm that is registered in Uganda and satisfies 
the remaining conditions can lawfully be regarded as a Ugandan company. At the 
same time, a Ugandan-owned company which employs only Ugandan nationals 
and specializes in the assembly of imported parts may or may not be considered 
‘Ugandan’, depending on the availability of locally produced input substitutes. In 
relation to the primary intent of LCPs—that is, value creation that is retained 
within the national economy, employment generation, and the deepening of 
domestic industrial capabilities—both companies should ideally qualify as ‘local’. 
The definition further complicates the reporting and measurement of local content 
through the procurement records of licensees, contractors, and subcontractors. 
While it may be feasible for the procurement departments of IOCs to report on 
purchases from domestically registered companies or even domestically owned 
companies, the administrative costs of discerning whether each supplier is indeed 
‘Ugandan’ as per the law (in the case of reporting companies and the evaluating 
authority) may be unreasonably high.
The second point of ambiguity, as also noted by OAG (2015), stems from the 
lack of clarity regarding what constitutes a local good or service. For instance, 
part II section 9 of the upstream national content regulations requires that licensees 
accord first preference to the procurement of goods produced and readily available 
in Uganda, and services rendered by Ugandan citizens and companies. However, 
the more quantitative (and specific) bid evaluation criteria under section 13(b) of 
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the same regulations provides for the evaluation of national content (accounting 
for no less than 10 per cent of the evaluation score) based on utilization of ‘local 
goods and services’, among other criteria. Without clarity on what constitutes 
‘local’ in this regard, there is no guarantee that even Ugandan companies will 
provide goods that are produced in-country. The OAG (2015) report consequently 
recommends that procurement reports reflect whether goods purchased (regardless 
of company classification) are indeed imported or domestically produced. This 
recommendation has since been incorporated under reporting requirements for 
licensees under section 25 of both the upstream and midstream regulations. 
However, the definitions continue to remain unclear.
3.2.2 Presence of monitoring mechanisms
Monitoring processes related to the implementation of national content regulations 
are well established. Licensees are required to submit quarterly and annual reports 
detailing their performance in this regard (see Table 16.1 for further details). These 
reports are evaluated by the PAU in relation to national content programmes 
prepared and submitted by licensees within twelve months after the granting of a 
license. As a result, even though there are no established ‘annual targets’ related to 
the participation of national industry, performance can be evaluated against 
company-specific plans that are ratified by the PAU.9 However, neither the company-
specific plans for the use of national content, nor the reports of their achievements 
in this respect are made available to the public. The public release of documents 
detailing planned and achieved procurement of locally produced goods and 
services by IOCs (and their subcontractors) could enhance transparency, while 
providing an information resource for aspiring suppliers.
3.2.3 Feasibility of implementation
The ability to implement the regulations outlined above ultimately hinges on the 
preparedness of domestic firms to supply goods and services of the quality and 
scale required by the oil industry. Anecdotal evidence from industry interviews 
and national supplier information workshops suggests that international companies 
are committed to finding solutions that involve local content. This could involve 
the unbundling of supply contracts and process innovation in project design to 
facilitate local sourcing. However, IOCs and their contractors are also very clear 
about their expectations from suppliers. This consists of requirements for health, 
safety, and environmental standards, business conduct and ethics, and financial 
9 However, there are annual targets laid out by the regulations related to the direct employment 
and training of Ugandan citizens. For instance, at least 30 per cent of management staff should consist 
of Ugandans at the start of petroleum activities. This should increase to at least 70 per cent within five 
years after the start of activities (part II, section 17 PEDP NC Reg.).
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and operational controls, among other provisions.10 These expectations, currently 
beyond the reach of several domestic suppliers, are considered necessary for firms 
to pre-qualify for competitive tendering processes. Ugandan oil and gas suppliers 
interviewed by SBC (2013) indicate that key obstacles to development encountered 
by them include: visibility over demand, required infrastructure improvements, 
high borrowing costs, workforce skills deficit, demanding quality standards, and 
the capacity of suppliers. Although concerted policy efforts to address the first 
two issues have been made (or are planned), there are limited capability develop-
ment interventions and supplier credit-facilitation initiatives in place. In this regard, 
it is critical for the government to expedite its plans for an Industry Enhancement 
Centre to provide training, matching, and financial advisory services to domestic 
suppliers. Sen (2018: Box 1) discusses an ongoing donor-funded initiative in 
Uganda (the E4D/SOGA programme) that provides health, safety, and environ-
ment and bid management training to local suppliers.
4. Assessing domestic supplier capabilities in Uganda
The overview and assessment of local content requirements in Uganda’s oil and 
gas sector underscores the importance of ‘bridging the gap’ between existing 
supplier capabilities and the requirements of the industry. Estimates from a 
baseline survey (SBC 2013) suggest that the natural resource sector in Uganda 
can generate up to 150,000 indirect and induced jobs (at its peak) if domestic 
supplier integration in natural resource value chains is realized. This section 
aims to collate evidence on existing domestic supply linkages to the natural 
resource sector, and the capabilities of prospective oil and gas suppliers to 
inform the policy process. In particular, the analysis is structured to answer two 
key questions: (1) How are local firms integrated into the natural resource value 
chain in Uganda? (2) What capabilities do domestic firms have to enter the 
resource value chain?11
4.1 How are local firms integrated into  
the natural resource value chain?
To ascertain the extent and nature of domestic supplies to the natural resource 
sector, I examine transaction-level value-added tax (VAT) declarations in Uganda. 
These returns include all reported purchase transactions by the natural resource 
10 For example, Fluor (2018) outlines business conduct and ethics expectations for suppliers by 
Fluor Corporation, which is a prospective EPC contractor for the Tilenga project.
11 The latter is with a specific focus on the oil and gas sector.
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sector (i.e. oil, gas, and mining), which are listed along with the (anonymized) 
tax identification numbers of sellers. This feature of the dataset allows me to 
identify the sectors which firms that sell to the natural resource sector correspond 
to. VAT in Uganda is payable by individuals, businesses, and corporate entities 
with business sales over 150,000,000 Ugandan shillings (UGX; approximately 
US$40,000) per annum. Notably, this threshold was raised from UGX 50,000,000 
(US$13,000) by the VAT Amendment Act (2015) that came into force in the fiscal 
year 2015/16. The dataset utilized for the purposes of this study  corresponds to 
the period 2010–14/15 (as more recent periods were not available due to data 
access limitations). Consequently, the analysis pertains to the universe of reported 
purchase transactions by the natural resource sector, from tax-paying domestic 
firms with annual turnover above US$13,000. While this would typically constitute 
an important limitation for the analysis of nationally representative firm capabilities 
in Uganda, our focus is limited to the subset of firms with the potential to supply an 
international industry. Therefore, tax compliance and earnings above minimum-
income thresholds (for taxation purposes) amount to prerequisites for the iden-
tification of these firms. The largely formal nature of procurement within the 
natural resource sector (especially oil and gas operators) also lends itself to this 
analysis.
Figure 16.1 presents a mapping of input supply relationships in Uganda’s natural 
resource sector corresponding to the fiscal year 2014/15. Each node (or circle) 
represents a firm, and each connecting edge represents the presence of a supply 
relationship between two firms in the fiscal year 2014/15. Nodes have been 
 coloured according to their sector of operation, where medium-grey nodes (or 
red nodes in the four-colour version of this figure in Sen 2018) (categorized under 
‘mining and quarrying’) represent purchasing firms from the natural resource 
sector. These also include firms from the oil and gas sector. Due to the limited 
number of oil and gas operators in the economy, the analysis has been conducted 
at the aggregate natural resource sector level in order to prevent the identification 
of any one firm. The layout of the network has been adjusted to concentrate more-
connected firms (ones with a higher number of supply relationships observed) at 
the centre, and isolate less-connected firms at the periphery.12 The size of nodes 
has further been scaled in proportion with the number of firms that a given firm 
has a supply relationship with (note that this is distinguished from buyer relation-
ships, as a result of which natural resource firms are typically smaller in size 
unless they also sell to other natural resource firms). The fan-like structures 
emanating from natural resource firms in this graph is a result of representing 
12 The Force Atlas2 layout was used for purposes of spatialization using Gephi network visualiza-
tion software. This is a force-directed layout wherein nodes repulse each other like charged particles, 
and edges counteract this by attracting their nodes like springs. The position of nodes in the resulting 
layout is dependent on the position of other nodes and the connections between them. See Jacomy 
et al. (2014) for further details.
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only direct-purchase relationships. In other words, Figure 16.1 does not depict the 
 suppliers of suppliers, and so on.
The mapping of domestic suppliers in Uganda’s natural resource value chain 
illustrates that there is indeed a population of local goods and service providers 
that sell to the sector. However, these supply transactions are dominated by trades 
with the retail and wholesale sector, which account for almost half of the supply 
Legend:
Wholesale & retail (43.97%)
Manufacturing (10.22%)
Mining & quarrying (7.98%)
Construction (5.93%)
Transportation & storage (5.73%)
Professional, scientific, & technical activities (5.52%)
Administrative & support activities (4.09%)
Financial & insurance activities, and other services (3.68%)
Information & communication (3.48%)
Accommodation & food service activities (2.66%)
Electricity, gas, steam, and air conditioning supply (1.84%) 
Water supply (0.41%)
Other (4.49%)
Figure 16.1 Domestic suppliers in Uganda’s natural resource value chain, FY 2014/15
Source: Author’s illustration based on data from the Uganda Revenue Authority
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connections in the graph. This includes the purchase of largely imported products 
such as motor vehicle parts and accessories, motor vehicles, machinery, and 
equipment, among others. The manufacturing sector ranks second among suppliers 
in terms of connections in the network (estimated at 10 per cent of the whole). 
A handful of manufacturing firms (shown in dark medium grey here, or blue in 
Sen 2018) dominate the supplier network, trading with most natural resource 
firms. These include manufacturers of plastic products, fabricated metal products, 
batteries and accumulators, and cement, plaster, and lime, to name a few. A small 
population of manufacturers is also observed at the periphery of the network. 
These firms only trade with a subset of natural resource sector buyers and include 
manufacturers from a variety of sub-sectors such as manufacturers of basic iron 
and steel, soft drinks, pulp, paper, and paperboard. The construction sector (in 
light grey or neon green in Sen 2018), which accounts for 6 per cent of connections 
in the network, appears to be well spread out across the core and the periphery, 
with no evidence of any one dominant supplier. The transportation and storage 
sector (in moderate grey or pink in Sen 2018) supplies a variety of services to the 
natural resource sector, including cargo handling, warehousing and storage, 
freight, and land transport. Of these, the cargo-handling sub-sector is observed to 
be the most ‘connected’ and consists of a few key suppliers that most buyers are 
dependent on. Other less-connected sectors that demonstrate the presence of 
‘lead firms’ in the supplier network include information and communications 
(lighter grey, or light pink in Sen 2018), water supply (medium lighter grey, or 
purple in Sen 2018), and electricity, gas, steam, and air-conditioning supply (black, 
or navy blue in Sen 2018).
The limited purchase of domestically manufactured goods and services by the 
natural resource sector (as a whole) depicted in Figure 16.1 calls into question the 
growth policy relevance of fostering supply linkages to the (more narrowly defined) 
oil and gas industry. In fact, Tordo et al. (2013: 7) find that direct purchase link-
ages from the oil and gas industry, across forty-eight countries, is lower than that 
of other sectors. The authors note that few, if any, industries display a lower level 
of direct backward linkages. Utilizing actual input purchase transactions recorded 
in Uganda’s VAT dataset (rather than estimates based on input–output tables), 
I confirm that this may also be the case for the current country context.
Figure  16.2 depicts input–supply relationships across industries in the entire 
(formal) Ugandan economy in FY 2014/15. Each node now represents an industry 
(defined at the ISIC Rev. four-digit level). Edges represent the presence of supply 
relationships across industries. Supply relationships (or edges) have only been 
depicted for industries if the number of transactions between a given buyer– 
supplier industry pair exceeds 5 per cent of the buyer’s total purchase transactions 
over the period. Other aspects of the graph’s layout correspond to that of 
Figure  16.1—that is, more connected industries are positioned at the core, and 
nodes have been scaled up based on supplier ‘connectedness’. However, the colour 
scheme has now been used to highlight direct backward linkages from the oil and 
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gas industry (coloured in black) to other supplier industries (dark grey here, or 
coloured in red in Sen 2018). Corresponding to the purchases observed at the 
firm level from the natural resource value chain, I find that the oil and gas 
industry (while still in its exploration and appraisal phase) purchased goods and 
services directly from the wholesale and retail trade, transport and storage, electric 
power generation, transmission and distribution, and information and commu-
nications sectors. However, the number of light grey and white nodes here (grey 
and yellow nodes in Sen 2018) underscores the numerous domestic industries that 
oil and gas companies were not making significant direct purchases from.
Figure 16.2 further extends the notion of productive linkages to encompass not 
only direct suppliers to the oil and gas industry, but also indirect linkages through 
Figure 16.2 Direct and indirect backward linkages from the oil and gas sector, 
FY 2014–15
Source: Author’s illustration based on data from the Uganda Revenue Authority
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the industries which (in turn) sell inputs to supplying industries. This broader 
definition of backward linkages conforms to the approach first proposed by 
Chenery and Watanabe (1958) using input–output tables as discussed by Tordo 
et al. (2013: 164–5). Using actual purchase transactions recorded between the oil 
and gas industry (depicted in black), its direct suppliers (in dark grey, or red in 
Sen 2018), and the suppliers of suppliers (white nodes, or yellow nodes in Sen 
2018), the economic reach and potential impact of the industry becomes much 
more apparent. Indirect suppliers that will be affected by the anticipated increase 
in demand from oil and gas companies include industries as diverse as short-term 
accommodation providers, plastic product manufacturers, and manufacturers of 
fabricated metal products. Notably, as the oil industry establishes further direct 
supply linkages the commencement of the engineering, procurement, and con-
struction phase (followed by production and operations and maintenance), the 
network of indirect suppliers reached will grow exponentially.
The analysis of linkages through purchase transactions has important impli-
cations for the study of local content, and interventions required to support 
domestic preparedness for the upcoming increase in supply opportunities. 
Direct suppliers to oil and gas companies will need to ensure that their own sup-
ply chains (including domestically produced and imported input suppliers) are 
equipped to service the increase in production required to meet contractual 
obligations. To this end, the government of Uganda has access to an invaluable 
resource through its VAT transaction records (filed on a monthly basis) and 
ASYCUDA customs data (recorded at the transaction level). The analysis of 
these records, in conjunction with industry consultations, can help to create an 
evidence base to inform the design of targeted supplier development and sup-
port initiatives. This can be attained at little incremental cost to the government.
4.2 What capabilities do domestic firms have  
to enter the resource value chain?
Despite heightened public interest (and an elaborate regulatory framework) to 
enhance national participation in the oil sector, there is still limited evidence on 
supplier capabilities to service the industry. Available information sources include 
a slightly dated Industrial Baseline Survey commissioned by IOCs (SBC  2013), 
and a NSD maintained by the PAU. The NSD is a useful tool to provide basic 
information on registered suppliers, as sectoral regulations require all prospective 
suppliers (whether domestic or foreign) to be registered on the database.13 This 
includes data on company names, business type, sector of operation, business 
category, country of registration, physical address, and additional information (if 
13 Requirements for inclusion in the database include: evidence of business registration, social 
security provisions for employees, tax compliance, and possession of a bank account.
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any). As of 28 February 2018, 1,277 suppliers were registered on the National 
Suppliers Database, of which 75 per cent were companies incorporated in Uganda. 
However, the NSD does not convey any information on supplier capabilities in its 
current form.14 This subsection consequently draws on novel administrative data 
sources (e.g. VAT and PAYE datasets maintained by the revenue authority) to 
augment the publicly available information on domestic supplier capabilities.
Table 16.2 examines the composition of the NSD at the broad sector level. The 
table presents the number of domestic and foreign suppliers, classified on the 
14 Future phases of the National Suppliers Database may include a joint qualification system, and 
an e-market for the procurement of goods and services.
Table 16.2 Oil and gas suppliers in Uganda: by sector and selected variables
Sector Registered suppliers Domestic firms in  
top 5 per cent
 in Uganda abroad above 95th percentile/ 
total assessed
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Accommodation and food service 36 2 0/1059
Administrative and support activities 35 6 1/977
Agriculture, forestry, and fishing 5 0 9/369
Arts, entertainment, and recreation 1 0 0/172
Construction 158 42 7/3119
Education 10 1 0/78
Electricity, gas, and air-conditioning 
supply
23 6 12/203
Financial and insurance activities 37 1 8/265
Human health and social work activities 27 3 1/155
Information and communication 59 12 9/841
Manufacturing 52 79 44/1673
Mining and quarrying 26 32 3/123
Other service activities 138 26 0/1005
Professional, scientific, and technical 
activities
173 69 2/1208
Public administration and defence 1 0 1/799
Real estate activities 12 0 7/654
Transportation and storage 99 20 7/1015
Water supply, sewerage, waste 
management
16 10 0/85
Wholesale and retail trade 53 7 202/8058
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the PAU and the Uganda Revenue Authority.
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basis of country of registration, in columns 2 and 3 respectively. Rows correspond-
ing to sectors (listed in column 1) which feature in the schedule of  goods and 
 services reserved for domestic supply are highlighted in grey. The darker shade of 
grey implies that the whole sector has been reserved for domestic  suppliers, whereas 
the lighter shade indicates that only specific sub-sectors have been reserved. For 
example, the transportation and clearing and forwarding sub-sectors have been 
reserved for purposes of domestic supply. However, this does not include all the 
sub-sectors that feature under ‘transport and storage’, such as warehousing and 
storage. Column 4 displays a representative measure of the capabilities of domestic 
firms under each sector. This indicator measures the number of domestic firms 
from each sector that feature in the top 5 per cent (i.e. above the 95th percentile) 
of most ‘productive’ firms in Uganda. The measure of productivity utilized here 
corresponds to sales or revenue earned per worker and has been constructed by 
combining firm-level sales information from monthly VAT returns with employ-
ment information from monthly PAYE tax returns.
A few limitations of the data in Table  16.2 should be noted. The measure of 
revenue per worker was constructed using yearly averages for firms correspond-
ing to each sector over the period 2010–14/15. However, the number of suppliers 
registered on the NSD corresponds to a single point in time (suppliers registered 
in Uganda as of 28 February 2018). There is also no reason to suppose that the 
sample of domestic firms listed in the NSD corresponds (wholly) to the sample of 
firms which filed PAYE and VAT returns between 2010–14/15, although these are 
all tax-paying firms. Despite these limitations, the summary indicator in column 
4 conveys useful information for two reasons:
 • For any given sector the presence of non-zero firms among the most 
 productive firms in the economy is indicative that it is indeed a competitive 
sector with high growth potential. This suggests the sector’s importance 
from an economic policy perspective, and should feature in the prioritization 
of any supplier development initiatives rolled out by the government.
 • Information on the number of firms in a sector that are above the productivity 
threshold relative to the total number of firms assessed is indicative of the 
presence (and probability) of a small or mid-sized population of highly pro-
ductive domestic firms in a particular sector. This can help the government 
and IOCs to identify sectors in which supplier integration may be feasible 
and targeted in the short term.15
Overall, the data presented in Table  16.2 highlight several notable features. 
Columns 2 and 3 indicate that foreign suppliers outnumber domestic suppliers in 
15 Ideally this analysis should be conducted at the sub-sector level to guide policy action.
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the manufacturing and mining sectors. A closer look at the data reveals that foreign 
manufacturers typically dominate more technologically complex sub-sectors such 
as the manufacture of other electrical equipment, special-purpose machinery, 
and chemical products. This pattern conforms to expectations, as these industries 
are currently beyond the reach of Uganda’s domestic industrial capabilities and 
have limited potential for local content development.
Column 4 further confirms the results of Spray and Wolf (2017) that high-
productivity sectors in Uganda primarily consist of services (including informa-
tion and communications, construction, transport and storage, wholesale and 
retail trade) and manufacturing sectors. Narrowly defined industries within these 
aggregate high-productivity categories (e.g. cargo handling, wireless telecommu-
nication activities) that have the potential to supply the oil and gas industry along 
with a wider range of economic sectors may be relevant candidates for targeted 
supplier development initiatives. Fostering these ‘connected’ and high productivity 
industries can result in broad-based and sustainable economic gains. Notably, 
Spray and Wolf (2017) also find that the growth of productivity and output in 
these industries is a strong indicator of overall economic growth. However, it is 
worth emphasizing that even in the case of more productive and connected 
manufacturing and service industries (where a stronger economic case for local 
content can be argued), it is imperative to consider the costs and benefits of vari-
ous policy options. Mandating local content requirements in these sectors can 
risk exacerbating supply bottlenecks (while raising input costs), not only in the oil 
industry, but all other industries that are connected through backward linkages.
The row-colour scheme identifying reserved goods and services, coupled with 
the productivity measure (column 4) highlight concerns that the accommoda-
tion and food service sector and water supply, sewerage, and waste management 
sector may be under-prepared to service the industry. Detailed assessments by 
the oil industry in SBC (2013) observed that the catering of camp facilities, food 
supply, and hazardous waste management industries were below required stand-
ards in 2012. Indeed, due to the lack of internationally recognized standard certi-
fication in occupational health and safety (ISO 45001) and quality management 
systems (ISO 9001:2008), no domestic catering firms were awarded contracts 
during the oil exploration phase in Uganda (Atuhairwe 2018). A more optimistic 
picture has emerged in the treatment of hazardous wastes sector, where the country 
has evolved from having non-existent capabilities (in 2013) to state-of-the-art 
facilities, such as a US$20 million oil waste treatment plant in Nyamasoga.16
Figure 16.3 further presents the distribution of average labour productivity in 
(selected) sectors discussed above. These are presented in a logarithmic scale to 
facilitate cross-sector comparison. This implies that the histograms, although 
apparently normally distributed, are significantly skewed to the right in absolute 
16 See Sen (2018: Box 2) for further details.
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terms. In other words, there is a consistent pattern across sectors where a large 
number of low-productivity firms are observed, and only a few high-productivity 
firms feature in the right tail of the distribution.17 The significant heterogeneity in 
firm productivity observed within sectors highlights another important consid-
eration for the design of potential supplier development interventions: within a 
target sector, should interventions focus on the right tail of the productivity dis-
tribution to include only high-capability firms, or encompass the whole distribu-
tion of firms? This is an especially relevant consideration given the tight time 
frame for industrial supply opportunities in Uganda.
To approach the question posed above, it is useful to consider the capabilities 
of the median firm (in targeted sectors) relative to the requirements of the oil 
industry. Table 16.3 summarizes performance indicators of median firms from (a 
few) priority industries for local content development identified by SBC (2013). The 
study identifies twenty-five industries based on potential benefits to the economy 
(in terms of job creation potential and skill development) and feasibility—that is, 
investment intensity and time required for quality upgrading to industry standards.18 
Columns 2, 3, and 4 present information on the number of employees hired, 
monthly revenue earned per worker, and monthly value added per worker 
17 The vertical grey line in the diagram corresponds to the 95th percentile of the economy-wide 
labour productivity distribution. It is used to identify the number of firms in the top 5 per cent, as 
described in Table 16.3.
18 For succinct presentation, only selected manufacturing and service industries from the list of 
twenty-five industries have been included.
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Figure 16.3 Distribution of revenue/workers across select supply industries, 
logarithmic scale
Source: Author’s illustration based on data from the Uganda Revenue Authority
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(in 2015 US dollars) observed for the median firm in each supplier industry. These 
data correspond to the period 2010–14/15. For instance, the median cargo-handling 
firm has seven employees, earns US$719 in revenues per worker, and adds value 
worth US$454 per worker in a given month. Column 5 further provides information 
on the quality of goods and service provision in each of these industries, relative 
to the oil and gas industry’s standards, as per SBC (2013).19 We observe that only 
one industry—the treatment and disposal of non-hazardous waste—conformed 
to the industry quality standard (in this list). As of 2013, oil and gas operators also 
perceived that five industries among the reserved schedule (corresponding to 
transport of goods and people, catering, and civil works) were far below industry 
standards.
An example from the transport industry may help to illustrate what it means to 
be ‘far below’ the industry standard in practice. SBC (2013) interviewed thirty-three 
companies in the transportation sector and found that a total fleet of 2,500 trucks 
operated in 2012. Of these, only companies supplying 200 trucks met required oil 
and gas producers’ land transportation safety recommended practices and ISO 9001 
quality management standards. Relative to the estimated increment in demand 
for trucks during oilfield development and production, the study estimated a supply 
gap of 700 per cent. Recent reports suggest that the transport and logistics industry 
19 These assessments correspond to the year 2013, and may consequently be a little dated.
Table 16.3 Median firm by supply category and indicator, in 2015 US$






[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Manufacture of structural metal 
products
7 4,022 1,621 Below
Manufacture of furniture 7 3,599 708 Far below
Treatment and disposal of  
non-hazardous waste
9 253 142 Meets 
standard
Construction of roads and railways 19 702 0 Below
Construction of other civil 
engineering projects
19 1,336 1,028 Far below
Urban and suburban passenger  
land transport
9 282 65 Far below
Freight transport by road 10 1,801 976 Far below
Cargo handling 7 719 454 Far below
Restaurants and mobile food 
service activities
13 600 167 Far below
Note: Revenue/worker and value-added/worker are reported on a monthly basis in 2015 US$.
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the Uganda Revenue Authority and SBC (2013).
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may still be under-prepared to service the demands from the oil industry, although 
a handful of indigenous firms (such as Bemuga Holdings and Globe Trotters Ltd) 
have acquired international standards certification (Rwothungeyo 2018).
5. Conclusion
Extant empirical evidence indicates that supply linkages to the external sector 
(whether direct or indirect) is an important driver of productivity improvements 
at the firm level (Atkin et al. 2017; Spray 2017; Spray and Wolf 2017). This chapter 
consequently focuses on LCPs as a means to leverage the anticipated demand pull 
from oil and gas exporters to foster supplier capabilities in a wide range of ‘con-
nected’ goods and service sectors. The summary of extensive (and fairly ‘specific’) 
local content requirements in Uganda’s oil industry, however, suggests that the 
government has thus far leaned principally on legal and regulatory instruments to 
force productive linkages to national industry. Instead, market-enabling policies 
that support domestic firms to overcome the sizeable barriers to entry into these 
global value chains are more likely to yield an implementable and durable pattern 
of supplier integration. The importance of a collaborative approach to local con-
tent (as opposed to a ‘command and control’ approach) is already becoming 
apparent on large infrastructure development projects in Uganda, where local 
firms are losing out due to their inability to meet standards, in spite of legal directives 
to source locally (Kasemire 2018). Indeed, the key contention of this chapter is 
that the combination of limited supplier capabilities and insufficient capability-
development interventions requires urgent remedial policy action.
A wide range of policy options are available to the government of Uganda 
to  pursue a collaborative approach to local content management. This may 
include the establishment of an independent local content unit to foster buyer– 
supplier linkages through information provision, matchmaking, and networking 
(Steenbergen and Sutton 2017). A review of the existing institutional framework 
to promote local content in Uganda’s oil and gas sub-sector suggests that it may 
be important to distinguish responsibilities for this function from the sector 
regulator and the line ministry in charge of energy and mineral development. 
Instead, this chapter recommends the adoption of a long-term view in which 
institutions are developed to foster buyer–supplier linkages in the oil and gas 
sector, which can gradually be expanded horizontally to other sectors. This fol-
lows from the view that sub-sector-level LCPs are ultimately linked to national 
industrial development and employment-generation objectives.
The chapter further assesses oil and gas supplier capabilities by examining 
input-sourcing patterns from the natural resource value chain, and indicators 
of firm performance from tax administration datasets. The analysis underscores 
the need for capability-raising innovations or policies to support aspiring 
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domestic suppliers. However, the design of appropriate supplier development 
interventions, including their scope (targeted or broad-based), funding modalities, 
and effectiveness within a limited time frame require further investigation. The 
current analysis offers an approach towards the identification of programme 
scope—that is, (1) the prioritization of high-potential productive and ‘con-
nected’ sectors; and (2) consideration of the within-sector distribution of firm 
capabilities (compared to industry standards) to assess whether a programme 
should only target high-capability firms or the sector more broadly.
I conclude with policy recommendations to ultimately refocus the government’s 
approach to local content promotion to much-needed supplier development ini-
tiatives. These are as follows:
 • Establishment of the Industry Enhancement Centre (IEC) jointly planned 
by the government and IOCs to impart business and technical training to 
domestic firms, as a priority.
 • Scaling up of existing business development training programmes (in the 
interim, prior to the establishment of the IEC) for domestic suppliers. This 
could include, for example, the E4D/SOGA programmes related to bid man-
agement and HSE compliance (see Box 1), which have demonstrated their 
effectiveness at a small scale.
 • Design of policy interventions targeted at alleviating supply-side constraints 
(e.g. access to finance, standards certification) faced by priority supply 
 industries.
 • Extension of the NSD using updated information on supplier capabilities 
(e.g. firm performance, markets served, transaction history). This could help to 
guide prospective buyers, while enhancing the visibility of domestic suppliers.
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The Boom–Bust Cycle of Global Copper 
Prices, Structural Change, and Industrial 
Development in Zambia
Robert Liebenthal and Caesar Cheelo
1. Introduction
Since becoming independent in October 1964, Zambia has experienced a number 
of resource-based boom-and-bust cycles. Its main industry, copper mining, 
accounted for more than 90 per cent of exports in the late 1960s (Nash 1997). In 
2017, that share was still 73.6 per cent (MOF 2018), indicating little diversification—
although, as we discuss later, there has been variation over that period. Mineral 
exports other than copper exist, notably cobalt, gold, coal, manganese, and semi-
precious stones, and in recent years cobalt, which is mined along with copper in 
several mines, has become increasingly important as global prices have strength-
ened due to the use of the commodity in electronics.1 Despite this, mineral 
exports continue to be dominated by copper. Zambia remains around the world’s 
seventh-largest copper producer and the second-largest in Africa, having ceded 
first place to the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2015. Thus, understanding the 
boom, or rather the cycle of booms and busts, over Zambia’s economic history is 
almost entirely about understanding the fortunes and misfortunes of the copper 
mining industry, its impact on the rest of the economy, and how the industry and 
the broader economy have been managed during booms.
Much has been written about Zambia’s experience in managing its mining 
industry and in trying to ensure that this industry benefits the economy of 
Zambia and its people. Successive development plans, most notably the Fifth, 
Sixth, Revised Sixth, and Seventh National Development Plans (2006–10, 2011–15, 
2013–16, and 2017–21, respectively) have struggled with the issue. In particular, 
Adam et al. (2014) is a good starting point, offering perhaps the most exhaustive 
1 However, cobalt, at 1.3 per cent of exports in 2017, and gold, at 2.2 per cent, remain relatively 
small.
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recent analysis of the topic; among their key conclusions was that, ‘Zambia is a 
country endowed with abundant natural resources that can be harnessed to put 
the country on a sustainable development path. Foreign ownership of mining 
companies and attractive tax incentives have limited the amount of resources that 
the economy can absorb from increased mining revenues’, and also that, ‘democ-
racies find the conversion of natural resource wealth into sustained prosperity 
particularly difficult to manage’ (Adam et al. 2014: 14).
This chapter sets out to assess the prospects for Zambia’s natural resources, 
notably its mining industry, and the implications for its revenues, especially for 
the public sector, focusing particularly on the available evidence on the size of the 
revenues and the timing of their availability. Then, based on the country’s long 
and challenging experience of managing the fluctuating fortunes of the industry, 
it attempts to draw lessons for policy and institutional changes.
2. Zambia’s economic and political context
Zambia’s economic performance can be broken down into three main phases, 
drawing on the insights and observations of various authors (Adam et al. 2014; 
Bigsten and Kayizzi-Mugerwa 2000; Chan and Clancy 2000; IMF 2017; Kaunda 
2002; Nash 1997; Ndulo and Mudenda 2004).
From independence in 1964 to 1973, the economy grew on average by 6 per 
cent per annum as mining output and copper prices rose (Nash 1997; Ndulo and 
Mudenda 2004). In 1970, the mining industry was partially nationalized, as the 
state took majority ownership of the mines, followed in 1973 by full nationaliza-
tion and the abrogation of management agreements with the former owners. 
Eventually, ownership of the mines was vested in Zambia Consolidated Copper 
Mines Ltd (ZCCM), a wholly government-owned corporation. Also in 1973, 
Zambia became a one-party state following a socialist ideology, a situation 
reversed in 1991 when a multiparty dispensation was reintroduced (Chan and 
Clancy 2000).
The Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD), which was elected in that 
year, espoused a liberal, free-market agenda and started a process of economic 
liberalization and privatization, culminating in privatization of the mining indus-
try in 2000 (Bigsten and Kayizzi-Mugerwa 2000; Chan and Clancy 2000; Ndulo 
and Mudenda, 2004). From 1973 to 2000, the economy stagnated and per capita 
incomes actually fell, due to low copper prices and adverse terms of trade (oil 
prices having increased dramatically in the 1970s) as well as economic misman-
agement. Copper output, which reached 750,000 tons in 1970, fell steadily to 
only 250,000 tons in 2000. From 2000 onwards, economic growth recovered, 
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aver aging more than 6 per cent until 2009, when the international financial 
crisis hit and copper prices again dipped significantly. By 2009, copper output 
had again reached over 700,000 tons, following major investment in the sector 
by the new owners (Adam et al. 2014; IMF 2017) (see Liebenthal and Cheelo 
2018: Figure 1).
3. Extent of the mineral resource
There are limited data on Zambia’s mineral resource. A United States Geological 
Survey of undiscovered copper resources in Africa estimated that 8.4 million tons 
of undiscovered copper lies in the Roan arenite tract, which roughly covers Zambia’s 
Copperbelt and Central Provinces (Zientek et al.  2014). However, this does not 
include the North-Western Province, which in 2017 accounted for 70 per cent of 
Zambia’s production of 797,000 tons, with three of the largest mines, Kansanshi, 
Lumwana, and Kalumbila. Nor does it include Northern Province, where at least 
one investor is seeking to start a major mine. Although mineral reserve quantifica-
tion studies and reports are hard to come by, the Zambia Business Times of 26 March 
2016 quotes an ‘economic report on Africa’ as recording that Zambia had a copper 
reserve of some 35 million tons in 2016, equivalent to US$228 billion at a copper 
price of US$6,500 per ton (Zambia Business Times 2016).
The World Bank (2016) concluded that rules for licence allocations and geological 
data collection—that is, the de jure situation—are the highest-scoring aspects of 
Zambia’s mining regime. In other words, the basic legal framework for Zambia’s 
mining industry is reasonably sound. However, the World Bank also found issues 
relating to the awarding and retention of exploration and mining licences, which 
it said lacked transparency and consistency. It found weaknesses in three areas:
 • interview responses on allocating and managing licences raised concerns 
about the use of discretionary power, whether procedures are followed in 
practice, the application of procedural timeframes, the application of sanc-
tions on non-performing companies, and poor resourcing of the unit man-
aging licence monitoring
 • keeping the mining cadastre up to date
 • the state of mapping and geological exploration, which falls short due to a low 
proportion of licensed ground being serviced by active mapping and due to 
limited recent geologic mapping, and because the development of geological 
information, including geological mapping and databases, is not strong.
The same report stated that geological mapping of the country is only 60 per cent 
complete and that there is no large-scale reconnaissance licence in place. Thus, 
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the full extent of Zambia’s mineral resources is yet to be discovered, fully quantified 
through exploration, and exploited.
The Fraser Institute, which conducts annual surveys of investment perceptions 
among mining companies globally, ranked Zambia sixth out of fourteen African 
countries in 2017 for investment attractiveness, and seventy-first out of 104 
glo bal ly—compared with forty-third in 2016 (Stedman and Green  2017). 
Respondents to that survey voiced increased concern over the taxation regime, 
the geological database, and political instability.
Zambia scored 50 out of 100 points in the Natural Resource Governance 
Institute’s resource governance index for 2017 (NRGI 2017), with an above-average 
score for value realization (58/100) and the enabling environment, but below 
average for revenue management (35/100). The index was especially positive 
about ZCCM-IH,2 which it rated the second-best-governed state-owned enter-
prise in sub-Saharan Africa. However, the pipeline of new investment in mining 
is limited. Recent investments have included the Kalumbila mine, output from 
which is already scaling up significantly, the Synclinorium investment by Mopani 
mine in Kitwe, and the new smelter at Kansanshi in Solwezi. Given the gestation 
period for new investment, it is possible that mining output could reach a plateau 
in the next few years. In addition, mining output and new investment have been 
constrained in the recent past by power shortages. Mining consumes about 
55 per cent of Zambia’s power generation.
Zambia has taken steps recently to address its power deficit, most notably by 
eliminating power subsidies and thus making power investment more attractive. 
This was despite resistance from the mining industry, which was the major bene-
ficiary from the power subsidies. The current investment pipeline includes a 
700 MW investment at Kafue Lower, some 600 MW of solar installations, and 
350 MW from the Maamba coal-fired facility. Finance is being sought, by both 
public and private operators, through public–private partnerships (PPPs), for 
major investments at Batoka and on the Luapula River. There is reason, therefore, 
to be cautiously optimistic about the country’s ability to meet its power require-
ments. The Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC) is also taking a 
controlling interest in the country’s largest independent power producer, the 
Copperbelt Energy Corporation, with a view to expanding its access to private 
finance.
As a result, the Seventh National Development Plan (7NDP) is cautious about 
projecting Zambia’s future copper output, with a target of 1  million tons by 
the  end of the plan period, compared with 797,266 tons in 2017 (Republic of 
Zambia 2017) based on current investment plans. At the same time, the 7NDP sets 
2 Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines-Investment Holdings (ZCCM-IH) was established in 2001 
as the holding company for the minority shareholding that the Zambian government retained after 
privatization. Its shareholding ranges from 10 per cent to 50 per cent in ten mining companies.
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out strategies to address these issues, notably through better geological information 
generation and provision; improved mineral processing; development of market 
linkages; and promotion of mineral exploration. Petroleum exploration is being 
promoted, and a number of oil blocks are being explored, but it is too early to 
estimate any yield from these efforts. At the time of writing, a new mining policy 
is reported to be under preparation, but no details are currently available.
Current price projections by the World Bank (2015a), the Fraser Institute 
(Stedman and Green 2017), and others indicate that prices for copper are likely to 
remain in the US$6,000–7,000 range and that cobalt prices are also likely to remain 
high. Such projections are of course subject to great uncertainty, depending on an 
expanding world economy, especially with the growth of China, strong investment 
and construction demand, and the growth of the electric car industry. Recent 
actions on world trade by the US government could well lead to lower growth in 
world trade and the global economy. But even without such con sid er ations, the 
track record of commodity price forecasts has been mixed—inevitably so.
4. How large are the resource revenues likely to be?
From 2013 to 2025, one estimate is that 5 per cent to 7 per cent of GDP can be 
raised from mining companies (Simpasa et al. 2013). This compares with 5 per cent 
of GDP (28 per cent of government revenue) in 2014. This estimate includes not 
only mineral royalty and company income tax, but VAT on imports, income tax 
(PAYE) on wages and salaries paid by the mining companies, and other pay-
ments. The key assumptions behind the lower figure are that the mining tax 
regime remains unchanged from 2013 and that unit costs for the industry 
increase at the same rate as they did from 2008 to 2012. Output and exports are 
assumed to remain at 2012 levels. This could therefore be considered a conservative 
estimate, given that both output and prices are now higher than at that time, 
and that output is likely to increase based on projects that have started since 
then or are in the pipeline. In US dollar terms, public revenues would remain at 
slightly over US$1  billion per annum. Similarly, a World Bank projection in 
2015—based on the mining tax regime in place then (subsequently revised)—
projected public revenues at US$1.5 billion by 2020, tapering off to US$1.2 billion 
by 2013 (World Bank 2015b). However, a much more optimistic scenario from 
the same United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) source has revenues 
reaching US$4 billion per annum, based on the expiration of capital allowances, 
significantly higher levels of production and exports, and  higher prices. The 
conclusion is that the range of possible public revenue  outcomes is large and 
uncertain. Notably, the lower range of possible revenue projections does not 
show a significant increase in public revenues from mining, indicating that there 
may, in fact, be no boom.
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5. When are the revenues likely to come on line?
The future trajectory of mining revenues will depend on the extent of the resource 
(discussed above) and new investment. New investment in turn will depend in 
part on a range of government policies in the mining sector, notably support for 
exploration, licensing, and taxation.
As noted earlier, mining already accounts for a significant share of exports 
(75 per cent in 2015), government revenue (26 per cent), and GDP (10 per cent) 
(ZEITI 2015). In addition, mining investment over the period 2004–16 totalled 
US$12.3 billion, about 70 per cent of the total foreign direct investment (FDI) 
stock in Zambia (BOZ 2017). It accounts for about 21 per cent of formal sector 
employment (World Bank 2015b).
As noted above, copper output had fallen from a peak of 700,000 tons in 1970 
to 250,000 tons in 2000, partly because of low copper prices but also because of 
limited investment and high operating costs, leading to the mines losing some 
US$20 million per month by the late 1990s. Under pressure from international 
donors, but also recognizing concerns about the performance of the mines, the 
mines were privatized, with the government holding a residual golden share of 
about 10 per cent on average in the privatized companies through ZCCM-IH.
The privatization process has been criticized and remains controversial. In par-
ticular, the Development Agreements (DAs) between the government and the 
new owners (which have never been officially published, but have been leaked) 
locked in taxation and other provisions for 15 to 20 years (depending on the par-
ticular DA3) in a way that prevented the Zambian government from benefiting 
from any price or profit windfall (Lombe and Mwakacheya 2017; Manley 2017). 
Specifically, mineral royalty was set at 0.6 per cent of gross sales value, less the 
cost of transporting, insuring, and processing/refining the products; company 
income tax (CIT) was set at 25 per cent of gross profits, less depreciation, price 
participation payments to ZCCM-IH, capital expenditure incurred during the 
year (100 per cent depreciation), and accumulated losses carried forward (Lombe 
and Mwakacheya 2017; Manley 2017). The DAs also included provisions for sub-
sid ized electricity—a significant distortion as the mines came to consume more 
than 50 per cent of Zambia’s power output. As noted earlier, privatization contrib-
uted to a substantial increase in mining investment and consequently output, 
though the increase in copper prices during that period means that attribution is 
not straightforward. In general, for many commentators, the mines’ privatization 
was seen as ‘selling the family silver’ (Kaunda  2002). Certainly, the sale of the 
mines coincided with the low point in the copper price cycle, with the probable 
3 It should be noted that the DAs were not standard, and that different provisions applied to each 
mining company.
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result that the mines were sold for less than they would have been, had it been 
possible to wait for better conditions.
Despite the Agreements, in 2008 the government introduced both a windfall 
and a variable profits tax, which—after protests from the mining companies—
were eventually withdrawn (Adam et al. 2014). At the same time, the DAs were 
abrogated. In addition, the depreciation allowance was reduced from 100 to 
25 per cent; the loss carry-forward was reduced to a maximum of ten years; 
hedging operations were to be taxed separately; and the mineral royalty was 
raised to 3 per cent and applied to gross sales (Manley 2017). An IMF assessment 
suggested that the result of these changes was to increase the average effective rate 
on mining in Zambia from around 31 per cent to 47 per cent (Adam et al. 2014), 
taking Zambia from being one of the lowest to one of the highest tax regimes 
among developing countries.
Following criticism from the mining companies, the tax regime was again 
changed in 2009. The windfall tax was withdrawn and the 100 per cent capital 
allowance was restored, but the royalty was increased to 6 per cent in the 2012 
budget, sufficient—according to IMF estimates—to generate an additional 
1.5 per cent of GDP (Adam et al. 2014). However, in the 2015 budget the mineral 
royalty rate was changed to 20 per cent for open-pit mines and 8 per cent for under-
ground mines, while corporate income and profits taxes were set at zero. After only 
a few months, in July 2015, corporate income and profits taxes were reintroduced 
and set at 30 per cent, while the mineral royalty was set at 9 per cent for all mines.
In 2016, the mining tax regime was changed again, partly in response to pres-
sure from the mining companies. The main change was the removal of the 9 per 
cent royalty and its replacement with a price-based royalty, similar to the windfall 
tax but at lower rates: 4 per cent when the LME price is below US$4,500 per ton, 
5 per cent when it is between US$4,500 and US$6,000, and 6 per cent when the 
royalty is above US$6,000. With prices currently in the US$6,000–7,000 range, 
this is significantly lower than the previous regime. In addition, the variable 
 profits tax was removed (Manley 2017).
Manley also estimates that the effect of the new tax regime will be to reduce the 
effective tax rate for low-cost mines from about 58 per cent to about 43 per cent, 
and for high-cost mines from about 90 per cent to about 68 per cent. Most 
mines in Zambia, especially the underground mines, are relatively high-cost, 
(See  Liebenthal and Cheelo 2018 figure 2). However, an increasing share of 
mining output is coming from lower-cost mines, mainly open-pit, in the North-
Western Province.
Related to this, Manley argues that the new tax regime is less progressive with 
respect to price, and therefore less able to capture the rents generated by the 
mines. Since the royalty is applied to output, not profits, it does not capture rents 
directly. But it is a reasonable assumption that profits rise as prices rise, so that 
relating the royalty to price increases is an approximation to rent increases, 
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though probably not to total rents. Manley goes on to argue that the Zambian 
government will face pressure to increase taxes again if prices remain high. At the 
same time, if prices are lower in the future, a less progressive regime risks the 
closure of high-cost mines, with consequent impact on employment, especially in 
the politically sensitive Copperbelt.
Ideally, the tax regime would capture rents through profit taxes, which take 
account of costs. But mining costs are notoriously hard for the tax authorities to 
verify, and are widely suspected of being inflated specifically to avoid taxation. 
While there are challenges in verifying output and sales too, these are somewhat 
less difficult than those on the cost side and may be easier for the tax authorities 
to overcome. In general, lack of quality data on mining companies in Zambia has 
fuelled perceptions of large-scale tax evasion (World Bank 2016). Efforts to 
improve data quality and availability are proceeding. The Zambia Extractives 
Industries Transparency Initiative (ZEITI) has produced authoritative data up to 
2015, but nothing more recent (ZEITI 2015).
In addition, the government is, with support from co-operating partners, 
implementing two projects aimed at addressing the data issue. The Mineral Value 
Chain Monitoring Project (MVCMP, www.mvc.org.zm), which is based at the 
Zambia Revenue Authority (ZRA), monitors the mineral value chain from 
ex plor ation to export, one of its aims being to improve tax collection. In addition, 
it is establishing the Mineral Output Statistical Evaluation System (MOSES), 
which will produce comprehensive audited data on mining production and 
exports. Secondly, the Mineral Production Monitoring Support Project (MPMSP), 
based at the Ministry of Mines and Mineral Development (MMMD), also aims to 
support tax collection through effective regulation and monitoring of mineral 
production, particularly through capacity development at the MMMD. It aims to 
improve the issuance of mineral export permits and the analysis of mineral con-
tent through spot tests. Since early 2016, new monthly reporting systems for min-
eral production are being used to compare mines’ production reports with their 
export permits and royalty reporting.
For obvious reasons, the extent of tax evasion and avoidance is hard to estimate 
and is the subject of controversy. The report of the High Level Panel on Illicit 
Financial Flows (IFFs) from Africa—also called the Mbeki Report—stated that 
Zambia loses around 9 per cent of its GDP to IFFs (AU/ECA Conference of 
Ministers  2014: 55). The UNCTAD (2016) study Trade Misinvoicing in Primary 
Commodities in Developing Countries found that over the period 1995–2014, 67.7 per 
cent of Zambia’s copper exports went to China and Switzerland, both countries with 
high levels of export misinvoicing. In the case of Switzerland, no such exports are 
recorded by the recipient country, probably because the exports are effectively in 
transit to another destination (Readhead 2016). UNCTAD (2016: 16) found copper 
under-invoicing of US$5.6 billion, equal to 10 per cent of Zambia’s copper exports 
over the period. Global Financial Integrity, the Washington-based think tank, at one 
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point stated that Zambia lost US$8.8  billion in IFFs between 2001–10 (Kar and 
Freitas 2012) and that the country was losing US$2–3 billion per year to the mining 
industry, but then modified the claim, maintaining that the problem clearly exists 
but withdrawing the specific estimate (Forstater 2017a, b). Against this, the World 
Bank (2016) found that Zambia scored relatively well on tax policies and instru-
ments, including rules for auditing, base erosion, and profit shifting.
The existence and extent of tax evasion and avoidance and IFFs related to the 
mining sector are inevitably the subject of political debate and pressure. For 
example, in March 2018 the ZRA announced that it had uncovered tax ir regu lar-
ities by a prominent mining company of ZMK76.5 billion (about US$7.6 billion) 
resulting from the misclassification of consumables and spare parts at im port-
ation for the previous five years; the company subsequently identified itself as 
Kalumbila mine, owned by First Quantum Minerals, Zambia’s largest mining 
company and largest tax-payer. Similarly, a dispute is ongoing between ZCCM-IH 
and First Quantum over the application of profits from Zambian mines to devel-
opment expenditures at a South American mine. Such disputes are almost in ev it-
able and no judgement as to their validity can be made here. However, they can 
increase the perceived risks of new investment if they are not handled within a 
rules-based framework which reflects consultation.
Lombe and Mwakacheya (2017) conducted interviews with mining companies 
and other stakeholders (unions, community sector organisations) to establish 
perceptions about the way government has handled the industry. In addition to 
concerns about policy consistency, they record a lack of consultation; a preference 
by government for operating through statutory instruments rather than legisla-
tion; a lack of appropriate analysis and impact assessments; the politicization of 
decision-making; and insufficient attention to revenue-sharing among central 
government, local government, and communities. While such agencies as the 
World Bank and the IMF, not to speak of the mining industry itself, argue for a 
stable and predictable tax regime, the relatively short-term time horizon for poli-
ticians in Zambia means that that regime—and indeed other aspects of mining 
policy—are at constant risk of change due to new developments, as well as new 
analysis. As Manley states:
The government faces two trade-offs when designing the tax regime. One is the 
desire for a progressive regime that captures rent and increases the overall stabil-
ity of tax policy against the disinclination to expose the treasury to the risk of 
low mining revenue if prices fall. The other is the desire for a progressive tax 
regime on the one hand, and a regime that is simple enough to collect revenues 
and combat tax avoidance on the other. (Manley 2017: 17)
The political trade-offs around the tax regime are complicated further by the 
impact the mining industry has on employment, social development, and the 
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environment. Despite employing some 90,000 workers directly (about 8 per cent 
of formal employment; World Bank 2016), the numbers in indirect employment, 
especially in mining areas, are much larger. Likewise, despite the small share 
(approximately US$2 billion annually: some 10 per cent) of goods and services 
consumed by the industry that are produced locally, many contractors to the 
mines use local labour and are subject to the fortunes of the mining industry. As 
noted earlier, this poses a particular challenge for the higher-cost operations in 
the Copperbelt, where some of the older mines are approaching the end of their 
lives. Recent experience in the absorption of job losses in the Copperbelt sug-
gests, however, that these challenges can be managed through a combination of 
co-operation with the trades unions, retraining, and small business support.
Before privatization, ZCCM, as the state-owned mining company, provided a 
wide range of social services, (hospitals, schools, local infrastructure) in most if 
not all mining areas. With privatization, these responsibilities went to local 
authorities, which were ill equipped, both financially and organizationally, to 
carry them out to the standard to which they had been delivered under ZCCM. 
As stated in the MinGov report, ‘a key shortcoming is the absence of a legislated 
requirement for sharing resource revenue between central and local governments’ 
(World Bank 2016). The ICMM (2014) found that ‘in 2012, the four mining com-
panies (Mopani, KCM, Lumwana and First Quantum) spent just under US$70 
million on social investments’, equivalent to 0.3 per cent of Zambia’s GDP. In the 
Copperbelt, the companies have continued to run hospitals, health clinics, and 
some schools—in addition to training facilities aimed specifically at the develop-
ment of mine-related skills. In the ‘New Copperbelt’, North-Western Province, 
where community expectations of services were lower, much attention has been 
paid to basic infrastructure and community services. At Kalumbila, a new town-
ship has been developed by the mining company. ICMM (2014) concluded that 
consultation and engagement around the services being provided by the mining 
companies was to be recommended; that a holistic approach to providing com-
munity services had been quite successful; and that alignment and partnership 
with local government and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) had been 
quite effective.
The long history of mining in Zambia has left a legacy of environmental damage 
in mining towns (World Bank 2016). At privatization, the responsibility for 
addressing this legacy was left with the government and with local authorities, 
which were and are ill equipped to handle it, both financially and technically. 
Kabwe, for example, still has levels of lead pollution as high as or higher than those 
of any other municipality in the world. Tailings dumps accumulated over decades 
of mining have not been cleaned up, since their owners (and many informal 
miners) believe that increased copper prices will at some point make recovery 
profitable. Meanwhile, the dumps are causing environmental health liabilities 
in local communities. In addition, copper smelters in several Copperbelt 
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municipalities have been responsible for sulphur dioxide (SO2) emissions, 
potentially causing acid rain, soil erosion, crop damage, and air and water pollu-
tion. The Kafue River has been affected, which has given rise to some international 
activism by environmental NGOs. In addition, new (post-privatization) environ-
mental liabilities are often inseparably mixed with the old ones, so that 
the responsibility for clean-up is unclear. In addition, some mining companies 
are not complying with existing regulations, specifically the requirements of the 
Environmental Protection Fund (EPF). In particular, the prospect that some of the 
old tailings could be processed at some point in the future (and the fact that 
some of them are being processed now by illegal small-scale miners who have 
some political influence) means that there is resistance to remediation. These 
li abil ities may eventually become the responsibility of the state.
The government has attempted to address some of the environmental health 
risks. It succeeded in directly addressing some of the major risks, notably several 
tailings dumps, with some demonstrated impact on local exposure levels; and in 
achieving some policy and legislative progress, notably the Environmental 
Management Act of 2011 and operationalization of the EPF. However, as noted 
above, much of the legacy of pollution remains; the responsibility for addressing 
new environmental issues is ambiguous; and the institutional mechanisms for 
addressing these issues still require strengthening.
6. Fiscal policy and managing copper booms
In Adam et al. (2014), Paul Collier argues that three rules need to be instituted to 
govern depleting (or exhaustible) resources, apart from managing volatility. These 
are: a savings rule, which governs the share of resource revenues that should be set 
aside to offset the depletion of the resource; a process for managing investment of 
the savings; and a debt strategy which governs recourse to borrowing.
The savings rule can refer to both domestic private and public saving, i.e. 
assuming private saving is retained in the country and therefore available for local 
investment. While there is reinvestment of profits (savings) by the mining com-
panies—in addition to new inflows from outside Zambia—there is to date no 
private Zambian-owned company in copper mining (though there are several 
small mines and some presence in the gemstone sector). Thus, savings in Zambia 
from the mining sector mainly take the form of public saving, which is essentially 
about taxation, and any dividend that might accrue to the government as result of 
its holdings in the mines through ZCCM-IH. On the public sector side, Zambia 
has not created a specific sovereign wealth fund for managing the natural resource 
revenues from copper mining. This long-term fiscal policy management stance is 
markedly different from that of, say, Zambia’s neighbour to the south-west, 
Botswana. Like Zambia, Botswana is landlocked, and like Zambia, it is mineral-
resource-rich, though mainly in diamonds. In 1994, the Pula Fund was established 
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under the Bank of Botswana Act, as a sovereign wealth fund to hold a long-term 
investment and form part of the country’s foreign exchange reserves. The Pula 
Fund’s goal is to preserve a portion of the income from diamond exports for 
future generations. Dixon (2016) reports that the Pula Fund is Africa’s oldest and 
third-largest fund, and that it stood at US$5.4 billion in 2016. Collier (Adam et al. 
2014) notes that a savings rule such as the establishment and operationalization 
of a sovereign fund should take account of the time that complete depletion of 
the resource is expected to take: the closer it is to depletion, the higher the savings 
rate should be.
To date, Zambia has no mineral savings rule in place. Moreover, there is not—
and never has been—any mechanism in place to address price volatility, for 
example through a stabilization fund. Without any savings rules, there is no sys-
tematic process for managing investment of the savings. Even successive develop-
ment plans and annual budgets, while making implicit and, generally, conservative 
assumptions about likely mineral price trends, have not explicitly set out different 
possible revenue scenarios against which to plan different expenditure scenarios. 
While there is widespread recognition among policymakers that revenues can be, 
and generally are, volatile, the general sense is that little if anything can be done 
about the volatility itself. The main policy response is to emphasize economic 
diversification away from mining, a theme which appears in all plans and policy 
statements and is nominally given high priority. However, diversification has had 
limited success in practice.
Collier also advises using debt strategies as a fiscal policy anchor for managing 
resource revenues (Adam et al. 2014). Zambia published its first Medium-Term 
Debt Strategy (MTDS) in mid-2017 through the efforts of the country’s Ministry 
of Finance (MOF 2017b). Between 2005/06, when the country secured debt for-
giveness under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative and the 
Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI), and around 2012, when renewed rapid 
debt accumulation began, Zambia had no need of a debt strategy. But with the 
mounting debt, which reached 58 per cent of GDP by 2016 (as we show in 
Section 7), Zambia needed a debt management strategy; hence the MTDS. 
However, the MTDS does not make any association between domestic resource 
mobilization strategies and copper mineral resource revenues or even global 
copper prices. If the strategy takes into account these important factors, it only 
does so covertly or implicitly. Thus, Zambia does not have an explicit resource 
revenue management strategy from a fiscal policy perspective.
7. How much spending? Fiscal projections
As noted earlier, the 7NDP sets a target for domestic revenue (including mining) 
at 18 per cent of GDP, which is in turn targeted to reach a growth rate of 5.5 per cent 
per annum by 2021. It also aims at keeping the fiscal deficit at 3 per cent of GDP, 
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so that public spending does not exceed 21 per cent of GDP (Republic of 
Zambia 2017). However, the fiscal deficit in 2017 was 7.8 per cent of GDP, against 
a target of 7.0 per cent, suggesting that significantly more fiscal adjustment will be 
needed to come into line with the plan. In addition, GDP growth was 4.1 per cent 
in 2017, and is projected by the World Bank at 4.3 per cent in 2018 and 4.7 per cent 
in 2019—below the 7NDP targets for those years (4.6 per cent and 5.2 per cent, 
respectively) (World Bank 2017). The composition of public spending also gives 
rise to scepticism that there will be any unencumbered windfall from the mineral 
resource in the near term. Personal emoluments absorbed some 42.5 per cent of 
current expenditure in 2017, while interest payments absorbed another 24.5 per cent 
(MOF 2018).
As one would expect, the fiscal projections on anticipated mineral revenue 
contributions to the overall fiscal position are hard to pin down. The 7NDP sets 
out targets, as reported earlier, but does not disaggregate mineral revenue. Over 
the medium term (2018–20), the Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) 
projects that total domestic revenue will increase from ZMK47.9 billion in 2018 to 
ZMK65.9  billion in 2020 (MOF  2017a). The total mineral sector contribution 
(mining corporate income tax plus mineral royalties, excluding PAYE and import 
VAT) will increase from ZMK5.3 billion in 2018 to ZMK6.4 billion in 2020, while 
its share in total domestic revenue is projected to decline from 11.1 per cent of 
total revenue in 2018 to 9.7 per cent in 2020 (see Figure 17.1). The declining share 
reflects an intention by the authorities to slightly reduce fiscal dependency on 
the mines over time in the medium term. However, these projections predate the 
large increase in debt and debt servicing since 2017 (see later), which might be 
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Figure 17.1 Revenue forecasts in the MTEF
Source: Authors’ construction based on MOF (2017a).
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8. Revenue-sharing arrangements
As argued earlier, Zambia’s current mineral tax regime is broadly in line with 
good international practice and is capturing in the region of 40–70 per cent of 
pre-tax profits, depending on the cost structure of the mines. In addition, since 
ZCCM-IH holds between 10–20 per cent of the shares in the operating mines, 
except Lumwana, it can be claimed that there is additional benefit to the Zambian 
state, although this has typically taken the form of increases in asset values, since 
dividends have to date rarely been declared. However, these calculations do not 
take account of possible profit shifting, transfer pricing, etc., which are denied by 
the mining companies.
Leaving possible tax avoidance aside for the time being, the main issue with the 
current tax regime is its possible lack of progressivity if mineral prices increase. 
The presence of ZCCM-IH offers the potential for the Zambian state to influence 
the operating and investment policies of individual mines, though there are limits 
arising from ZCCM-IH’s minority shareholder status. As noted in the MinGov 
report, co-ordination among the various government agencies involved in the 
mining sector, (the Ministries of Mines and Mining Development, Finance, and 
National Development Planning, and ZRA) could be improved (World Bank 2016).
It is generally argued that the tax regime should be stable and predictable. 
Certainly, investors will be sensitive to the ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ whereby—once 
they have committed resources for investment and are locked in—they are vul-
nerable to various perceived assaults on their capacity to earn returns. However, it 
may be difficult for Zambia to maintain the present tax and royalty regime, espe-
cially if copper prices remain high, since there could then be a strong case for 
raising the royalty rate. In addition, as noted above, Zambia’s debt situation and 
the need to raise resources for debt servicing will increase the pressure to recover 
more resources from the mining industry.
As noted earlier, Zambia is taking some steps to address tax avoidance through 
the MVCMP and the MPMSP, but these initiatives are in their early stages and 
focus mainly on the revenue side. Possible trade misinvoicing and transfer 
 pri cing aimed at under-reporting profits—while receiving some attention, as 
Readhead (2016) notes—may still require more.
9. Reducing sovereign debt
Zambia’s public debt declined rapidly after the country qualified for debt relief 
under the Enhanced Initiative of the HIPC and MDRI, falling from 261 per cent 
of GDP in 2000 to 25 per cent only six years later in 2006 (Figure 17.2). Fiscal and 
current account balances jumped to one-off highs in 2006 before normalizing. 
Current account balances saw a short-lived episode of positive annual outcomes 
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from 2009 to 2012. Fiscal balances remained in deficit throughout, becoming 
deeper from 2014 onward. This reflected a rapid accumulation of debt, as the pub-
lic debt stock rose from 36 per cent of GDP in 2014 to 62 per cent in 2015. The 
IMF (2017) estimated Zambia’s debt stock at 56 per cent of GDP in 2017, very 
close to the 58 per cent of GDP debt stock estimate announced by the Ministry of 
Finance at an Economics Association of Zambia (EAZ) event about ten months 
later in August 2018. The IMF’s prediction was that the debt will reach about 
72 per cent of GDP by 2023 (IMF 2018), accompanied by twin (fiscal and current 
account) deficits. The IMF maintained its assessment of Zambia as being at high 
risk of debt distress, sustaining the opinion of a joint IMF-World Bank Debt 
Sustainability Analysis (IMF 2017).
However, with a reducing revenue percentage contribution from mining, no 
big bonanzas can be expected from the sector in terms of large revenue inflows 
for debt amortization, even in scenarios where global commodity (mineral) 
prices rebound further. Mining proceeds are more likely to be pooled with other 
revenues towards honouring constitutional obligations (the inflated public wage 
bill) and statutory obligations (interest payments on debt and arrears payments).
10. Exchange rate
Zambia’s dependence on traditional (mainly copper) exports and therefore on 
global mineral commodity prices, particularly copper prices, places the country 
at risk of ‘Dutch disease’—negative impacts on the economy through possible 
sharp rises in inflows of foreign currency associated with copper which make the 
country’s other products less price-competitive on the export market—when 

















































Figure 17.2 Fiscal and external balances and public debt
Source: Authors’ construction based on IMF (2018).
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by 21.3 per cent and 20.6 per cent per annum respectively, in 2016 and 2017, after a 
dramatic 29.9 per cent fall in 2015 (See Liebenthal and Cheelo 2018: Figure 5).
The dependence of Zambia’s traditional export earnings on global mineral 
commodity price movements—copper prices in particular—is quite evident in 
the statistics. For instance, the annual percentage changes in traditional exports 
were directly correlated with annual changes in global copper prices over the 
period 2003–17 (See Liebenthal and Cheelo 2018: Figure 6 Panel (a)). However, 
the relationship between traditional export changes and the real effective 
exchange rate is less obvious (BOZ 2018).
One way of testing the competitiveness of non-traditional exports is to check 
whether the local currency is overvalued. The IMF (2017) conducted a real 
exchange rate assessment for Zambia. The assessment suggests that a large 
depreciation brought the real effective exchange rate closer to equilibrium in 
2016. The results are based on the External Balance Assessment (EBA-lite) 
methodology,4 which included three approaches, namely: (i) the current 
account model (CA); (ii) the real exchange rate model (REER); and (iii) the 
external sustainability (ES) approach.
Table 17.1 in Liebenthal and Cheelo 2018 presents the three sets of results. In 
summary, the IMF finds the following:
 • The CA approach suggests that the real effective exchange rate is about 5.6 
per cent overvalued.
 • The REER approach suggests that the real effective exchange rate is in line 
with fundamentals.
 • The ES method indicates an overvaluation of between 4.2 per cent and 10 
per cent.
These results show that the local currency was somewhat overvalued although 
they are inconclusive about the magnitude of the overvaluation. This means the 
improvement in global copper prices and the resultant increase in copper for-
tunes has had a small negative effect on the competitiveness of Zambia’s non-
traditional exports—prima facie evidence for mild Dutch disease.
11. Fiscal rules
Fiscal rules are long-lasting, legally-binding, quantitative limits or restrictions on 
budgetary aggregates. They are numerical bounds on budget aggregates like rev-
enues, expenditures, public debt, and the budget balance. They restrain both the 
4 The EBA-Lite methodology is an IMF innovation for comprehensively assessing an economy’s 
external sector position, going beyond the conventional exchange rate and (balance of payments) cur-
rent account components to include the assessment of external balance sheets, capital flows, and 
reserve adequacy.
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executive and the legislature from amassing excessive powers and discretion in 
budget-setting and execution (Lienert and Fainboim 2010; Schaechter et al. 2012). 
Fiscal rules are generally established through legislation, or, in some cases, as 
constitutional provisions, thus lasting beyond a single fiscal year. They often last 
beyond the term of office of a single government (Schaechter et al.  2012). This 
promotes continuity and consistency in policymaking and execution. Proponents 
of fiscal rules favour them because they offer an avenue for recourse to legal sanc-
tions in cases where political commitment and institutional capacities are weak.
However, opponents of fiscal rules argue that, at best, such rules could be taken 
as but one component of a wide fiscal framework or budget system laws (clear 
rules for formulating, executing, and reporting on the annual budget, as well as a 
clear statement of medium-term fiscal policy objectives). Many observers argue 
that the ultimate success of a fiscal framework will depend on the political com-
mitment to implement it. Baunsgaard et al. (2012), for instance, emphasize that 
the issue of political commitment is not trivial, citing an extensive literature on the 
political economy of resource-rich countries which demonstrates its im port ance. 
And fiscal rules might actually compromise the prospects of success of the fiscal 
framework, particularly if policymakers realize that they can get away with flout-
ing the rules without any sanctions.
The question we are therefore left with is: are economies that are prone to fiscal 
slippages better off or worse off with fiscal rules? Again, this issue requires a more 
systematic literature review and further study in order to determine the useful-
ness and reliability of fiscal rules for a country like Zambia.
12. Public investment
Rajaram et al. (2014) and the Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability 
Report (PEFA) (GRZ 2017) set out three broad areas for assessing public invest-
ment management:
 • planning (including preliminary screening of projects for consistency with 
national strategies and objectives)
 • allocation (including detailed project appraisal, project selection, and 
budgeting; i.e. linkage to the budget cycle)
 • implementation (including protection of investment, funding availability, 
project management, and evaluation).
The most recent assessment of public investment management in Zambia is 
contained in the PEFA 2017 report, which paints a dismal picture. It reports that 
there is currently no public investment management system in place (GRZ 
2017: 36). A Public Investment Planning Department has been established in 
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the Ministry of National Development and Planning, but without supporting 
legislation5 it is handicapped and lacks capacity. However, it is in the process of 
developing a comprehensive planning and budgeting framework (GRZ 2017: 
37); and the 2018 budget proposal contained a commitment to strengthening 
the public investment management (PIM) system. Economic analyses of project 
pro posals and major investments are not conducted or reviewed other than by 
the sponsoring entity (i.e. a ministry or parastatal agency), or as required by an 
outside financing entity such as a donor agency. No formal system is in place 
for project identification, screening, or appraisal. While provision for invest-
ment projects is made in the current-year budget, multi-year provision and 
protection of funding is not taken seriously. No standard procedures are in 
place for project monitoring, though progress reports are available selectively. 
As indicated earlier, mining revenues are not separated out from other public 
revenue sources, so there is no separate budget for such investments. In general, 
maintenance of public assets is underfunded, despite some efforts, for example 
through the Road Fund, to earmark funds for road maintenance. As reported in 
the PEFA, the maintenance budget is not adequate to maintain the quality of 
infrastructure.
As a result, comprehensive information is not available on how borrowed 
funds have been spent and whether such spending meets appropriate economic 
and social criteria. For the first two Eurobonds (US$750 million issued in 2012 
and US$1,000 million issued in 2014), a detailed plan for their expenditure was 
issued (See World Bank 2017: 32), with most of the resources targeting infrastruc-
ture, mainly roads. The World Bank (2017: 32) notes that where resources have 
not been linked to specified investment, they have been largely used to finance 
public consumption.
Road investments are undoubtedly a priority in Zambia, though it can be 
argued that maintenance of the existing network deserves a higher priority than 
much new construction. Comprehensive road investment programmes are under 
implementation (the Link Zambia 8000 for US$5.4 billion, the Pave Zambia 200 
Project, plus urban road programmes for Lusaka and the Copperbelt). However, 
in addition to questionable priorities (notably major trunk road investments in 
areas of low population density and little-travelled areas), the costs of road con-
struction in Zambia appear to be significantly higher than in other African coun-
tries (World Bank 2017: 33). In addition, serious questions have been raised about 
various recent investments, notably the procurement of 42 fire trucks in 2017 at 
US$1 million each and a US$280 million investment in a digital migration plat-
form for public broadcasting.
5 Planning and budget legislation has been promised for some time, but has not been presented as 
at the time of writing.
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Finally, the strong spending appetite for recurrent (consumption) spending, 
particularly wages (personal emoluments), at the expense of investment ex pend-
itures has been a source of concern. Actual wage bill expenditure (releases by the 
Ministry of Finance) averaged 37.4 per cent of total domestically financed 
expenditure during 2015–17, marking personal emoluments as holding the largest 
share of recurrent expenditure in the country (Table 17.1). Because public sector 
wages and salaries are constitutionally protected from underfunding, the wage 
bill burden can be expected to remain a significant feature in Zambia’s fiscal land-
scape over the medium term.
13. Conclusions
This chapter extends and amplifies the observations of others and also provides 
some new perspectives towards understanding the boom over Zambia’s economic 
history, recounting the fortunes and misfortunes of the economy in the wake of 
swings in the copper mining industry. In many ways the chapter corroborates the 
views and assertions of others. For instance, Adam et al. (2014: 19) judge the 
period until 2002 in Zambia to have been a failure from the point of view of cop-
per extraction and use:
Successive governments did not use the revenues from copper to accumulate 
productive assets. Instead, they were used to finance consumption subsidies for 
the population and production inefficiencies in the state-owned copper com-
pany. In reality, the policy was even worse: not only were revenues from copper 
used for these recurrent purposes rather than for investment, they were also 
used as the implicit collateral for international sovereign borrowing . . . Hence, 
far from accumulating assets, the country accumulated debts.
Table 17.1 Expenditure releases on selected recurrent budget items













Personal emoluments (PEs) 16.1 35 18.8 40 20.0 37
Interest payments 5.2 11 7.4 16 9.8 18
Strategic reserves (FRA) 1.9 4 0.9 2 1.0 2
Government goods and services 5.1 11 4.8 10 4.9 9
Farmer Input Support Programme (FISP) 2.1 5 1.9 4 2.8 5
Domestic finance expenditure (DFE) 46.2 100 46.7 100 53.8 100
Source: Authors’ construction based on Ministry of Finance Annual Economic Reports (various), 
available at: www.mof.gov.zm/?page_id=5246 (accessed February–August 2018).
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Adam et al. go on to argue that Zambia was saved from these errors by the rise in 
the world price of copper and by the debt forgiveness (HIPC and MDRI) that 
largely cancelled Zambia’s debt by 2006. Some twelve years on, the risks and 
challenges described by Adam et al. remain all too evident.
Compared with 2002, Zambia in 2018 finds itself with a similarly bullish price 
outlook for copper and other commodities (most notably cobalt); with an indus-
try that, through privatization, has begun to operate more efficiently and is con-
tributing much more than it did in earlier periods to the public revenue; attracting 
significant foreign investment; but with an even more catastrophic accumulation 
of sovereign debt and virtually no prospect of official debt relief. As noted earlier, 
there is no mineral boom in prospect for Zambia given current price and output 
projections; rather, there is a reasonable chance of avoiding debt distress if strong 
fiscal management is put in place.
The current mining fiscal regime appears generally well placed to ensure a rea-
sonable sharing of mineral revenues between the private sector and the state, with 
the possible defect that it is insufficiently progressive and will come under 
renewed pressure if copper prices are sustained at the present levels. If and when 
changes in the regime are contemplated, it will be important to base them on 
good analysis and, to the extent possible, on wide consultation.
Probably the main lacunae in the mining fiscal system are the weakness in data 
and, particularly, the vulnerability to mispricing, profit shifting, and other IFFs. It 
should be emphasized that there is little hard evidence on the amounts being lost 
through these means, but there can be no doubting the need for more transpar-
ency around all mining transactions, or the challenges involved in making this 
happen. A good start has been made with the MVCMP and MPMSP projects, but 
more will be needed. Related to this, strengthening capacity and co-operation 
among the key government agencies involved in the mining industry should 
remain a high priority. The widespread mistrust of the mining industry among 
stakeholders requires greater transparency, at a minimum, together with a stronger 
effort to improve the dialogue.
The recent accumulation of debt, and the great challenges to fiscal manage-
ment, including but not limited to public investment mismanagement, should set 
in motion a process of learning the lessons and ensuring they are widely under-
stood—in addition to the obvious need to achieve better fiscal results and manage 
the debt stock going forward. Zambia’s institutions dealing with economic 
management have been weakened in the recent past, for reasons that need 
more investigation and analysis but which start with an apparently dysfunctional 
pol it ical system. The ability of Zambia to ringfence and prudently use the mineral 
rev enues from copper mining in building productive capacities through asset 
accumulation remains elusive, as recurrent consumption expenditure demands 
dominate the fiscal landscape and the agenda of the fiscal authorities.
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The Construction Sector in Zambia
Caesar Cheelo and Robert Liebenthal
1. Introduction
The importance of good-quality infrastructure in determining the course of 
industrialization, structural transformation, and economic development in any 
economy is generally well established in the literature (ECA  2017; Page  2018). 
Economic infrastructure includes a range of basic services—physical structures, 
systems, institutions, services, and facilities—that are the foundational tool for 
developing the economy of a country, region, or city. The stock of physical infra-
structure or physical assets is one of the bedrocks of industrial activity. It broadly 
determines the efficiency with which producers and consumers operate and 
interact in clearing markets, significantly shaping the fortunes of an economy.
A range of constructed or capital installations exist which qualify as (physical) 
infrastructure. These include: (i) transportation systems such as roads, bridges, 
walkways, rail, airports, and ports; (ii) electric energy production and distribution 
systems such as electric grids; (iii) water and sanitation systems that provide a supply 
of clean water, allow for water resource management, and support sanitation 
through waste disposal subsystems; (iv) housing infrastructure, including accom-
modation or buildings for residential and commercial purposes, office buildings, 
and extractive industry and manufacturing infrastructure or factories, which are 
specialized types of housing infrastructure; and (v) telecommunication installations 
like phone, television, or internet network installations, satellites, etc.
Because of the public good nature of most physical infrastructure, most efforts 
to install or build physical assets, particularly in developing countries like Zambia, 
tend to be public-sector-driven and state-funded. Granted, contemporary 
infrastructure projects in Africa are generally financed through loan and grant 
term-financing from cooperating partners or through public–private partnerships, 
albeit mainly limited to energy projects. However, even these foreign-financed 
projects must eventually be paid for by the host countries through loan or grant 
repayments. Thus, for a number of African countries the ultimate direct financing 
of infrastructure projects out of domestic taxpayer resources has been inevitable 
and its scale sizeable.
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However, the private good nature of some physical infrastructure, particularly 
residential and commercial accommodation buildings in the private domain, 
must not be forgotten. In Zambia, both the private residential housing and the 
commercial office and retail outlet (shopping mall) subsectors have seen tremen-
dous growth in the past eighteen years (2000–18), especially in urban areas. These 
dynamics are worth keeping in mind given the way they have changed the human 
settlement and retail aspects of the Zambian economy.
The construction sector is a critical determinant of how successful an economy 
will be at converting its public and private resources or investment efforts into 
physical assets. For instance, emerging evidence from a large sample of countries 
suggests that restricted sectoral competition results in relatively higher construction 
costs, which are in turn correlated with relatively poorer-quality infrastructure 
installations. Similarly, the success of building social infrastructure such as schools, 
health facilities, water and sanitation systems, and so on critically depends on the 
competitiveness of construction services. If construction services face bottlenecks 
or constraints in production and are unable to increase supply, any surge in demand, 
other things being equal, will force costs and prices to rise, reducing the output of 
physical asset for a given nominal investment outlay.
To deliver infrastructure, construction services require a range of critical factor 
inputs, including raw material inputs, (skilled and unskilled) labour, land, tech-
nology, finance, organization, and so on. Each can significantly enhance or con-
strain the expansion of physical assets. This study has a twofold objective, namely: 
(i) to identify the key bottlenecks and constraints in the construction sector in 
Zambia; and (ii) to identify policy options to enhance the sector’s ability to 
respond to surges in demand for construction services. We consider these issues 
over the past decades in Zambia, with a bias towards the last eight years (2010–17). 
Broadly, in this study, we employ industrial organization and political economy 
tools as the main conceptual and analytical lenses, and we draw on secondary data 
as the main basis of empirical observation and inferencing. The methodology we 
utilize is simple and straightforward, and is self-evident as part of the presentation 
of the main observations and insights.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows: section 2 presents a basic 
description of the industrial organization of the construction sector in Zambia; 
section 3 assesses the key bottlenecks, constraints, and challenges in the con-
struction sector; and section 4 concludes the chapter with a summary of plausible 
policy options for dealing with key bottlenecks in construction.
2. Organization and change in Zambia’s construction industry
The demand for construction services, which are responsible for expanding the 
stock of physical assets of infrastructure in Zambia, stems from the evolving 
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demographic, political, and economic circumstances of the economy. These 
aspects are highlighted in turn in the subsections that follow.
2.1 Demographic, political and economic  
changes, and construction in Zambia
Zambia’s population was projected at 16.4 million inhabitants in 2017 (CSO 2013). 
The country covers a land area of 752,618 km2 (World Bank 2018b), meaning a 
fairly low population density of 22 persons per km2 compared with an average 
density of 44 persons per km2 in sub-Saharan Africa. The urban population is 
estimated at 42 per cent of the total population, with the rest (58 per cent) resid-
ing in rural areas. Outside the national parks, game reserves, Game Management 
Areas (GMA), and forest reserves, most rural and urban spaces in the country are 
occupied by human inhabitants, although some districts are very sparsely popu-
lated, with extremely low densities—e.g. Mulobezi in Western Province, with 
3.0 persons per km2, Luano in Central Province (3.6), Mufumbwe, North-Western 
(3.8), Ngabwe, Central (4.0), Kasempa, North-Western (4.1), and Sesheke, 
Western (4.3) (Brinkhoff 2018). These human settlement patterns in rural areas 
add to considerable pressure on the authorities to expand Zambia’s public-
sector infrastructure development agenda to cater for the rural areas. This is 
because even the most sparsely populated areas are entitled to physical infra-
structure (roads, electricity, infrastructure, schools, health facilities, water and 
sanitation, etc.).
Conversely, the high population densities in urban areas have raised demand 
for commercial and residential real estate, thus pushing up demand for building 
construction services in these areas. Lusaka District, where the capital city is 
located, has by far the highest population density at 5,808 persons per km2 
compared with, say, 856 persons per km2 in the second most densely populated 
district, Kitwe (Brinkhoff  2018). Lusaka has therefore established itself as the 
most preferred destination for private investments in residential housing, as 
well as in commercial private buildings for office accommodation and retail 
space (shopping malls and supermarkets). The demand for related building 
construction services is therefore much greater in Lusaka than in other parts of 
the country. Added to these human settlement pressures, the current political 
dispensation is anchored on an economic philosophy of state-led development, 
to be achieved primarily through public goods infrastructure expansion. The 
2011–2016 Manifesto of the ruling political party in Zambia, the Patriotic Front 
(PF), asserts that:
Under the MMD government, investment in infrastructure development has been 
limited and the pace of development slow. Part of this is due to an obsession with 
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maintaining ‘tight money’ through fiscal and monetary policies. This has resulted 
in many parts of Zambia resembling ghost towns despite more than five years of 
record mineral prices and a production boom. (Patriotic Front 2011: 29)
In 2011, when the PF came to power, its manifesto locked the country into an 
ambitious infrastructure development path that persists today. The public infra-
structure development ambitions are also seen in the Seventh National Development 
Plan 2017–2021 (7NDP; Republic of Zambia 2017). The 7NDP has ten Strategic 
Development Outcomes, including one on ‘Improved Transport Systems and 
Infrastructure’, which focuses on construction and rehabilitation of railways; 
development of aviation infrastructure and operations; construction and rehabili-
tation of the road network; and construction and rehabilitation of maritime and 
inland waterways. Beyond this, the Development Outcomes in agriculture, tour-
ism, water and sanitation, information and communication technology (ICT), 
etc. all incorporate components of related infrastructure development.
Ultimately, the underpinning philosophy of a sustained expansionary fiscal 
path committed Zambia to, initially, two major infrastructure development 
undertakings, namely:
 • the Link Zambia 8000 road project—also known as Accelerated National 
Roads Construction Programme (ANRCP)—which was initiated in 2012, 
aiming to transform Zambia into a land-linked country through extension 
of the surfaced core road network by 8,000 km in three phases
 • the creation of new districts and revitalization of old ones, which saw an 
expansion of the total number of districts from 72 in 2011 to at least 108 in 
2017 (Brinkhoff  2018), with all the new districts requiring administrative 
infrastructure (offices and personnel housing, schools, health facilities, road 
network, etc.).
To date, Zambia’s political commitment to development through infrastructure 
expansion has remained consistently strong, particularly during the period 2013–17. 
The country’s nominal expenditure on non-financial assets (NFAs) (or capital 
spending on physical assets) grew from ZMK2.5 billion in 2010 to a peak of 
ZMK12.8 billion in 2015 before slowing down somewhat to ZMK8.3 billion in 
2017 (Figure 18.1, Panel (a)). Concurrently, the share of NFA expenditure increased 
from 17 per cent of total budget expenditure in 2010 to a high of 25 per cent in 
2015 (the year before the general elections of 2016), but declined to a period low 
of 14 per cent in 2017 (a year after the elections).
The government roads programme was the most dominant planned non-
financial capital expenditure item in the National Budget during 2010–17 
(Figure 18.1, Panel (b)), accounting for an annual average allocation of 42 per cent 
of NFAs over the period. The other major capital expenditures, such as rural 
electrification, power rehabilitation, railway line rehabilitation, and water and 
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sanitation were relatively small and intermittent to varying degrees during the 
period. Surprisingly, significant electric power rehabilitation expenditures were 
made during 2012–15, with part of the financing (about US$255 million, or 34 per 
cent) meant to come from borrowed proceeds (US$750 million) from the 2012 
Eurobond (World Bank  2017). However, the notable expenditure seen in 
Figure  18.1, Panel (b), failed to protect Zambia from the power shortage that 
would ensue as a result of a partial drought in 2015.
Overall, it can be expected from the foregoing that the demand for con-
struction services in Zambia will continue to be significantly influenced by the 
public sector’s demand for and expenditure on major infrastructure develop-
ment projects and programmes. In turn, these decisions will continue to be 
significantly determined by the political dispensation, particularly the appetite 
for infrastructure development as a key avenue towards economic growth and 
development.
As the political economy factors driving construction and infrastructure devel-
opment in Zambia continue, policymakers and decision-makers would do well to 
pay attention to the efficiency of the country’s investments. Although somewhat 
cursory, one popular and quick way of gauging the efficiency or productivity of 
investment is to calculate and assess the incremental capital–output ratio (ICOR). 
The ICOR is computed as the investment-to-GDP ratio (investment as a percent-
age of GDP) divided by the GDP growth rate (per cent). It measures the marginal 
amount of investment capital necessary for an economy to generate an extra unit 
of production output (or GDP). Overall, the higher the ICOR value, the lower the 










































































Panel (b): Composition of NFA spending
Rural electrication [left axis]
GRZ roads [left axis]
ZESCO power rehabiliation [left axis]
Railway line rehabilitation [left axis]
Water and sanitation [left axis]
NFAs (% of total budget expenditure) [right axis]
Non-financial assets (NFAs) [left axis]
NFAs (% of total budget expenditure) [right axis]
Figure 18.1 Public expenditure on physical assets
Notes: GRZ = Government of the Republic of Zambia; ZESCO = Zambia Electrical Supply Company.
Source: Authors’ construction from Ministry of Finance Annual Economic Reports (available at: www.
mof.gov.zm/?page_id=5246, accessed Fe–Aug 2018) and Fiscal Tables (provided privately).
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Over the period 2000–17, Zambia’s ICOR first declined steadily between 2000 
and 2010, reflecting gains in production efficiency during the period (Figure 18.2). 
On average, over 2000–10, the country’s annual ICOR value was 5, implying that 
US$5 of capital investment was necessary to generate US$1 of extra GDP. Then, 
from 2011 onwards, except in 2012, the ICOR value increased markedly and sus-
tained high value until the close of the period. The annual average ICOR value 
over the latter period was 9, implying that to generate US$1 of extra GDP now 
required not US$5 but US$9 of capital investment—suggesting that Zambia 
became less efficient in its use of capital. The country’s capital stock has become 
increasingly less growth-enhancing, thus raising questions about, among other 
things, the quality of investment spending and in particular the quality of the 
construction services that are responsible for the capital formation (or installation 
of infrastructure).
From the perspective of sectoral economic activity, the growth of the con-
struction sector has been impressive over a sustained period. This performance 
has been significantly underpinned by Zambia’s aforementioned high propensity 
to spend on infrastructure development. Save for two short episodes (2007–9 and 
2012–13), the real growth rate in construction value added has always been higher 
than the overall real GDP growth rate since the turn of the twenty-first century 
(Figure 18.3). However, construction sector growth has also seen a higher degree 
of volatility than the overall real GDP growth trajectory.
Underpinned by robust growth, the contribution of construction services to 
the economy has increased markedly. The share of construction in economic 
activity increased rapidly from 3.6 per cent of GDP in 1995 (three years after the 
liberalization reforms of 1992) to a sectoral peak of 10.9 per cent in 2000, and then 
declined marginally to 10.3 per cent in 2017 (CSO 2018).
In terms of employment, out of the total of 5.9 million employed persons in 


































































Total investment (constant $ million) [right axis] ICOR [le axis]
Figure 18.2 Real total investment and capital productivity
Source: Authors’ construction based on IMF (2018).
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the total). Of these, 59,085 (32 per cent) were employed in the formal sector while 
123,721 (68 per cent) were in the informal sector.
The average earnings for paid employees in construction in 2014 was ZMK1,834 
per worker (ZMK1,851 for men and ZMK1,401 for women) compared with rela-
tively higher earnings overall across all industries combined (ZMK2,344 both 
genders, ZMK2,427 men, and ZMK2,129 women). On the other hand, the average 
work time for employed persons (15 years or older) in 2014 was 44.7 hours per 
week (44.8 hours for men and 42.3 hours for women) compared with 40.7 
hours per week on average overall across all industries (43.4 hours for men and 
37.2 hours for women). This indicates that, on average, workers in construction 
typically worked for longer than their counterparts in other industries but earned 
relatively less. And this is despite the impressive real growth in construction 
sector value added and shares of GDP at the macroeconomic level.
2.2 Construction industry organization:  
cost and pricing implications
The construction industry can be viewed in terms of the supply of and demand 
for construction services. The industry is therefore organized in terms of the 
number of suppliers and consumers, the pricing mechanisms, the ease of entry 
and exit, the level of information flow (or asymmetries), and so on (industrial 
organization lens).
On the supply side, the National Council for Construction and Zambia Institute 






























































Figure 18.3 Percentage changes in GDP, by type of economic activity (constant prices)
Source: Authors’ construction based on CSO National Accounts data (provided privately).
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recorded 3,081 registered firms in 2016. This increased to 3,791 as of 30 September 
2017 according to the NCC list of registered contractors (NCC 2018). In terms of 
ownership, NCC and ZIPAR (2017) estimated that most of the firms (91.4 per 
cent) in the construction industry were Zambian-owned, with foreign-owned 
firms only accounting for 4.4 per cent and jointly owned firms for 4.2 per cent. 
Although foreign-owned firms constituted less than 5 per cent, they generally 
dominate the industry in terms of the value of contracts awarded. For instance, in 
2014, 90 per cent of foreign-owned construction firms which submitted public 
tender bids successfully secured the tenders, compared with the 3.8 per cent of 
Zambian-owned firms which were successful in the same year.
In the Zambian context, it is important to note that construction firms are 
graded based on each firm’s capacity to deliver, which is determined as a mix of 
the firm’s previous contracts, access to credit, numbers of professional and technical 
staff (human resource competence), financial position (including operating capital 
endowment), and state of technology. The grading system is numeric, with 1 the 
highest grade attainable and 6 the lowest. The higher the grade, the higher the 
annual registration fees a firm is required to pay. In 2014, the registration fee was 
ZMK7,750 for Grade 3 firms and only ZMK625 for Grade 6 firms.
The NCC and ZIPAR (2017) survey shows that the majority of the firms in 
construction (87.9 per cent) in Zambia in 2017 were registered in the lower 
grades (4–6), while firms in higher grades (1–3) account for about 12.1 per cent 
(Figure  18.4). This is corroborated by the registration pattern revealed in NCC 
(2018) (Figure  18.5). With firms in lower grades having limited values on the 
contracts that they execute, this market composition entails that higher-grade 
firms—i.e. firms that can generally afford higher registration fees—are inherently 
able to capture significantly larger market shares.
Thus, while the construction sector, on the supply side, allows for a fairly high 
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Figure 18.4 Grading of construction firms in Zambia, by overall proportion (%)
Source: Authors’ construction based on NCC (2018).
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the market, the registration fee, operating capital endowments, human resource 
competence, and state of technology all allow firms to significantly differentiate 
the construction services they are able to offer, thus posing a constraint on lateral 
firm movement to higher grades within the sector. It is on the basis of observa-
tions like these that the Ministry of Commerce Trade and Industry (MCTI 2018) 
has argued that, while the number of infrastructure projects in the construction 
sector in Zambia has been on the increase, there has been limited participation of 
local firms and inputs; MCTI has therefore argued for a local content strategy.
At face value one might expect the construction industry in Zambia to be 
characterized by monopolistic competition—a type of imperfect competition 
where market entry and exit are highly feasible and, more importantly, where 
many price-taking producers (firms) sell goods or services that are differentiated 
from one another and hence are not perfect substitutes (Gans et al. 2003). But, as 
we show later in this section, the industry is actually characteristic of an oligopoly, 
with very few dominant firms within each of the six construction sector service 
areas, namely: (i) Category B—general building and housing; (ii) Category C—
general civil engineering works; (iii) Category E—general electrical and tele-
communications; (iv) Category M—mining services: construction works within 
mining areas; (v) Category Me—mechanical engineering works; and (vi) Category 
R—general roads and earthworks.
It is partially in light of this industrial structure and the limitation that it 
imposes on local participation that Phiri (2016) analyses the 20 per cent sub-
contracting policy in the Zambian construction sector, assessing its efficacy in 
developing the capacity of local contractors, and finds that:
 • It would be difficult to grow the capacity of local contractors using the policy 
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Zambian Chinese Other foreign
Figure 18.5 Grading of construction firms, by number and ownership
Source: Authors’ construction based on NCC (2018).
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 • The policy statement only covered the road subsector and was silent on the 
other salient subsectors such as building and energy installation construction.
 • The policy did not have any measures or implementation framework for how 
its objectives would be achieved.; and
 • Foreign contractors were not willing to build the capacity of local contractors 
as there was no incentive for them to do so.
Saasa also finds that:
The 20 percent subcontracting initiative is neither policy nor law. NAMSSC has 
been pushing the Government to work on a legislation which would lead to 
increased compliance. The initiative has not been working as earlier envisioned . . . 
The transfer of technology or skills development is not working because 
RDA  nominates political cadres with no qualifications and knowledge in 
 construction but may produce NCC registration certificate. These politically 
inclined beneficiaries normally trade-off the 20 percent with Chinese contractors. 
Those that manage to participate face delayed payments of up to two years.
(Saasa 2018: 26)
Clearly, issues of efficiently, effectively, equitably, and justly promoting local 
content in construction should be a high priority on the Zambian agenda for 
construction sector development if the sector is to deliver the structural change 
and industrial development it is meant to bring to the country. The demand side 
of the construction industry can be compartmentalized into three broad sub-
groups of consumers of construction services, namely households, private firms, 
and the government.
Households’ direct demand for construction services is mainly exerted through 
demand for housing accommodation. According to the Living Conditions and 
Monitoring Survey (LCMS) of 2015 (CSO 2016), the distribution of households 
by the type of housing they occupy and by tenancy status (Table  18.1) reveals 
current (2015) housing service consumption patterns across the country. About 
81.3 per cent of urban households are resident in detached houses, flats/apartments, 
or semi-detached houses, compared with only 16.6 per cent of households in 
rural areas.
Moreover, the largest proportion of urban households (49 per cent) occupied 
rented private accommodation, followed by households in owner-occupied resi-
dences (41.4 per cent); in rural areas the vast majority (90.8 per cent) are resident 
in owner-occupied houses. Notwithstanding these patterns, the draft national 
housing policy (MLGH  2016) estimates that Zambia’s housing deficit was at 
1,539,000 units in 2016, of which 40 per cent were urban area deficits and 60 per 
cent were rural. The situation analysis in the draft policy suggests that Zambia has 
























Table 18.1 Percentage distribution of households, by type of housing and tenancy
Type of housing unit 
 Traditional hut Improved  
traditional hut




Other Total no. of 
households
Zambia 32 21.5 28.5 10.4 5.5 1.3 0.8 3,014,965
Rural 52.9 29.9 14.2 1.3 1.1 0.1 0.4 1,718,060
Urban 4.3 10.2 47.4 22.5 11.4 2.8 1.4 1,296,905
Tenancy 
 Owner- occupied Rent from 
institution
Rent from  
private owner
Free Housing Other Not stated Total no. of 
households
Zambia 70 1.8 22.2 5.9 0.5 0.0 3,014,965
Rural 90.8 1.1 2.0 5.8 0.3 0.0 1,718,060
Urban 41.4 2.8 49.0 6.1 0.8 0.0 1,296,905
Source: Authors’ construction based on CSO (2016).
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housing) due to, among other things, the limited economic opportunities and 
poor access to economic and social infrastructure, including social amenities and 
services, in rural areas.
Regarding firms’ demand for construction services or infrastructure, surprisingly 
little information and data exist to offer deep insights. In principle, it is argued 
that demand mainly comes indirectly, in terms of business needs for logistical 
support infrastructure (storage, office accommodation, transportation, energy, 
telecommunications, etc.). According to the last Zambia Business Survey (Clarke 
et al. 2010), such logistics infrastructure services, particularly transport and land 
access, were relatively serious obstacles for micro, small, and medium-scale enter-
prises (MSMEs) in Zambia in 2008, whereas they were relatively lesser constraints 
for large firms, except in the case of electricity, which was the most significant 
obstacle (Table  18.2). The main take-home point here is that the presence of 
obstacles implies that at least a latent demand for construction services will exist 
as firms seek options to address the supply shortfalls behind the constraints.
To the extent possible, firms and households transfer their demands for con-
struction services to the government by demanding physical infrastructure as a 
public good. In turn, the government’s demand for construction services as the 
state yields to public pressure is typically seen in its infrastructure spending habits 
(seen in section 2.1).
Table 18.2 Most serious obstacles to firms’ operations (2008)
Large firms MSMEs
Potential obstacle Rank Potential obstacle Rank
Electricity* 1 Access to finance 1
Macroeconomic instability 2 Transport* 2
Cost of finance 3 Cost of finance 3
Tax rates 4 Access to land* 4
Access to finance 5 Corruption 5
Corruption 6 Crime 6
Crime 7 Macroeconomic instability 7
Tax administration 8 Electricity* 8
Trade regulation 9 Political environment 9
Transport* 10 Business licensing/registration 10
Access to land* 11 Telecommunication* 11
Worker education/skills 12 Tax rates 12
Political environment 13 Trade regulation 13
Telecommunication* 14 Worker education/skills 14
Business licensing/registration 15 Labour regulation 15
Labour regulation 16 Tax administration 16
Notes: Rank ranges from 1 (most serious) to 16 (least serious), based on firm perceptions; * related to 
construction services demand and logistics infrastructure.
Source: Authors’ construction based on Clarke et al. (2010).
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Based on the interaction of supply and demand within the industrial organization 
context of construction, price determination is highly opaque, given a fairly high 
degree of information and supplier participation asymmetries. NCC and ZIPAR 
(2017) attempt a decomposition analysis of the firm types or categories in the 
construction sector. The market structure analysis finds that the sector is generally 
reflective of an oligopolistic market across the firm categories (Table 18.3), implying 
a strong possibility of collusion in price fixing and market-share capture.
2.3 Construction regulations and public institutions
Regulations and public institutions are often erected to rectify key market failures 
such as some of those encountered in the foregoing narrative. The legal and 
public-sector institutional environments surrounding any given sector are there-
fore key determinants of how well the sector will perform. This subsection briefly 
highlights some of the key regulations and public institutions in construction.
2.3.1 Important procurement laws and regulations in  
construction in Zambia
UNZA and COLMAK (2010) highlight seven pieces of legislation and broad 
agreements that are important in guiding and regulating the construction sector 
in Zambia. The seven legislative and regulatory procurement arrangements make 
up the legal framework to which public procurement—including construction 
procurement—is anchored.
2.3.2 Important governance and regulatory institutions  
and other stakeholders
The overarching governance body for infrastructure development and therefore 
construction services is the Ministry of Housing and Infrastructure Development 
(MHID). The ministry was created in September 2016 to superintend the 
designing, procuring, and construction of all public infrastructure. It is respon-
sible for various functions, including the following: architecture; aviation infra-
structure; building and construction industry policy; education infrastructure; 
health infrastructure; maritime infrastructure; national housing policy; and 
land-transport-related infrastructure. Six key statutory bodies are under the 
governance and direction of the ministry, namely: the Association of Consulting 
Engineers of Zambia (ACEZ)/Engineering Institution of Zambia (EIZ); the National 
Council for Construction (NCC); the National Housing Authority (NHA); the 
Quantity Surveyors Registration Board (QSRB); the Road Development Agency 
(RDA); and the Zambia Institute of Architects (ZIA).
The apex regulatory public institution in the construction industry in 
























Table 18.3 Market structure, by construction firm category
Firm category No. of firms Product Entry 
barriers






Building and housing 1,269 Differentiated None Some 65 1,935 Oligopoly
Road and earthworks 138 Identical or 
differentiated
Moderate Considerable 86 2,529 Oligopoly
Civil engineering works 224 Differentiated Moderate Considerable 94 5,818 Oligopoly
Mining services 151 Differentiated Moderate Considerable 96 2,403 Oligopoly
Electricity and telecom works 1,093 Differentiated None Some 78 1,979 Oligopoly







Notes: Concentration ratio (C5) is a common measure of the market share of the five largest firms in the industry; ranging from 0–100 per cent, it shows the extent of market 
control of the largest firms in the industry, illustrating the degree to which an industry is oligopolistic. Typically, a C5 value of 0 per cent depicts perfect competition; 1–40 per cent 
means close-to-perfect competition to oligopoly; 40–70 per cent means most likely an oligopolistic industry; and 70–100 per cent means ranging from an oligopoly to monopoly. 
The HHI is an alternative measure which gauges level of market competition in an industry. It ranges from 0 to 10,000 ‘points’, with higher points denoting higher levels of market 
concentration or monopoly power among few firms. That is, a higher HHI score depicts lower levels of competition in the industry.
Source: Adopted from NCC and ZIPAR (2017).
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Construction Act No. 13 of 2003 and is responsible for the promotion, development, 
training, and regulation of the construction industry in the country. The NCC is a 
cornerstone institution in regulating and assuring the quality of construction ser-
vices given its role as registrar of contractors in Zambia.
Another important institution for construction in Zambia is ACEZ, a repre-
sentative body for consulting engineers in the country. ACEZ exists to promote 
professional interests, rights, powers, and advancement of the profession of 
 consulting engineers; promote training of engineers; establish a code of conduct 
of consulting engineers; and serve the public in matters connected with engineering. 
Under the Engineering Institution of Zambia (EIZ) Act No.  17 of 2010, Section 
19(2)(c), consulting engineers are required to be members of ACEZ and to also 
register with the Engineering Registration Board in the college of consulting 
engineers. By law, this means that membership of ACEZ is mandatory for any 
organization or person providing or intending to provide engineering consultancy 
services, and only those consulting firms/companies that meet the above require-
ment should be engaged to provide engineering services on a consultancy basis.
As of June 2018, ACEZ had seventy registered members, including fifty-four 
Lusaka-based engineering consulting firms, four Copperbelt-based firms, two 
firms with dual (Lusaka and Copperbelt) physical presence, eight (Lusaka-based) 
sole-practitioners, and two (Lusaka-based) associate members. The ratio of 
ACEZ-registered consulting engineers to NCC-registered construction contractors 
was 1:54 in 2018. The skewed spatial distribution of consulting engineers implies 
that their services outside the capital, Lusaka, should be at higher cost, taking into 
account accommodation, transportation, and other incidental costs on out-of-
Lusaka services.
Architects and quantity surveyors are also key service providers in the con-
struction sector. Practising architects are registered with ZIA, which is founded 
on the Zambia Institute of Architects Act Cap 442 of 1995. On the other hand, 
practitioner quantity surveyors are registered with and regulated by QSRB, under 
the Quantity Surveyors Act (Cap 438) No.  37 of 1995. In relation to ZIA and 
QSRB, this study did not find systematic and reliable information on the numbers 
of practitioners registered with the respective statutory bodies. However, the legal 
provisions or legislation governing the practices are clear and available in the 
public domain.
Public procurement and therefore procuring public sector entities are an 
important source of demand for construction services in Zambia. An overview by 
UNZA and COLMAK (2010) reveals that, as of 2010, Zambia’s procuring entities 
are well documented. A total of 174 procuring entities across ten categories were 
captured in the baseline report, with the largest two categories being ministries and 
government departments, accounting for 21 per cent of the total, and statutory 
bodies (20 per cent), while the smallest two categories were banking and lending 
institutions and media institutions, each accounting for 2 per cent.
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Typically, once physical assets are installed in Zambia they are managed and 
operated either by the procuring entity or by a specially established body cor-
porate or statutory body. The governance structure that oversees the manager 
and operator of the infrastructure will then depend on the overall governance 
structures superintending the procuring entity, body corporate, or statutory 
body. Typically, a separate regulatory authority will also have been established to 
independently and impartially regulate the sector that the procuring entity, body 
corporate, or statutory body operates in. For instance, for public roads the RDA 
is the procurer, manager, and operator of the infrastructure while MHID is the 
overall governance authority that among, other things, appoints the RDA board of 
directors. Interestingly, the regulation of the RDA (a statutory body established 
through the Public Roads Act No. 12 of 2002) is split between NCC and the Road 
Transport Safety Agency (RTSA), a statutory body under the Ministry of Transport 
and Communication (MTC).
Recent research suggests that more reliable and effective principal–agent 
arrangements between MHID and RDA should be sought in order to improve 
the independence and professionalism that RDA is meant to have. Saasa (2018) 
argues that MHID commands an overbearing influence over the ultimate deci-
sions regarding which road investments are pursued. The study noted a lack of 
independence of the RDA in the implementation of road projects and public 
infrastructure works due to political interference from its parent ministry.
In addition to the above, the construction sector draws the attention of cross-
cutting oversight and watchdog institutions including the parliament (oversight) 
and the Auditor General’s Office, and non-governmental organizations (e.g. 
Transparency International—Zambia, Zambia Land Alliance, etc.). These use 
various approaches to foster the accountability, transparency, and overall good 
governance of the industry.
3. Bottlenecks in the construction sector
What are the key bottlenecks to supply responses? These can be categorized into 
three broad fields, namely: firm-level, firm-specific factors; industry-wide factors; 
and national or macroeconomic bottlenecks. We consider each of these in turn.
3.1 Firm-level bottlenecks
NCC and ZIPAR (2017) isolate a number of firm-specific challenges and bottlenecks 
that affect the competitive pricing of construction services. For instance, when 
viewed by NCC grade, construction firms have vastly different characteristics in 
terms of operational investment decisions and levels of exposure to external 
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constraints and challenges. The lower-grade firms (Grades 4–6) generally invest 
far less in modern methods of construction, construction technology, and basic 
ICT than their higher-grade (Grades 1–3) counterparts. Moreover, more low-grade 
firms face challenges with access to finance and high labour turnover than do 
their counterparts in the high-grade groups. Implicitly, the state of technology, in 
particular construction methods used, is low, adversely affecting the price and 
quality of physical infrastructure that the industry is able to supply. Similarly, the 
issue of disparate levels of access to information and resulting information 
asymmetries—for instance, in knowledge about government tenders and tender 
procedures—have already been discussed. Suffice to say that this too results in 
suboptimal pricing and can also negatively affect the quality of infrastructure that 
construction services can deliver.
The firm-level diversity also promotes an oligopolistic market structure in 
which the largest, most dominant firms possibly collude in setting prices and 
deciding on the supply of construction services, thus pseudo-affecting supply 
responses. Granted, Zambia has competition regulations and laws and a Competition 
and Consumer Protection Commission, but behaviours such as collusion are 
hard to detect and even harder to prove. And even when evidence is provided, 
enforcement in terms of prosecution may be problematic as it is often the respon-
sibility of other agencies that can be somewhat far removed from the industrial 
significance of these cases.
Ultimately, construction services are highly differentiated by firm grade, firm 
category, and a host of other firm-specific characteristics, thus preventing com-
petitive pricing from emerging in the industry. Firms are able to significantly 
influence the final price on contracts because their product is quite differentiated 
from what other firms might offer. In turn this acts to distort or even delay supply 
responses to rising demand for construction services.
3.2 Industry-wide bottlenecks
The industry-wide bottlenecks include a variety of structural challenges, systemic 
inertias (‘red tape’), and constraints which affect sectoral firms indiscriminately, 
but which larger, more sophisticated firms can better contend with given their 
larger operating capital outlays, among other things. For instance, other things 
being equal, the earlier-mentioned cost of registration with NCC—e.g. a fee of 
ZMK7,750 per year for Grade 3 firms compared with ZMK625 per year for Grade 
6 firms—forces smaller firms with financial constraints to stay small.
The industry also faces significant constraints to doing business, particularly in 
relation to acquiring a construction permit. Table 18.4 shows, for instance, that 
dealing with construction permits still takes in excess of six months (189 days) 
























Table 18.4 Selected doing-business indicators
DB 
year

















2006 11 230 10.4 6 73 9.6 7 36
2008 11 207 10.7 6 73 9.6 7 34
2010 11 207 7.3 6 42 6.6 7 19
2012 10 208 6.5 5 45 8.3 7 19
2014 10 189 3.9 5 45 8.6 7 8.5
2016 10 189 2.6 6 45 15.0 7 8.5
2018 10 189 3.1 6 45 9.9 7 8.5
Note: ‘DB year’ = ‘Doing Business year’, the twelve-month period adopted by the World Bank for the Ease of Doing Business Survey.
Source: Authors’ construction based on World Bank (2018a).
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doing-business indicators like registering property and starting a business. This 
naturally constrains the supply responses of contractors trying to set up shop and 
do business in Zambia.
Weak institutional support and commitment in the industry is also a challenge 
which can serve as a significant constraint to construction services supply. Weak 
institutional commitment is clearly demonstrated in that, in March 2017, the 
(International) Board of Construction Sector Transparency (CoST) initiative 
informed Zambia’s Ministry of Housing and Infrastructure of its decision to revoke 
the membership of CoST Zambia, an international country-centred (public and 
private sectors and civil society) multi-stakeholder initiative designed to promote 
transparency and accountability in construction. This was because over an 
extended period CoST Zambia had not demonstrated progress towards imple-
menting CoST standards. Thus, although the country was among the eight where 
CoST was successfully piloted between 2008 and 2011, by 2015 it had been declared 
‘inactive’, having failed to make meaningful progress for an extended period. CoST 
Zambia was given a further six months to get itself ‘reactivated’ through appropri-
ate policy reform and compliance measures. With no high-level commitment or 
movement from the responsible institutions, the timeline and all subsequent time-
lines lapsed, forcing the board to take its March 2017 decision. The risk is high that 
weaknesses in transparency, accountability, and good governance will continue to 
obtain, making room for vices like corruption and rent-seeking.
In some instances, the room for corruption is created by the over-design and 
over-specification of construction projects at inception. Anecdotal evidence on 
road construction costs in Zambia compared to Kenya is a first-line indication of 
the possibility of over-design and over-specification related to corruption and 
rent-seeking. On average, road construction costs in Zambia were around US$1.6 
million per km, which, on the face of it, was not very different from the average in 
Kenya ($1.5 million per km). However, once it is observed that the road projects 
selected in the Kenyan case were all relatively more complex urban road engage-
ments with an average road length of 20 km, we readily notice than the Zambian 
case, with a fairly large number of long truck road projects (of 120 km length on 
average), has some seemingly overpriced roads. In particularly, many experts and 
observers have aired suspicions that the Lusaka–Ndola dual carriageway con-
struction project (commissioned in late 2017) and the Chikwa road construction 
project (of 2018), worth an estimated US$3.3 million and US$3.1 million per km 
respectively, were grossly over-specified and thus overpriced. Saasa (2018) pro-
vides evidence lending support to these suspicions.
Transparency International Zambia (TIZ) is on record as having recently cited 
‘cadreism’ as a major source of corruption in the construction sector in Zambia 
(Lifuka 2018). TIZ’s opinion is that the common problems faced by the construction 
industry include the non-disclosure of beneficial owners of bidding construction 
companies and rigging of tenders, among others.
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While cadreism and ‘cadre-preneurial contract trading’ (the specialization by 
politically connected cadres in the illicit capture of public tenders and their sale 
on illegal secondary tender markets) might be a new phenomenon, evidence of 
strongly suspected corruption in the construction sector is now well docu-
mented. The Auditor General’s report for the year ended 2016 (OAG 2017) records 
over twenty major construction-related counts of financial irregularity and/or 
misconduct on the part of procuring entities (ministries, provinces, and spending 
agencies) and/or contractors. Construction- or infrastructure-related anomalies, 
irregularities, misconduct, and so on amounting to a total of ZMK213.3 million 
(equivalent to US$22.5 million) were observed in the 2016 financial year.
An FIC (2018) report provides further evidence of possible corruption and 
malpractice in the construction sector:
Construction: During the year [2017], it was observed that some businesses in 
the construction sector made large cash deposits. This is unusual considering 
that payment for services provided in this sector are made either by cheque or 
other safer electronic means instead of cash. It was noted that a total of USD 
9,668,421.14 and ZMW 14,150,918.70 cash deposits were made by construction 
businesses. In 2017, a total of USD 3,430,852.81 and ZMW 391,553,520.20 cash 
withdrawals were reported to the Centre. It was further observed that a number 
of construction companies awarded contracts by some quasi-government insti-
tutions had no capacity to execute the works, while others were not tax compliant.
(FIC 2018: 10)
Essentially, a staggering US$55.96 million of suspicious and questionable cash 
transactions were made between procuring entities and contractors in 2017. 
Moreover, the underlying weaknesses in the legal framework—which CoST 
Zambia should have helped to address—have been prevalent for over a decade. 
UNZA and COLMAK (2010) report that the legal requirement for the release of 
material project information (MPI) established by the Public Procurement Act 
No. 12 of 2008 was (and still is) focused on the disclosure of the best-evaluated 
bidder only. The disclosure of the wining contractor and consultant’s name and 
the contract value are the only details required to be disclosed. The other MPIs 
that should be required to be released include: the scope of the projects; the 
tender procedure; a list of tenderers; the contract programme; and details of any 
re-award of main contract. Of the pre-tender MPIs, only the Environmental 
Impact Assessment is permitted by law to be released.
Unfair advantages among foreign-owned firms also cause supply response 
 distortions, particularly insofar as the equitable distribution of public tenders 
and construction contracts is concerned. Anecdotal evidence abounds of China’s 
influence in the construction sector landscape in Zambia. Many practitioners and 
even officials in the Ministry of Finance argue that large-scale infrastructure 
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projects that are bankrolled using Chinese loans always come with ‘fine print’ in 
loan contracts, whereby the transactional benefits are all captured by Chinese 
entities. Thus, financial handling takes place through Chinese financial inter-
mediaries and the awarding of project contracts is mainly (80 per cent plus) to 
Chinese firms, most of whom are Chinese state-owned or state-affiliated entities 
that are subsidized by the Chinese government to do business in Africa.
3.3 Macroeconomic factors serving as construction bottlenecks
The main macroeconomic bottlenecks relate to variables with a direct impact on the 
cost of construction services. These include the adverse business shocks and uncer-
tainty associated with a local currency collapse, coupled with heightened inflation 
such as occurred in Zambia from mid-2015 through most of 2016 (Figure  18.6, 
Panel (a)). They also include factors like high credit or borrowing costs (high 
interest rates) and fuel price hikes due to policy reforms (Figure 18.6, Panel (b)).
Another major risk, which is perhaps not yet a bottleneck, is the high level of 
public debt. According to the IMF (2018), Zambia’s public debt stock rose from 
19 per cent of GDP in 2010 to 62 per cent in 2017 and is projected to increase further 
to 72 per cent of GDP by 2023. This first-line indication is therefore that the 
country’s debt stock is very close to unsustainable levels or may have already 
breached the sustainability threshold. Considering that the debt was accumulated 
mainly to cover three large public expenditure items—the wage bill, debt service 
interest payments (both consumption expenditure items), and large infrastructure 
projects, particularly the GRZ roads programme (section 2.1)—the anticipated 
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Inflation [Jan 2010 = 100]
Lending interest rate (%)
Diesel (K per litre) [right axis]
Figure 18.6 Selected macroeconomic stability indicators
Source: Authors’ construction based on BOZ fortnightly statistics (available at: http://www.boz.zm/
monetary-and-financial-statistics-New.htm, accessed February 2018) and CSOmonthly bulletins 
(available at: http://www.zamstats.gov.zm/index.php/publications/category/1-monthly-bulletin, 
accessed April 2018).
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for infrastructure and therefore construction services. Given that the supply of 
 construction services has been significantly stimulated by the government’s 
infrastructure expenditure, the anticipated reversal of fortunes underpinned by 
the debt overhand is likely to have a significant adverse effect on the industry.
4. Summary of options for dealing with key bottlenecks
From the foregoing, what institutional, governance, and policy reforms are desir-
able for the construction sector in Zambia? We recommend the following:
4.1 Institutional, governance, and regulatory reforms
 • Key institutions charged with the governance of the construction sector should 
be reformed through the establishment of ‘carrot-and-stick’ mechanisms 
like Cabinet Office-administered performance-based contracts throughout 
these organizations.
 • The law should be strengthened in terms of the provisions for procuring 
entities in construction (as well as in other sectors) to proactively release 
necessary or material project information into the public domain; and for 
the much talked-about international price benchmarking.
 • The construction authorities (MHID and NCC) should work towards 
strengthening, streamlining, and simplifying the procurement and contract-
ing rules and systems, particularly assessing processes that have in the past 
resulted in information and participation asymmetries; loss of RDA inde-
pendence; and risks of rent-seeking, cost escalation, financial irregularity, 
corruption, misconduct, and malpractice.
 • The authorities should establish a contract unbundling policy and law, par-
ticularly for large contractors, so that no single large-scale contractor is 
awarded contracts to execute, say, more than 60 per cent of the works as a 
monopoly services supplier. The unbundling of contracts will create room 
for smaller contractors to participate in some aspects of the unbundled 
infrastructure development projects.
4.2 Industry-support policies and reforms
 • The authorities should consider establishing training and capacity-building 
programmes that improve the sharing and use of information and know-
ledge and enhance know-how or competency, thus reducing information 
asymmetries—particularly to the benefit of local service providers.
 • The private sector is already substantively supporting training and local 
skills development through contributions to the statutorily determined Skill 
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Development Levy (SDL), a 0.5 per cent levy on gross remunerations (payroll) 
payable by employers with effect from 1 January 2017, under the SDL Act 
No. 46 of 2016. However, due to reported juridical disagreements between 
the Ministry of Higher Education (MOHE) and the Technical Education, 
Vocational and Entrepreneurship Training Authority (TEVETA) over who is 
charged with administering the SDL funds, the operational framework has 
to date not been formulated. Stakeholder authorities like the construction 
authority should readily intervene to ensure that slippages that impede the 
training and skills development of practitioners under their charge are fully 
and swiftly resolved. Specifically, they should ensure that the rightful pro-
portion of the proceeds of the SDL starts to flow to the construction private 
sector towards skills development.
 • The authorities should review and update the local content strategy of MCTI 
and the partial policies such as the 20 per cent subcontracting policy towards 
establishing a robust and comprehensive local content policy and implemen-
tation framework for construction services.
 • Within the overall local content policy and strategy, the authorities should 
establish viable options for increasing access to finance for local contrac-
tors. An important financing option will be negotiated with tied aid and tied 
 development finance from bilateral partners like China who have a significant 
contractor presence in Zambia. For instance, access to Chinese government 
development assistance to Zambia by Chinese contracts should be condi-
tional on the contractors demonstrating a willingness and ability to build 
the capacities of local contractors through skills, technology, and operating-
capital transfer partnerships.
 • The authorities should consider establishing publicly supported and financed/
resourced skills development and research and development programmes 
towards improving upon the currently low standard of methodology and 
technologies used by the majority of local contractors in construction; con-
tractors, particularly local contractors, should be given sufficient knowledge 
and comparative advantage of the quality and safety standards for construction 
in Zambia.
 • The authorities should explore other options for the mobilization and ring-
fencing of affordable finance, including trade credit to frontrunner or winning 
sectors like construction.
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At independence in 1964, Zambia inherited an economy driven by copper 
 mining. This has not changed despite post-independence policies to industrialize 
and diversify the economy. Copper mining continues to dominate the economy, 
accounting for over 70 per cent of the country’s foreign exchange earnings. 
Between 2006–15, the total contribution of mining to the gross domestic product 
(GDP) averaged 12.9 per cent, with a high of 14.6 per cent in 2014. Its contribution 
to GDP is second only to that of services, the fastest-growing sector in the 
 economy over the same period. The mining sector is also a significant employer, 
providing direct employment to 82,725 people in 2014 (GRZ 2017).
To counter the dominance and vicissitudes of commodity dependence, Zambia 
began to build its industrial sector shortly after independence. Both the initial 
and subsequent development plans prioritized agriculture and manufacturing as 
growth poles for industrialization and economic diversification. In 1965, manu-
facturing value added (MVA) contributed about 7 per cent to GDP. Over 2011–15, 
the MVA contribution to GDP averaged 7.5 per cent, indicating stagnation in real 
manufacturing output over time. In contrast, between 2004–13 the Zambian 
economy grew at an average of 7.7 per cent, spurred by high levels of investment 
in the mining industry. These occurred on the back of high copper prices that 
persisted during the period. Yet according to the 2016 Human Development 
Report, the incidence and depth of multidimensional poverty increased between 
2006–10 (UNDP 2016: xviii). It hence appears that the conversion rate from high 
economic growth rates to welfare gains to the poor has not been sufficient.
The dominance of copper mining in the economy makes it a good choice to 
drive industrialization and local content (LC) growth. Estimates of input goods 
and services are reported to be as high as US$5 billion annually (Fessehaie et al. 
2015: 55). The share of domestic firms in the mining market is less than 4 per cent, 
while that of indigenous firms is about 1 per cent (Fessehaie et al. 2015; UNDP 
2016). It is clear that localizing a significant portion of the supply chain, through 
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manufacturing linkages, would not only contribute to industrialization and 
 economic diversification; it would support greater welfare gains through 
increased employment and wealth redistribution.
2. LC and industrialization: a brief review
2.1 What constitutes LC?
The term ‘local content’ commonly refers to domestic purchases of goods and 
services, and/or the employment of nationals in an extractive operation. However, 
LC is often extended to local workforce or supplier development or the provision 
of infrastructure and services to communities around a mining operation. Thus 
‘local’ can refer to the spatial spread of benefits in the vicinity of a project, in a 
district or national economy, or even in a regional economy. When applied to the 
supply of goods and services, ‘local’ can also have ownership connotations. The 
benefits to the national economy depend on the ownership of the ‘local’ firm. This 
is illustrated in Figure 19.1, which posits that the highest economic value added is 
created when the supplier firm is a locally owned and operated manufacturer, 
sourcing its inputs locally. Conversely, the lowest value added arises from a foreign-
owned importer and distributor.
For the above reasons, some countries consider that LC is fully met when 
goods or services are provided by firms that are owned or controlled by domestic 
capital (OECD 2017). These broad definitions of LC extend its scope to linkages 
with other economic sectors (AfDB 2017: 4; OECD 2017: 7; Tordo et al. 2013: 1). 
Firm 1
Importer (foreign owned 
with no local participation)
Firm 2
Importer (foreign owned 
with some local 
participation)
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Figure 19.1 Classification of local supplier firms of goods and services
Source: Author’s illustration, adapted from AfDB and BMGF (2014: 11).
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They are particularly favoured by developing countries, keen to extract the greatest 
economic and social benefits from exhaustible resources. Typically, extractive 
projects create few domestic linkages in these countries (UNCTAD 2007: 140).
How well LC supports industrialization and economic transformation depends 
on the policy space. For this reason, LC tends to also be defined in terms of its 
long-term policy objectives. These commonly include technology transfer; research 
and development (R&D) to improve innovation and national competitiveness; 
and downstream value addition to deepen the natural resources value chain 
(AfDB and BMGF 2014; OECD 2017; Tordo et al. 2013).
2.2 LC, economic linkages, industrialization,  
and structural change
The extent to which an extractive operation generates linkages with other eco-
nomic sectors is a fundamental aspect of LC. The principal commercial linkages 
are the upstream (backward) links, which connect the extractive operation to its 
suppliers of goods and services, and the downstream (forward) links, which pro-
cess the operation’s output into intermediate manufactures and final products. 
These linkages are commonly termed production or industrial linkages. They 
involve flows of information and/or materials between two or more industrial 
sectors or firms, and are based on the notion of value added to raw materials or 
intermediate semi-manufactures (Braunerhjelm  2010; Kragelund  2017; OECD, 
UNCTAD, and WTO 2013).
Morris et al. (2011: 8) make an important distinction between the breadth and 
depth of linkages. The upstream breadth refers to the share of inputs that is 
acquired locally, while on the downstream side breadth represents the proportion 
of production processed by local firms. The depth, on the other hand, is the extent 
of domestic value added to locally acquired inputs upstream or locally processed 
outputs downstream. By and large, the breadth and depth of linkages determine 
the strength of capital-formation structures, and the degree of industrial develop-
ment and economic diversification. LC is therefore a key driver of industrializa-
tion and, through inter-firm production linkages, enables product specialization 
and a division of labour. This boosts productivity and competitiveness due to 
efficiencies in factor allocation.
The literature abounds with empirical evidence linking aggregate factor prod uct-
iv ity to economic growth. Bartelme and Gorodnichenko (2015) use an input-
output approach to quantitatively analyse the empirical relationship between 
linkages and their aggregate productivity. Their results show that the strength of 
linkages, measured as the average output multiplier across industries and/or 
sectors, strongly determines total factor productivity. Their work confirms the 
importance of specialization and factor allocation efficiency in economic growth 
and development.
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Production linkages are in effect manufacturing associations. Manufacturing is 
hence a key driver of aggregate growth and industrialization (Hernesniemi et al. 
1996; Karmiloff  1989) and an increase in its share directly raises growth. Tyler 
(1980) provides empirical evidence that the competitive manufacture of goods for 
domestic consumption, but more so for export, correlates with economic growth 
and industrialization. For a sample of fifty-five middle-income countries,1 he 
found a strong correlation between GDP and growth in manufacturing output 
and exports. Manufacturing takes place at firm level. Newman et al. (2017) explore 
the empirical relationship between export performance and productivity at firm 
level using panel data from Vietnam. They find strong evidence that productive 
firms self-select into export markets and that export performance is associated 
with increased firm-level productivity. These effects are cumulative over time, 
with productivity gains arising from years of exporting experience. They conclude 
that firms actually learn by exporting, and that the extent of learning is related to 
their capacity to adapt and change in order to benefit from export possibilities in 
liberalized markets.
2.3 The importance of technological change  
and entrepreneurship
While classical economics emphasizes the importance of investment and capital 
accumulation in economic growth, neoclassical economists postulate that 
innovation and entrepreneurship are more critical to transforming factors into 
increased economic output. This has led to the so-called new growth theory, 
whose central argument is that technological advances and innovation are more 
critical to boosting productivity than improvements in capital stock (Colander 
2017; Hernesniemi et al. 1996; Porter 1990). Technological change is further pos-
tulated to create significant spillover effects, thus providing other economic sectors 
with new ways of improving productivity. These spillovers are important to struc-
tural transformation and industrialization.
There exists a strong body of empirical evidence linking technological in nov-
ation to manufacturing and industrialization. Examples include several studies 
undertaken under the Learning to Compete (L2C) project which confirm the 
importance of investing in R&D and innovation to boost within-firm prod uct iv-
ity and improved manufacturing export competiveness (Mattoussi and Ayadi 2017; 
Newman et al. 2017). Demonstrative evidence indicates that the quality of R&D in 
sciences and engineering provides the greatest source of innovation. Similarly, 
empirical evidence from OECD countries indicates that increased entrepreneur-
ship, as measured by business ownership rates, is associated with higher rates of 
1 Defined as having a GDP per capita of US$300 or less in 1977 dollars.
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employment growth (Braunerhjelm  2010). These insights suggest that while 
techno logic al innovation creates new knowledge, innovative entrepreneurship is 
the main link between knowledge, commercialization, and output growth. They 
are highly relevant to African countries, such as Zambia, where R&D, innovation, 
and endogenous entrepreneurship are seriously constrained.
2.4 Global and regional value chains and LC
Global value chains (GVCs) are production networks typically coordinated by 
multinational enterprises (MNEs). GVCs have become a key feature of produc-
tion, accounting for about 84 per cent of international production networks and 
over a quarter of global GDP (UNCTAD 2017). Some 90,000 MNEs have a com-
bined total of US$27 trillion in foreign direct investment (FDI) stock in nearly 
1 million foreign affiliates worldwide. Fundamentally, GVCs exploit differences in 
factor productivity across countries, creating manufacturing value added to raw 
materials or intermediate feedstock. The competitiveness of the final product is 
dependent on aggregate productivity across the production networks and the 
value added at each stage of production.
GVC growth has been rapid, facilitated by technological advances in transport 
and information and communication technologies which have reduced trade 
costs. Whereas in many G20 countries the domestic content in gross exports 
decreased between 1995–2009, the income derived from exports of value added 
by GVCs increased by 106 per cent during the same period (OECD, UNCTAD, 
and WTO 2013: 12). This increase was more pronounced in emerging economies, 
particularly the BRIC economies (Brazil, Russia, India, and China). Domestic 
value added derived from foreign final demand increased in China by 600 per cent, 
in India by 500 per cent, and in Brazil by nearly 300 per cent. To the contrary, 
Africa’s share in GVCs has remained limited.
Although GVCs are coordinated by MNEs, empirical evidence suggests a 
 substantial contribution to aggregate innovation and production by small entre-
preneurial firms (Braunerhjelm 2010; UNCTAD 2010). In Sweden, once a natural-
resources-driven country but now a major mining equipment and machinery 
manufacturer, one-third of patented applications in manufacturing emanate from 
small businesses of less than twenty-five employees. Significantly, a substantial 
proportion of patenting small firms have links to a Swedish MNE (Braunerhjelm 
2010). This underscores the significant role innovative small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) play in GVCs, and highlights the need for Least Developed 
Country (LDC) government and firm strategies that embrace GVCs as a means of 
upgrading production.
The regional milieu offers GVCs opportunities for spatial agglomeration. These 
include enterprise clustering and developing manufacturing linkages; sharing of 
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business development services; and access to knowledge and skills (Braunerhjelm 
2010; Pietrobelli and Rabelloti 2010; UNCTAD 2010). Several studies undertaken 
by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) argue that 
South Africa’s superior knowledge-creation institutions, and research institutes in 
mining, represent a growth opportunity for southern Africa, which is essentially a 
mining economy (UNECA 1997). It is hence unsurprising that South Africa has 
several GVCs operating in the Zambian mining industry.
3. The evolution of LC in Zambia
3.1 LC, manufacturing, and industrialization in  
Zambia: a historical perspective
3.1.1 LC and import-substitution industrialization, 1964–91
At independence in 1964, Zambia inherited a mono-economy dominated by 
 copper mining. This accounted for about 50 per cent of GDP and 95 per cent of 
export revenues. Manufacturing value added contributed only 6.9 per cent to 
GDP (UNDP 2016). It is therefore unsurprising that diversifying the economy 
dominated the country’s initial development plans.2 The cornerstone of these 
plans was an import-substitution industrialization strategy (ISI) targeting the 
manufacture of intermediate and consumer goods; the development of linkages 
in the economy; and the production of a surplus for exports (Karmiloff  1989; 
UNDP 2016). Broadly viewed, ISI was in effect an LC development strategy.
ISI swiftly gained traction during the first decade (1964–74), aided by the 
nationalization of productive assets and buoyant commodity prices. Nationalization 
included the acquisition of majority (51 per cent) shares in Roan Copper Mines 
and Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines, the two main mining assets, and their 
merger in 1983 to form Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM). The chief 
reason for nationalization was to assert control over a private-sector-driven econ-
omy in which capital accumulation was foreign-controlled, profit repatriation 
deemed excessive, human resources development limited, and investment in pro-
duction selective (Kaunga 1993).
Manufacturing value added grew rapidly at 13 per cent per year in constant 
1970 prices (Karmiloff  1989) and by 1980, state participation in manufacturing 
GDP and employment had risen to 56 per cent and 54 per cent respectively 
(Kaunga  1993: 4–5). The bulk of import substitution, and state participation, 
occurred in the consumer goods subsectors of food, beverages, textiles, and 
tobacco, which by 1970 accounted for 60 per cent of total manufacturing output. 
2 These were the Transition Development Plan (1964–6) and the First National Development Plan 
(1966–71).
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These are generally the soft subsectors of manufacturing, with low technological 
barriers (Morris et al.  2012). The larger rates of growth, however, occurred in 
chemicals, plastics and rubber, and metal products—subsectors of direct rele-
vance to LC. Together these subsectors accounted for about 40 per cent of total 
manufacturing output and had the larger share of private sector firms, particu-
larly in basic metal and metal fabrication (Karmiloff 1989: 6).
The high growth rates in the subsectors of rubber products, chemicals, non-
metallic minerals and metals, and machinery was a boon for LC growth in the 
mining industry. Zambia swiftly established comprehensive manufacturing fa cil-
ities for mining inputs in these subsectors. Rubber products included rubber 
linings, seals and couplings, tyres, and V-belts. Metallic products included wear-
resistant crusher parts, mill balls, valve components, wire ropes, roof bolts, rock 
drills, rock drill steels, conveyor idlers and pulleys, pumps, and valves; while the 
chemical side included explosives, fuses, and detonators.
Downstream of the copper value chain, manufactured products included cop-
per rod, electric cables, and transformers. From a side-stream viewpoint, en gin-
eer ing facilities for the manufacture of components mushroomed. They included 
foundry, machine, and fabrication workshops. However, the facilities were typ ic-
al ly low-end and suffered from a lack of in-house engineering expertise. This, 
coupled with limited imports of specialty steels, led to poor operating practice 
and invariably uncompetitive poor-quality products.
From a skills viewpoint, a comprehensive study by UNECA found that Zambia 
had well-established education and training facilities at degree, technician, and 
artisan levels (UNECA  1996). However, there were skill deficits especially in 
 specialized areas such as engineering, mine and mineral process design, project 
en gin eer ing, ore estimation, and operations research. Regulatory-level skills, 
including in policy design, mine safety, and environmental management, were 
also qualitatively and quantitatively deficient. These weakness were partly attrib-
uted to a lack of industry participation in skills development and knowledge gen-
eration, and to poor funding of universities and technical and vocational training 
facilities by government (UNECA 1996).
ISI had a number of structural deficiencies (described in section 5) and by the 
mid-1970s, the strategy struggled as industrial production declined. A rapid fall 
in world copper prices led to a dramatic decline in Zambia’s economic fortunes, 
and ISI was abandoned altogether in 1991 with the change in government. 
Nevertheless, the period is generally described in the literature as the most suc-
cessful of Zambia’s attempts at LC growth and industrialization (AfDB 2017; 
Karmiloff 1989; UNDP 2016).
3.1.2 LC, market liberalization, and privatization, 1991–present
The new government refocused policy on macroeconomic stabilization and 
 economic liberalization as the main catalysts for reflating industrial growth. The 
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main aim of the measures was to remove any structural distortions and inefficiencies 
created by the ISI policy and improve competitiveness in the manufacturing sec-
tor. Restrictions on imports and exports were eliminated, tariffs decreased, and 
most foreign exchange controls removed. However, exports, rather than increasing, 
declined on the back of weak commodity prices and a depreciation in the 
exchange rate. The import-intensive heavy manufacturing industries that sup-
ported LC further weakened and, by 2000, total manufacturing value added had 
fallen to about 10 per cent of GDP from about 25 per cent in 1991. The unintended 
consequence of liberalization was a collapse of manufacturing (UNDP 2016).
This led to a shift in policy in 2001 towards export-oriented industrialization 
and improving beneficiation in the copper value chain. This policy has been 
accompanied by the introduction of Multi-Facility Economic Zones (MFEZ). 
These aim to support the emergence of clusters of firms that benefit from spatial 
proximity to grow various industrial processes, from primary to tertiary process-
ing. There are several MFEZs at present. The Chambishi MFEZ reportedly focuses 
mainly on the copper supply chain, and houses both heavy and light industries, 
including copper smelting; manufacture of copper wire and cables; household 
appliances such as stoves; motor parts; and agro-processing (UNDP 2016: 22). 
However these products probably require verification: an assessment done for 
this chapter suggests that the list might be exaggerated. The new Kafue Iron and 
Steel MFEZ is being designed around the Integrated Kafue Iron and Steel plant 
and is expected to focus on engineering, machinery, and equipment manufacture 
for economic sectors including mining, agriculture, manufacturing, construction, 
chemical, and infrastructure development.
3.1.3 Privatization stymied LC development and the manufacturing sector
Privatization of the mining industry from the early 2000s hastened the collapse of 
a struggling manufacturing sector. At the time, Zambia was in a very weak bar-
gaining position given its heavy indebtedness to the Bretton Woods institutions, 
and it inadvertently made over-generous concessions through the Development 
Agreements (DAs) signed with individual mining companies (Simpasa et al. 2013). 
These included imports of capital equipment free of customs and excise duty; 
capital write-off of any expenditure on imports of plant and machinery and a 
reduction in corporate tax through such imports; and carry-forward losses that 
limited tax payments until profitability was regained.
These provisions are commonly cited as a major source of tax leakages (Tordo 
et al. 2013). They provide cost-accounting opportunities to legally circumvent tax 
payments through aggressive capital recovery, and asset creation to redeem costs 
that might constitute normal business losses. Generally, cost- and production-
reporting continue to raise concerns in the industry (ICMM 2014); according to 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, ‘cost reporting requires increased consistency and 
transparency across the industry’ (PwC 2013: 42). Other than being a potential 
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source of tax leakages, these provisions have had the effect of rewarding mine 
owners for importing their inputs rather than sourcing goods from domestic 
manufacturers. The legal provisions do not oblige mine owners to purchase inputs 
locally and there are no preferences for Zambian suppliers. These factors have led 
to reversals in LC growth from the ISI era.
Despite the above weaknesses, forward linkages persist within the copper value 
chain. Copper is mostly exported in smelted and refined forms, representing a 
number of value-added stages beyond mining. Traditionally, downstream pro-
cessing of refined copper into rods and wire was exclusively undertaken by one 
company. However, with the large Chinese investment in the Chambishi MFEZ, 
forward linkages are reported to have deepened with expansion in exports of 
semi-fabricates (Morris et al. 2011; UNDP 2016). Available information is, however, 
patchy, suggesting the need for a more thorough survey to establish the current 
state of linkages.
3.2 Current LC initiatives
Current LC initiatives in Zambia include a collaborative public–private initiative, 
the Zambia Mining Local Content Initiative (ZMLCI), funded by the World 
Bank and the International Finance Corporation. This operates under the joint 
leadership of the Chamber of Mines (CoM) and the Zambia Association of 
Manufacturers (ZAM). It seeks to enhance local content and use of locally 
manufactured inputs in the Zambian mining industry. The (UK) Department for 
International Development-funded Private Enterprise Programme (PEP-Zambia) 
seeks to create sustainable business partnerships between Zambian SMEs and 
large corporations and offers business development services for small businesses. 
This programme also runs business plan competitions to promote endogenous 
entrepreneurship (AfDB 2017). These programmes are ongoing and it is probably 
premature to gauge their success.
Individual mining firms maintain their own LC initiatives in addition to pro-
viding employment estimated at 82,725 people in 2014 (GRZ 2017). While these 
numbers are large, they represent less than 2 per cent of the labour force for a 
sector that contributed 12.9 per cent to GDP in 2015 (UNDP 2016). This under-
scores the capital intensity of the industry. Non-employment-industry LC initia-
tives include running supplier development programmes, providing support to 
trades training institutes, and investing in infrastructure and community devel-
opment programmes. KCM, for example, has a Local Economic Development 
Strategy which includes a vendor development programme in which it has identi-
fied a range of products for possible local sourcing. The company also runs the 
Kitwe Trades Training Institute. Mopani provides training for SMEs through 
workshops and employs dedicated staff to help SMEs with tender procedures. 
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Mopani also provides support to the Kitwe Trades Training Institute. FQM has 
a  supplier development programme providing training in tendering and cost 
 estimations. It also provides financial and teaching support to the Solwezi Trade 
Training Institute. Due to the remoteness of its operations, FQM has also invested 
heavily in extensions to the electricity grid, construction of the airport at Solwezi, 
and road maintenance in North Western Province (AfDB 2017).
While industry itself views as considerable its contribution to LC growth and 
Zambia’s industrial development (ICMM 2014), various reports and field surveys 
suggest that stakeholders, including government, view these efforts as ad hoc and 
insufficient (AfDB 2017). There is widespread scepticism about the value of indus-
try supplier development programmes, with stakeholders suggesting regular 
audits of their effectiveness and sustainability, as well as their alignment to public 
policy on industrialization. Judged by the low value of local suppliers participating 
in the mining supply chain (see section 3.3), these sentiments appear justified.
3.3 LC, supply chains, and domestic supplier firms
Figures vary for the supply of goods and services to the Zambian mining indus-
try. A study prepared for the ZMLCI in 2012 estimated local sourcing at approxi-
mately US$2.5 billion per year, while later ZMLCI stakeholder consultations in 
2014 raised this estimate to about US$5 billion (Fessehaie et al. 2015). The ZMLCI 
study categorized expenditure into core mining services (drilling services, under-
ground development, instrumentation services, contract mining, etc.); core input 
goods (explosives, mill balls and rods, chemicals, plant spares, etc.), non-core  services 
(security, catering, customs handling, cleaning, transportation, etc.); and non-core 
goods (safety and office equipment, stationary, nuts and bolts, light fittings, etc.). 
That study, and others (ILO 2014; Morris et al. 2011), generally distinguish three 
types of suppliers of goods and services. Category 1 comprises international sup-
pliers, mainly subsidiaries of original equipment manufacturers (OEMs), large 
distributors, and representatives of GVCs that have a local presence. They have no 
manufacturing facilities and hence create little domestic value added. Category 2 
comprises international suppliers with no local presence, while Category 3 
consists mostly of indigenous traders, commonly referred to as ‘briefcase busi-
nessmen’ (Morris et al. 2011: 54), and a number of small manufacturing firms 
producing a range of mining inputs. The inputs include metallurgical plastics 
and rubber products, engineering products, and paints. This group also includes 
the domestic manufacture of packaged explosives and explosive accessories; 
timber for underground support systems; and agricultural lime and quicklime. 
Figure 19.2 summarizes the distribution of expenditure among the three categories 
of suppliers in the four expenditure classes, based on the lower amount of US$2.5 
billion per year.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 11/01/20, SPi
432 Local Content in Zambia—a Faltering Experience?
The figure indicates that foreign suppliers, with or without a presence in 
Zambia (i.e. Categories 1 and 2), dominate all classes of goods and services sup-
plied to the mines. Percentage-wise, they account for 98 per cent of core services, 
95 per cent of core goods, 87 per cent of non-core goods, and 95 per cent of all 
non-core services provided. Aggregately, Figure 19.3 shows that the foreign sup-
pliers account for 96 per cent of goods and services procured by the mines, while 
domestic manufacturers and traders share 4 per cent. The 4 per cent includes 
resident multinational manufacturing companies (e.g. in explosives, cement, drill 
steels), and resident haulage companies. Indigenous Zambian suppliers of goods 
and services are estimated at about 1 per cent and are mostly found in simple 


















Category 1 Category 2 Category 3
Figure 19.2 Market share of goods and services by supplier origin (US$ millions)







Figure 19.3 Estimated composition of Zambia’s mining procurement expenditure, 
2012 (US$ millions and %)
Source: Illustration based on ZMLCI data (Fessehaie et al. 2015: 53).
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The conclusion is hence manifest that the industry supplier development 
 programmes at firm level have not succeeded in upgrading Zambian indigenous 
suppliers to provide core goods and services.
Yet the small domestic input manufacturers hold the greatest potential for gen-
erating domestic MVA and growing LC. However, their capabilities are limited by 
a range of weaknesses. These include a lack of access to long-term capital; inabil-
ity to access engineering design expertise and production technologies; high costs 
of production inputs; and low-level facilities that lack full quality control of 
production.
The above weaknesses result in poor-quality goods that do not meet industry 
standards. Structured support is required to grow the capabilities of this group for 
a predetermined set of low-entry core goods and services. This could include 
margins of preference; incentives for imports of raw materials and equipment; 
technical mentorship; and access to technology and structured finance. Mentorships 
have proved particularly useful in South Africa and are part of global best prac-
tice (see Genesis Analytics 2014: 15–20).
4. The policy and legislative space for LC
Zambia’s long-term development context is guided by Vision 2030. Adopted in 
2006, the Vision foresees the country attaining the status of a ‘prosperous middle-
income nation by 2030’ (GRZ 2006). By that date, Zambia’s economy is envisaged 
to be well diversified with a strong industrial sector, a modern agricultural sector, 
and an efficient services sector. It is further envisaged to be technologically profi-
cient, fully able to adapt, innovate, and invest using its human and natural 
resources. From an LC viewpoint, the economy is envisioned to have strong cohe-
sive industrial linkages in the primary, secondary, and tertiary sectors, supported 
by sound and well-maintained socio-economic infrastructure (GRZ 2006). These 
attributes are a good basis for LC growth.
The Vision is broken down into a series of sectoral sub-visions and targets for 
development. Some of the key sectors that impact on LC development are shown 
in Table 19.1. Vision 2030 is implemented through five-year national development 
plans (NDPs). The current plan, the Seventh National Development Plan (7NDP), 
seeks greater responsiveness and alignment to Vision 2030 (GRZ 2017). It sees the 
sources of accelerated economic growth and industrialization as: a full ex ploit-
ation of Zambia’s comparative resource endowments; a strong export-oriented 
manufacturing and industrial base with solid backward and forward linkages; 
improved productivity through greater human capital development and techno-
logic al innovation; and graduating micro and small to medium-scale enterprises.
The Plan sees mining as a source of value-added intermediate inputs for 
manufacturing and other economic sectors, increased productivity, and export 
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competitiveness. It forms a good base for industrialization and LC growth. 
However, visions and development plans are actualized through policies and 
 legislative and other regulatory provisions. An excellent review of how well the 
policy and legislative environment supports industrialization and LC growth has 
recently been undertaken by the African Development Bank (AfDB 2017). The 
main findings of the review are that a number of sectoral policies are supportive 
Table 19.1 Visions and goals of certain economic and social sectors relevant to LC 
development
Sector Vision Targets/goal
Mining Private-sector-led mineral resource 
exploration and exploitation that 
contributes to sustainable socio-
economic development by 2030.
Increase in share of mineral 
output used in industrial 
production to 30 per cent 
by 2030.
Manufacturing Technology-based and export-
focused manufacturing sector that 
adds value to abundant natural 
resources by 2030.
Increase in share of general 
manufacturing contribution to 
GDP to 36 per cent by 2030;
increase in manufactures 
exports as a share of 
merchandise exports to  
71 per cent by 2030.
Infrastructure A well-developed and maintained 
socio-economic infrastructure by 
2030.
Develop and implement 
public–private partnerships;
achieve affordable and 
efficient connectivity.
Energy Universal access to clean, reliable, and 
affordable energy at the lowest total 
economic, financial, social, and 
environmental cost by 2030.





A nation in which science, 
technology, and innovation are the 
driving forces in national 
development, and which competes 
globally by 2030.
Build and sustain human 
resource capacities and 
capabilities by 2030;
strengthen linkages between 
productive sectors and 




Sustained full employment by 2030. Have an efficient and effective 




Innovative and productive lifelong 




responsive to social and 
economic needs;
increase university and skills 
training output by 2 per cent 
per annum.
Source: Author’s illustration based on AfDB (2017: 24).
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of Vision 2030. However, subordinate pieces of legislation are generally aligned 
neither to the Vision nor to the policies they claim to implement.
A good example of misalignment is that which exists between the 2013 Mineral 
Resources Development Policy and the 2015 Mines and Minerals Development 
Act, both under current implementation. The Policy emphasizes improved down-
stream processing to create export goods; forming linkages with other economic 
sectors; enhancing the acquisition of relevant skills; and raising levels of R&D and 
innovation. These principles are absent in the Act, which serves more as a licens-
ing than an industrialization tool. Metrics for increasing LC are inadequate, while 
the use of incentives, taxes, and tariffs—all common tools for deepening linkages 
in the mineral value chain—has been counterproductive to LC development, as 
earlier outlined.
Similarly, the Employment and Labour Market Policy seeks to develop ‘an effi-
cient and effective labour market in order to enhance productivity in the econ-
omy’ and to ‘resort to foreign labour only in those fields still lacking adequate 
qualified human resources’ (GRZ 2004: 6). The Policy further aims to create rele-
vant skills for the labour market, especially in generating value added. However, 
there are no triggers for these elements in the Employment Act, which contains 
no provisions preferencing the employment and training of nationals, or limiting 
the employment of expatriate staff (AfDB 2017).
The Industrial Policy, adopted by Cabinet in 2018, envisions ‘an industrialised 
and competitive nation with a diversified, innovative and globally competitive 
industrial base, which contributes to sustainable growth and employment 
 cre ation by 2027’ (GRZ 2018: 14). The Policy aims to address weaknesses of low 
prod uct iv ity; lack of export competitiveness; unclear incentive packages for LC 
growth; limited beneficiation; and restricted access to affordable long-term 
investment finance.
Two of the main pieces of legislation subordinate to the Industrial Policy are 
the Zambia Development Agency (ZDA) Act and the Citizens Economic 
Empowerment (CEE) Act. These Acts are aligned to Vision 2030 and are con-
sistent with LC growth and the 7NDP. The ZDA Act, for example, targets SME 
growth; increased R&D and innovation; and improved industrial productivity 
and export competitiveness. Similarly, the CEE Act requires all companies and 
state institutions to ensure the broad representation of qualified citizens in all 
occupational categories; and companies to prepare and implement employment 
equity plans with numerical targets. The Act empowers the Commission to deter-
mine thresholds to be prescribed for the participation of targeted citizens, citizen-
empowered companies, and citizen-influenced companies in tenders for the 
procurement of goods and services. Both the ZDA Act and the CEE Act are, how-
ever, poorly implemented on account of persistent budget deficits.
Kragelund (2017) refers to the influence of other policies and legislation as 
 contextual factors whose cohesion is necessary for successful LC initiatives. The 
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above examples and field survey findings (AfDB 2017) suggest fragmentation 
and incoherence across policies and acts in relation to industrialization and LC 
growth. These contextual factors need to be fixed for LC and industrialization 
to succeed.
5. LC and industrialization: the structural impediments
Earlier analysis shows that industrialization, the growth of LC, and structural 
transformation are principally determined by the quality of production linkages, 
whose drivers are:
 a. efficiency of factor allocation, and the productivity of firms participating in 
LC linkages
 b. investment and capital accumulation, especially in infrastructure
 c. quality of skills and endogenous entrepreneurship
 d. technological change, the rate of innovation, and spillover effects
 e. a supportive policy and institutional environment.
These elements provide context for the analysis of the structural impediments 
to LC development and industrialization that follows.
Morris et al. (2012) frame the story of industrialization in most sub-Saharan 
African (SSA) countries as dirigiste import-substitution policies (which initially 
built domestic industrial capabilities, albeit of low productivity and internationally 
uncompetitive), followed by structural adjustment policies (which generally eroded 
many of the industrial capabilities of the preceding era), and, more recently, the 
promise that SSA economies can emulate the export-oriented success of some 
East Asian economies (Morris et al. 2012: v). This certainly appears to be the case 
for Zambia.
5.1 ISI: a defective industrialization and LC agenda?
To recap, ISI aimed to develop manufacturing linkages for intermediate and con-
sumer goods and to grow exports. While the policy initially succeeded in creating 
a burgeoning manufacturing sector, there were structural distortions in the pro-
duction linkages that emerged. Firstly, there were inefficiencies in factor alloca-
tion. ISI was more successful in the consumer goods subsectors of food, beverages, 
textiles, and tobacco. These subsectors increased domestic backward linkages, as 
evidenced by the decline in the share of manufactured imports in total consump-
tion from 66 per cent in 1965 to 46 per cent in 1972 (Karmiloff 1989: 12). However, 
from the viewpoint of substituting for imported mining input goods, these 
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sub sectors were inconsequential. The subsectors of rubber products, chemicals, 
non-metallic minerals and metals, and machinery were of greater consequence to 
substituting imported mining input goods. These capital-intensive subsectors 
absorbed over 70 per cent of investment during 1964–74, and no less than 45 per 
cent of all new investment during 1975–85. Yet they had poor backward linkages 
into intermediate goods and a high import dependence. There was no investment 
made in the manufacture of domestic intermediate goods to offset the high 
import dependency.
ISI was also characterized by distortions in factor productivity. Driven by the 
large initial investments in chemicals, rubber, and plastics, assets per worker in 
these subsectors rose dramatically by about 75 per cent in the first decade. 
However, despite initial upward blips, total factor productivity (TFP)3 and MVA 
both declined dramatically over 1965–80. The largest decline occurred in base 
metals, reflecting the low capital productivity of the mining industry, starved of 
capital reinvestment. More generally, there were large deteriorations in output-to-
capital ratios in industrial chemicals and plastics, as firms directly dependent on 
the mining industry struggled to cope with shortages of the capital required to 
keep plants operational (Karmiloff 1989: 19).
The productivity distortions of ISI should be understood in the context of the 
economic challenges of the time. A global recession and a slump in copper prices 
in the 1970s sent the copper industry into a spiral of falling export revenues and 
diminishing production volumes. Zambia’s economic growth as a whole floun-
dered (UNDP 2016). Table 19.2 indicates that by 1985 GDP growth had declined 
to –0.3 per cent, largely due to ballooning consumption and to shrinking copper 
exports and gross domestic investment (Karmiloff 1989: 5). ISI growth in manu-
facturing hence took place in the context of stagnating aggregate output, crippled 
by low capacity utilization in the mining industry itself and in the import-intensive 
subsectors that supported it.
The manufacture of mining inputs requires a range of skills and technological 
capabilities (Morris et al.  2012). There was a lack of technological skills and 
ex pert ise especially in engineering subsectors including high-end foundry, fabri-
cation, and machining facilities (AfDB 2017). The absence of an iron and steel 
industry during the ISI era is cited as the single most constraining factor due to 
limitations in imports of various steels for the engineering subsector. The decline 
in TFP, in the face of expansion in capital assets, has been largely attributed to 
these weaknesses (AfDB 2017) and the difficulty in endogenous assimilation of 
technologies embodied in new capital equipment (Karmiloff 1989). Under these 
conditions, ISI led to a proliferation of poor and uncompetitive products, with 
exports of manufactures at less than 2 per cent of total exports per annum.
3 Combining capital and labour inputs.
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5.2 Post-1991 reforms: an elusive industrialization  
and LC agenda?
Market liberalization had the aim of improving factor allocation and productivity 
in order to stimulate the export competitiveness of the manufacturing sector. It 
also aimed to improve beneficiation in the copper value chain (UNDP 2016). ISI 
had similar objectives, hence these were not new goals. Table 19.3 shows growth 
in the real GDP and economic sectors over the period 1991–2015. GDP growth 
was high, particularly during 2006–10, on the back of significant FDI in the min-
ing sector. From 2005–14, FDI inflows averaged US$1.2 billion annually, facili-
tated by exceptionally high copper prices during the period. These inflows made 
investment funds in commodities liberally available and greatly increased copper 
output to about 800,000 tons in 2017.
FDI inflows have unfortunately been disproportionately concentrated in the 
mining sector, with the five largest mining companies accounting for nearly 100 
per cent of the inflows. This has crowded out investment in the manufacturing 
and agriculture sectors, perceived to be the main sources of diversification and 
industrialization (UNDP 2016). Table 19.3 shows that despite the post-2000 policy 
aim to build a strong manufacturing sector, the share of manufacturing in real 
GDP continually declined from an average of 25.3 per cent during 1991–95 to 
7.5 per cent during 2010–15.
Of consequence in Table 19.3 is the dramatic rise in the share of services, which 
accounted for more than 56 per cent of GDP over 2011–15. This represents the 
meteoric rise in the wholesale and retail trade, mostly among South African chain 
stores, as well as the high transportation costs of a highly import-dependent 
Table 19.2 Growth and structure of GDP, 1960–85






Sources of GDP 1970 1980 1985
Government consumption 16 26 23
Private consumption 39 55 62
Gross domestic investment 28 23 14
Exports less imports 17 −4 −3
Sectoral contribution    
Agriculture 11 14 15
Manufacturing 10 19 21
Mining, quarrying, public utilities 37 33 15
Wholesale and retail trade 10 12 13
Transport and communications 4 6 5
Other services including government 20 27 28
Source: Author’s illustration based on Karmiloff (1989: 5).
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 11/01/20, SPi
Lombe 439
economy. With the notable exception of the growth in services, there has been 
little structural diversification in Zambia’s capital formation.
The technological formation of manufacturing continues to be narrow. A 
review in 2010 revealed that resource-based manufactures (mainly in the food, 
beverages, and tobacco subsectors) and low-tech manufactures (fabricated metal 
products) accounted for 87 per cent of manufacturing GDP (GRZ 2014; UNDP 
2016). Only 13 per cent of total manufacturing output was medium- to high-tech 
manufactures, comprising mainly the chemical and machinery sub sectors. The 
observed ISI structural weaknesses in areas crucial to industrialization and LC 
growth have hence persisted. Labour productivity has reportedly been declining 
partly due to weak physical capital, lack of access to technologies of production, 
and low levels of productive skills (GRZ 2014: 63). The unavailability of skilled 
labour has been more acute in the areas of chemicals, rubber, plastic, electrical 
machinery and equipment, and repair and installation of machinery—all vital 
areas for industrialization.
Endogenous entrepreneurship, important for growing domestic capabilities, 
has also continued to be weak. The prima facie view demonstrated by Figure 19.1 
is that locally owned firms are more deeply embedded in the local economy and, 
crucially, are more committed to LC development than fleet-footed foreign-
owned firms. In their seminal work, Morris et al. (2012) explore the impact of 
ownership of lead-commodity firms and their suppliers on the direction and pace 
of domestic linkage development in natural-resource-exporting African countries, 
including Zambia. They demonstrate that ownership origins matter in jurisdictions 
Table 19.3 Real GDP and sectoral growth over the period 1991–2015
Average % growth 1991–95 1996–2000 2001–05 2006–10 2011–15
Real GDP −3.0 2.8 4.8 8.7 5.2
Sectoral growth
Agriculture 4.9 −2.4 −1.4 7.4 9.1
Industry (mining, manufacturing, 
construction, and utilities)
4.1 0.6 12.1 12.3 2.9
Manufacturing 1.0 2.3 5.7 3.8 6.7
Services (wholesale and retail 
trade, transport, other)
−2.4 7.0 5.8 9.3 7.2
Sectoral contribution, % of GDP
Agriculture 21.8 20.0 17.2 12.5 8.3
Industry 43.5 29.9 27.7 33.7 35.1
Manufacturing 25.3 12.5 10.9 9.3 7.5
Services 34.7 40.2 45.1 53.7 56.6
Source: Author’s illustration, based on data calculated from Africa Information Highway (2018).
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like Zambia where there is no local ownership in the lead-commodity firms and 
their suppliers. The Western owners, including South African mining firms, have 
typically adopted the ‘global-sourcing-follower-supply’ model of supply chain 
management. This requires first-tier suppliers to co-locate with the commodity 
producer. Hence, GVCs such as Caterpillar, Atlas Copco, and others have 
 followed the mining firms into Zambia but have very limited links with the 
domestic supply chains. This explains their complete dominance in the supply 
chains demonstrated earlier.
On the other hand, the ‘going-out policy’4 has shaped the behaviour of Chinese 
mining firms. Backed by the strategic intent to command access to resources, 
Chinese investment in mining in Zambia has grown rapidly from the original 
acquisition of Chambishi Copper Mine by the China Non-Ferrous Metals 
Company. This investment has now expanded into an industrial park, the Zambia 
China Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone, hosting about thirty-nine manu-
facturing enterprises that extend the Chinese mining value chain in Zambia. 
Chinese mining firms have focused less on outsourcing and have tended to 
in tern al ize supplies. The locally based suppliers are increasingly Chinese-owned, 
not just with respect to technology-intensive inputs but also in relation to the 
provision of relatively simple inputs which can characteristically be supplied by 
domestic suppliers (Morris et al. 2012).
These issues underline the importance of distinguishing between localization, 
which is deepening domestic value added, and indigenization, which is increas-
ing the share of national ownership in the linkages (Morris et al.  2012). While 
there has been some localization, albeit at a relatively minor level, there has been 
very little indigenous participation in LC development in Zambia in either the 
pre- or the post-privatization eras. Industrialization without growing endogenous 
entrepreneurship and domestic technological capabilities cannot be sustainable. 
There are no demonstrative precedents for this approach.
The policy and institutional environment for LC growth and natural-resources-
led industrialization has continued to be weak. Zambia did not have an industri-
alization policy until 2018, and an LC policy is under development, presumably 
with an LC Act to follow. This should improve policy cohesion and alignment to 
the industrialization goals of Vision 2030. Institutionally, industrialization and 
LC development fall under the Ministry of Trade Commerce and Industry. 
However, responsibility for industrialization activities spans several ministries, as 
seen earlier. Coordination has proved to be a challenge. Other institutional  factors 
that impede industrialization include the inadequate levels of quality infrastructure, 
particularly rail and energy (UNDP  2016), and the limited availability of long-
term finance, which constrains the growth of SMEs. Also, business pro ced ures 
remain cumbersome, while enterprises with market power commonly practice 
4 This provides China with access to natural resources through the provision of preferential loans 
for infrastructure and social development in exchange for natural resources companies.
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price discrimination. This applies, for example, to electricity, fuels, copper metal, 
cement, and water. Aggregately, these factors raise the costs of manufacturing 
inputs, thereby making production uncompetitive for domestic and export 
 markets (GRZ 2014).
6. Back to basics: mending the role of LC in industrialization
6.1 Improve the competitiveness and productivity  
of the manufacturing sector
Structural fault-lines in productive linkages have hobbled LC and industrializa-
tion. The subsectors of consequence to LC growth and industrialization continue 
to have high import dependence on account of poor backward linkages into 
intermediate goods. This, combined with poor skills and access to technological 
innovation, has been responsible for the poor capital and labour productivity 
 levels in subsectors relevant to LC, and those of manufacturing in general. To 
improve the competitiveness of manufacturing, and exports, Zambia needs to do 
several things:
6.1.1 Develop a domestic raw material base
This is necessary to provide intermediate goods to key subsectors of manufactur-
ing. Of importance is the new integrated iron and steel industrial cluster. This has 
been included in the 7NDP to stimulate industrialization and LC growth particu-
larly in the areas of chemicals, rubber, plastic, and machinery and equipment 
manufacture for the economic sectors, including mining, agriculture, manufac-
turing, construction, and infrastructure development.
It will be necessary to identify and develop target goods for which manufacturing 
capabilities either are available or can competitively be built up in a reasonable 
time. These are goods that present low-technology entry points and are already 
being, or have previously been, manufactured locally. Examples have been pro-
vided in the text. For these ‘low-hanging fruits’, it will be necessary to evaluate the 
domestic market potential, technologies of production, and sources; local raw 
material sources; and the business partnerships required for their manufacture.
6.1.2 Improve workforce skills
Labour productivity depends on workforce skills and capabilities. The chapter 
notes Zambia’s poor stock of skills across the key sectors critical to industrializa-
tion, particularly in various engineering fields. This is exacerbated by the weak 
participation of industry in education and training (E & T), and the detachment 
of company career paths from institutions of learning.
There will be a need, as part of incentives and legislative provisions, to explore 
how industry participation in E & T can be improved. The AfDB (2017) report 
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recommends that an industry skills survey be undertaken, which should serve as 
a basis for a workforce development model; a skills forecasting model; and inte-
grating industry competency-based schemes with E & T learning. Industrialization 
and structural transformation will also require the state to develop, as matter of 
urgency, a medium- to long-term human resource development plan to align sec-
ondary and tertiary education, and skills training to meet the strategic needs of 
industrialization.
6.1.3 Improve R&D and innovation
The depth of technological innovation determines capital productivity and the 
capability to produce exportable manufactures. R&D and a national system of 
innovation are the most important sources of technological upgrading. Zambia 
has to develop a national system of innovation to drive the pace and direction of 
technological innovation for manufacturing. Targeted policy interventions are 
required that adapt imported technologies through indigenous R&D and in nov-
ation. Industry participation in R&D and innovation will need to be scaled up 
through the use of appropriate incentives to reward companies investing in R&D 
or in areas that are key to industrialization and LC development.
6.2 Strengthen the policy and legislative base  
for LC growth and industrialization
While the planning and policy frameworks are supportive of developing pro duct-
ive linkages and of industrialization, the subordinate legislation generally is not. 
Weak alignment and poor implementational coordination are impediments to 
industrialization, structural transformation, and LC growth. Several actions will 
be required to reinforce the legislative provisions.
6.2.1 Strengthening mineral legislation
The 2015 Mines and Minerals Development Act is inadequate in its current form. 
There will be a need to deepen LC and industrialization provisions by:
 a. aligning the Act to its policy objectives and those of Vision 2030
 b. providing incentives that reward mining and other companies engaging in 
high-level skills-building and domestic R&D to develop products and pro-
cesses that extend the mineral value chain
 c. introducing targets preferencing the employment of nationals and their 
integration into company career paths, especially at higher technical and 
managerial levels
 d. providing targets preferencing local suppliers, supported by monitorable 
firm-level LC plans for supplier development.
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6.2.2 Rationalizing the use of incentives
The current incentives structure, inherited from the Development Agreements, 
rewards mining firms for importing goods rather than encouraging their domes-
tic manufacture. At the same time, there are no incentives, such as import tariffs, 
to protect nascent manufacturing industries for goods that can be manufactured 
locally. Nor are there any export tariffs on unbeneficiated mineral products to 
encourage local processing. The entire area of incentives needs to be evaluated to 
determine their impact on domestic manufacturing and industrialization; in nov-
ation, productivity, and export competitiveness; and mineral tax revenues. This 
should lead to improved targeting of incentives towards broad industrialization 
goals. Targeted incentives could also encourage some GVCs to relocate part of 
their production to Zambia.
6.2.3 Harmonizing legislation across sectors
Examples have been provided of incoherence in several pieces of sectoral legislation 
in respect of industrialization and LC objectives. There will be a need for a detailed 
review of the coherence of the legislative provisions across the different policies and 
acts, to harmonize their support for industrialization and LC growth. This probably 
requires the development of a stand-alone LC policy and act in order to accommo-
date key provisions relating to industrialization and LC development.
6.3 Build the capabilities of endogenous SME  
manufacturing firms and suppliers
The literature reviewed confirms the role of endogenous entrepreneurship in 
business start-ups and employment creation, as well as in providing innovative 
inputs into GVCs. In Zambia, a dearth of endogenous entrepreneurship has 
limit ed SME growth to the supply of simple non-core services to the mining 
industry. There is need for long-term programmes to remove the intractable lack 
of skills and technological accumulation among SMEs, coupled with improving 
their access to structured long-term finance. It would be useful to review how 
nationals can best be supported to acquire lower-end manufacturing technologies 
and expertise through mentorships and foreign partnership arrangements. 
Mentorships are particularly useful in graduating SMEs into providing core 
 mining input goods and services.
6.4 Strengthen the macroeconomic environment
LC development and industrialization require a stable macroeconomic environ-
ment, efficient infrastructure, and supportive institutions. Inflation and monetary 
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policy will need to aim at reducing the cost of capital through a stable financial 
sector that facilitates long-term project borrowing.
Road, rail, and energy infrastructure will need further improvements to 
 support industrialization efforts. Rail infrastructure continues to be in poor shape 
to support bulk movement of cargo. Zambia has been in an energy deficit, with 
frequent outages since 2009, and by 2020 demand is projected to be twice the 
current generation capacity. Zambia needs to double generation capacity by that 
date. Physical infrastructure for skills-building and R&D to support innovation 
are dysfunctional. Industrialized countries that succeeded in developing out of 
commodities had major programmes to support skills acquisition and R&D to 
assimilate and improve technologies. An improvement in national institutions 
will be required to enhance technological innovation in manufacturing firms 
rele vant to industrialization and LC growth.
On the soft infrastructure side, it will be necessary to widen the scope of the 
Zambia Bureau of Standards to accommodate standards for broader engineering 
goods. Government functions too will need to be reorganized to better support 
LC growth and industrialization. It may be necessary to create an apex ministry 
of industrialization to improve the coordination of LC development and industri-
alization efforts.
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Implications for Public Policy
John Page and Finn Tarp
1. Introduction
Although natural resources make diversification and structural change more 
challenging, public policy matters. Tradable goods production will expand or 
contract according to whether it is internationally competitive. This depends both 
on relative prices and on the policy and institutional changes and investments 
that governments make to enhance competitiveness. This chapter draws together 
some lessons for the design of policies to promote structural change in the grow-
ing number of African resource exporters. We begin by addressing the three key 
themes that guided our research—managing the boom, the construction sector, 
and linking industry to the resource.
We then propose some ideas for widening the options for structural change. 
These include policy and institutional reforms to deal with Dutch disease, 
expanding the concept of structural change from a focus on industrialization to 
‘industries without smokestacks’, and investing in knowledge. We argue that 
governments in resource-abundant economies can use institutional and policy 
reforms and public investments to mitigate the impact of Dutch disease. They 
can also broaden their options for diversification by promoting the growth of 
tradable services and agri-business, including horticulture. Creating and using 
know ledge—either specific to the resource or in areas where the economy may 
have localized competitive advantages—has been an important element in the 
diversification of several resource-rich economies, and African governments 
can learn from these successes. Finally, natural resources open new opportunities 
for spatial policies, such as resource-based Special Economic Zones (SEZs) and 
growth corridors that can catalyse resource-based infrastructure for national 
development.
2. Managing a modest boom
There is a common thread among the African resource exporters we have studied. 
In all these countries—except perhaps Mozambique—the impact of the resource 
on the economy will probably not be large enough to be transformative. None of 
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them is likely to become another Kuwait. At the same time, resource revenues could 
well be large enough to be potentially disruptive. Gas in Mozambique might bring 
a much larger windfall, though its timing and magnitude are uncertain. In short, 
most of the resource exporters we have studied face the challenge of managing a 
modest boom.
The fact that the revenue stream associated with the resource discovery may be 
more modest—and more volatile—than politicians and the public believe and 
that the extent of the resource may be limited raises important issues for public 
financial management. As Mark Henstridge reminds us in chapter 2, the produc-
tion of a mineral is actually a sequence of asset transformations. While the labels 
‘production’ and ‘revenue’ imply a flow of output or income, those transactions 
are mainly steps in the transformation of an asset from one form to another. 
Sustainable development depends on converting the rents from extracting 
resource assets into assets yielding other sources of income. One way to diversify 
income is by accumulating financial assets abroad. Prudent fiscal management, 
therefore, depends on identifying investments that have a high likelihood of 
yielding benefits to the domestic economy that exceed the opportunity cost of 
holding foreign assets.
In poorer economies, the needs of today’s poor should outweigh the needs of 
future—presumably richer—generations, and in principle, the returns to domestic 
investment should exceed those offered by foreign assets. The country studies, 
however, suggest that while using public expenditure to support current con-
sumption or new investment makes sense in principle, it is challenging in practice. 
In Ghana, Mozambique, and Zambia pressures to spend without the institutions 
governing public expenditure in place have proved difficult to resist. Managing 
even a modest boom puts substantial pressure on public financial management in 
three areas: managing expectations, controlling the volume of public expenditure, 
and improving the quality of public investment.
2.1 Managing expectations
Ghana, Mozambique, Uganda and Tanzania share a common problem: both le gis la-
tors and the public believed that the revenues from new resource discoveries 
would be larger and would come on stream sooner than they have done. In addition, 
despite a long history of copper revenue management, Zambia has ended up in 
debt distress, largely from relaxing fiscal discipline in the face of rising copper 
prices. Managing the expectations arising from any new resource discovery is 
essential to establishing the basis for prudent public financial management.
In Ghana, early oil revenue projections were bullish, and with the impending 
2008 national elections in sight, the incumbent government did little to manage 
public expectations with respect to the volume and timing of revenues. As a 
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result, the petroleum discovery gave a false impression that there was more fiscal 
space than existed. This fiscal buoyancy also made it difficult to develop a political 
consensus for critical improvements in institutions such as fiscal rules and the 
independence of the central bank. In Mozambique, the EMATUM bond issue of 
2013 had an obvious problem at the time of contracting the loan. The bond issue 
had a maturity date of 2020. Therefore, even if the very optimistic revenue projec-
tions had proven to be correct, the timing was clearly off. Full repayment of the 
loan had to happen before one dollar of gas revenues became available.
Despite projections that imply that production of gas is at least a decade away 
in Tanzania, expectations have been high, including in Mtwara—the onshore 
supply base for offshore exploration—where unrest resulted in several fatalities. 
Ironically, today the prospects of the energy companies reaching a final invest-
ment decision appear to be growing increasingly remote.1 Since Uganda reached 
the commercial threshold of oil in 2008, the government, civil society, and the 
public have speculated regarding the size of the oil boom to come, and some of 
these expectations have already resulted in infrastructure investments. To date, 
none of the previous projections of the onset of production proved realistic.
Two vulnerabilities appear to have led to fiscal exuberance in the five case-study 
countries. First, early projections of revenues tended to use optimistic estimates 
of price trends, and of the extent of the resource. Second, the resource extraction 
agreements between the multinational companies and the government were not 
publicly available. Lack of public disclosure of the agreements forced analysts to 
use the limited published information available—together with some relatively 
standard features of production-sharing agreements—to make rough estimates of 
the level of resource revenues and extraction costs.
To address the first problem, governments need to make the public (and their 
political representatives) aware of the great uncertainty attached to estimating 
commodity prices and the extent of commercially extractable resources. In the 
case of Tanzania, for example, Henstridge notes that the initial optimism sur-
rounding the extent of the undersea gas reserves has come up against the reality 
of declining natural gas prices, calling the commercial viability of liquefied nat-
ural gas (LNG) exports into question. There has been little public communication 
on the uncertainty surrounding when and how the projects may go ahead. This is 
an area where the international financial institutions could be helpful. Both the 
IMF and the World Bank have specialized staff dedicated to monitoring com-
modity price trends and making projections. In economies with new resource 
discoveries, governments should publicize these organizations’ price projections 
and estimates of price variability.
In the case of resource extraction agreements, disclosure on the part of govern-
ment and the extractive companies can reduce the uncertainty associated with 
1 See chapter 11.
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the timing and scale of revenues. Most resource-extraction contracts around the 
world are confidential. Yet, Cameroon, Colombia, Ecuador, Kazakhstan, Kurdistan, 
Liberia, Morocco, and Timor Leste have all published their production-sharing 
agreements. Among the countries in our case studies, Ghana stands out for the 
extent to which it has made the content of its production-sharing agreements 
available to the public. Public access to the production-sharing agreements may 
also strengthen the incentives for the extractive companies to make accurate 
information available regarding the extent of commercially viable reserves.
2.2 How much spending?
Pressures to increase public spending are an unavoidable companion to resource 
discoveries. This raises the question of how to assess how much spending is too 
much. Regardless of whether spending is in the form of consumption or public 
investment, there is an absorption constraint. Getting feedback from the econ-
omy when the public investment programme moves forward will show whether 
the limits of absorptive capacity become binding. The most direct signals are 
inflation and the exchange rate. Some appreciation of the exchange rate is in ev it-
able when spending out of resource revenue increases, but when inflation acceler-
ates and the exchange rate is appreciating beyond manageable limits, the pace of 
spending needs scaling back.
The country studies underscore this point. In Ghana, there has been an upward 
trend in inflation since 2012, reaching 17.5 per cent in 2016. Fiscal slippages and 
aggressive capital investments, along with some overvaluation contributed to 
widening current account deficits through 2013. Although the cedi depreciated by 
31 per cent against the dollar in 2014, IMF estimates suggest a real effective exchange 
rate overvaluation of around 8 per cent. In Mozambique, the inflation rate accel-
erated from 2 per cent in 2014–15 to an average of 17.3 per cent in 2016–17 and the 
exchange rate has appreciated in nominal terms by 24 per cent since October 
2016. In Zambia, inflation responded to the recent spending surge by accelerating 
from 7.4 per cent in 2013/14 to 14 per cent in 2015/16. Following a doubling of the 
Kwacha value of the US dollar in November 2015, the currency has appreciated by 
about 70 per cent. Clearly, public expenditure exceeded the absorptive capacity of 
those economies. Tanzania and Uganda in contrast, have kept inflation in check 
in the five per cent range and sustained relatively stable exchange rates.
2.3 Improving the quality of public spending
The quality of public spending should determine the quantity of public spending. 
The key decision rule for a resource-abundant economy should be never to 
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finance an investment project where the return broadly and carefully assessed is 
less than that obtained from holding foreign assets. Applying this rule, however, 
is more complex than it appears at first sight. While it is possible to estimate the 
returns to investments in discrete domestic investment projects with some preci-
sion, it is considerably more difficult to appraise the benefits of efforts aimed at 
improving the competitiveness of the economy as a whole. Nonetheless, problems 
with addressing externalities should not be an excuse for failure to evaluate the 
great majority of investment projects. Once the overall volume of spending con-
sistent with prudent public investment is set, governments should park any 
remaining revenue in investments overseas.
One of the critical failures of public expenditure management found in the 
country studies is the lack of effective systems to prioritize and select investment 
projects. Even Ghana, which attempted to introduce global best practices into the 
management of resource revenues, has had greater success in promoting trans-
parency in accounting for revenues than in identifying priorities for public 
expenditure. Similar, although more extreme, issues have affected project selec-
tion in Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia. In all cases, accurate estimates of the 
returns to the projects financed out of resource revenues are not available.
Addressing this problem requires improving the quality of project appraisal. 
A major contributor to Botswana’s success in translating diamond revenues into 
economic development was the requirement for appraisal of every public invest-
ment project. Chile, another resource-rich economy, followed similar rules. It is 
revealing that none of the countries among those we studied has systematic 
requirements for project appraisal. To improve project selection, governments 
need to build a cadre of economists with training in project appraisal and make 
them responsible for project preparation in each spending ministry. The finance 
or economics ministry—as the case may be—should have a prioritized list of pro-
jects meeting the agreed threshold rate of return. To succeed in changing the 
organizational culture, a prerequisite is that writing sound project appraisals 
become a required skill for officials to advance their careers, together with the 
capacity to identify and reject inadequate appraisals.
The country studies show that frequently public investments proceed without 
adequate provision in the budget for recurrent costs of maintenance. This is 
especially dangerous in the case of spending out of resource revenues. Lack of 
maintenance can seriously degrade project returns. Adam and Bevan (2014) show 
that the returns to operations and maintenance of existing, poorly maintained 
public infrastructure are higher, in terms of their contribution to growth, than 
building new infrastructure. Maintenance costs, themselves, also increase when 
routine maintenance is deferred (Burningham and Stankevich 2005).
Adopting a medium-term expenditure framework (MTEF) that incorporates 
multi-year maintenance plans can help make budget preparation more forward-
looking. However, forward planning is only effective where inputs from line 
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departments are sound. Proper budgeting for maintenance needs good data on the 
condition of infrastructure assets and the scope and cost of work to be completed. 
This requires greater communication between sector managers in line ministries 
and budget decision-makers. Governments should also ensure that user fees are 
adequate to cover routine maintenance, as well as the operation of the infrastruc-
ture and its replacement.
Where reforms to institutionalize maintenance expenditures are difficult to 
implement, governments should consider earmarking resource revenue for the 
management of assets. Botswana, for example, used a rule of thumb that 18 per 
cent of the capital cost of any public asset—whether a school, medical facility, 
road, or bridge—needed to be budgeted for recurrent costs of maintenance. 
When they checked later, planners found that the ratio required was a bit higher 
and cut back the investment programme.
The rapid accumulation of debt in several countries introduces another public 
expenditure option—paying down the debt. Van der Ploeg and Venables (2011) 
argue that when a country faces debt-elastic foreign interest rates, it may be desir-
able to use a portion of the resource windfall to repay foreign debt. The positive 
empirical relationship between the stock of foreign debt and the credit spread 
means that where governments face external credit constraints, reducing foreign 
debt can boost domestic investment and growth. However, debt reduction will 
not be optimal in all cases. There should be persuasive evidence that the economy 
is credit constrained.2 In any case, governments should avoid the temptation to 
relax prudent debt management practices in the face of pressure from domestic 
constituencies to front-load spending.
3. Construction and ‘investing to invest’
As the country studies demonstrate, high costs in the construction sector can act 
as a brake on the ability of the economy to transform investment effort into 
investment outcomes and limit the opportunities for the domestic firms to par-
ticipate in the construction phase of natural resource projects. Paul Collier has 
emphasized the need for policies to reduce the marginal cost of construction: he 
terms this ‘investing to invest’ (Collier 2011). Because the speed with which con-
struction can expand without driving up prices should determine the pace of 
public investment, the government needs a rapid flow of information from the 
construction sector to design the public investment programme.
2 When van der Ploeg, Stefanski, and Wills (2012) analysed the potential uses of petroleum revenue 
in Ghana using the same model, they concluded that the government should give priority to reducing 
the stock of foreign debt. Similar conclusions are likely to hold for Mozambique.
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This is not a trivial task—the history of public–private engagement in Africa 
has shown more failures than successes (Page and Tarp 2017)—but it is essential. 
Ghana, Uganda, and Zambia highlight the close links between macroeconomic 
management and price shocks to construction costs. The vicious circle of too 
much fiscal expenditure spurring rising construction costs in all three countries 
reinforces the argument that feedback from the construction sector is crucial for 
effective management of the public expenditure programme.
One reason why construction prices tend to rise in response to increases in 
demand is that construction requires organization, land, material inputs, skills, 
and finance. Each can potentially constrain the expansion of output. The case 
studies identify limited capabilities in domestic contracting firms, opaque or 
time-consuming regulations, lack of skilled labour, problems with the price and 
quality of material inputs and lack of access to finance as factors that increase 
costs and limit the supply response in the construction sector. Public policies can 
address many of these constraints.
3.1 Increasing the capabilities of local contractors
The great majority of firms engaged in construction in the country studies are 
micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs). Business training is one of the 
most common forms of support to MSMEs around the world. While training 
programmes have traditionally targeted services and manufacturing firms, gov-
ernments in economies with new resource discoveries may wish to focus first on 
the construction sector. Cheelo and Liebenthal, for example, conclude that there 
are potentially high pay-offs to establishing capacity-building programmes for 
construction firms in Zambia.3
Unfortunately, the results of most MSME training programmes have been 
 disappointing (McKenzie and Woodruff  2012). Few studies find any significant 
impacts of training on firm performance. Paradoxically, the impact assessments 
find that the firms that most benefit from training are those with superior prior 
performance. Rather than training an untargeted range of micro and small firms, 
the government might consider running a business plan competition in which 
winners receive a substantial prize and access to training (McKenzie 2015). If the 
construction sector appears to be non-competitive overall, as in Zambia, policy 
changes to promote greater competition are also essential.
An alternative to training would be to assist business organizations in the con-
struction sector to acquire good management practices and make them available 
to their members. In India, for example, the private sector almost wholly funds 
3 See chapter 18.
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the Confederation of Indian Industries, which provides services of this kind at 
fees that are within the reach of India’s smaller manufacturing companies. These 
types of initiatives have lower fiscal costs and make the private beneficiaries bear 
a greater cost share than training. They also face a market test; if they do not 
deliver value, firms will abandon them.
3.2 Relaxing supply constraints
As Kirchbirger notes in chapter 3, frequently, the public sector, itself, is re spon-
sible for policy-induced constraints to construction. Sometimes, as in the cases of 
Ghana, Tanzania, and Uganda, urban land rights are confused, and this can delay 
projects. Similarly, planning permissions might be slow. In Zambia, dealing with 
construction permits takes more than six months.4 In Tanzania there are about 
twenty-four steps to obtain construction permits, including obtaining a location 
plan, registration with regulatory boards, and inspection by local government 
authority officers. In total, these procedures may take up to 184 days.5
Institutional and policy reforms can prevent these stages from becoming 
constraints. The Ghana Housing Policy, launched in 2017, for example, aims to 
establish a land register to provide information on land ownership and to estab-
lish a programme of land ownership confirmation and guarantee arrangements. 
In Tanzania, the government has directed municipalities to ensure that the 
planning and construction committee makes decisions on issuing permits 
within one month. This has reduced the statutory time to process permits from 
ninety to thirty days, although realizing this reduction will require improving 
the per form ance of local government authorities.
In each of the countries studied, contractors and clients pointed to problems 
with the cost and quality of material inputs. Poorly designed policy restrictions 
on imports, poorly performing institutions such as customs, or the poor per form-
ance of the port may become a bottleneck that requires policy action. In Tanzania, 
for example, the Port of Dar es Salaam is the most acute problem. The main 
symptoms of the port’s inefficiency are long delays at anchorage and in the series 
of operations needed to remove merchandise from the port. McMillan et al. 
(2017) estimate the total cost of delays to be equivalent to a tariff of 22 per cent on 
every container of imports. A combination of economizing on their use and 
stimulating local production may be one way to relieve the constraints imposed 
by lack of non-tradable inputs, although as the cases of Ghana and Mozambique 
illustrate, stimulating local production of inputs requires developing the local 
construction value chain.
4 See chapter 18. 5 See chapter 12.
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Because such skilled trades as bricklayers, welders, electricians, and plumbers 
are complementary to unskilled labour and capital, it is not surprising that all the 
country studies identified skills constraints as a major impediment to the expan-
sion of construction. With planning, construction skills can be locally developed, 
and the government should allocate resources to training well before the con-
struction phase of a resource boom. A significant number of the skills needed by 
the resource sector are transferable. These include metal works, building, civil 
engineering and infrastructure, and mechanical and electrical work. Therefore, a 
programme of vocational training to a standard good enough to permit trainees 
to work on the construction phase of a natural resource project will generate a 
more elastic supply of people with the skills that can also relieve constraints fa cing 
the public investment programme. Immigration policies that facilitate the 
temporary location of service providers can also reduce the cost of importing 
skilled labour. For East Africa’s emerging resource exporters—Kenya, Tanzania, 
and Uganda—this could be done within the context of deeper regional integration 
in the East African Community (EAC).
When contracts are awarded on price only, local contractors are often unable 
to win bids due to lack of access to financing. Reforms to the financial sector may 
help to ease the constraints to smaller firms imposed by the inability to rent or 
lease equipment. Cheelo and Liebenthal, for example, suggest that in Zambia, the 
government explore options to mobilize affordable credit for the construction 
sector. Governments need to exercise care, however, in the design of targeted 
finance programmes. The assumption that breaking financing constraints will 
allow micro and small business owners to scale up their operations appears to be 
true only when business owners have the skill and resources to profit from the 
investment (Banerjee et al. 2010; Bauchet et al. 2011). For this reason, as Colonnelli 
and Ntungire suggest in chapter 15, improvements in leasing and factoring markets 
may offer greater pay-offs than credit interventions targeted at construction firms.
Some governments exacerbate the financing constraints faced by local firms by 
failing to make timely payments for work done. In Ghana and Uganda, for 
ex ample, delays in payment for government construction projects often limit the 
participation of local firms and lead to delays in project completion.6 In Ghana, a 
new administration may not finish projects started by an outgoing government, 
and funding delays are common.7 These payment issues tend to favour larger, for-
eign firms since they are more likely to have the financing needed to remain in 
business in the event of delayed payments. One solution to this problem would be 
to enact a Delayed Payment Law (DPL), like those found in the United Kingdom, 
Singapore, and Malaysia, making it mandatory for government to pay interest on 
all delayed construction payments.
6 See chapters 6 and 15. 7 See chapter 6.
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3.3 Dealing with corruption and collusion
Corruption and collusive behaviour are difficult areas to deal with. We have no 
more than an imperfect understanding of the mechanisms by which corruption 
flows through into higher costs. One obvious channel is ‘leakage’ of funds. 
Construction is the economic sector most dependent on public procurement. 
This, coupled with typically sizable average contracts, gives public officials and 
politicians opportunities to extract rent from the private sector. The use of in fer-
ior materials and failure to meet specifications are other likely mechanisms. These 
problems magnify when the government plays both the role of the client and that 
of the regulator.
A widely held view in Tanzania is that corruption during procurement and 
project execution is widespread. In Ghana, the large volume of funds earmarked 
for construction projects frequently obscures money included for bribery and 
kickbacks. In Uganda, only 37 per cent of audited procurement contracts were 
fully satisfactory in their allocation and execution. The same audit rated a signifi-
cant number (26 per cent) as ‘high risk’—subject to severe violations including 
fraud and corruption. However, only 22 per cent of construction firm owners in 
Uganda believe that court enforcement works well in corruption cases.8
Collusive behaviour raises costs. By one estimate, overcharges due to cartels in 
developing countries lead to about 40 per cent higher construction prices on 
average. Common problems faced by the construction industry in the countries 
we studied included non-disclosure of the beneficial owners of construction com-
panies bidding on contracts and rigging of tenders. In Zambia, in addition to oli-
gopolistic pricing in the sector, politically connected groups specialize in the 
illicit capture and sale on illegal secondary markets of public tenders.
Some suggested mechanisms for dealing with corruption include strengthen-
ing the role and integrity of the project engineer and checking the wealth of key 
procurement agency officials. Countries could also experiment with different 
incentive contracts for engineers to encourage reporting of corruption and fraud. 
Collusion is difficult to detect. Building up and publicizing databases of unit costs 
of comparable construction activities can assist governments in ensuring that 
they are not overpaying (World Bank 2011). Transparency, however, comes with a 
risk. The same data may facilitate collusion among firms.
4. Linking industry to the resource
Natural resources change the balance of power between governments and foreign 
firms. In countries that are not resource-abundant, governments are engaged in a 
8 See chapters 6, 12, 15.
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global beauty contest to attract FDI. In resource-rich countries, the foreign in vest-
ors are the contestants. This provides an opportunity for governments to broaden 
domestic industrial capabilities by integrating local companies into the supply 
chains of the multinational resource extraction firms (MNCs). In all the countries 
studied, governments have introduced local content and value addition initiatives 
along the natural resources value chain with the intention of diversifying by 
expanding the range of domestic firms participating in the resource sector.
John Sutton’s Enterprise Maps of Ghana, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia 
offer some insight into the state of current capabilities in the countries we studied.9 
Such industries as food and beverages, cement, and building materials are fairly 
highly developed in each country. Metal and mechanical industries, en gin eer ing 
and assembly, and plastics are not. The crucial difference between these types of 
industries is that food, cement, and building materials all serve the local market 
and are subject to substantial ‘natural protection’ due to weight, per ish abil ity, or 
bulk. They are also products sold to consumers directly. Metals, en gin eer ing and 
assembly, and plastics are different. While all four countries studied by Sutton have 
some activity in each industry, it is generally limited to the least demanding seg-
ments of the market in terms of both quality and productivity. That is because 
these are intermediate goods for which the international quality standards are high 
and the demand on African capabilities is too great (Sutton 2012).
Metals, engineering and assembly, and plastics are also the sectors in which 
supplier linkages to the natural resource value chain offer the greatest prospects 
for capability building. Two of the key mechanisms through which higher cap-
abil ities build up in firms are through demanding buyers and repeated relation-
ships. The first refers to exchanges of information between suppliers and buyers with 
a reputation for demanding high quality adding to the capabilities of supplying 
firms. The second is a close and continuing contractual relationship between 
buyer and supplier, which often involves a two-way movement of technical and 
engineering personnel. Demanding buyers and repeated relationships are charac-
teristic of the resource MNC value chain. This implies that the objective of the 
Africa Mining Vision of improving the capabilities of domestic firms by linking them 
to the natural resources value chain remains valid. The question is how to do so.
4.1 Local content
Progress in increasing local content and value addition varies. Most of the coun-
tries we studied have succeeded in introducing and enforcing requirements for 
the employment and gradual skills upgrading of nationals. Local procurement 
9 See for example Sutton and Landmead (2013), Sutton and Keptney (2012), or Sutton and Olomi 
(2012).
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regulations have met with less success for several reasons, including the scarcity 
of enterprises capable of satisfying industry standards in the procurement of 
goods and services. The country studies show that in general, local companies 
have concentrated at the lower end of the natural resources supply chain. Firms 
lack the engineering expertise, production knowledge, and quality controls to 
move up the chain.
Poor implementation of local content development policies is also a common 
problem. Often, there is need for greater collaboration between different stake-
holders and ministries, and in several countries, programmes aimed at the 
resources sector lack coherence with broader economic development policies. For 
example, the Vision 2030 and 2017 Seventh National Development Plan have 
guided Zambia’s long-term development. While some policies support Vision 
2030, Lombe argues that the underlying legislation lacks alignment to the Vision, 
particularly in mining and mineral resources. Ghana created the Petroleum 
Commission to improve the alignment of local content policies with broader 
development objectives, but there are concerns about its capacity.10
Dietsche and Esteves observe that in Mozambique, local content objectives are 
contained in a diverse range of policies, strategies, plans, laws, and regulations, 
aimed at achieving different impacts and targeting different beneficiaries. In 
Tanzania, many provisions for local content are unclear and not well enforced. 
Ellis and McMillan argue that while the National Economic Empowerment 
Council could provide increased coordination of local content initiatives, the 
continued authority of the Ministry of Energy and Minerals over the extractive 
industries may frustrate its efforts. In Uganda, Sen points out there is a lack of 
clarity regarding what constitutes a ‘local’ good or service, making it difficult for 
firms to comply with the regulatory environment.11
4.2 A public–private partnership
Integrating local firms into the resource value chain depends on addressing the 
priorities and concerns of both the MNCs and the government. Politicians and 
public officials often have inflated expectations, and the MNCs that dominate 
resource extraction can be sceptical that any local firm has the capabilities to 
enter their value chain. Dietsche and Esteves argue that because international 
investors in mining, oil, and gas have limited experience in Mozambique, co ord-
in ated action by the public sector, the local private sector and the international 
investors is essential to bridge the gap between current standards and the stand-
ards demanded by the multinational companies. Ackah notes that in Ghana, 
10 See chapters 7 and 19. 11 See chapters 10, 13, 16.
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MNCs have had difficulty in identifying and assessing the suitability of Ghanaian 
suppliers, most of which have relatively short track-records and lack reputation. 
Local SMEs also face an information gap regarding tendering opportunities. 
Lombe suggests that in Zambia, it would be useful to undertake an evaluation of 
lower-end technologies for inputs into mining and develop mechanisms to sup-
port local firms to acquire these technologies.12
Integrating domestic firms into the resource value chain is a more complex 
undertaking than legislating or regulating local content. It depends on the ability 
of government and industry to develop an effective public–private partnership. 
Most major resource extraction multinationals devote considerable resources to 
the management of local content development. In Uganda, anecdotal evidence 
from industry interviews and national supplier information workshops indicates 
that international companies are committed to finding ways to increase participa-
tion by local firms, including unbundling supply contracts and innovation in 
project design. However, the international oil companies and their lead contrac-
tors are also very clear about their high expectations from suppliers.13
On the public-sector side, well-designed institutions to negotiate and manage 
local participation are critical to success. Page advocates in chapter 4 creating a 
unit—located within the office of the head of state or government—to act as the 
broker between the multinational companies and domestic firms. Because the 
agency must have support at the highest political level during negotiations, he 
argues that the president or prime minister should take the lead. In addition, 
staff of the unit must understand both the requirements of the procurement 
divisions of the multinational companies and the range of capabilities of domestic 
firms to propose realistic targets for suppliers. Some staff should have industry 
experience, while others need a public-sector background to facilitate coordination 
across government agencies.
While several of the countries we analysed have created institutions to guide 
their local content initiatives, they have not been wholly effective. One of the con-
cerns raised about the competence of the Ghana Petroleum Commission, for 
instance, is that it is relatively new and the exposure of Ghanaian technical staff to 
the oil and gas industry is limited. In Mozambique, the Institute for the Promotion 
of Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (IPEME) has encountered similar prob-
lems because it lacks the knowledge and experience required to guide supplier 
development in the specialist areas of expertise demanded by the extractive 
industries. The Petroleum Authority of Uganda has compiled a National Suppliers 
Database to regulate the procurement of goods and services in the petroleum sec-
tor. Yet, the database does not convey any information on supplier capabilities.
12 See chapters 7, 10, 19. 13 See chapter 16.
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It is striking that none of the local content initiatives in the countries we studied, 
are subject to review and oversight. Programmes designed to promote selected 
activities—such as local content—should incorporate periodic reviews and be 
evaluated against observable outcomes, for example, the rate of growth of jobs. If 
they are failing to meet expectations, corrective actions should be undertaken. 
Interventions should also be subject to sunset clauses. Requiring that a pro-
gramme expire unless a review recommends extension would place the burden 
on advocates to show why it remains relevant (Page and Tarp 2017).
4.3 Training
Training can raise the capabilities of local firms to the minimum level needed to 
allow them to enter the MNC value chains. To succeed, however, the government 
and the resource extraction companies must agree on the design of training, and 
on the qualification process through which a firm achieves approved vendor status. 
Supplying training without buy-in by both parties is unlikely to lead to success. 
Ghana is a case in point. Its Enterprise Development Centre (EDC) began in May 
2013 as a five-year project jointly sponsored by the Jubilee Partners and the gov-
ernment. The EDC provides support to small and medium enterprises attempting 
to enter the oil and gas sector, through a range of services such as business train-
ing, capacity building, advisory services, and access to market information. It also 
acts as a focal point for coordination between SMEs and the oil and gas companies, 
their contractors and subcontractors. In August 2016, lack of funds led to the 
suspension of the activities of the EDC. At that time, only about twenty-two of 
the 400 SMEs registered with the Ghana Petroleum Commission had gained con-
tracts after receiving training. Clearly, there was a breakdown in communications 
between the private- and public-sector partners in the enterprise.14 Mozambique’s 
experience with the IPEME has been broadly similar to that of Ghana.
In Tanzania, there is a lack of clarity surrounding plans for capacity development. 
Although the 2017 Petroleum Regulations provide fiscal incentives to encourage 
gas companies to develop local supplier training programmes, there has been no 
analysis of Tanzanian firms’ capacity to engage in the natural gas sector. In Zambia, 
a collaborative public–private initiative, the Zambia Mining Local Content 
Initiative—under the joint leadership of the Chamber of Mines and the Zambia 
Association of Manufacturers—is attempting to increase the use of locally manu-
factured inputs in the mining industry. Past initiatives failed to achieve sustainable 
impact, largely because of the failure to address the minimum procurement 
standards of the mining companies.15
14 See chapter 7. 15 See chapters 13 and 19.
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5. Widening the options
New discoveries of natural resources also offer opportunities. In addition to local 
content and value addition initiatives, governments can draw on several other 
options for diversification. This section explores three. The first is to deploy 
institutional and policy reforms and public investments to mitigate the impact of 
Dutch disease. The second involves broadening the options for diversification to 
include ‘industries without smokestacks’, such as IT-enabled services, tourism, 
agro-industry, and horticulture. Investments in knowledge—either specific to 
the resource or in areas where the economy has location-specific comparative 
advantage—can expand the opportunities for structural change. The third option 
exploits the close links between natural resources and the spatial economy. 
Developing resource-based SEZs and growth corridors can leverage the invest-
ments made by resource extraction firms for broader national development.
5.1 Dealing with Dutch disease
Although the relative price changes that occur in a resource-abundant economy 
make diversification more difficult, governments can enhance the productivity 
of private investments outside the natural resource sector through institutional 
and regulatory reforms and public investments. Well-designed regulatory 
reforms, reliable electrical power, lower costs of transport, and workers better 
able to perform their jobs make countries more competitive by raising the 
potential productivity of all firms. In short, governments can attempt to deal 
with Dutch disease by improving the ‘investment climate’.16
Regulatory reforms are an attractive place to begin. They have low fiscal costs 
and the potential to increase absorptive capacity. Surveys of firms in resource-
abundant countries highlight a wide range of areas in which regulatory or admin-
istrative burdens raise costs and reduce competitiveness. In Mozambique, for 
example, business regulations—and the opportunities for corruption engendered 
by the regulatory regime—increase firms’ costs and reduce competitiveness 
(World Bank 2009).17 In Uganda, senior managers of manufacturing firms spend 
on average more than thirteen days a year dealing with government officials, and 
40 per cent of the manufacturing firms surveyed complained that regulations 
were not interpreted consistently (Henstridge and Page 2012). In Tanzania, tour 
operators and other tourism service providers face a plethora of regulations 
16 There is by now a large literature on the investment climate in Africa. See, for example, the Africa 
Competitiveness Report of the AfDB, World Economic Forum, and the World Bank (2017).
17 See also the 2017 survey of Mozambican manufacturing firms by Berkel et al. (2018).
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and taxes (Ellis et al. 2016). Tour operators pay a minimum of twenty-nine taxes, 
levies, and fees, mostly to the central government. Hotel operators face fifty-five 
taxes, licenses, fees, and levies. Over 80 per cent of respondents reported that 
most regulatory procedures lacked transparency.
Reforms that encourage the entry and exit of firms can have a positive impact 
on productivity as well. The formal manufacturing sector in Africa enjoys highly 
concentrated product markets. In small open economies imports ought to pro-
vide contestability—and Africa’s economies have become much more open to 
imports over the past twenty years—yet World Bank Enterprise Surveys often find 
that firms do not feel pressed by competition. About a quarter of large firms in 
Tanzania, for example, responded to the World Bank Enterprise Survey that there 
were no new competitors in the markets in which they operated (Yoshino et al. 
2013). Changes to rules that make markets more open and contestable can reduce 
concentration and the likelihood of anticompetitive practices.
The revenues that flow from natural resources open fiscal space for governments 
of resource-abundant economies to address two of the fundamental constraints 
to competitiveness in Africa, lack of infrastructure and skills. The literature exten-
sively documents the productivity penalty that African firms pay because of poor 
infrastructure.18 The quality of electricity service ranks as a major problem 
according to more than half of the firms in more than half of the African countries 
in the World Bank’s Investment Climate Assessments. Transport ranks a close 
second. Global value chains in activities from manufacturing to horticulture are 
highly demanding of trade logistics; and resource-rich African countries rank 
poorly in the World Bank Trade Logistics Index (World Bank  2016). For these 
economies, investments in trade-related infrastructure are essential for the success 
of efforts to diversify exports.
Despite significant gains in average levels of schooling, lack of production-
related skills remains a major constraint to African firms. A survey of country 
experts from forty-five countries for the African Economic Outlook 2013 found 
that over half of respondents cited lack of skills as a major obstacle keeping 
African firms from becoming competitive (AEO 2013). Educational quality is a 
problem at all levels. Learning assessments in Africa show that most primary stu-
dents lack basic proficiency in reading at the end of second or third grade. 
Employer surveys report that African tertiary graduates are weak in problem 
solving, business understanding, computer use, and communication skills (World 
Bank 2007). In an environment in which donor funding is becoming increasingly 
restricted, governments can use resource revenues to close the skills gap through 
improving educational quality and increasing access to post primary and voca-
tional/technical education.
18 See for example Escribano, Guasch, and Pena (2010).
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Investing to invest and linking industry to the resource are complementary to 
improving the investment climate. Investing resource revenues to expand infra-
structure and education require—to some extent—the transformation of public 
expenditures into physical assets. Thus, construction will largely determine the 
success of public actions designed to boost competitiveness. In addition, construc-
tion plays an important role in mitigating a critical symptom of Dutch disease. 
A natural resource boom often leads to a real estate boom. The appreciation of the 
real exchange rate raises the returns to non-tradable activity, as well as to non-
traded capital, mainly structures. If the construction sector is weak, the supply of 
structures is inelastic, which implies that the real estate boom will be reflected in 
rising prices rather than in new construction.
By increasing firm capabilities, well-designed programmes to integrate domestic 
firms into the resource value chain can increase the overall productivity of 
domestic manufacturing. Natural resources MNCs are demanding buyers and 
often engage in repeated relationships with their suppliers. Both contribute to 
the development of firm capabilities in linked domestic firms. As the number of 
higher capability firms expands, the potential for productivity spillovers increases.
5.2 Broadening the horizon: industries without  
smokestacks and investing in knowledge
Our understanding of industry is changing. Today, new technologies have spawned 
a growing number of services and agri-businesses—including horticulture—
that share characteristics in common with manufacturing. They are trad able, 
have high value added per worker and can absorb large numbers of moderately 
skilled workers. Like manufacturing, ‘industries without smokestacks’ benefit 
from technological change, productivity growth, scale, and agglomeration 
economies.19 Where these industries have characteristics traditionally attributed 
to manufacturing—strong linkages, productivity growth, and innovation—they 
can act as an engine of structural change.20 In fact, tradable services—such as 
ICT-enabled services and transport, and logistics—have become leading sectors 
in several countries (Lavopa and Szirmai 2014).
Because industries without smokestacks share firm characteristics with ‘smoke-
stack’ industries, investment climate reforms apply equally to manufacturing, 
tradable services, agro-industry, and horticulture. In chapter  4, Page proposes 
that to spur structural change an ‘export push’ complements investment climate 
reforms. By using trade policies, public investments, regulatory reforms, and 
institutional change governments can support new exporters and diversify the 
19 See Ghani and Kharas (2010) and Newfarmer, Page, and Tarp (2018).
20 See, for example, Ghani and O’Connell (2014), Szirmai and Verspagen (2015) and Tregenna (2015).
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export basket. Institutional reforms and investments to improve trade logistics are 
key elements of the export push. Another critical component is prudent macro-
eco nom ic management of the resource windfall. While some appreciation of the 
real exchange rate is unavoidable, government must manage public ex pend itures 
to reduce excessive upward pressure.
In addition to investing in general skills, resource exporters can attempt to 
build specialist knowledge linked to the extractive industries themselves. The 
South African mining supplier industry has developed globally competitive cap-
abil ities based on serving the domestic mining industry. South Africa is a world 
leader in a wide range of mining equipment products and its mining companies 
have in-depth knowledge of turnkey deep-level mine design and operation. The 
Norwegian government invested in building specialist knowledge about deep-sea 
oil exploration through its universities. Now, Norway’s knowledge-based oil ser-
vice industry is a major source of exports. A first initiative in building specialized 
knowledge might be to strengthen the geology and engineering departments of 
national or regional universities with the intention of developing more tech nic-
al ly qualified staff and in the longer run, a services export industry.
Chile’s successful transformation into a leading global producer of salmon and 
wine suggests that African resource exporters can use knowledge to diversify into 
industries without smokestacks. Because agro-industry, tourism, and tradable 
services often benefit from location-specific comparative advantage—for ex ample, 
climate or languages—they may prove less vulnerable to real exchange rate 
appreciation than task-based manufactured exports. Success in establishing or 
expanding them, however, depends to a large degree on the knowledge of potential 
markets and production held by firms. Governments can develop three-way part-
nerships with the private sector, universities, and specialist research institutions 
to support the acquisition and dissemination of knowledge.
5.3 Spatial industrial policy
Natural resources, and the foreign investors and infrastructure they often bring, 
open new areas for spatial industrial policies. While most first-generation SEZs in 
Africa have focused on manufacturing, they are relevant to resource-based indus-
tries as well. By supporting specialist supply networks, the zones can reduce over-
heads, shorten delivery times, and increase innovation. In Zambia, the Chambishi 
Multi-Facility Economic Zone (MFEZ) focuses mainly on the copper supply 
chain, including copper smelting, manufacture of copper wire and cables, and the 
manufacture of mining equipment. The new Kafue Iron and Steel MFEZ around 
the Integrated Kafue Iron and Steel plant will focus on engineering, machinery 
and equipment manufacturing. The Shama EPZ in Ghana targets the petroleum 
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 11/01/20, SPi
Page and Tarp 467
and petrochemical sector. It contains tank farms logistics and haulage contractors 
and firms manufacturing chemical inputs and accessories for the petroleum 
industry.
The challenges surrounding the development of resource-based SEZs are like 
those facing other SEZs. Infrastructure, institutions, and attitudes matter 
(Newman and Page 2017). Unless infrastructure and institutions are world class, it 
may prove impossible to draw firms into the zone. SEZ managers with business 
experience and a business outlook are critical to success. Because knowledge 
spillovers allow supplier firms to improve their production processes or products, 
resource-based SEZs are complementary to policies designed to build the cap-
abil ities of local firms through greater integration into the resource value chain. 
For this reason, the design of the institutions intended to foster value-chain rela-
tionships is critical to the success of the SEZ.
Minerals exports generally require large infrastructure investments such as 
roads, railways, power, and ports. Regional SEZs—often called ‘growth corridors’—
can play a catalytic role in attracting investors to new locations around this infra-
structure. Growth corridors are attractive for three reasons. First, they can help to 
solve coordination problems between investments in related projects, increasing 
the prospect of rapid private-sector response to infrastructure improvements. 
Second, it is possible that in resource-centered zones the bulk of capital spending 
on infrastructure for both transport and power can be financed by the resource 
projects, themselves. Finally, they highlight the possible complementarities 
between investment projects in the area.
Recent experience with growth corridors has been both positive and negative. 
The partnership between South Africa and Mozambique in the Maputo 
Development Corridor is widely regarded as a success. Based on that experience, 
Mozambique is developing integrated minerals transport and logistics systems in 
the Beira, Nacala, and Zambezi Valley Development Corridors. The corridors rely 
on commitments by government and the private sector to collaborate in infra-
structure investment. By way of contrast, Tanzania joined Rwanda in 2005, to 
develop a Central Development Corridor (CDC) containing Tanzania’s cluster of 
gold mines and connecting the Dar es Salaam port with the Great Lakes region. 
An objective of the initiative was to grow the agro-industrial, manufacturing, 
tourism, mining, and service sectors in the corridor. However, progress has been 
slow due to lack of funding and poor institutional capacity.
Both cases suggest that governments should approach growth corridors with 
some caution. While narrow cost–benefit analyses often miss the role of infra-
structure in triggering private investment, it is possible to exaggerate its catalytic 
effect and policymakers frequently have a tendency to do so. Governments need 
to take care to assess the costs and benefits of proposed spatial initiatives real is tic-
al ly and integrate them into broader national development plans.
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6. Conclusions
There is a common thread among the five African resource exporters we have 
studied. In these countries—except perhaps in Mozambique—the impact of the 
resource most probably will not be large enough to be transformative. However, it 
could well be large enough to be disruptive. This puts substantial pressure on the 
need to improve public financial management in three areas: managing ex pect-
ations, controlling the volume of public expenditure, and improving the quality of 
public investment. In all the country cases, public expectations of the size and 
timing of the resource boom were overly optimistic. Efforts to make information 
on the extent of commercial reserves, trends and variability of prices, and the 
terms of resource extraction agreements widely available can help to manage 
future expectations.
Three of the five countries succumbed to spending pressures—financed by the 
accumulation of debt—before resource revenues started to flow. All three now 
face significant debt management issues. Setting the boundaries on the volume of 
public spending and adjusting them using feedback from the economy are essen-
tial elements of prudent resource revenue management. Because the quality of 
public expenditure should ultimately govern the quantity, governments need to 
adopt better methods of project selection—including broad-based use of economic 
and social cost–benefit analysis—and develop budget institutions to ensure that 
new investments are adequately maintained.
The construction sector can act as a brake on the ability of the economy to 
transform investment effort into investment outcomes. Our country studies 
found that limited capabilities in domestic contracting firms, opaque or time-
consuming regulations, problems with the price and quality of material inputs, 
lack of technical and skilled labour, and limited access to finance are factors that 
increase costs and constrain supply response. These are all areas in which public 
action can make a difference. The great majority of firms engaged in construction 
in Africa are micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs). While training is 
one of the most common forms of support to MSMEs, we need new approaches 
to identify the types of construction firms that can most benefit from training. 
Frequently, the public sector is responsible for policy-induced constraints; it 
should address these through reforms.
Because they control access to the resource, governments can attempt to 
build firm capabilities in the larger economy by integrating local suppliers into 
the resource value chain. The country studies suggest that success largely 
depends on the ability of government and industry to develop an effective 
 public–private partnership. Well-designed public institutions to negotiate and 
manage local participation are critical to success. Training programmes can 
indeed raise the cap abil ities of local firms to the minimum level needed to allow 
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them to enter MNC value chains. At the same time, country experience cautions 
that these programmes must be well designed and attuned to the needs of the 
industry.
Although discoveries of natural resources make structural change more chal-
lenging, they also offer new opportunities. Policy reforms and public investments 
can mitigate the consequences of Dutch disease by improving the ‘investment 
climate’. Institutional and regulatory reforms and investments in infrastructure 
and skills can boost the productivity of firms outside of the resource sector. 
‘Industries without smokestacks’ and investments in knowledge, linked either to 
the resource itself or to industries with country-specific sources of comparative 
advantage, widen the options for diversification. Resource-based SEZs and 
growth corridors have the potential to leverage the investments made by resource 
extraction firms for broader development. At the same time, proper planning and 
effective policy design require realistically assessing their potential impact in the 
context of broader national development goals.
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